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This thesis critically explores the concept of the Public Works Programme (PWP) and interrogates 
the social protection performance of public works programmes (PWPs) in the context of chronic 
poverty, with a particular focus on the fundamental questions of programme incidence and impact. 
It reviews PWPs from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, using original qualitative and 
quantitative data drawn from a range of sources, including extensive field analysis and evaluations of 
PWPs in four countries in sub-Saharan Africa, interviews with the major multilaterals implementing 
PWPs and original survey work, designed, implemented and analysed by the author in South Africa 
to address the empirical issues arising from the current literature regarding PWP incidence and 
impact, as well as a literature review of over 200 PWPs implemented in east and southern Africa, 
detailed case studies of six international PWPs, and a review of both the social protection and public 
works literature.  
The prevailing view among donors and government agencies with responsibility for social 
protection, is that PWPs are preferable to alternative social protection instruments in terms of the 
working age unemployed poor living in chronic poverty. This thesis explores the function and 
limitations of PWP in this context, and outlines major programme choice and design issues, drawing 
lessons from the international context, and challenging the assumptions underlying these policy 
preferences, thus opening the way for more informed and appropriate policy selection.  
This thesis first identifies a number of conceptual problems in the current public works discourse, 
arguing that these arise primarily from the adoption of the generic term ‘public works’ to describe a 
highly heterogeneous policy instrument with a wide array of different forms and objectives, which 
encompass both social protection and also labour market objectives, in some cases resulting in 
conceptual and design tensions and contradictions. The thesis attempts to offer a response to the 
conceptual confusion in the literature by proposing a typology of PWPs, and a schema which 
explicitly recognises the diversity of PWP objectives, and the implications for programme design. In 
this way, the thesis aims to provide the tools for a more rigorous and robust international debate.  
Having highlighted the conceptual difficulties associated with PWPs, the thesis then explores the 
questions of PWP incidence and impact, which are central to any assessment of PWP performance, 
but which have been neglected in the international literature, particularly with reference to sub-
Saharan Africa.  These questions are critically important, given that PWPs are frequently selected 
over alternative forms of social protection in the absence of an evidence base to illustrate their 
efficacy, often on the basis of unsubstantiated assumptions about their impact and social protection 
function. This thesis attempts to explore these issues of incidence and impact empirically, on the 
basis of a survey carried out on two case study PWPs in South Africa, linking programme 
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1  INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines the role of the Public Works Programme (PWP1) as a social protection 
instrument in the context of chronic poverty. Public works programmes are popular instruments for 
the delivery of social protection in situations of chronic, as well as acute poverty, and are widely 
implemented throughout Asia, Latin America and Africa, often with funding from the major 
international donor agencies2. PWPs are perceived to present a ‘win-win’ policy option; providing 
employment while also creating assets, and in this way offering a welfare transfer which is also a 
tangible economic investment, rendering them an attractive option for policy makers and donors.  
However, the available evidence suggests that the assumptions underlying the selection of PWPs in 
preference to alternative instruments may be based on problematic conceptualisations of the term 
PWP, and unrealistic expectations about the potential social protection impact of such programmes, 
particularly when implemented in the context of chronic poverty. In the light of this, a fundamental 
question emerges, about which the current literature is largely silent: are PWPs an appropriate policy 
instrument to deliver social protection in the context of chronic poverty?  
This thesis reviews this question from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, using original 
qualitative and quantitative survey data, together with a range of primary and secondary sources. The 
thesis draws on a body of original work by the author, including a review of over 200 PWPs 
implemented in east and southern Africa, detailed analysis of international case studies3, extensive 
original field research and evaluation of PWPs in sub-Saharan Africa4, a series of interviews with 
representatives of major multilaterals implementing PWPs5, an extensive literature review, and an 
original survey of PWP participants designed, implemented and analysed by the author in South 
Africa explicitly to explore the key empirical questions arising from the literature relating to 
programme impact and incidence. The thesis focuses primarily, although not exclusively, on an 
analysis of the social protection function of PWPs offering short-term employment in the context of 
                                                            
1The acronym ‘PWP’ will be used in this thesis as a singular noun. Where public works programmes are being 
referred to in the plural the form ‘PWPs’ will be adopted. 
2 The World Bank, the ILO and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) are among major funders 
of PWP globally. 
3 PWPs in India, Argentina, Ireland, Ethiopia, Indonesia and the USA. 
4 South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Ethiopia 
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chronic poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, and draws on detailed case studies from Malawi and South 
Africa.  
The question of the social protection function of PWPs in the context of chronic poverty and 
unemployment has been neglected in the international literature, but remains critically important, as 
it is not evident that the selection of PWPs over alternative forms of social protection leads to an 
optimal outcome for the poor in such contexts. Much of the current development discourse, as 
articulated by donors and many government agencies with an interest in social protection provision, 
identifies PWP responses to the problem of the working age poor unemployed and underemployed6 
living in chronic poverty, as preferential to cash transfer alternatives. However, the absence of an 
evidence base inhibits the potential for informed policy selection. This thesis explores the function 
and limitations of PWPs in this context, focusing particularly on programme incidence and impact, 
and outlines major programme design issues, drawing lessons from the international experience.  
In addition, the thesis addresses problems in the current discourse which arise from the adoption of 
the generic term ‘public works’ to describe a highly heterogeneous policy instrument with a wide 
array of different forms, by proposing a typology of PWPs, and a linked schema of PWP objectives 
to provide the tools for a more rigorous international debate.  
1.1 Core Definitions 
Before proceeding further it is necessary to define the key terms used in this discussion: social 
protection, social security, social assistance, social insurance, chronic poverty and structural 
unemployment. 
 
Social protection is a somewhat contested term (see Devereux (2007)), but for the purposes of this 
study may usefully be defined as: 
‘... public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk, and deprivation which are 
deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society.’ (Conway, de Haan and 
Norton, 2000:5) 
                                                            
6 For the remainder of this paper, the term unemployed will be used to cover both these categories, for the sake of 
brevity. This shorthand reflects the fact that the division between these two categories is not necessarily absolute in 
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Social security is a subcomponent of social protection, which comprises a ‘state-run method of income 
protection’, (Evans, 1998:258). Social security typically takes the form of a cash transfer but can also 
include state employment through some form of PWP. Social security programmes are 
conventionally divided into social insurance and social assistance (Conway et al., op cit::5-6). Social 
insurance is contingent on prior contributions, while social assistance is non-contributory. In this 
thesis, in terms of their social protection function, PWPs are considered to be a form of social 
assistance, i.e. a non-contributory form of social security.7 Whereas the grants that form the bulk of 
social assistance interventions are primarily unconditional,8 PWPs require that work is performed in 
exchange for the social assistance transfer. While this thesis examines PWPs primarily in relation to 
the provision of social protection, it is important to recognise that PWPs are in some instances adopted 
as instruments of active labour market policy (ALMP), rather than social protection (Gottschalk, 
1997), and sometimes as an instrument which can deliver simultaneously on both employment and 
social protection objectives. The tensions inherent in these differing objectives is explored in detail 
in chapters two, three and four, and is central to the conceptual confusion at the heart of the current 
public works discourse. 
PWPs are defined in this thesis as all activities which entail the payment of a wage (in-kind or cash) 
by the state, an agent acting on behalf of the state, or NGOs, FBOs and other providers not 
associated with the state, in return for the provision of labour, in order to i) enhance employment 
and ii) produce an asset (either physical or social), with the overall objective of promoting social 
protection. Following Hulme, Moore and Shepherd (2001), chronic poverty is defined as a situation in 
which a significant proportion of the population remain in poverty between one period and the next, 
due to their inability to accumulate the productive assets required to exit poverty. The term structural 
unemployment is used to describe a situation in which a high level of involuntary unemployment 
persists over a prolonged period, and is primarily the consequence of shifts in the structure of the 
economy rather than an exogenous shock.9 
                                                            
7 It is important to note however that some argue that the work requirement itself constitutes a form of in-kind, rather 
than monetary, contribution, (Devereux 2008, pers comm), and as such PWP have characteristics of both social 
insurance and social assistance. 
8 Grants with a social conditionality, such as participation in health care or education , are however increasingly 
popular, particularly in Latin America, (for the merits of such conditionality see Ozanira da Silva e Silva (2006)).  
9 The term structural unemployment has been used to describe different scenarios in the literature. In this thesis the 
term structural unemployment is adopted as a short hand for unemployment which persists over a prolonged period 
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1.2 Origins of the Research Problem 
This thesis builds on the body of research conducted by the author, starting with a cost-effectiveness 
analysis of PWPs in South Africa (McCord, 2002), which led rapidly to the identification of key data 
problems in terms of lack of information on incidence and impact. If the existing literature is 
examined, it becomes clear that any policy conclusions based on either the cost of programme 
implementation or any imputed social protection benefit accruing from PWP performance are highly 
problematic and compromised by severe data and conceptual constraints.  
Awareness of the simultaneous absence of an adequate empirical evidence base for PWP 
performance, and the implementation of large numbers of PWPs across sub-Saharan Africa, whose 
effectiveness was in serious question, and for whom the likelihood of meeting ambitious goals set 
out in programme rhetoric was extremely low, led the author to explore and, where possible, shed 
light on some of the questions ignored in the mainstream policy debate, and to attempt to offer 
some contributions to developing a more rigorous and systematic analysis of PWPs and their social  
protection function.  
On the basis of formal programme evaluation work10 the author increasingly came to suspect that 
many PWPs might be costly, inefficient and ineffective in terms of their social protection impact, 
particularly in the sub-Saharan African context where data on programme impact, incidence or cost 
are almost uniformly unavailable. This situation has an added urgency given the lack of voice of 
PWP beneficiaries, for whom PWPs have been repeatedly selected in preference to alternative policy 
options which may be more effective in terms of the provision of social protection in the context of 
chronic poverty and structural unemployment. 
From these concerns a critical question emerges regarding the efficacy of the social protection 
function of PWPs in the context of chronic poverty. It is this question which this thesis attempts to 
address by exploring a series of related issues. Foremost among these issues is the concern that PWP 
performance is critically linked to the specific labour market context, and that a generic form of 
PWP offering short-term employment, which typifies PWPs in sub-Saharan Africa, may represent a 
                                                            
the economy rather than the business cycle or an exogenous shock. In this form of unemployment, the number of 
unemployed exceeds the number of job vacancies, so that if even all open jobs were filled, some workers would 
remain unemployed.  
10 The author participated in independent reviews of five donor funded PWP with social protection objectives in 
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mismatch of form and function. Such programmes may not reduce poverty or improve livelihoods 
in the medium to long term, and the benefits accruing may be only temporary, rendering PWPs not 
developmental instruments, as often anticipated, but rather instruments offering only a transitory 
respite by providing a temporary reduction in the depth of poverty.  The implication of this concern, 
which finds echoes of support in the findings of a small number of other researchers, is that PWPs 
may not, as has frequently been anticipated, result in effective and low-cost targeting of resources to 
the poorest, or confer sustained social protection benefits, and are not necessarily a cost effective 
means of delivering support to this group. The question of incidence is also raised, and when the 
lack of data on this issue is taken into account, it becomes clear that PWP popularity is largely based 
on a set of assumptions and beliefs, and possibly also ideologically informed preferences, rather than 
any form of evidence base. These are the major concerns and insights emerging from programme 
experience which led the author to attempt this exploration of the anatomy of the social protection 
function of public works programmes.  
In the light of these research concerns, this thesis focuses on the question of state and donor 
interventions to promote social protection through PWPs. PWPs are a key component of the current 
social protection framework in many sub-Saharan African countries, inasmuch as these countries 
have an explicit social protection strategy, often constituting the only form of social security for the 
able-bodied working age poor.  PWPs are centrally placed in the conceptualisation of social policy 
and are ascribed considerable potential in terms of addressing the core challenges of both 
unemployment and poverty. Despite this policy prominence, both PWP incidence and their 
microeconomic and labour market impacts have not been studied systematically, and almost no 
research has examined these questions in relation to PWPs implemented in sub-Saharan Africa, 
rendering evidence-based policy development in this area problematic.  
1.3 Literature Review and Research Questions 
The major areas of contemporary research into PWPs have been related to their cost-effectiveness in 
terms of cost per unit of wage transferred to participants. Ravallion and Subbarao have carried out 
seminal work examining the cost-effectiveness of the PWP as a transfer instrument (see, for 
example, Ravallion (1998); Subbarao et al. (1997)). This work examines the efficiency of PWPs as a 
mechanism to deliver social protection from a primarily economic perspective. However, the 
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‘An exhaustive literature search revealed a surprising dearth of detailed and credible evidence 
on the impacts of employment creation across the world.’ (Devereux and Solomon, 2006:37) 
This problem is particularly acute in terms of the impact of the short-term PWPs most frequently 
implemented in sub-Saharan Africa, with most of the limited research carried out to date focusing on 
PWPs in Asia or South America. In addition, the extant literature does not attempt to analyse in 
detail the way in which PWP participation confers social protection benefits, tending to focus 
primarily on the monetary value of the wage. The literature is also limited on the question of PWP 
incidence, i.e. which segments of the population participate in PWPs. This constitutes a major 
omission if the social protection performance of PWPs is to be assessed. The implication of these 
omissions is that attempts at either cost effectiveness or impact analysis are severely compromised by 
a lack of empirical evidence, rendering any form of evidence-based policy choice highly problematic, 
with regard to the selection of PWP or alternative social protection instruments. The two concerns, 
incidence and impact, are discussed below, in relation to the international literature.  
A number of critical additional issues also emerge from the existing literature: the lack of conceptual 
clarity or consistency regarding the term PWP, the empirical challenges to the assumed self-targeting 
of PWPs which lies at the heart of the PWP concept and the significant gulf between programme 
expectations and outcomes.  These issues are summarised below, and reviewed in detail in the body 
of the thesis. 
Incidence 
There is very little evidence outside South and Eastern Asia on PWP incidence and therefore the 
distribution of PWP benefits. The research available is primarily focused on the Indian Jawahar 
Rojgar Yojna (JRY) (see for example Ghosh and Guha-Khasnobis (2006)) and Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) (for example Gaiha (2000, 2005)), and the Indonesian 
Padat Karya (PK) (Suryahadi et al., 1999), with no similar systematic analysis of PWP incidence being 
documented in sub-Saharan Africa. This research lacuna is critical, yet not identified in the literature 
as problematic. In the absence of such evidence, it is widely assumed that PWPs spontaneously result 
in the allocation of resources to the poor.  Hence the selection of PWPs over alternative instruments 
is frequently predicated on the assumption that the poorest will self-select into PWPs on the basis of 
the limited wage, which renders PWP employment unattractive to the non-poor.  
However, the limited empirical evidence available challenges this assumption, suggesting that 
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and Madala, 2006). This implies that it cannot be assumed that PWPs effectively channel resources 
to the poorest on the basis of self-selection, and highlights the need for empirical incidence analysis 
to establish an evidence base on which segment(s) of the population actually participate in PWPs in 
each context. The implementation of a social protection instrument in the absence of information on 
incidence is highly problematic. Unless the characteristics of the group benefiting from the transfer 
are known, it is not possible to assess the extent to which social protection objectives are being met, 
yet this lack of targeting information is typical in PWPs implemented throughout sub-Saharan Africa. 
Current examples are the national Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in South Africa, and 
the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) PWP, neither of which systematically gathers baseline data 
on the socio-economic characteristics of their participants, despite both programmes being 
nominally intended to support the poorest among the working age unemployed.11 
Impact  
PWP impact can be assessed in terms of both the immediate social protection impact during the 
period of participation, and the intermediate or sustained impact after programme participation has 
been completed. The discussion of both dimensions of impact in the literature is reviewed below. 
Within the social protection discourse (among donors, implementing agencies, programme designers, 
civil servants and politicians), there is a dominant assumption that the implementation of PWPs will 
confer significant short-term and frequently also medium to long term social protection benefits. 
irrespective of their duration or other design features. Even the academic literature is relatively scarce 
in terms of a critical engagement with the theoretical basis for expecting PWPs to have a significant 
social protection impact. There are only a limited number of academics working in this area 
generically, most notably Subbarao and Ravallion (see, for example, Subbarao (1997, 2001, 2003); 
Subbarao et al. (1997); Ravallion (1998) and Ravallion et al. (1991, 1995)). There are only a small 
number of others working on either area or country-specific analysis outside Asia, notably Devereux 
in southern and eastern Africa (see for example Devereux (2000) and Devereux and Solomon 
(2006)), Adato and Haddad in South Africa (see Adato et al. (1999, 2001)); Sharp in Ethiopia (Sharp 
et al., 2006); and Chirwa and Mvula in Malawi (Chirwa et al., 2004a, 2004b; Chirwa and Mvula, 2004; 
Chirwa, 2007). There is a larger body of research on PWPs in India, most notably the works of Datt, 
                                                            
11 While baseline data on participants are not gathered in either programme, it should be noted that recent work by 
Lembani and Mandala (2006) has attempted to make an initial assessment of the relative effectiveness of PWP self 
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Dev, Dreze, Gaiha and Ravallion, and this country has produced a particularly rich seam of research 
related to the long-running MEGS, which was initiated in 1965, the Jawahar Rojgar Yojna (JRY) and 
the recently launched National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP). The work 
examining the JRY and MEGS tends to be of greater methodological sophistication than work on 
other PWPs, largely due to the 30-year history of the scheme, which has facilitated the possibility of 
gathering longitudinal data, and has offered a rich source of material for analysis.  
Throughout this literature, however, the focus is on an assessment of the short-term social 
protection impact during the period of participation in the programme, and much of this work tends 
to make use of simplifying assumptions which do not give adequate recognition of critical factors 
inherent to PWPs, rather than other forms of social protection. Of greatest significance among these 
factors are: the extremely limited attention given to income forgone when calculating the net income 
benefit from programme participation (with the notable exceptions of Lipton, (see for example 
Lipton, Yaqub and Darbellay (1998)), and Jalan and Ravallion (2003), as discussed in Van de Walle 
(1998); omission of consideration of non-remunerated activities forgone (domestic work, child care; 
completion of subsistence farming responsibilities, etc.) and their impact on short- and medium-term 
livelihoods; the significant but generally invisible issue of the cost of accessing PWP employment, in 
terms of a range of rents associated with controlling access to PWP employment (Pellisery, 2008); 
and the disturbing finding illustrated most recently in research from Bangladesh that the physical 
labour requirements of a PWP may entail a trade off between household welfare benefits and 
individual PWP worker costs, with malnutrition increasing significantly among PWP workers while 
overall household nutritional status improved (Helen Keller International, 2007).  
These factors indicate that the nature of PWPs presents a series of analytical challenges in terms of 
social protection impact, over and above those commonly considered in the social protection 
discourse. It is interesting to note that all but the first of these issues is excluded from discussion in 
the otherwise excellent social protection evaluation chapter on PWP evaluation in the World Bank’s 
social protection toolkit (Ravallion, 2003). 
However, with the notable exceptions of Ravallion and Subbarao, the PWP literature has been 
characterised by the paucity of attempts to evaluate even actual short-term benefits resulting from 
PWP participation, with the primary research focus being the cost of the resources expended 
through a PWP, in terms of allocations to wage and assets, or the number of days of employment 
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failing to address the core question of impact. The monitoring and evaluation system of the South 
African Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) provides an example of the input oriented 
monitoring-and-evaluation style which is typical of PWP monitoring and analysis throughout the 
continent (Karuri et al., 2007). 
Besides the inadequacies of much of the analysis of current impact of PWP participation outlined 
above, the second major omission in the literature is the question of the medium to long-term social 
protection impact of PWP implementation.  This question is not so urgent in the case of PWPs 
designed to address a short-term crisis, offering a single episode of basic consumption smoothing 
over a limited period of labour market disruption, or ongoing or repeated periods of social assistance 
as required, although it is also of interest in these instances, if there is an interest in assessing the 
longer term significance of such interventions. However, where the labour market or livelihoods 
problem is chronic, or repeated, and the nature of the PWP selected to provide social protection in 
this context is a single, often brief episode of PWP employment, the question of the social 
protection impact of this episode of employment becomes critical if an assessment is to be made of 
the appropriateness (in terms of impact and cost) of such an intervention. This situation is typical in 
sub-Saharan African PWPs (South Africa, Malawi, etc), in which a short episode of PWP 
employment is offered in the context of a cyclical or chronic labour market or livelihoods crisis, with 
the intention of achieving a sustained social protection benefit. It is this situation in particular which 
this research attempts to interrogate critically. 
There are only a very limited number of references to the research gap relating to the medium to 
long term impact of PWPs in the literature. One such example is offered by Ravallion who 
recognises the need to consider a programme’s impact after the period of disbursement:  
‘The study period is rarely much longer than the period of the program’s [PWP’s] 
disbursements. However, a share of the impact on people’s living standards may occur beyond 
the life of the project. This does not necessarily mean that credible evaluations will need to track 
welfare impacts over much longer periods than is typically the case – raising concerns about 
feasibility. But it does suggest that evaluations need to look carefully at impacts on partial 
intermediate indicators of longer-term impacts [...] even when good measures of the welfare 
objective are available within the project cycle.’ (2003:10) (emphasis added) 
Ravallion suggests using a proxy indicator such as savings accrued from the PWP wage income as an 
‘intermediate indicator’ for possible future welfare gains beyond project duration; an approach 
adopted in Chen and Ravallion (2003). The adequacy of such an indicator is questionable for a 
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other than the wage. However, the fact that Ravallion recognises the need to consider future impact 
of the programme is almost unique in the literature, and such analysis is scarce, largely due to the 
conventional evaluation timeframe outlined by Ravallion above. This represents a critical insight, 
namely that evaluation tends to be restricted to the duration of programme implementation and 
disbursement, or at best the period directly thereafter, and so excludes an assessment of performance 
against any intermediate or longer term objectives ascribed to the programme. This is a significant 
omission in terms of the current attempt to assess the social protection impact of short-term PWPs 
in the context of chronic poverty, as the ability to assess impact ‘beyond the life of the project’ is 
critical if a meaningful analysis of social protection interventions intended to proffer sustained 
benefits is to be made.  
Given the large number of PWPs offering short-term episodes of employment currently being 
implemented as ‘social protection’ interventions in contexts of chronic unemployment with 
objectives relating to sustained reductions of poverty, an exploration of this issue is long overdue. 
Examples of such programmes include the MASAF PWP in Malawi (UK DFID, 2002), the 
Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF) PWP (World Bank, n.d.), and the EPWP in South Africa 
(Karuri et al., 2007). 
Lack of Conceptual Clarity of the Term PWP  
The term PWP is used widely in the literature as though the term had a commonly accepted 
meaning. However, this undifferentiated use of the term is problematic, as it results in a range of 
different programmes which share the common PWP work requirement and in many (although not 
all)  instances, social protection objective, but are otherwise disparate in form, design and 
implementation modalities, being described by a single nomenclature.  In some cases PWP are 
considered to be instruments of active labour market policy rather than social protection per se, 
representing a further variant of the PWP concept, wherein the generation of additional aggregate 
employment, (conferring indirect social protection benefits), rather than the provision of direct 
social protection benefits to a specific target group through the wage transfer, is the primary 
objective (Gottschalk,1997). Despite the multiple and diverse forms PWPs may take, this complexity 
is not recognised in the literature, which instead elides different concepts and programme 
interventions under a single generic nomenclature, at the expense of analytical and conceptual clarity, 
often resulting in problematic programme design choices and programme expectations (McCord, 
2004a) . This lack of clarity in the PWP literature contributes to a lack of informed and critical 
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distinguish different kinds of programmes, and the fact that specific and distinct design 
characteristics are required to achieve the anticipated social protection outcomes in different 
contexts. The unproblematised adoption of the generic term PWP has resulted in the widespread 
implementation of PWPs in which the form selected is not appropriate for the particular labour 
market or socio-economic context, or indeed the desired social protection outcomes, with the result 
that programmes repeatedly fail to meet the policy expectations.  
A related issue resulting from the lack of conceptual rigour regarding the form and function of 
PWPs is the empirically unsubstantiated discussion of PWP as substitutes for cash transfers in much 
current policy debate. The literature is silent on this problematic assumption of the two 
interventions’ substitutability. 
 Does Self-targeting Work?  
An additional major area of contestation emerging in the literature is the question of whether the 
work requirement and low wage lead to ‘self-targeting’ on the basis of ‘less eligibility’, in the sense 
that only the poorest would choose to participate in PWP where there is a physical labour 
component and low wages (see discussion in Meth (2003)), as anticipated in the conventional PWP 
discourse. The mainstream PWP literature tends to assume and reiterate the desirability of the ‘less 
eligibility’ criterion for participation in PWP, in the sense that it offers a low cost way of targeting the 
poor (see, for example, Subbarao (1997)), rather than requiring external control and screening, with 
the associated costs:  
‘Maintaining the program wage at the level no higher than the ruling market wage for 
unskilled labour can enable the poor to self-select themselves into the program.’ (Subbarao, 
1997:5) 
Subbarao goes on to argue that an additional benefit associated with a relatively low wage rate is that 
it is most likely to prevent rationing of access (ibid). If a programme is implemented on such a scale 
that employment is available to all the eligible poor who seek it, then such an approach does have 
the potential to prevent rationing of access. However, such situations of programme scale exceeding 
or matching programme demand are extremely rare, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that demand 
outstrips employment availability in almost all cases, although typically, data are not systematically 
gathered on this critical question. It is also commonly argued that such an approach reduces the risks 
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However, this literature has in recent years been questioned from two main perspectives, most 
notably by Barrett and Clay (2003). The first is whether the limited wage does result in participation 
of the intended beneficiaries, and the second is whether the payment of a low wage to facilitate 
targeting might cause a tension with the social protection objectives of the intervention (see for 
example Devereux (2002)). Subbarao himself concedes this latter point, but does not pursue it in 
terms of the social protection implications (Subbarao, 1997:2). Recent ex-ante analysis based around 
the NREGP in India also argues that drawing on prior experience with the MEGS, major inclusion 
errors are likely if the self-targeting approach is adopted in India, resulting in a significant cost 
premium, compared with alternative cash transfer options, if PWPs are the social protection 
instrument selected to address poverty (Murgai and Ravallion, 2005). 
Anticipated PWP Outcomes 
There is, within the practitioners’ discourse around PWP, a prevalent and much repeated assumption 
that PWPs, particularly labour-based infrastructure creation, represent a way of killing two birds with 
one stone; addressing both the infrastructure and the poverty deficit simultaneously, by creating 
infrastructure, while at the same time providing employment which offers a route out of poverty 
(Tessem, 2007). 
This assumption is summarised in the following statement at the 12th Regional ILO Seminar on 
Labour Intensive Practices, which represents the ILO position on the relationship between PWP and 
social protection, and asserts that the adoption of labour-based methods will result in significant 
employment (and by implication poverty reducing) benefits: 
‘In Africa, as in many other developing countries, the twin challenges of employment and 
infrastructure have been recognised as the most pressing if the national and regional 
development goals set by ourselves and those we have agreed to collectively, i.e. Millennium 
Development Goals, are to be met. Employment-intensive investment approaches present 
an opportunity through which the two challenges can be addressed simultaneously.’ (Amri-
Makhetha, 2007) 
From the existing literature, there is little evidence to support the contention that PWPs have the 
potential to provide employment and poverty reduction on the scale anticipated in such statements, 
which nevertheless are largely unchallenged within the social protection discourse. It is not evident 
from the available evidence base that significant12 amounts of additional employment are likely to be 
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created through most current PWPs, or that the nature of employment offered (in terms of wage 
rate and duration) is adequate to have a significant impact on anything other than short-term poverty 
reduction, particularly in the context of chronic or repeated un- or underemployment.  
This is indicative of a mismatch between the social protection and poverty reducing impacts which 
are frequently ascribed to PWPs, and the outcomes which both the theoretical and empirical analysis 
suggest are likely to result from PWP implementation. The key problems here are the poor empirical 
evidence base on which to draw, and the lack of critical theoretical engagement around the question 
of PWPs in relation to social protection. It is this critical gap which this thesis attempts to highlight, 
and take steps towards addressing. 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
Exploring these neglected questions, and attempting to develop a more systematic and critical 
analytical approach to the potential of PWPs in terms of social protection delivery is the central 
challenge of this thesis. The thesis comprises twelve chapters which interrogate the questions and 
debates discussed above, and attempt to set out a framework for a more robust and critical 
engagement with public works in the international discourse. 
This first chapter sets out the rationale for the thesis and outlines the key research questions which 
the thesis addresses, offering a brief overview of current literature and highlighting the core 
questions of PWP incidence and impact, with particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa. The critical 
problem of the lack of consistent PWP terminology and associated lack of rigour in the discourse is 
raised, particularly in the context of the social protection function of PWPs, together with the 
implications of this conceptual confusion in terms of lack of clarity regarding realistic and 
appropriate programme objectives. 
As a contribution to improving the rigour or the debate two tools are presented in the second 
chapter. The first is a typology of PWPs, intended to differentiate between a range of different forms 
of PWP. The second is a schema of PWP objectives which attempts to identify the different 
objectives which are adopted in PWPs internationally in various combinations. The argument made 
is that the current conceptual confusion and adoption of generic terminology results in an 
inadequately robust link between the type of PWP selected and anticipated programme outcomes. 
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The critical importance of adopting an appropriate PWP for the particular labour market or social 
protection context is highlighted, and the risks of adopting a generic form of PWP which has not 
been purposively selected for its relevance and potential to the specific labour market context are set 
out, noting the limited social protection potential of PWPs offering short-term employment in the 
context of chronic poverty and elevated unemployment. 
Having established the mismatch between PWP form and function in many instances, the 
relationship between PWPs and social protection is discussed in detail in chapter three, drawing on 
the typology and objectives schema set out in the previous chapter, and the potential vectors 
through which PWPs might deliver social protection benefits is explored. On the basis of a scrutiny 
of the literature, policy statements and empirical evidence, three vectors are identified through which 
social protection benefits may potentially accrue to programme participants. These are: wage, assets 
and skills development, a formulation which extends the prior conceptualisation of PWP impact 
vectors. 
In chapter four the adequacy of the existing PWP impact and evaluation literature is discussed, with 
a critical review of the cost effectiveness approach which has dominated PWP evaluation in recent 
decades. Next, in chapters five to seven, each of the social protection vectors identified in chapter 
three (wage, assets and skills development) is assessed in terms of its own merits and social 
protection potential, in an internal critique of the PWP approach.  
Next, taking into account the shortfalls in the PWP evidence base, a detailed original case study of 
PWP incidence and impact is examined, using empirical data to interrogate and illustrate the 
conceptual arguments set out in the previous chapters, and review each of the three vectors of 
transmission from an empirical perspective, in chapters eight to eleven. This empirical study explores 
the contribution of PWPs to social protection in South Africa, drawing evidence from two PWP case 
studies, one offering short-term full time employment at a restricted wage, and one offering ongoing 
part-time employment at the market wage, but adopting community targeting to reach the poorest. 
The case study attempts to provide some initial responses to the central questions of incidence and 
impact, examining the targeting of PWPs and their social protection impact in order to identify key 
policy lessons and establish an evidence base for future policy development.  
Finally, conclusions are drawn in chapter twelve. The primary conclusions are that it is not useful to 
continue the generic usage of the term PWP, that there is a serious dissociation between form and 
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PWPs, such as those implemented in much of sub-Saharan Africa, is not an appropriate response to 
the problems of chronic poverty.  The current PWP situation results in poor performance in terms 
of social protection outcomes and, inasmuch as the existing evidence base allows us to make 
informed analysis, low levels of cost effectiveness. The lack of application of academic rigour and 
scrutiny to the range of interventions grouped under the generic PWP term is a problem, whose cost 
is borne by the working age poor throughout sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of poorly conceptualised 
programmes which demand a heavy burden of labour inputs from the poor for whom labour may be 
a scarce resource, and significant cash and administrative skills inputs from governments (which are 
in many cases also scarce resources), but do not necessarily offer commensurate benefits for either 
party, and may be a sub-optimal policy response to the question of social protection for the working 
age poor.  
A discussion of the potential ideological factors underlying the choice of PWPs over alternative 
social protection interventions is included in appendix 1.  
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2 WHAT ARE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES?  
This chapter offers a working definition of PWPs and gives an overview of the diversity of forms of 
PWP, before briefly outlining their history as an instrument of social protection this century. Next, 
the heterogeneity of the PWP concept is highlighted, and the conceptual confusion that arises as a 
result of the use of the generic term PWP to describe a range of highly diverse programmes without 
making any distinction between different forms. In an attempt to address to this problem, a four-
part PWP typology and schema of PWP objectives are developed  in the hope that they may provide 
a framework for a more systematic and insightful engagement with PWPs in future literature, and 
promote increased clarity in the PWP discourse .   
2.1 PWP Definitions  
There are many different kinds of public works programmes (PWP), but the key components are the 
provision of employment for the creation of public goods at a prescribed wage for those unable to 
find alternative employment, in order to provide some form of social safety net. For the purpose of 
this thesis, PWP are defined as all activities which entail the payment of a wage (in cash or in kind) 
by the state, or by an agent acting on behalf of the state, in return for the provision of labour, in 
order to i) enhance employment and ii) produce an asset (either physical or social), with the overall 
objective of promoting social protection. The concept is defined more loosely in much of the 
literature linked to the World Bank, as set out by Subbarao, who defines public works programmes 
as: 
‘... programmes in which participants must work to obtain benefits. These programmes offer 
temporary employment at a low wage rate, and have been widely used for fighting poverty.’ 
(2001:2) 
It is interesting to note, according to this definition, that PWP are inherently temporary, an issue 
which will be discussed in detail below.  
There are a number of variant forms of PWP. The majority of PWPs offer either food or cash in 
return for physical labour, and are known as food-for-work (FFW) or cash-for-work (CFW) 
programmes, respectively.  Whether cash, food or other inputs are the most appropriate mode of 
payment varies according to the nature of the labour market shock which has created the need for 
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inflation is high, food often remains the optimal form of payment (Basu, 1996)13.    In some 
programmes the wage, in the form of food, is used as an incentive for communities to construct 
assets (food-for-assets or FFA), or to participate in training programmes, (food-for-training or FFT), 
expanding the concept of PWP still further.  Recently, the WFP have adopted the terms Food for 
Assets (FFA), and Targeted Food Distribution for Assets (TFDA) to describe their PWP to indicate 
that food is being given to assist communities in producing assets that will be of economic value to 
them, in an attempt to move away from the beneficiary perception that the work requirement 
represents a form of conditionality which must be fulfilled in order to access food, irrespective of the 
quality or value of the asset created14 (McCord, 2005). Programmes using a food rather than cash 
wage tend to be implemented or supported by agencies such as WFP or USAID, which have 
historically had surplus food stocks at their disposal, but limited access to capital to fund 
conventional CFW initiatives (see McCord, 2005).15 Other PWPs offer alternative forms of payment, 
such as inputs-for-work (IFW), where the wage is paid in the form of agricultural inputs (fertilizers 
and seeds) as in the Malawian Government’s Inputs for Assets (IFA) programme (UK DFID, 
2004b).   
 
The PWP concept is further complicated by the fact that the term ‘workfare programme’ is used 
synonymously with ‘public works programme’ in much World Bank literature (Subbarao, 2001:2; 
Vodopivec, 2004). This loose use of terminology is problematic given the specific labour market 
origins and policy objectives associated with the ‘workfare’ concept, and the fact that this represents 
only one possible component of the broader and pluralistic public works concept16. The range of 
variant PWP forms and nomenclature inconsistencies identified above contribute to the poorly 
conceptualised usage of the term PWP in both the literature and policy discourses, with the generic 
                                                            
13 NGOs in Ethiopia are conducting pilot programmes to test the relative impact of different forms of PWP 
remuneration, and beneficiary preferences. (Devereux et al., 2005) 
14 The WFP present this approach as a ‘soft’ PWP, an intermediary step between the free (unconditional) food 
distributions provided by WFP in emergency contexts, and the cessation of food distributions once the crisis has 
abated, attempting to introduce a market element into the relationship between the beneficiary and the aid agency, in 
terms of the reciprocality of food receipt in return for work.  
15 The 40% global grain price rise in 2007/8 severely reduced the operating grain surplus of both USAID and WFP, 
and so the incidence of such programmes in the future is likely to be limited.  
16 Workfare is associated with the US active labour market policies initiated in the 1980s, and similar UK policies, 
known as ‘welfare to work’ which attempted to make unemployment benefit conditional on taking up work 
opportunities offered to the unemployed, thereby attempting to reduce frictional unemployment and in this way bring 
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term ‘public works’ tending to be used for a multitude of divergent programmes, diverse in terms of 
both design and objectives. This conceptual melee is acknowledged by Subbarao, who states that: 
‘There is much confusion about the meaning and scope of public works programs (also 
known as workfare programs) across countries.’ (2001:2) 
In terms of their position in the social protection lexicon, PWPs are sometimes considered a 
particular form of conditional transfer (see Samson, van Niekerk and Mac Quene (2006:8)), with the 
transfer being given in return for the fulfilment of the work requirement.  This categorisation is not 
unproblematic, and it is argued in this paper that there are critical differences between PWPs and the 
more conventional forms of conditional and unconditional transfers which do not entail a work 
requirement, which have a significant impact on their respective social protection functions. 
Notwithstanding these definitional problems, the core PWP concept implies a labour-oriented form 
of social protection instrument in which a wage is provided in return for labour, with the objective 
of providing a safety net at a time when regular wage employment or participation in normal 
livelihoods activities is disrupted, due to an economic, political or environmental shock, or in 
response to situations of chronic unemployment, resulting from structural shifts in the economy. At 
the most general level, PWPs tend to have as their primary objective the provision of some form of 
social protection for the poor who are not able to find work or pursue their normal livelihoods 
activities due to some form of disruption in the labour market. They are intended to provide a basic 
income and prevent the distress selling of assets in order to meet subsistence needs and frequently 
involve the creation or maintenance of potentially productive infrastructure, such as roads or 
irrigation systems, which are also intended to contribute to the livelihoods of participants. 
Depending on the nature of the crisis driving the implementation of a particular PWP, other 
objectives of greater or lesser importance may include skills development through work experience 
and on-the-job training, the stimulation of economic growth through the promotion of demand 
among PWP beneficiaries, and the maintenance of social and political order in the context of 
unacceptably high levels of unemployment and poverty. These objectives are explored in more detail 
below.  
Programmes are usually self-targeted on the basis of the principal of ‘less eligibility’. This concept 
implies that ‘relief [social assistance] should be limited to an amount and administered in a manner 
which leaves the recipient worse off than the employed’ (Barr, 1998:17). On this basis the value of 
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attractive option for the poor unemployed, and will not result in labour market distortion with 
workers being drawn out of other forms of low income employment. This is often achieved by 
setting the wage at or below the market wage, on the assumption that only the poor will self-select 
for PWP employment at this wage. When employment is offered to all those seeking work, or at 
least one member of all work-seeking households, the programme is known as ‘universal’. However, 
where the number of those seeking PWP employment exceeds the number of jobs available, access 
is rationed using a variety of mechanisms including targeting on the basis of demographic or 
geographical characteristics, the allocation of employment through lottery systems, and/or 
community-targeting, where employment is allocated by communities among themselves17.  
The PWP wage (in cash or in kind) is usually given in return for a set amount of work. This is often 
defined in terms of the completion of a particular task (task-based employment) in order to avoid 
perverse incentives for workers to extend the time taken to complete a given task, thereby avoiding 
the potential efficiency trade-offs which could result from the adoption of a PWP mode of asset 
production.  
2.2 History  
PWPs have been implemented throughout the world for several centuries, with major programmes 
implemented in Britain and Prussia during periods of labour market disruption and heightened 
unemployment resulting from industrialisation and conflict; in the United States of America during 
the Great Depression in the 1930s; and in Africa, Latin America and Asia during the second half of 
the twentieth century (Subbarao et al., 1997). In developing countries, PWPs have been used in 
response to both developmental and emergency crises, while in recent decades they have frequently 
formed a component of World Bank-supported Social Funds, often with developmental objectives 
relating to livelihoods and poverty reduction (for example MASAF in Malawi, and TASAF in 
Tanzania). In Africa programmes have tended to be short term and contingent on donor funding, 
while in Asia multilateral food-aid initiatives supported large-scale food-for-work programmes 
during the post-war decades. More recently many Asian programmes have shifted to cash-for-work 
and been implemented for prolonged periods, with primarily domestic funding (Korea, India) (ibid). 
While PWPs are generally not used as long term instruments to address poverty, there are cases in 
Asia where they perform this function, most notably the Indian MEGS, initiated during the 1960s 
                                                            
17 A range of potential targeting measures is discussed in detail in Coady et al. (2002). This issue is not explored 
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and still in operation, and the recently introduced NREGP, also in India. These programmes address 
poverty by attempting to ensure sustained access to employment by the poor, thereby guaranteeing a 
minimum regular income, and in this way promoting income insecurity and reducing vulnerability.  
Food-for-work (FFW) was particularly popular in the post-war period largely due to the major grain 
surpluses produced by the US, which, under Public Law 480 (PL480), were used to support FFW 
programmes around the world. PL480, also known as the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, or Food for Peace (FFP), is the US policy of using surplus production to 
supply the world’s largest global food-aid programme, which in 2003 had a total value of US$2 
billion. However in recent decades, CFW has become increasingly popular, offering a more 
responsive and flexible option for beneficiaries, as cash can be used to meet a range of household 
needs directly, rather than requiring a process of household level monetisation which often entails 
losses in the net transfer value of the commodities provided as in-kind PWP payment. However, it is 
often donor institutional priorities, rather than beneficiary preferences, which dictate PWP payment 
modalities; agencies for whom food stocks comprise form a large component of their operating 
budget, still tend to promote in-kind payment. The World Food Programme and USAID still 
primarily support FFW based PWPs, with USAID utilising food drawn from the Food for Peace 
(FFP) allocation from US surplus agricultural production.  
2.3 PWP Heterogeneity 
As illustrated above, while PWPs share the core characteristics of employing labour for the creation 
of public goods18 (physical or social) at a prescribed wage for those unable to find alternative 
employment, with the objective of providing some form of social protection, there are many 
different kinds of PWP interventions. PWPs are not monolithic entities, but a conceptually varied 
                                                            
18 There are a small number of PWPs that provide private rather than public goods. Examples of these would be 
small-scale localised PWPs designed to assist HIV-affected community members through the creation of household 
level vegetable gardens in Zimbabwe (see McCord (2005)), or components of the Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (MEGS), which at times during its 40-year history has created private assets when it has not been 
possible to identify sufficiently labour-absorbing public assets for construction in a particular area. The recently 
introduced NREGP in India has explicitly extended its mandate to include the creation of private assets, as outlined 
by the Centre for Science and Environment: ‘It is argued that though creating private assets goes against the 
objective of a public works programme, the poor quality of public assets, absence of community benefits, and lack of 
maintenance funds is bringing about a change in the profile and ownership of these assets. While it may prove (sic) 
the durability and benefits of assets created under the EGS, it has also raised concerns about the equitable 
distribution of EGS benefits. For instance, farm ponds are in great demand under EGS (sic) in Maharashtra, but these 
are privately owned assets and cost Rs 40,000, require (sic) more than one acre of land and hence benefit only the 
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form of intervention, which can vary in terms of duration, relationship to the labour market, scale, 
targeting and implementation modalities. This diversity is not explicitly recognised in the literature, 
and its implications are not adequately considered. 
Two critical problems are linked to the failure to recognise the heterogeneity of PWPs and the 
resultant loose use of terminology and conceptual confusion. The first is the discussion in the 
literature and at policy level of PWP as though it was a unitary concept, resulting in the mistaken 
attribution of the benefits arising from one form of PWP to other different types of programme 
within the genre.19 The second problem, which is a direct consequence of the first, is the 
inappropriate and widespread adoption of a particular form of PWP which has become the 
archetype in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. These issues are explored below. 
The World Bank characterises PWP as a short-term instrument for responding to acute or transient 
shocks20. This form of PWP has become common in the PWP discourse; providing a short-term 
episode of employment which reduces distress selling of assets, promoting consumption smoothing 
on a temporary basis during periods of disrupted access to income, particularly where the problem is 
covariate. In the context of such an acute labour market crisis, the World Bank argues that the use of 
a PWP instrument offering temporary employment may be appropriate in terms of cost and impact, 
particularly where the output of the programme is an asset which will reduce the vulnerability of the 
community to future shocks (see Subbarao et al. (1997) for a full discussion).  
The kind of short-term PWP outlined above has, however, become synonymous with the term PWP 
in much of the current discourse, and is widely implemented in a range of contexts outside the 
specific ‘acute shock’ scenario where its efficacy has been identified by the World Bank and is 
consistent with conventional microeconomic theory. In the policy discourse, this form of short-term 
PWP has become the dominant ‘ideal type’ PWP, and the PWP of choice in much of sub-Saharan 
Africa, including South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania. It is selected in response to a range of labour 
market deficiencies and social protection challenges, without cognition of the fact that this 
represents only one particular PWP variant, which is appropriate in a limited set of circumstances, 
rather than being universally effective. If examined in light of limited empirical evidence and 
                                                            
19 For example, President Mbeki of South Africa mistakenly publicly attributed the benefits of an EGS-style long-
term PWP (Zibambele) to the National Public Works Programme (EPWP), which offers only a single episode of 
short-term employment, in his address to the National Council of Provinces (2003). 
20 See, for example, the 2001 World Development Report (World Bank, 2001) and the World Bank Poverty Nets 
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economic theory, it is clear that this form of short-term PWP response is not appropriate in many of 
the contexts in which it is currently adopted.  
In the literature it is argued that this archetypal form of PWP providing short-term employment 
functions as a response to acute or transient labour market disruption and this in itself is non-
problematic. What is necessary to problematise is the identification of such PWPs as appropriate 
instruments in contexts which are not characterised by transient labour market disruption, on the 
basis of the assumption that a short-term PWP intervention can effectively address poverty, 
irrespective of the nature or cause of the labour market crisis. In the context of chronic poverty and 
labour market failure it is not evident that a short-term PWP intervention will have a significant or 
sustained impact (see McCord (2004a) with reference to South Africa). Subbarao et al. reflect this 
analysis, arguing on the basis of cross country experience, that: 
‘... public works are essentially a temporary safety net and should never be used as a 
permanent escape route from poverty.’ (1997:168) 
Subbarao et  al.’s use of the generic term ‘public works’ to describe a specific form or subset of short-
term PWPs illustrates the problem in the discourse, which entails the identification of short-term 
PWPs with the whole genre of PWPs. It could be argued that whether a PWP offers a temporary or 
permanent route out of poverty depends on the kind of PWP being implemented, and it is necessary 
to deconstruct the concept and clarify the characteristics of the PWP under discussion in order to 
promote an informed and useful debate. This entails challenging Subbarao et al.’s identification of all 
public works with short-term public works, and their argument that public works generically should 
not, de facto, be used to address chronic poverty. Interestingly, while the archetypal short-term PWP 
is not appropriate as a permanent escape route, as Subbarao et al. assert, this type of PWP is often 
mistakenly adopted, even, ironically, with Bank support, as in the case of the MASAF programme in 
Malawi. Other forms of PWP which offer prolonged or repeated access to PWP employment have 
been used successfully to provide ongoing poverty reduction, such as the MEGS in India.  
The confusion of the archetype for the range of PWP types is problematic in terms of the social 
protection outcome, as PWPs offering a single short episode of employment are repeatedly 
prescribed by donors and governments in situations of chronic poverty, in the hope that they will 
provide the ‘permanent escape route’ that Subbarao himself argues is not an option. The policy 
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implementing these programmes anticipate that these programmes will have a significant social 
protection function, resulting in sustained improvements in livelihoods and poverty reduction21.  
2.4 The PWP Problem  
The key issue illustrated by the foregoing discussion is that conceptual confusion is leading to 
inappropriate policy choice, programme design errors, and unrealistic expectations on the part of 
implementers, with neither economic theory nor the (limited) evidence base supporting the adoption 
of short-term PWPs in many of the contexts in which they are currently being implemented. This is 
in part due to ideological factors which underlie donor and government preferences for market-
based development solutions which can be achieved by a ‘treatment’ of the target group (Surender, 
2007), and which render the archetypal PWP extremely popular (McCord, 2008).22 
Despite the dominance of the PWP archetype, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and Subbarao’s 
identification of this type with the whole genre, many widely differing programmes share the generic 
PWP nomenclature, while enjoying only a small area of shared identity, relating to social protection 
and employment. But at the same time, the term PWP is frequently adopted and used either 
generically or without adequate definition to ensure a common understanding of which particular 
form of PWP is under discussion. The core problem is the lack of a clear conceptual framework for 
a term itself which is highly heterogeneous in its manifestations. The lack of conceptual clarity and 
adoption of common terminology in the absence of a common understanding of the meaning of the 
terminology is highly problematic in the PWP academic and policy discourses, and exacerbates the 
challenge of appropriate policy choice.  
Definitions which might assist in the clarification of the use of PWP terminology are absent in the 
current debate, which instead uses the term PWP as though it were homogenous, and the literature 
offers no typology of the different types of PWP. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to define 
a typology of PWPs, and then to develop a schema of PWP objectives which may be applied to the 
typology, as even within a single form of PWP there may be a range of different objectives and 
relative priorities. 
                                                            
21 An example is the DFID-supported PWP in Malawi which has as its goal ‘enhanced livelihoods for poor people in 
Malawi’ (DFID UK, 2004).  
22 The ideological dimensions of PWP selection are not explored further in this thesis, but the issue is explored in 
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2.5 A PWP Typology  
The variety of interventions falling under the broad concept of PWP range from large-scale national 
government employment schemes (GES), to more limited project-based or geographically specific 
interventions responding to transient labour market problems. However, in the current discourse 
there has been no attempt to establish any form of codification of this diversity, and there is no 
typology to facilitate more meaningful analysis or disaggregation of the generic term ‘PWP’. A review 
of the international literature and over 200 separate programmes was carried out in order to identify 
discrete forms of PWP on the basis of core features relating to design and primary objectives. The 
result is a typology of PWP which groups programmes into four broad types. These types share a 
common PWP identity in terms of the provision of employment with some form of social 
protection objective, but within this common framework, adopt different realisations of the basic 
public works concept. The two dominant types of PWP are: those offering short-term employment, 
and large-scale government employment programmes offering some form of employment guarantee.  
The two less frequent, but still identifiable types are: those promoting labour intensification of 
government infrastructure spending, and programmes which enhance supply-side characteristics, 
promoting ‘employability’. It is important to note that while some programmes may include aspects 
of more than one of these types, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, all PWPs tend to have 
a primary identity which enables them to be located in one of the four categories. This typology is 
applied to the current PWP discourse in this thesis in order to illuminate, and attempt to clarify the 
current conceptual confusion. For the sake of brevity the four types of programme identified above 
have been called types A, B, C and D, and they are summarised in box 2.1 below. 
Box 2.1: PWP Typology 
Type A 
PWPs offering a single short-term episode of employment  
Type B 
Large-scale government employment programmes which may offer some form of employment 
guarantee 
Type C 
Programmes promoting the labour intensification of government infrastructure spending 
Type D 
Programmes which enhance employability 
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Type A: Short-term Employment 
PWPs offering short-term employment are typically implemented as a response to some form of 
temporary labour market or livelihoods disruption, which may result from environmental (e.g. 
drought, flood or hurricane) or economic shocks, such as the East Asian financial crisis, or occur 
during the annual ‘hungry season’, particularly in Africa. They are mostly, although not exclusively, 
implemented in the infrastructure sector, and the intention is to temporarily increase aggregate 
employment, while providing a basic income for consumption smoothing during a temporary period 
of elevated unemployment or livelihoods disturbance. These programmes tend to offer basic ‘risk 
coping’ or ‘protective’ forms of social protection (see chapter three). In these programmes, the social 
protection transfer objective dominates objectives relating to the provision of assets, which may in 
many instances be essentially a ‘make-work’ activity, selected in order to satisfy the work 
conditionality. 
Such programmes are frequently implemented in Bangladesh and other Southern Asian states in 
response to climatic shocks, and in Africa as a response to the seasonal food insecurity and 
underemployment which occurs during the annual ‘hungry season’, prior to the main harvest. 
Indonesia’s Padat Karya (PK) programme is an example of a Type A programme, developed in 
response to an economic shock (Vaidya and Abedin, 2007). These programmes have come to be 
seen as archetypal PWPs in many situations, synonymous with the generic term PWP, and are typical 
of PWPs currently implemented in many sub-Saharan African countries (such as South Africa, 
Malawi, and Tanzania).  The labour market function of such short term programmes is not always 
clear in contexts where the labour market challenge is not one of temporary disruption but rather of 
structural chronic low labour demand, an issue which will be discussed in more detail in the chapters 
which follow.  
Type B: Government Employment Schemes/Employment Guarantee Programmes 
Large-scale government employment programmes (GEPs) are a response to chronic or sustained 
levels of elevated unemployment, and entail significant increases in government expenditure on 
directly employing those who would otherwise be unemployed, as an ‘employer of last resort’ (ELR), 
with the objective of promoting aggregate employment on a sustained basis. Employment may be 
created in any sector, and may be provided either directly by government, or indirectly through 
private sector employers or civil society. The US New Deal programmes of the 1930s typify this 
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to promote both macroeconomic development (increasing aggregate employment and stimulating 
the economy), and social protection outcomes. A subset of GEPs, wherein the state guarantees 
ongoing or repeated episodes of employment on demand to those who are eligible, are known as 
Employment Guarantee Schemes (EGSs). An example is the NREGP in India. These programmes 
provide a form of non-contributory income insurance through guaranteed employment for all who 
seek it.  
The US response to the Great Depression in the 1930s exemplifies a classic public sector 
employment programme. Under the programme, massive state expenditure on PWP was initiated, at 
their height absorbing up to 50% of the unemployed in an attempt to stimulate consumer demand 
and prevent the deepening of the economic recession (Harvey, 2007a). These programmes take the 
form of EGSs in some countries, wherein employment is guaranteed to all members of eligible 
groups on demand. Such programmes are currently operational in several states in India, for 
example, the MEGS (see Dev (1995)), as well as nationally under the recently launched NREGP 
(India, Department of Rural Development, 2007). In the Indian context, employment is defined as a 
constitutional right and the state offers a guaranteed number of days of employment each year to 
one unemployed work seeker from any rural household seeking employment. The worker will be 
employed for a maximum of 100 days each year on the creation of community assets and paid at the 
minimum wage. A similarly large-scale programme, initiated in 2006, is being implemented in 
Ethiopia in response to the disruption of livelihoods which occurs annually as the result of persistent 
drought (the Productive Safety Nets Programme or PSNP), although the extent to which 
employment can be offered to all seeking it in this case is constrained in practice, particularly in years 
of serious drought, as a cap on total employment supply has been set as part of the project design.23  
Hence while the PSNP is a large scale government employment scheme, the cap means that it does 
not function as an employment guarantee programme, and employment is severely rationed with 
access determined by administrative selection rather than demand. 
The definition of ‘universal’ is variously applied both in PWP design and in the literature, and access 
may be rationed even within nominally ‘universal’ programmes, or Employment Guarantee Schemes 
(EGSs). Examples of large-scale programmes which have attempted to provide some form of 
                                                            
23 As an illustration of the scale of demand for PWP employment in Ethiopia, the precursor to the PSNP offered 
temporary work to up to 1.4 million people in drought-affected communities each year between 1999 and 2003 (see 
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universal coverage in order to meet explicit social protection objectives are the US New Deal, the 
Jefes programme in Argentina, the Ethiopian PSNP, and the Indian NREGP24. The most generous 
definition of universal access would demand the provision of employment for all unemployed 
workers, but this is typically mediated by the adoption of criteria limiting eligibility based on 
considerations such as poverty (as in the New Deal), spatial location of workers (as in NREGA, 
which is open only to the rural unemployed), or some form of household rationing, such as offering 
one job per household (NREGP and Jefes) 25. The Jefes programme had two additional criteria: a 
demographic condition limiting participation to heads of households with children or disabled or 
pregnant spouses, and an exclusion relating to those receiving unemployment insurance or transfer 
benefits from the government26. In many EGSs attempts have been made to limit ‘demand’ for PWP 
employment in this way by adopting criteria limiting eligibility. Interestingly, among the EGSs 
discussed above, only the Jefes programme adopted a low wage to promote self-targeting by the 
poorest (the dominant form of rationing access to PWPs generally), while in the other programmes 
the work requirement alone was the primary targeting mechanism (McCord, 2007b), and wages were 
deliberately set at the minimum wage, reflecting an explicit concern among programme designers 
that the value of the labour of PWP participants should not be discounted relative to other labour 
market participants (Harvey, 2007a). This ethical concern is not evident in the discourse around the 
other types of PWP, where discounting the value of labour of PWP participants relative to others is 
central to programme design, and not identified in the literature as problematic.  
The problem of rationed access even under ‘universal’ EGSs is exacerbated by the frequent inability 
of the state, or its agents, to provide sufficient PWP work for all those eligible, due to issues of state 
capacity (programme design, technical supervision, execution, etc.), further worsening the rationing 
problem, even among those who are eligible. Interestingly, this problem is accommodated in a 
number of programmes which offer(ed) a commitment to the provision of a universal minimum 
income transfer for the poor, as a backup, should the state not be able to offer adequate employment 
for all the eligible seeking it within the programme. Recognising that state failure to provide adequate 
                                                            
24 The extent to which such programmes succeed in realising their ‘universal’ aspirations, however defined, varies 
considerably for many reasons including constrained budgets, institutional weaknesses, capacity constraints and 
corruption. 
25 In the PSNP more than one member can work, but collectively, household members are only permitted to work a 
total of 22 days, thereby earning a total of one month’s wage per household. 
26 Interestingly a companion programme, the Programmea de Emergencie Laboral (PEL), offering similar benefits, 
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employment risks undermining PWPs’ mass employment and thereby also social protection 
objectives, PWPs facing these constraints (such as the NREGP, PSNP) have been designed and 
implemented in such a way that, irrespective of whether it is possible to supply adequate PWP 
employment or not, the programme default is the provision of an ongoing (or repeated) cash 
transfer to those eligible, if they are not provided with PWP employment, in the form of an income 
support ‘back-up’ or unemployment insurance.27 In the case of the New Deal’s employment 
programmes, those who could not be accommodated in PWPs, or whose earnings in public or 
private employment were insufficient to meet their basic needs, could apply to local relief agencies 
for public assistance. In this way the need for an income guarantee to back up the government’s job 
creation efforts was recognised.28 Hence, in these cases, provision of an ongoing transfer is not 
dependent on the capacity of the state to deliver employment; a fundamental difference from 
programmes where state capacity to deliver is the binding constraint on PWP scale, as in the case of 
the South African EPWP. The centrality of capacity constraints in determining the successful 
performance of PWP has also been identified by Subbarao, who conceded that: 
‘The main constraint in implementing public works programs in much of Africa is the lack of 
capacity.’ (2001:viii) 
Type C: Labour Intensification  
The primary objective of this type of PWP is the construction of assets while increasing aggregate 
labour usage. These programmes are almost exclusively initiated in the infrastructure sector, and 
adopt labour-based techniques in order to promote the absorption of increased amounts of labour 
for each unit of asset constructed. The work of the Ethiopian Rural Roads Authority (ERRA), the 
AGETIP (Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public contre le sous-emploi) in Senegal, 
related AFRICATIP-supported programmes in Western Africa, and the ILO’s Employment-
Intensive Investment Programmes (EIIPs) which promote the use of labour-based techniques in the 
infrastructure sector are typical of this type of intervention.29 In such programmes the social 
                                                            
27 In the case of NREGP, the primary function of the ‘back-up’ unemployment insurance guarantee is to provide an 
incentive for local government to offer sufficient employment, since they are obliged to pay the unemployment 
insurance from their own resources, while PWP wages are funded by central government. However, this approach 
also has the implicit function of protecting workers from the inability of local government to provide adequate 
employment.  
28 Harvey, 2007, pers. comm. 
29 The Chinese Yigong-daizhen programme is similarly constituted (see Devereux and Solomon (2006:23)), although 
in this case, the objective of simultaneously providing infrastructure and employment coexists with a major forced 
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protection benefits are assumed to result from the increase in aggregate levels of employment 
generated during the creation of assets, and to accrue to workers as a direct outcome of employment 
provided, and possibly also indirectly as a result of the productive value of assets created, although 
recent work carried out by the ILO in Ethiopia using the newly developed Rapid Assessment of 
Poverty Impacts (RAPI) methodology indicates that it may not be possible to identify sustained 
benefits resulting from the assets created (Osei-Bonsu and Mengesha, 2007). While these 
programmes are primarily aimed at infrastructure provision, they also confer basic short-term ‘risk 
coping’ or ‘protective’ social protection benefits, through the wage, which terminate at the point of 
programme completion. Such programmes also frequently entail the promotion of small contractor 
development, in order to establish a cadre of entrepreneurs able to manage infrastructure provision 
contracts in a labour-intensive way. 
Type D: The Promotion of Employability  
Finally there is a PWP approach which focuses on addressing supply-side constraints to 
employment, and promoting the ‘employability’ of workers, by promoting workplace experience and 
skills formation among the unemployed. Such programmes are implemented when the key constraint 
to employment is lack of skills rather than lack of employment opportunities per se. These 
programmes have primarily been adopted in Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, at times of frictional unemployment, i.e. when the fundamental 
problem has been skills shortages in the labour pool. This type of programme assumes that sufficient 
numbers of jobs are available for the unemployed if they are adequately retrained and supported, and 
is associated with a political concern to encourage the unemployed to take up available work 
opportunities rather than to provide them with unemployment benefits. This approach is typified by 
the US set of ‘workfare’ programmes and the UK ‘Welfare to Work’ initiative of the 1990s, which 
make the provision of social protection benefits for the working age poor unemployed conditional 
on participants taking up low-paid work or participating in work experience or training programmes. 
This approach will only confer social sustained protection benefits and promote aggregate 
employment if the underlying assumption – that sufficient employment is available to absorb a 
significant number of the unemployed if they acquire additional skills and experience – holds true. 
                                                            
remunerated PWP employment in order to promote social protection outcomes. In this respect, such a programme 
may fall into separate category of interventions, along with forced labour programmes in Burma, and so is not 
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Otherwise, such initiatives are likely to result in worker substitution, rather than significant increases 
in aggregate employment. 
Programmes to enhance employability by addressing supply-side problems are primarily found in 
OECD countries, as part of broader Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) (see Martin and Grubb 
(2001)) designed to enhance skills and offer incentives for re-entry into employment. The success of 
such programmes is contingent on the ability of the programme a) to successfully transfer skills to 
participants, and b) to transfer skills which match skills in demand in the economy. This approach is 
also contingent on the labour market context being characterised by frictional rather than structural 
unemployment, and the existence of significant numbers of appropriate unfilled job opportunities in 
the labour market. The feasibility of such approaches has been questioned in the literature (ibid), as 
has its appropriateness in the context of developing countries facing structural rather than frictional 
unemployment (Karuri et al., 2007). This issue is discussed in detail in chapter seven.  
2.6 A Schema of PWP Objectives  
Establishing a PWP typology brings some conceptual clarification to the PWP discourse. However, 
there is a need to go beyond PWP form to look at PWP objectives in more detail, an area which is 
also neglected in the literature, and remains conceptually confused. A review of international 
evidence suggests that a wide range of objectives are associated with PWPs, and a single programme 
may include a diversity of objectives. While particular objectives are associated with certain forms of 
PWP (for example, type D PWPs have as a key objective skills development), different PWP types 
are not necessarily or exclusively linked with particular objectives, and most programmes have a 
range of associated objectives, which may be variously prioritised.  
The relative balance of objectives in a PWP can result in significant differences in programme design 
and social protection outcomes. Lack of clarity on the relative importance of objectives within a 
PWP with multiple, potentially competing or contradictory objectives has been identified as the 
cause of PWP failure in a number of cases (see Adato et al. (1999), with reference to the South 
African CBPWP, McCord (2007b), regarding the South African EPWP; and Curtain (1999), 
regarding the PK in Indonesia).  
Drawing on the international reviews of PWP objectives set out in McCord (2005, 2007b), it is 
proposed that the objectives typically found in PWPs can be grouped into six broad categories, 
providing a conceptual schema for future PWP analysis. These objective categories, representing sets 
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as set out in programme documentation, representing the range of different aspirations and 
intentions associated with PWP implementation, and are illustrative of the confusion of ultimate and 
instrumental objectives in the current discourse.  As a result the objective sets are not wholly 
discrete, with some being instrumental, or proximate objectives necessary to achieving other, 
ultimate objectives (for example skills development as a means to reduce frictional unemployment) 
and some focusing on micro level impacts while others focus on the macro-economic consequences 
in the aggregate. Notwithstanding the issue of inter-relatedness, the explicit identification of the 
range of PWP objectives  is useful both in terms of in attempting to disaggregate the PWP concept, 
and also in terms of providing a basis on which to assess PWP performance (see discussion in 
chapter 4). The six objective sets are: i) social protection (most frequently articulated as ‘poverty 
alleviation’), ii) employment, iii) skills development, iv) asset or service provision, v) macroeconomic 
stimulation, and vi) political stabilisation. Within each of these objective sets, detailed objectives are 
identified. The most commonly articulated PWP objective is poverty alleviation. The remaining five 
objective sets are instrumental in terms of their relationship to social protection outcomes, 
contributing indirectly to this objective, either intentionally or through positive externalities, while 
also addressing a range of other policy concerns directly (enhancing labour demand, promoting 
supply-side improvements through skills development, improving service provision, macroeconomic 
stimulation, and political stabilisation). This analysis clarifies the fact that PWPs can have both direct 
and indirect social protection objectives simultaneously, unlike other social protection instruments 
such as cash grants which tend to focus exclusively on direct social protection benefits through a 
cash transfer. The six broad categories of objectives are summarised in Table 2.1 and each is 












Table 2.1: International Overview of PWP Objectives  
Objective Detail/Sub-Objectives  
Social Protection  Income relief through temporary employment  
Income relief through ongoing/repeated employment 
Improved livelihoods after exiting 
Employment Alleviate unemployment by creating short-term work opportunities  
Reduce frictional unemployment by increasing the capacity of those exiting PWP to take up existing unfilled work 
opportunities  
Increase aggregate demand for labour through labour intensification 
SMME development in the construction sector (change structure of demand for labour in the construction sector in order to 
facilitate greater labour intensification) (instrumental) 
Increased government expenditure – Government Employment Schemes (GES) 
Skills Development Skills training and work experience increase capacity of participants to earn an income after exiting (instrumental, directly 
contributes to 1.3 above) 
Physical and Social 
Infrastructure Provision  
Improve provision of basic physical infrastructure and physical services (road construction and maintenance, school 
construction, dam creation, irrigation, etc.) 
Improve social infrastructure through service delivery (e.g. Home Based Care (HBC), pre-school facilities) 
Macroeconomic Stimulation  Introduce sufficient capital into economy to have stimulate demand on a regional or national level 
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The Social Protection Objective  
The objective of social protection, which is often expressed as poverty alleviation, is 
explicitly articulated in most PWPs. Typically, social protection is the primary objective of a 
programme, reflecting its core rationale, as in the case of type A and B programmes. 
However, not all programmes explicitly include social protection as an objective, and for 
some the stated objectives are intermediate or proximate ones, such as ‘job creation’, with 
the ultimate social protection outcome of job creation remaining implicit. In other cases, 
PWPs are primarily oriented to service provision, and in such cases the social protection 
objective is subordinate to objectives of asset or service delivery, and is perceived as a 
secondary benefit resulting from a core service delivery function, as in the case of type C 
programmes.  
The relationship between the various objective sets and social protection is often not well 
articulated in the literature or programme design, with causal linkages between the 
achievement of the proximate objectives and some form of meaningful social protection 
outcome often being assumed as axiomatic, rather than empirically demonstrated. Also, the 
frequently observed mismatch between programme type and programme objectives implies 
that there is an assumption that any of the four types of PWP identified above can 
successfully deliver on any of the objective sets, irrespective of the design factors limiting the 
potential of each type of PWP intervention. For example, as discussed above, it is frequently 
assumed that type A (short-term) programmes can be successfully linked to the realisation of 
social protection objective sets in situations of chronic poverty, despite the fact that the 
design of such a programme is inherently inappropriate for delivering sustained social 
protection outcomes in any context other than one characterised by a short-term labour 
market disruption. The linkage between programme type and objective is particularly 
problematic in relation to social protection, where the assumption that any form of 
employment provision will lead to meaningful, as opposed to extremely transient, social 
protection gains, tends to dominate the discourse, and where theoretical and empirical 
analysis is particularly scarce. The work of Ravallion, Datt and Subbarao approaches this 
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programmes in emergency situations, rather than addressing the problem of social protection 
impacts of type A programmes in chronic contexts. Recent work drawing on material from 
Bangladesh, Malawi, South Africa and Ethiopia (Helen Keller International, 2007; McCord, 
2003; Chirwa et al., 2004a, and Osei-Bonsu and Mengesha, 2007) shows significant cause for 
concern in terms of the inappropriate social protection objectives ascribed to type A and 
type C PWPs in particular. The key problem here is the association of particular social 
protection objectives with the incorrect type of PWP, and the resulting poor fit between 
PWP form and function.  
When PWP objectives include some form of sustained social protection, adequate wage rates 
and/or prolonged employment duration are required to promote accumulation, since the 
poor use income to satisfy basic consumption needs first, then invest in human capital 
(education and health) and social capital, and only then invest in activities to promote 
livelihoods. Hence, a PWP is only likely to impact on productive investment and an 
improvement in livelihoods which will be sustained after the period of programme 
implementation if it provides more than the income required to ensure that basic 
consumption needs are satisfied (Devereux, 2000). Even when wage income is limited in 
comparison with household needs however, PWPs can have a significant impact by 
providing a form of income insurance, although a programme can only serve this function if 
the public works employment is available on a sustained basis, guaranteeing ongoing income 
flows through employment as required,. Evidence from India indicates that this insurance 
function may be of greater significance than the value of the transfer in terms of sustained 
poverty reduction, since it reduces income fluctuation and thereby prevents acute distress to 
the poor (Dev, 1995).Three different sub-objectives relating to social protection provision 
have been identified in the literature, and are set out below.  
Income relief through temporary employment 
From a theoretical perspective, income relief through temporary employment is appropriate 
in contexts where the problem of poverty and/or unemployment is determined by some 
external shock (such as conflict, drought, floods, economic crisis or recession) and is 
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programme, which was implemented in response to the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis. This is 
the case in many PWPs where an explicit poverty alleviation goal is linked to a short-term 
episode of employment provided in the context of a temporary labour market crisis.  
The provision of such an episode of short-term employment in the context of structural 
unemployment, when the labour market itself is not expected to provide large-scale 
employment in the short to medium term, is problematic, but occurs frequently (South 
Africa, Malawi, Tanzania) (see discussion in McCord (2007b)) and is scarcely questioned in 
the international literature (with the notable exception of Devereux and Solomon (2006) 
who mention this issue in relation to evidence from Zambia of the limited impact of short-
term PWP employment). It is interesting to note the lack of discussion of the limitations of 
such programmes in these contexts, and the fact that implementation of such programmes 
occurs relatively frequently in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, despite being a 
seemingly inappropriate instrument in the context of structural unemployment, when the 
need is for interventions offering sustained benefits.  
Income relief through ongoing or repeated employment 
If a PWP approach to social protection is selected in the context of structural or chronic 
unemployment, or contexts with regularly repeated episodes of un-/underemployment and 
poverty, as currently experienced in many developing countries, particularly those in 
southern Africa, then the appropriate form of intervention would be the provision of some 
form of long-term employment through government employment programmes (GEPs) or 
EGSs, rather than the brief episode of employment provided under many PWPs. It is 
interesting to note that the inappropriateness of the provision of once-off short-term 
episodes of employment in this context is widely recognised in the literature; see, for 
example, the World Bank’s 2001 World Development Report (World Bank, 2001), where it 
is explicitly argued that offering short-term PWP employment in the context of chronic 
unemployment is not likely to offer a sustained reduction in poverty. Rather than proposing 
some form of sustained PWP, such as GEP or EGS, the Bank argues that alternative forms 
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Improved livelihood as a result of accumulation during PWP participation  
Many PWPs anticipate producing a sustained reduction of poverty by increasing the capacity 
of participants to earn an income after exiting. This could be achieved by promoting i) 
financial accumulation (through wages), ii) the accumulation of productive assets (through 
savings), (this could also be positively affected by the provision of productive assets as an 
output of the PWP itself and) iii) through the accumulation of human capital (through skills 
development and experience) during programme participation,. If these forms of 
accumulation were adequate to improve livelihoods, then this sub-objective would be met. 
While financial and physical asset accumulation are not conceptually problematic, the 
assumed livelihoods value of improvements in supply-side characteristics is not conceptually 
robust in all labour market contexts: whether a given intervention will increase the 
‘employability’ of participants is conditional on the availability of sufficient jobs (see, for 
example Meth (2008b)). This limitation is discussed further below in relation to the skills 
development objective, and is explored in detail in chapter seven   
The Employment Objective 
PWPs seek to address employment in four ways, three of which are direct and one indirect: 
i) the provision of temporary jobs, ii) reducing frictional unemployment through enhancing 
the quality of labour supply, iii) increasing aggregate demand by shifting the relative factor 
intensity of infrastructure provision through labour intensification and the promotion of 
SMMEs, and iv) increasing public sector employment. Each is briefly outlined below. 
Provision of Temporary Jobs 
As discussed above, the provision of temporary employment tends to characterise PWPs 
which are implemented during a period of temporary labour market disruption, which is 
expected to normalise in the short to medium term. An example of this is the provision of a 
short episode of employment in the Indonesian PK programme which was a response to a 
particular and acute (short-term) labour market shock which created a short-term spike in 
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Reducing Frictional Unemployment through Labour Supply Improvements  
The temporary nature of the employment offered under many type A, C and D PWPs in 
situations of chronic rather than acute elevated unemployment may be understood in terms 
of their objectives of providing ‘spill-over benefits’ (work experience and training), rather 
than being intended to make a significant contribution to aggregate employment or poverty 
relief per se.30 In this way, in addition to the provision of a temporary cash wage which 
provides immediate and temporary assistance to participants, the purpose of the temporary 
jobs is explicitly to offer training and work experience to the unemployed in order to 
improve their labour market performance once they have exited the programme, this is 
linked to the skills development objective outlined below. 
In programmes intended to reduce frictional unemployment the objective is to improve the 
quality of labour supply, so that workers will be able to take up unfilled jobs already existing in 
the economy. This approach tends to characterise PWP interventions which form one 
component of active labour market policies in OECD countries, where the objective is the 
reduction of unemployment which is primarily ‘frictional’, i.e. unemployment that results 
from a mismatch between the skills available in the labour force and those required by the 
economy, which can be addressed by the provision of relevant skills and experience to 
improve the quality of labour supply (Martin and Grubb, 2001). However, this approach is 
based on the premise that there are sufficient existing work opportunities to absorb the 
unemployed, which they will be able to take up if they are given training and work 
experience through PWP employment, or other forms of labour market assistance. This is 
not the case in many sub-Saharan African countries, where the number of unfilled job 
vacancies existing in the economy resulting from skills shortages is often marginal in relation 
to the scale of unemployment (see, for example, Kraak (2003)). The potential impact of a 
supply-side improvement approach to employment in PWPs offering short term 
employment is further constrained by the necessarily short duration of training, which limits 
the opportunity for adequate levels of skills transfers, and sometimes also by the poor quality 
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of training provided (see Karuri et al. (2007)). Where workers do subsequently achieve 
employment as a result of the limited training received, this often results in the displacement 
of other low-skilled workers, rather than net increases in aggregate employment.  
The effectiveness of this approach even within OECD countries has been seriously 
challenged in recent years, and its appropriateness outside the OECD, in contexts where 
unemployment is not frictional, but structural, is questionable.  
Increasing Aggregate Demand through Labour Intensification  
Increasing aggregate demand for labour through labour intensification and/or increased 
government expenditure is central to many PWPs, which are founded on an attempt to close 
an economy’s job gap through direct state intervention when market-based employment 
demand is inadequate, in terms of providing adequate livelihoods for a large segment of the 
population. 
Attempts to increase aggregate demand for labour through the labour intensification of 
production are widespread, and relate primarily to the provision of physical infrastructure, as 
exemplified by the ILO Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) model, and 
AGETIP in Senegal. Such programmes do not necessarily require additional funding, but 
rather a shift in the factor intensity of existing expenditure to increase employment. 
Despite the widespread implementation of labour intensification programmes, many of 
which are promoted by the ILO through its EIIP, labour intensification (LI) has not been 
extensively mainstreamed internationally, and remains a marginal component of 
infrastructure provision in most contexts. In South Africa for example although LI forms a 
major rhetorical component of the state’s strategy to ‘accelerate and share’ growth (South 
Africa, The Presidency, 2006), only a limited proportion of infrastructure expenditure 
suitable for labour intensification adopts LI approaches, and this is explicitly recognised as 
an area where the national PWP has failed to meet its objectives (DoPW, 2007). In South 
Africa, as elsewhere, this is largely due to lack of buy-in to LI approaches within the 
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cited in McCord (2006a)). As a consequence, the potential for expansion of aggregate 
employment in construction remains largely unrealised internationally.  
In PWPs with this type of objective, the focus is on the macroeconomic impact, in terms of 
an aggregate expansion of the labour market, rather than the social protection impact on 
individuals, and so analysis tends to be limited to the proximate outcome (job creation) 
rather than the ultimate outcome, in terms of the impact of such employment on social 
protection. The social protection outcome of such an intervention is highly contingent on 
programme design features which determine the nature of the work provided (duration, 
wage level, etc.), and also the socio-economic characteristics of those able to access the 
additional employment generated.  
SMME Development in the Construction Sector 
The objective of labour intensification is often associated with a broader attempt to change 
the structure of demand for labour in the construction sector, as in the case of the 
Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) in South Africa and the AGETIP in 
Senegal (Wade, 2004). However, in order for such a transformation to be achieved, the 
development of a cadre of contractors familiar with LI approaches is required, and hence the 
development of SMMEs with the capacity to implement a Labour-Based Infrastructure 
Programme (LBIP) in the construction sector is sometimes an instrumental objective within 
PWPs. This approach entails investment in the promotion of construction and maintenance-
oriented SMMEs which are expected to utilise more labour-intensive approaches than larger 
enterprises (CIDB, 2008). SMME creation was a major component of the AGETIP 
programme, which recognised that the creation of a cadre of SMMEs was both an end in 
itself and also a necessary prerequisite if a large-scale shift to LI was to take place (McCord, 
2007b). Interestingly, however, there is no evidence of the robustness of this assumption, 
and the impact of promoting SMME engagement in PWP may be one of worker substitution 
(which may or may not itself be a deliberate policy objective) rather than the creation of new 
jobs, particularly in situations where labour intensity is already high, and existing personnel 
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McCord (2004a, 2006a), with reference to the Gundo Lashu Programme in Limpopo, and 
the Western Cape EPWP). 
Government Employment Programmes 
Increasing aggregate employment through increased government expenditure is one of the 
most conventional forms of employment creation, and has been adopted in a wide range of 
contexts, with the most well known historical example being the New Deal programmes in 
the USA in the 1930s, which was mirrored by the employment programmes for ‘poor whites’ 
in South Africa during the same period (Abedian and Standish, 1986) Recent examples 
include the massive MEGS and NREGP in India, and the Argentinian Jefes programme 
(Harvey, 2007b). In these programmes, employment may be directly provided by the 
government, or through the private or NGO sectors on the basis of an expansion of 
government funding to increase employment in labour-intensive activities. 
PWPs with this objective are dependent on significant additional public expenditure, which 
may be funded for example through deficit funding, as in the New Deal, or additional off-
budget donor funds, to pay for the creation of additional jobs, as in the case of the PSNP. 
Without a significant fiscal allocation, the aggregate increase in employment from a GEP is 
likely to be marginal, as illustrated by the EPWP in South Africa, which is implemented 
without an additional budgetary allocations, and whose impact on aggregate employment is 
extremely limited, providing only 80,000 person years of work per annum (South Africa 
Department of Public Works, 2007) in the context of unemployment levels of four to eight 
million.  
The adoption of a government employment programme (GEP) to meet the objective of 
increasing aggregate employment is ideologically in tension with the public sector 
restructuring and downsizing carried out by many MIC and LIC in recent decades, and 
renders the explicit implementation of such an approach problematic in many contexts, 
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Skills Development Objective 
The objective of skills training and work experience to increase the capacity of participants 
to earn an income after exiting is essentially an instrumental objective, directly contributing 
to the reduction of frictional unemployment objective outlined above. Linked to the 
‘employability’ aspect of the poverty alleviation objective above, this objective seeks to 
provide skills training and work experience through PWP employment, in order to increase 
the capacity of participants to earn an income after exiting the programme.  This human 
capital approach is central to many OECD  PWPs, and has been highly influential in the 
active labour market policy (ALMP) discourse in recent decades, primarily in developed 
countries, but also, to a lesser degree in middle and low income countries (MICs and LICs). 
This approach has been found to have only a limited impact, and to improve the subsequent 
labour market performance of participants only if the training provided is closely aligned to 
the specific skills gaps identified in the wider economy (Martin and Grubb, 2001). Based on 
their review of international experience, Martin and Grubb argue that where training is 
included in programmes it should be kept small in scale, and ‘well targeted to the specific 
needs of both job seekers and local employers’ (ibid:33).  The South African EPWP is 
illustrative of a programme which does not conform with these guidelines, offering training 
which is not closely allied with the skills shortages identified in South Africa which are 
primarily for semi-skilled, artisanal and skilled workers, a shortcoming which is a direct 
consequence of the limited training contact time possible during the brief period of EPWP 
employment.31 This limitation is significant, since it has been recognised in the South African 
policy discourse that PWP employment without skills development will not have a sustained 
beneficial impact, see, for example, EPWP documentation citing the 2004 Growth and 
Development Summit: 
                                                            
31 This is explicitly acknowledged in the Infrastructure Sector Plan for the EPWP, 2005, which states ‘the 
nature of the labour-intensive construction industry is such that [...] employment opportunities for labourers 
typically last only four to six months. [...], this entitles labourers to only eight to 12 days of paid training. 
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‘…job creation without skills development, upgrading and training, does not lend 
itself to sustainable employment and will have no long-term economic impact on the 
lives of the unemployed…’ (EPWP, 2004) 
This insight from the EPWP provides a general critique of the limited training potential 
offered by short term PWPs. Within the Ethiopian PSNP and the MASAF Improving 
Livelihoods through Public Works (ILTPWP) programme, this problem is addressed 
through complementary training programmes such as agricultural livelihood-promotion 
activities and small business training, which are external to the PWP itself, and so are not 
constrained by the operational rigidities of the PWP, in terms of duration, management, or 
content (McCord, 2007b). These programmes aim to promote livelihoods through self-
employment, often at a survivalist level, rather than formal employment, in order to facilitate 
‘graduation’ from PWP dependence after a limited period of PWP support. The idea of 
‘graduation’ upon exit from type A PWPs is prevalent in the programme design 
documentation, and is central to the conceptualisation of the EPWP in South Africa, the 
Malawi MASAF PWPs, and the Ethiopian PSNP. However, there is no empirical evidence in 
the literature to support this aspiration and the little evidence which is available seems to 
suggest that most PWP participants return to the employment and poverty status quo ante 
once they exit PWP employment (Sultan and Slater, 2005; Ndoto and Macun, 2005). 
It is interesting to note that skills development is not typically a component of the 
programmes offering employment guarantees in the context of chronic unemployment. The 
NREGP does not include a skills development component but focuses on the ongoing 
provision of PWP employment in order to guarantee an income. Community development, 
skills training and livelihood-related interventions are carried out in association with the 
PWP, but not in the expectation that participation in these activities will reduce future 
vulnerability to the extent that they will obviate the need for ongoing PWP support. In 
contrast, the Jefes and New Deal programmes both contained training and retraining 
components, but there were critical implementation differences – contact time with 
participants was not limited to an average of four to six months (entailing a total of eight to 
12 days’ training contact time under the EPWP), and training was linked to skills demanded 
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employment. The capacity of both Jefes and New Deal to train and absorb reskilled workers 
was significantly higher than is the case within the EPWP, given the significant capacity 
constraints facing EPWP programme designers and managers, which would inhibit the 
potential for the EPWP to employ a wider range of EPWP-trained workers. Also, it is 
interesting to note that the training within Jefes was intended to promote the ability of 
participants to engage in the open labour market as the economic recession lifted (Harvey, 
2007b). This prospect of imminent economic recovery is not relevant in many contexts 
where the labour market problem is structural rather than cyclical, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Physical and Social Infrastructure Provision Objective 
There are two main forms of infrastructure which may be provided through PWP: physical 
infrastructure, the conventional approach, and social infrastructure, each is discussed below. 
Improve Provision of Basic Physical Infrastructure  
In much of the literature, the service provision function of PWPs is their unique selling 
point, rendering them preferable to alternative forms of social protection. This is well 
articulated in relation to physical asset provision by the ILO: 
‘Employment-intensive investment approaches present an opportunity through 
which the two challenges [employment and infrastructure] can be addressed 
simultaneously’ (Amri-Makhetha, op cit). 
In accordance with this vision infrastructure provision (primarily road construction) is the 
primary objective in PWPs supported by the ILO’s Employment Intensive Investment 
Programme (EIIP) (ILO, 2004), and achieving the objective in a labour-intensive way is the 
recommended approach in order to increase aggregate employment. Similarly, in Rwanda 
PWPs have been identified as a means to promote the provision of productive assets 
(Mellor, 2003), and also in countries recovering from conflict and requiring infrastructure 
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However, internationally, PWPs differ significantly in terms of the relative emphasis given to 
the objective of infrastructure provision, even in instances when asset creation is nominally a 
key objective. In such programmes, the construction of physical assets is sometimes merely a 
way to satisfy the ‘work’ conditionality required for receipt of a transfer rather than being the 
core rationale for the programme, against which it is evaluated. In some cases, such as the 
PSNP in Ethiopia, the PK in Indonesia, and the Jefes programme in Argentina, the primary 
motivation for the PWP is the delivery of the wage to participants in order to alleviate 
poverty, and asset construction activity exists primarily to satisfy the work requirement 
which represents  essentially a targeting mechanism, on the basis of the principle of less 
eligibility (as discussed above). In the Indian, Ethiopian and Argentinian programmes, when 
it has not been possible to provide sufficient work projects to absorb all those seeking work 
within an adequate timeframe, the work condition has been waived, and the cash transfer 
provided without any work requirement32. In these cases it is evident that the asset creation 
objective is wholly subsidiary to the social protection imperative, and is not a requisite 
component of the programme, with the result that it can be dropped if necessary in pursuit 
of the primary social protection objective.  This situation differs significantly from that 
which would obtain in a type D programme, where asset creation is the primary purpose of 
PWP implementation. 
Improve Social Infrastructure through Service Delivery  
While the dominant form of employment in PWPs is the construction of physical 
infrastructure, historically a wide range of activities have been included under the PWP 
banner, including social service provision. In the New Deal programmes, PWP employment 
extended to teaching, adult literacy, nursery care, social care, the implementation of national 
statistical surveys and culture and performance art, as well as the production of consumer 
goods for direct distribution to recipients of public assistance. In Ireland, the Community 
Employment Programme (CEP) provided complementary social services, while the Jefes 
programme included funding for microeconomic activities in agriculture and home 
                                                            
32 In such instances where the programme is delinked from service delivery, the programme becomes 
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production, as well as social care for children and the elderly. The lower material input cost 
of social, rather than physical, service delivery has the potential to significantly reduce PWP 
implementation costs, and also increase the range of activities absorbing labour which 
enables an expansion of the scale of potential programme employment. In recent years 
programmes have been developed in sub-Saharan Africa which simultaneously provide 
employment for the poor, while also providing an expansion of social service provision, 
attempting to address the burden of unpaid care which falls largely on women and is 
increasing significantly due to the impacts of HIV/AIDS. The key challenges relating 
particularly to the social service delivery component of PWPs are: i) the issue of quality 
control, ii) the sustainability of service provision offered through non-permanent 
programmes, and iii) confusion regarding statutory responsibility for service delivery.  
The use of PWPs to create social as well as physical assets is one of the most innovative 
aspects of PWP programming to have developed in recent years. This approach has 
developed largely in response to the needs of households affected by HIV/AIDS and has 
developed spontaneously in southern Africa in recognition of the need to support social 
infrastructure in the context of high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and the growing pressure 
placed on households and existing service providers. PWP provision of social services is 
concentrated on Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) and Home Based Care 
(HBC) (also called Home Community Based Care (HCBC) in South Africa). Within the 
region, it is primarily Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Faith-Based Organisations 
(FBOs) and national Red Cross organisations that have developed social service-based 
employment programmes in response to the growth of the HIV pandemic, starting from the 
objective of increased service provision, rather than employment (McCord, 2005). In South 
Africa, this approach has been incorporated into the EPWP, with the dual objective of 
offering employment while also providing improved service delivery. This approach is 
particularly attractive as a PWP employment option, since it offers an opportunity to provide 
sustained part-time employment as well as meeting a recognised social need. Such 
programmes have the potential to absorb large numbers of workers through increased 
funding to the NGO or CBO sectors, and with the roll-out of VCT and ARVs throughout 














The Zimbabwe Red Cross Home Based Care (HBC) programme (operational since 1992) 
illustrates the potential for the objectives of PWP employment and service provision to be 
addressed jointly. The HBC programme is one component of an integrated range of inputs 
offered by the Red Cross for those affected by HIV/AIDS, including food distribution and 
agricultural support, and employs over 2000 HBC facilitators, supporting an estimated 
40,000 people directly and indirectly (ibid.). In South Africa, the need for an extension of 
social service provision more generally has led to the inclusion of social service provision in 
the national Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), with the objective of extending 
the outreach of social service provision. Social sector employment in Early Childhood Care 
and Development (ECCD) and Home Community Based Care (HCBC) comprises 13% of 
the total PWP employment. As with all government employment programmes, the 
programme’s success and the subsequent employment of EPWP ‘graduates’ in HCBC and 
ECCD is contingent on ongoing and expanding state funding of NGO activity in the social 
sector. 
While social service provision through PWP has focused on HBC and ECD, opportunities 
have been identified to expand PWP employment into a wide range of social sector 
interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, where currently unmet demand for services is inhibiting 
access to services such as support of ARV roll-out, Voluntary Counselling and Testing 
(VCT) service provision, tuberculosis (TB) sputum sample collection33 and delivery, birth 
registration, and a range of social grant registration and application services. This shift into 
social rather than physical infrastructure represents a significant opportunity for the 
expansion of socially constructive employment in PWP programmes in countries where 
service provision for the poor is otherwise constrained, at a time when demand for services 
is increasing as a consequence of HIV/AIDS. If adequately funded, this PWP employment 
in this sector also has the potential to offer the extended periods of employment required in 
                                                            
33 Ginsburg, adviser to the KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport and Public Works, implementing the 
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a GEP or EGS, in direct contrast to the inherently short-term nature of employment in 
physical infrastructure provision. 
Macroeconomic Stimulation Objective 
Historically PWPs have sometimes been adopted in pursuit of macroeconomic objectives,  
predicated on the injection of sufficient capital into the economy through the PWP wage to 
stimulate demand on a regional or national level, thereby stimulating secondary employment 
effects and facilitating economic growth.  To achieve this the scale of the employment 
created must be large and the infrastructure created economically productive. 
This objective, with its Keynesian undertones, is rarely explicit in the current PWP discourse, 
although it has been a major factor behind the adoption of PWP in the past, the most 
notable example being the New Deal programmes implemented in the USA during the 
depression of the 1930s, at a time when such policies entailing massive state expenditure on 
direct government employment were less ideologically problematic (although the decision to 
adopt such a massive and fiscally risky programme was contentious even at that time 
(Harvey, 2007a)). PWPs implemented under the US New Deal programme entailed a 
massive expansion of state expenditure, consuming an average 4% of GDP annually,  in an 
attempt to stimulate the economy while also providing sufficient employment to absorb a 
significant proportion of the unemployed and ensure that the basic needs of their families 
were met. Employment was provided in special programmes operated both directly by the 
government and also through private contractors, funded with a massive expansion in 
infrastructure expenditure. At their height, these programmes absorbed over 50% of the 
unemployed, and made a significant impact by promoting counter-cyclical expenditure and 
demand, and thereby stimulating economic growth, while also creating assets which 
themselves performed the function of stimulating growth, during a period of recession 
(ibid).  
The New Deal programmes illustrate that attempting to achieving the objective of 
macroeconomic stimulation through large-scale government employment creation is 
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human capital resources (administrative, managerial and technical) to manage effective 
implementation (ibid). It is interesting to note that the capacity to manage such a massive and 
complex programme effectively was in part due to the fact that the nature of the economic 
crisis resulted in unemployment across the skills spectrum. This rendered managerial, 
technical and administrative capacity readily available for deployment within the programme; 
a situation which is rare in contemporary settings, where a shortage of the skills required for 
effective programme implementation represents a major constraint to effective programme 
execution.  
Political Stabilisation Objective  
A review of the implementation timeframes of PWPs implemented in recent decades 
suggests that the final PWP objective may be an essentially political one; the provision of a 
visible government response to an unemployment or poverty crisis, with the aim of 
promoting political stabilisation and electoral support. Political change or instability is a 
common contextual feature at the initiation of many PWPs. During such periods of political 
instability or regime change, it is politically important for the state to be seen to be 
addressing unemployment in order to secure electoral support, and PWPs offer the potential 
for a high visibility intervention. The AGETIP, NREGP, EPWP and PK all fall into this 
category, being implemented directly prior to key political moments such as elections or 
periods of threat to the existing regime. Although PWPs may be implemented to promote 
political stabilisation, this objective is more frequently implicit than explicit, although 
somewhat unusually, this consideration was mentioned explicitly in a review of the AGETIP 
by its designer, who candidly stated that one of the success indicators of the programme was 
its high ‘visibility/cost ratio’ (Wade, 2004). Similarly, one particularly high-profile PWP in 
South Africa, which offered the best penetration into the rural poor, the largest scale of 
operation and the greatest impact, was implemented in one of only two provinces where the 
ruling party did not have a secure electoral majority34. In such contexts PWP visibility may in 
                                                            
34 The Zibambele programme, which is uniquely successful among PWPs in South Africa and is examined 
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some instances be more important that the actual content or coverage of the programme. 
This is true at least for AGETIP, which attained only minimal coverage (less than 0.5% of 
the labour force), yet is widely considered to be a PWP success story and is emulated 
throughout the West Africa region (McCord, 2007b). This may also be true of the national 
EPWP in South Africa, which is presented in the popular discourse as a significant 
intervention to addressing the problem of the working age poor, despite its extremely limited 
coverage and impact (for a full discussion of international PWPs’ scale of operation see 
chapter three).  The wider political and ideological issues associated with the selection of 
PWPs are discussed in appendix 1. 
Discussion of Objectives  
As illustrated above, the PWP concept incorporates a range of potential objectives. These 
objectives may be implicit or explicit, and may vary in terms of their relative prioritisation. 
Programmes sometimes adopt a multiplicity of objectives, which may not necessarily be 
consistent with the type of PWP selected and may even be mutually contradictory in terms 
of programme design requirements. An example of this is the tension between the provision 
of quality assets, and the urgency of providing immediate wage transfers, as in the case of the 
PSNP, which can create tensions within a programme. It is suggested in the literature that 
the existence of multiple objectives in one programme reduces likelihood of programme 
success, in part due to the increased managerial, administrative and coordination burden 
these objectives imply, and in part due to the potentially conflicting priorities implied by 
diverse objectives (Curtain, 1999). A similar problem was identified in the case of the South 
African EPWP, where it was argued that the coexistence of multiple objectives resulted in 
confusion among both implementers and beneficiaries regarding the nature of the 
programme, with negative consequences for both performance and accountability (Karuri et 
al., 2007).  
                                                            
KwaZulu-Natal province, one of only two provinces where the ANC had a real political competitor, in the 
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The New Deal programmes were able to successfully accommodate a diversity of mandates 
due to the adoption of a flexible institutional structure, wherein the individual programmes 
were implemented by different agencies with clear and discrete mandates, and had the 
authority to elicit cooperation from a variety of other government agencies (Harvey, 2007a). 
Such management flexibility is rare in current PWPs. Where there is an attempt to address 
multiple objective sets within one programme, as in the case of the South African EPWP35, 
there is a risk that the department leading the programme may lack the authority or skills to 
coordinate across diverse ministries; an issue which is particularly problematic if the lead 
department is one primarily charged with physical infrastructure provision, or is an external 
body, such as a Project Management Unit (PMU), with limited linkages with local or national 
government departments.  
2.7 Conclusion  
A critical weakness in the current social protection discourse is the failure to recognise 
explicitly that PWPs are a highly heterogeneous form of intervention. In the absence of an 
analytical framework providing a PWP typology or schema of programme objectives, which 
explicitly recognises their heterogeneity, PWPs are poorly conceptualised, and the idea that a 
single type of PWP (the PWP ‘archetype’ offering short term PWP employment) can be 
implemented effectively in a variety of settings, without cognition of the fact that a particular 
type of PWP can only achieve a limited set of objectives and can only function effectively in 
a particular labour market context, is pervasive in both the literature and programme design. 
This problem is in part a consequence of the conceptualisation of a PWP as a monolithic, 
rather than a highly differentiated, set of linked but functionally discrete interventions. The 
consequence is the tendency to adopt the generic term PWP without further definition or 
discussion, and to assume that whatever form of PWP is selected, a range of policy problems 
can be addressed, irrespective of the type of programme selected, or the nature of the 
                                                            
35 With reference to the objectives of the South African CBPWP, the predecessor of the EPWP, it was 
stated that ‘Relief and development, income generation and empowerment, jobs today and training for 
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underlying labour market problem i.e. the relationship between PWP form and function 
remains fuzzy in both the academic and political discourse. 
This conceptual weakness also has programme design and analytical consequences. Failure 
to set programme objectives with adequate rigour can lead to tensions and contradictions 
between objectives and negatively affect programme outcome (Curtain, 1999), while any 
assessment of programme performance is fundamentally influenced by the objectives against 
which a programme is evaluated. Neither the lack of analytical rigour in relation to PWP 
form and objectives, nor the programme design or analytical consequences are recognised in 
the existing literature.   
This chapter has attempted to address this critical weakness by providing both a PWP 
typology, and a schema of objective sets, in order to present a framework for a more 
rigorous and analytical use of the term PWP, and more explicit statements on PWP 
objectives, with the aim of stimulating more critical thinking on the concept of PWPs per se, 
and also the relationship between form and function that this implies. The typology and 
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3 THE SOCIAL PROTECTION FUNCTION OF PWPs  
In the previous chapter a PWP typology was proposed and a schema of PWP objectives put 
forward, to promote a more rigorous and less generic approach to PWP analysis. In order to 
explore the social protection function of the various PWP types this chapter links the PWP 
typology into the current social protection discourse.  
3.1 Definition of Social Protection  
For clarity from the outset, it is necessary to review and agree on a definition of social 
protection. While there are various definitions of social protection currently in usage (see 
Barrientos and Hulme (2008:3-4)) the broad framework developed by Devereux and 
Sabates-Wheeler (2004) offers a conceptually clear and intuitively comprehensible definition, 
based on rights, needs and empowerment. This can be set alongside the World Bank’s Social 
Risk Management (SRM) framework, which focuses more exclusively on risk (Holzmann 
and Jorgensen, 1999). Such an approach allows both frameworks to illuminate the various 
functions of different types of PWP interventions. 
Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) describe social protection as the attempt to promote 
the protection and accumulation of assets in order to reduce vulnerability. Their definition of 
social protection includes all initiatives that: provide income (cash) or consumption (food) 
transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social 
status and rights of the excluded and marginalised. They define the vulnerability social 
protection is attempting to address as a function of exposure to shocks or negative 
processes, mediated by a household’s resilience to those shocks. Devereux and Sabates-
Wheeler go on to describe a hierarchy of social protection interventions consisting of three 
categories to which they apply the terminology protective, preventive, and promotive or 
transformative social protection, with the latter being the form of social protection which has 
the most significant and enduring impact. These components conform broadly with the tiers 
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coping, risk management and risk reduction (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999) 36. It is useful 
to consider the social protection function of PWPs in relation to these two coexisting sets of 
definitions which are currently in common usage within the social protection discourse. In 
this way it is possible to initiate a critical analysis of the social protection function of public 
works, in relation to the broader social protection debate within which such programmes are 
located. Such an analysis has not been carried out elsewhere in the social protection 
literature, with PWPs escaping the critical scrutiny applied by economists and social 
development theorists to other such forms of social protection intervention. Currently, 
PWPs tend to be positioned generically within the social protection instrument armoury, but 
their function and anticipated impact is not clearly analysed in terms of the social protection 
concept in terms of its objectives, or with reference to the different levels of social 
protection interventions.  
Integrating PWP interventions into the three levels of the SRM or social protection 
discourse provides a useful framework for examining the social protection function of public 
works, and assists in the development of a theoretical framework for the analysis of likely 
PWP impacts. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to attempt to identify the vectors 
through which social protection benefits may be conferred through PWP interventions.  
There is frequently an a priori assumption that PWPs have a positive impact on poverty 
alleviation/reduction, either directly or indirectly, and in some instances even livelihoods 
promotion, through an accumulation of the human, material or financial assets required to 
move out of chronic poverty, on the basis of one or more of the PWP objective sets 
outlined in the previous chapter. When the concept of the PWP is interrogated to ascertain 
how these outcomes might be achieved, it can be argued that there are three primary vectors 
through which these impacts may potentially be achieved: i) the wage transfer, ii) benefits 
accruing from the assets created, and iii) improved labour market performance as a result of 
                                                            
36 It is important to note that notwithstanding the broad hierarchical conformity of the two models, there 
remain significant differences in terms of the conceptualisation of social protection underlying each model.  
However, for the purpose of creating a framework for the location of differing PWP types in terms of their 
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workplace experience and/or training. These three vectors are proposed as the means 
through which PWP participation might confer social protection benefits, in terms of the set 
of explicit and implicit expectations of how PWPs function in the social protection 
discourse, at political and populist level (and theoretical, inasmuch as this exists).   
A dual typology has been adopted in some sections of the literature, although it has not been 
formalised as such (see, for example Subbarao (2001)), which focus on the function of the 
wage transfer, while also recognising the importance of considering indirect effects accruing 
from the assets created. In line with this, Ravallion posits the need to include ‘spillover or 
indirect effects from assets’ (2003:1), identifying two vectors contributing to the social 
protection outcome of PWP participation: wage and indirect effects from the assets created 
(ibid). However, a review of PWPs internationally suggests that a third vector – training or 
work experience benefits – also exists in the current PWP discourse. The inclusion of 
training/work benefits reflects the prominence that skills development and work experience 
have acquired in the ALMP debate in recent decades (Martin and Grubb, 2001), and the 
influence of this debate, and of the US ‘workfare’ ideology in particular, on the design of 
PWPs in developing countries (McCord, 2007b). The perceived importance of skills 
development as a potential vector of social protection benefit transfer is illustrated in the 
EPWP (McCord, 2007a)37, and is critically explored in chapter seven. 
If skills development is added to Ravallion’s analysis, the mechanisms to transmit potential 
social protection benefits through PWPs may be grouped into three main vectors: 
• Wage transfer (cash, food or inputs) 
• Asset benefits 
• Training or work experience benefits 
                                                            
37 Institutional capacity building has been mooted as an additional vector of PWP impact. Devereux and 
Solomon argue, ‘In addition to the immediate wage income that labour-based programmes transfer to 
participants, these programmes also aim to generate long-term benefits through the assets created, training 
and skills received, and institutional capacity building. Clearly, a programme’s overall success must assess 
the extent to which it is able to transfer all these benefits.’ (Devereux and Solomon, 2006:24) There is little 
evidence to support the explicit inclusion of this fourth vector, and so capacity building has not been 
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The social protection impact of a PWP will vary depending on what combination of these 
vectors is effective in any given programme, the quality and relevance of each, and the 
duration and timing of their provision, which in turn will be influenced by the type of PWP 
adopted, and the range and relative prioritisation of objectives ascribed to the programme. 
These three vectors will not be critically discussed in this chapter (they will be examined in 
detail in the following chapters), but will be used as a form of shorthand to help locate 
PWPs within the broader social protection discourse.  
In Figure 3.1, a social protection framework is constructed which adopts the Devereux and 
Sabates-Wheeler conceptual framework and integrates it with the SRM social protection 
terminology. PWPs are located within this framework in an attempt to illustrate the diverse 
social protection outcomes likely to accrue from PWPs depending on the type of 
programme adopted and the vectors through which social protection benefits are conferred.  
In this figure, the World Bank concepts of coping, mitigation and reduction are equated with 
the concepts of protective, preventive and promotive/transformative social protection 
respectively. Safety nets comprise interventions which promote coping/protective and/or 
mitigation/preventive outcomes, while the term ‘springboards’ may be used to describe 
interventions which promote mitigation/preventive and/or reduction/promotive/ 
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Figure 3.1: A Conceptual Framework for the Social Protection Function of Public 
Works 
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Source: Derived from McCord (2005a) incorporating Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004). 
These categories are useful in terms of identifying likely PWP outcomes, with different 
programme types corresponding to different social protection outcomes. For example, a 
PWP offering only a single short-term episode of employment with no sustained benefits 
accruing from the assets created (type A), would confer only protective social protection 
(social assistance), limited to promoting a household’s capacity to cope with risk in the short 
term. The vector through which this would be achieved would be the wage transfer (food or 
cash), and the impact would be contingent on the value of the transfer in relation to 
household subsistence shortfalls. Here the function would be to enable consumption 
smoothing during a period of temporary labour market disruption. This conforms to the 
World Bank perception of the social protection function of PWPs (Vodopivec, 2004), which 
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an active labour market programme, in line with the type A PWP archetype identified above. 
However, PWPs function outside this limited sphere of social protection if other types of 
PWP are considered. If employment were offered on a sustained basis or guaranteed in 
times of need, without sustained benefits accruing to participants from the assets created, a 
programme would confer preventive social protection, or risk mitigation, representing a 
form of risk insurance, as in the NREGP or MEGS in India. Here again, the wage transfer 
would be the vector of social protection, offering either a basic income floor, or enabling 
repeated periods of consumption smoothing during periods of under- or unemployment, 
and again the impact would be contingent on the level of the wage.  
In the context of chronic poverty and unemployment, the potential of PWPs to provide 
sustained social protection benefits and poverty reduction (promotive or transformative 
social protection) is contingent on programme participation resulting in the accumulation of 
productive financial, physical or human capital as intended, although not necessarily 
achieved, in the Ethiopian PSNP or the Argentinian Jefes programmes. This could be 
achieved by the provision of a wage which is sufficient to permit capital accumulation, the 
creation of productive assets which directly contribute to improved livelihoods, or effective 
skills development which results in improved income-earning performance, as discussed 
above. This illustrates the critical importance of the relationship between the labour market 
context, and the type of PWP adopted in response, in determining the social protection 
impact of the intervention. This insight is at the heart of the critique of many PWPs 
implemented in sub-Saharan Africa and presented in this thesis. The match between the type 
of PWP selected and the economic and labour market context is a critical determinant of 
social protection outcome. Other issues affecting the social protection outcome relate to the 
universality or targeting of the programme, coverage (the scale of the intervention in relation 
to need), the quality of employment provided, and programme implementation modalities. 
These issues are examined below in order to ascertain their implications for the social 
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3.2 Labour Market Analysis  
PWPs may be implemented in a range of contexts which may, for the purpose of the ensuing 
analysis, although somewhat reductively, be grouped into two broad labour market and 
development situations: i) acute periods of labour market or livelihoods disruption (e.g. 
drought or flood), and ii) chronic high levels of under- or unemployment and poverty, or 
repeated seasonal vulnerability in the form of regular food security crises. The two scenarios 
in the second grouping are frequently not mutually exclusive. 
In each scenario, the effectiveness of a PWP intervention, in terms of its contribution to 
social protection, is contingent on the appropriate duration of PWP employment in relation 
to the labour market disruption which forms the context and origin of the need for a social 
protection intervention, and the extent to which it protects livelihoods and enables 
consumption smoothing to take place. Hence, the nature of the labour market crisis should 
be a key determinant of programme design, particularly in terms of programme duration if 
the programme is to have a significant social protection impact, as the form of PWP selected 
needs to be appropriate to the particular labour market context. In the case of an acute 
period of labour market disruption, the immediate PWP social protection objective would be 
asset protection and temporary consumption smoothing, with the assets produced through 
the PWP potentially also serving to mitigate future risk, promote the livelihoods of workers 
and/or other community members, and/or enhance development objectives of the broader 
society (with the service delivery objective set subordinate to the social protection objective 
set). By contrast, in situations of chronic or repeated labour market disruption, PWP 
effectiveness is contingent on the extent to which it contributes to adequate consumption on 
a sustained basis, which could either be achieved through the implementation of a 
programme offering ongoing or repeated transfers as required. This accumulation of 
financial, human and physical assets could then provide sustained social protection benefits 
into the future, even after the period of PWP employment and direct wage transfer is 
completed. In both cases the effectiveness of the PWP is contingent on the extent to which 
it enables asset protection and consumption smoothing throughout the period of labour 
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It is therefore critical to match both the duration of PWP employment and the degree of 
accumulation anticipated, to the labour market context, taking into account the nature of the 
labour market disruption in each instance. Employment in short-term PWPs based on the 
labour intensive creation of physical infrastructure typically lasts for only two to four months 
(McCord, 2007a). It is likely that the social protection benefits arising from short-term PWP 
employment would be limited to the period in which the wage transfer is taking place (this 
assumption is discussed in detail below). As a result, for most PWP participants it is likely 
that the period of benefit will be limited to the period of wage resource flows and hence be 
experienced for a limited duration only. While this is not likely to be problematic in the 
context of an acute period of unemployment, if the period of PWP employment matches the 
period of unemployment, a single short-term episode of employment in a PWP is unlikely to 
have significant sustained social protection outcomes in the context of chronic poverty and 
unemployment, or cyclical unemployment. If a sustained social protection outcome is 
desired in this context, a medium to long term intervention would be required, which would 
enable sustained consumption smoothing and possibly also accumulation in the form of 
human or financial capital or assets. In this context, the level of wages would also be a 
critical determinant of potential accumulation. Given the limitations of the short-term PWP 
as an instrument of social protection in the context of chronic unemployment and poverty, 
set out above, it would be expected that long-term PWP employment provision would be 
the most appropriate type of PWP response in this context; however, this is not always the 
case, and PWPs offering short-term employment (types A, C and D) are frequently 
implemented in contexts of chronic poverty (see, for example, MASAF PWPs in Malawi, 
EPWP projects in South Africa, and ILO EIIP in Ethiopia (Chirwa et al. (2004a); McCord 
(2004a); Mengesha and Osei-Bonsu (2007) respectively). The identification of this design 
‘mismatch’ between the needs indicated by the labour market context, programme 
objectives, and the design of the PWP response represents a critical insight into the poor 
performance of many current PWPs, which has not been explicitly recognised in the 
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3.3 Design Features Affecting Social Protection Impact 
A review of the international experience indicates that there are a set of common design 
features which directly impact on the likely social protection outcome of PWPs. Of central 
importance is programme duration in relation to the labour market crisis; an issue alluded to 
above. This consideration has direct consequences in terms of the consumption smoothing 
and accumulation outcomes of the programme, and is explored below in relation to the 
dominant conception of the term PWP, and the PWP archetype discussed above. Other 
critical design features affecting social protection outcomes are identified as targeting and 
coverage, scale, the quality of employment offered, and programme implementation 
modalities. Each is discussed in turn below. 
Duration  
There is a tension in the discourse relating to the need for the type of PWP selected to 
reflect the specificities of a particular context, as discussed above, and the simultaneous 
identification of the PWP concept with the archetypal short-term (type A) PWP which 
constitutes the dominant World Bank definition of the term. The implications of this and 
the resulting contradictions in the current debate are discussed below, with particular 
reference to PWP duration. Drawing on cross country experience, Subbarao et al. reiterate 
the linkage of PWP to transient rather than chronic poverty, arguing that:  
‘... public works are essentially a temporary safety net and should never be used as a  
permanent escape route from poverty.’ (1997:168) 
The implication of this statement is that PWPs are appropriate only where poverty is 
transient and a temporary safety net is required, with the underlying assumption that the 
benefit period is limited to the period of the wage transfer, and that the generic term PWP is 
synonymous with the type A archetype in World Bank parlance. However, somewhat 
inconsistently, it is also argued in the mainstream literature that when unemployment is 
cyclical, the PWP intervention should be repeated accordingly, and when poverty is chronic, 
there is a need to guarantee employment on an ongoing basis, as required, implying some 
form of EGS, rather than offering only temporary employment, if PWPs are to perform a 
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‘... failure to obtain this work [PWP employment] whenever needed will tend to 
undermine the social insurance function of public works schemes.’ (1994a:1358) 
Subbarao et al. concur, suggesting that:  
‘... in countries where poverty-gap ratios are high, the need to run the programme 
[PWP] year-round (and thus raise transfer benefits to the poor) assumes greater 
importance.’ (1997:84)  
This indicates a recognition that sustained, rather than short-term, employment is required if 
PWPs are to address chronic poverty; a statement which is in tension with the statement 
made by Subbarao et al. above, which argues that PWP should be considered as an inherently 
‘temporary safety net’. This apparent lack of internal consistency in the literature is 
problematic, and is worsened by the prevailing use of the generic term ‘public works’ 
without adequate reflection of the diverse range of PWP instruments, as discussed in chapter 
two. The use of the term PWP in the statement above is at odds with the dominant World 
Bank definition of PWPs, which presents them as short-term type A, C or D interventions, 
(see for example Subbarao (2001:2) and Vodopivec (2004), op cit), again illustrating the 
inconsistency and confusion which permeate the current literature.  
An important implication underlying these statements is, however, a reference to the fact 
that sustained benefits, subsequent to the period of programme implementation, should not 
be anticipated, and for this reason PWPs do not offer a ‘permanent route out of poverty’. 
Subbarao et al. reiterate this argument, stating that the consumption smoothing impact of 
PWPs in the context of crises is inherently limited, and linked temporally to the period of 
implementation and wage receipt, and that for this reason PWPs are not, as is frequently 
conceptualised, instruments to deliver sustained poverty reduction: 
‘... public works programs provide mainly current benefits.  They are not meant to 
function as a permanent escape route from poverty.  In fact, most countries offer 
only temporary employment during off-seasons, when agricultural work is limited, 
thus programs are expected to offer only stabilization benefits (consumption 
smoothing in poor households), not transfer long-run benefits.’  (1997:70) 
It is debatable to what extent ‘most countries’ offer repeated, rather than once-off access to 
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they are making that the primary benefit accruing from PWP participation is the wage 
benefit which is limited to the period of employment, and hence that long-term social 
protection benefits should not be anticipated from PWP employment, since the wage is 
typically not sufficient to allow significant accumulation. However, the subtlety of this 
message is frequently lost in operational contexts, with short-run single episodic 
programmes (type A) implemented in all three contexts, without reference to these nuances. 
PWPs offering single short-term episodes of employment are repeatedly developed, funded 
and implemented in situations of chronic unemployment with the objective of providing 
social protection to populations experiencing chronic, rather than transitory, poverty. This is 
done with support from donors, who anticipate sustained improvements in livelihoods and 
poverty reduction as the outcome of their interventions, 38 despite the fact that the literature 
argues that the effective sphere of such short-term PWPs is temporary crises, functioning to 
enable consumption smoothing.  
Some PWPs have been designed in recognition of the need to deviate from the type A PWP 
archetype in differing contexts, offering year-round or repeated PWP employment, where 
the labour market crisis is cyclical or chronic, particularly in Middle Income Countries 
(MICS). One example is the type B Zibambele road maintenance programme in KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa, offering ongoing part time employment. This programme is described 
in detail in chapter nine. It is notable that this programme was designed and funded without 
inputs from international donors such as DFID, the ILO and the World Bank who, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, tend to dominate PWP design, resulting in a set of 
programmes which replicate donor PWP design preferences, primarily offering type A or C 
(labour intensification) programmes, providing a single episode of employment, irrespective 
of the labour market context, with the term PWP in the region becoming almost 
synonymous with type A and C PWPs, irrespective of their particular objective sets. For 
these reasons the Zibambele programme is the exception rather than the rule in sub-Saharan 
                                                            
38 An example is one short-term DFID-supported PWP in Malawi which has as its goal ‘enhanced 
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Africa, where a common assumption remains among policy makers that the implementation 
of a generic PWP offering short-term employment is likely to have a meaningful social 
assistance impact, through a set of direct and indirect effects, and moreover that it will 
impact significantly on poverty, despite the empirical and theoretical evidence in the 
literature to the contrary.  
Programme duration has significant implications for the stabilisation (consumption 
smoothing) impacts of a PWP. Given the critical importance of the stabilisation benefits of 
PWPs, the conceptual tension between PWP type and intended outcome when short-term 
type A, C or D PWPs are implemented in contexts of chronic unemployment is evident, 
particularly if the intention is to provide social protection benefits directly, rather than 
indirectly. Evidence from the type B Zibambele programme in South Africa suggests 
significant benefits in terms of material and financial asset ownership, and human and social 
capital improvements resulting from a type B programme (see discussion in chapter eleven). 
These benefits resulted from a programme with relatively low remuneration but greater 
employment security and, most importantly, a sustained period of employment. These 
findings are consistent with the international literature on PWPs which highlights the 
importance of sustained employment for addressing the challenge of chronic poverty (see 
for example Dev (1995)).  
It is the risk insurance function of sustained employment which can offer preventive or risk 
mitigation benefits, and potentially also enable the accumulation of assets. If the social 
protection impact is to be sustained after programme termination in contexts of chronic 
unemployment, it is critical for PWP employees to have acquired the ‘minimum or threshold 
asset bundle that enables future accumulation’ during the period of programme participation 
(Carter, 2004)39. Unless the poor can accumulate sufficient resources to pass a critical asset 
threshold, they are very likely to fall back into poverty (Carter and May, 1997; Carter, 2004). 
Hence, the social protection challenge is to ‘create enabling conditions such that people can 
use time and markets to improve their well-being (and/or that of their children)’ and in this 
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way ‘crowd-in’ private accumulation (ibid). This is unlikely to happen if accumulation can 
only occur over a short period of time, as is typical in the short-term employment periods of 
employment offered by conventional labour-based infrastructure creation PWP (types A and 
C). Programmes focusing on the maintenance, rather than construction, of physical 
infrastructure or the provision of social services offer a greater opportunity for an extended 
period of wage transfer, and in this way increase the potential for accumulation to cross the 
critical asset threshold. Where there is a desire to create medium to long term PWP 
employment opportunities, the development of social sector employment may be of 
particular value, for example, in the areas of Early Childhood Development (ECD) and 
Home Based Care (HBC).   
Targeting and Coverage 
A third key PWP design option in terms of a programme’s social protection outcome is 
whether a PWP is targeted or universal (available to all those eligible to participate). To some 
extent this choice may be informed by issues of need, in terms of the identification of 
vulnerable groups, but it is also often contingent on the amount of funding available, as this 
dictates the scale of the programme in relation to the number of potential participants in 
search of employment. Universality is only an option if a PWP is implemented on a 
sufficiently large scale, either nationally or within a programme catchment area, such that all 
those seeking work can attain it (or some alternative form of PWP transfer if work is not 
available) and to some extent this is contingent on the institutional structures through which 
PWPs are operationalised, as well as budget constraints. In many cases coverage is an 
artefact of history, particularly where PWPs are project-based rather than part of a national 
social protection or labour market programme implemented directly by the state (typically 
type A, C or D, rather than type B programmes). In the case of project-based PWPs, or 
national programmes contingent on NGO implementation, as in the case of much of the 
MASAF PWP in Malawi, implementation tends to be concentrated in areas where NGOs 
have their programming base, rather than providing equitable coverage or promoting 
implementation in areas of particular need, potentially compromising the equitable 
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In many programmes the wage is deliberately low in order to limit demand for employment, 
in effect making ‘universal’ provision more feasible by virtue of the ‘less eligibility’ condition, 
while at the same time attempting to ensure that the poor are the primary beneficiaries 
(Vaidya and Ahmed, 2007). This form of targeting is administratively cheap, however, the 
efficacy of this approach is open to question in terms of reaching the poorest (Barrett and 
Clay, 2003; Lembani and Madala, 2006). In countries with high levels of poverty, low 
prevailing wages and high rates of unemployment, the use of low wages to promote the self-
selection of the poorest into PWPs may entail setting the wage so low that it fails to meet the 
basic subsistence needs of participants, thereby undermining the social protection rationale 
of programme implementation. Finding the balance between setting a wage low enough to 
limit leakage to the non-poor, while also having a significant impact on the livelihoods of 
participants, remains a key challenge in many PWP contexts.  
Reliance on a capped wage level to promote targeting may represent a rather blunt approach, 
resulting in somewhat approximate targeting outcomes. A capped wage will also reduce the 
reduction in the poverty gap resulting from programme implementation, with direct negative 
social protection consequences, and will reduce the likelihood of capital accumulation in the 
medium term, with negative implications for medium-term transformative outcomes. In 
order to reduce inclusion and exclusion errors, and approach the targeting nuance and 
subtlety often implied in the PWP rhetoric (for example, the targeting of certain 
demographic subgroups such as women or youth), explicit targeting criteria are required 
which reflect the objectives of the programme and recognise the heterogeneous nature of 
the unemployed and their differing needs and potential.40 For example, if household poverty 
reduction is the primary goal, then PWP employment might be targeted at female household 
heads, since research has indicated that this group tends to be more vulnerable, and that 
transfers to female household heads have a greater impact on household welfare than 
transfers to males (Appleton and Collier, 1995). If, however, promoting skills development 
and future employment prospects is the priority, then youths with the ability to travel in 
                                                            
40 It should be noted however, that such criteria are only of value inasmuch as there are means to ensure 
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search of employment, and many years of potential labour market participation ahead of 
them, would be a more appropriate target. Many programmes, however, do not monitor the 
outcome of their targeting strategy, and actual, rather than intended incidence is frequently 
unknown (see discussion in chapter four).  
Scale  
The other key issue determining PWPs’ actual or potential social protection impact is the 
question of scale. PWP scale of operation is rarely mentioned in the discourse, and where it 
is mentioned, it tends to be divorced from reference to programme objectives, the extent of 
need, eligibility, the scale of unemployment, or the size of the labour force (a more neutral 
and readily comparable denominator than unemployment, which tends to be variously 
defined). An example of this is given in Subbarao (2003:2), in which a table listing the scale 
of operation of PWPs in selected countries are provided, but without any means to 
contextualise the amount of employment created. Discussion of the scale of a programme 
without reference to the scale of the problem is problematic in terms of assessing the 
adequacy of social protection coverage offered by a programme, and the potential for that 
programme to contribute to national social protection objectives.  
In Table 3.1 the scale and coverage of eight PWPs from different countries are compared to 
illustrate the diversity of performance. It is interesting to note the low levels of coverage 
achieved in many celebrated programmes, such as AGETIP in Senegal or the South African 
EPWP. Comparisons are problematic given the limited and poor quality data available on 
PWP performance, and crude indicators adopted in many programmes such as ‘jobs created’ 
without reference to the duration, or full or part time nature of the ‘job’. In order to 
promote comparability, two coverage indicators have been constructed and included in the 
table: jobs created per annum as a percentage of the labour force, and annual person-years of 
employment created as percentage of the labour force. Size of labour force was chosen in 
preference to unemployment rate for these comparisons, given international inconsistencies 
in definitions and measurement of unemployment and underemployment. Comparison of 
PWP scale in relation to labour force gives a more readily comparable indicator of the labour 
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unemployment. In order to offer a fiscal comparator across the programmes, programme 
cost as a percentage of GDP has also been calculated41. For each programme, the most 
credible data available have been selected and the data represent the scale of performance at 
peak levels of programme operation – note for India the second figure is an estimate, based 
on programme projections and budgets for 2008/9.  
                                                            
41 Note, this measure is used for indicative purposes only and does not imply that programmes are 
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Table 3.1: A Comparative Assessment of PWP Scale  


























2,210,000 n/a 17.0 13.0 n/a 0.90 
India: NREGP 
(2006/7)** 
21,200,000 4,109,091 427.0 5.0 0.96 0.30 
India: NREGP 
(2008/9 est)*** 
n/a n/a  15 3.00 1.0 
Indonesia: PK 
(1998/99) 
1,481,481 181,818 92.0 1.6 0.20 0.20 
Ireland: CEP 
(90s) 
41,000 n/a 1.4 2.9 n/a 0.18 
Ethiopia: PSNP 
(2006/7) 
1,500,000 n/a 31.0 4.8 n/a 2.00 
Senegal: 
AGETIP (2004) 
21,000 n/a 4.5 0.5 n/a 0.80 
South Africa: 
EPWP (2006/7) 
200,000 70,000 16.0 1.3 0.44 0.20**** 
USA: New Deal 
Programmes 
(1933-1940) 
n/a n/a 53.0 3.4-8.9 n/a 3.9 
Source: McCord (2007b)  
Notes: * The Jefes programme has a small companion programme, the Programmea de Emergencie 
Laboral (PEL), which is similar in terms of benefits but has slightly differing eligibility criteria 
(Harvey, 2007b), and so the data here are not representative of total PWP expenditure or 
performance in Argentina.                                                                                                            
 ** NREGP 2006/7 was only operational in 200 out of 600 districts.                                                
 *** Indicative figures only based on assumption that programme is taken to scale as anticipated, 
i.e. programme is extended to all 600 districts by 2009, total cost anticipated to be approx 1% 
GDP, and approx 15% of the total labour force is likely to be employed.                                 
 **** This figure rises to 0.47% if the funding allocation to infrastructure is included, however, 
since this is not additional funding, but existing funds which are to be used in a more labour 
intensive way, this figure has not been used in the table , and the 0.20% represents only social 
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In Figure 3.2 the budgetary allocations to the various programmes are compared as a 
percentage of GDP to illustrate the diversity of scale from a fiscal perspective. 
Figure 3.2: PWP Costs as Percentage of GDP by Country 



































































Source: Derived from McCord (2007b). 
In Figure 3.3 the number of jobs created within the PWP is presented as a percentage of the 
total labour force. This also indicates the significant range in operational scales of the 
illustrative programmes, despite the programmes sharing similar objectives in terms of 
addressing unemployment and poverty. Senegal’s AGETIP, based on labour intensification 
of infrastructure expenditure, in line with the ILO’s EIIP, has the lowest share of workers as 
a percentage of the labour force, at 0.5%, while Ethiopia’s Employment Guarantee 
Programme, the NREGP as currently implemented, and the USA’s New Deal Programmes 
of the 1930s provided similar levels of employment – 5 to 6% of the labour force – while 
Argentina’s Jefes programme at its height, and the anticipated full operational scale of the 
NREGP are significantly higher, at 13 and 15% respectively.42  
                                                            
42 Actual Jefes performance was higher than the data suggest, as programme implementation stimulated a 
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Source: Derived from McCord (2007b). 
Such a comparison by scale is rarely conducted in the literature, and is extremely instructive 
in illustrating the problem of considering PWPs as a generic intervention, in terms of 
illustrating the diversity of scale of operation, even in programmes with national coverage 
aspirations. While each of these PWPs enjoys a profile in the international literature as a 
significant national policy response to social protection needs, the scale disparities illustrated 
above when the programmes are contextualised, imply significantly differing social 
protection outcomes, with the South African and Senegalese programmes being unlikely to 
have a similar impact to the far larger Argentinian or Indian programmes, due to their more 
limited coverage and cost, although in the domestic policy discourse all are presented as 
similar social protection interventions.43  
                                                            
43 These findings are interesting given that the levels of unemployment in South Africa are higher than 
those experienced at the time of implementation of all the other programmes, with the possible exception of 
the USA during the 1930s, and so a larger scale South African PWP response might have been anticipated. 
The comparative scale and limited fiscal allocation to the programme is also noteworthy, given that it is 
intended to provide a significant social protection impact as part of the government’s social security 
framework, and to functionally replace a social grant for the working age poor unemployed. Social 
Transformation 2007, the ANC Policy Discussion Document, states that ‘to respond to the plight of the 
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Many PWPs which do not attempt to offer ‘universal’ access to employment are 
geographically limited, and even within their geographical operational areas, coverage is 
often limited to a small percentage of those eligible. Even in ‘national’ PWPs such as the 
EPWP in South Africa, or the MASAF PWP in Malawi, coverage is limited to a small 
proportion of those eligible, and only in a limited number of locations (Chirwa, 2007), 
resulting in a patchy and inequitable distribution of social protection provision, even without 
taking into account the variable quality of the provision, in terms of wages, working 
conditions, etc.  
Similarly, ILO supported EIIPs tend to offer small-scale localised employment 
opportunities, which as a result are highly rationed, rather than providing comprehensive 
social protection provision at a national, regional or even local level. In cases where such a 
PWP represents the national response to the problem of the working age poor, and is the 
sole programme to target this group, or when it is the only social protection intervention 
available in a particular location, these coverage limitations may represent serious 
deficiencies and inequities in social protection provision. 
The Quality of Employment  
Coverage limitations represent a ceiling dictating the maximum proportion of eligible 
beneficiaries who may be included within a given programme (assuming it is perfectly 
targeted to this group without significant inclusion or exclusion errors), and therefore 
determine the extent to which members of this group will or will not receive social 
protection benefits per se.  However, it is the quality of the employment offered which affects 
the degree of social protection benefit experienced by participants. This issue of employment 
quality has not been explored explicitly in the literature, but has been suggested by the work 
of Dev (1995), who argued that the availability and predictability of wage flows over time 
was more important than the net value of the transfer, in terms of its consumption 
smoothing benefits. Other key factors influencing the quality of employment, and the social 
                                                            
unemployed into productive and gainful employment, while also delivering training to increase the capacity 
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protection consequences of PWP employment are the predictability of the wage and the 
flexibility of employment44. Wage predictability takes the form of participant certainty that 
wages will be paid, and regularity of wage payment and stability of the wage level. Delays in 
payment and uncertainty over payment levels (sometimes resulting from fees or deductions 
extracted illegally by programme implementers) can undermine potential social protection 
benefits which would otherwise accrue to workers from a given wage. Payment delays, often 
resulting from administrative difficulties or delays in donor funding, can result in significant 
difficulties for households who have given up alternative survival strategies to participate in 
PWPs, in the hope of timely cash remuneration. However, the lack of voice and feedback 
opportunities in PWPs means that although the quality of the wage is challenged in many 
programmes by such implementation problems, the issue fails to enter into the mainstream 
PWP discourse as a factor influencing the social protection outcome of the programme45. 
Providing such wage predictability reduces the information asymmetries often experienced 
within PWPs when workers are not sure how much, or when they will be paid, or, in some 
scenarios where scepticism exists about government capacity and corruption, whether they 
will be paid at all for their labour.  
Employment flexibility has a range of characteristics, including the provision of part-time 
employment opportunities, flexible working hours, provision for the acceptance of substitute 
labour if a PWP worker is sick or has the opportunity to participate in alternative, temporary 
income-generating activities, and a mechanism for the permanent replacement of one worker 
with another household member in the case of death. The consequence of such employment 
flexibility is that it increases the likelihood of participation by members of labour-
constrained households, who might otherwise find it impossible to reconcile PWP 
employment with their own ongoing domestic responsibilities, and hence not be able to 
                                                            
44 These employment flexibility innovations were included in the Zibambele programme in KwaZulu-
Natal, see chapter nine, and were felt by participants to be a major factor in the success of the programme. 
45 This issue mirrors the current debate about donor relations with recipient governments, which asserts that 
aid must be regular and predictable and allocated for a sustained period (see for example the report of the 
Commission for Africa (2005)). While this argument has been largely accepted by donors in terms of 
bilateral aid flows, it has not translated into programmes which respect similar principles in relation to the 
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benefit from participation. It also enables workers to optimise their livelihoods 
opportunities, by reducing the need to forgo additional ad hoc employment opportunities, 
while employed in the PWP. Finally, and critically, it recognises that morbidity and mortality 
are key drivers of vulnerability among the poor, and allows households to protect household 
PWP income, even in times of sickness and death. These employment quality factors not 
only increase access to PWPs by the poor, but also help to empower participants, enabling 
them to maintain autonomy over livelihoods decisions, and to optimise their income from a 
variety of sources while participating in the programme. In these ways, the social protection 
benefits accruing are positively affected by the provision of ‘good quality’ employment, 
which is sensitive to the needs and opportunities of the workers. 
Implementation Modalities 
PWP performance also varies considerably as a consequence of choices relating to 
implementation modalities, which are determined by a range of budgetary, administrative 
and political considerations. While some programmes are implemented directly by the state, 
others are implemented by NGOs, directly by multilateral donors such as the World Food 
Programme or the European Union, through autonomous non-governmental Programme 
Management Units (PMU), as, for example, the European Union PWP in Malawi, or by 
private engineering and construction contractors46. These different implementation 
modalities can have a significant impact on PWP outcomes, affecting the relative 
prioritisation given to different PWP objectives.  Private sector-implemented PWPs, for 
example, tend to place lower priority on poverty targeting or social protection considerations 
than on attaining the contractually specified technical outcomes relating to the assets created 
(service provision objective sets). This is in large measure due to the limited contractual 
incentives for private sector implementers to ensure that social protection components of 
the programme, such as targeting the poorest, or ensuring timely wage payment, are satisfied 
(McCord, 2006a). This situation may be compared to implementation by other agencies for 
whom social protection objectives may dominate, for example, the Ethiopian PSNP is 
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implemented by local administrators, for whom social protection considerations relating to 
the distribution of the PWP wage outweigh objectives relating to asset delivery.  
Social protection performance can also be undermined by the selection of inappropriate 
performance indicators, irrespective of the institution responsible. Where process and output 
indicators are selected over outcome and impact indicators, and no baseline data on 
participants are available, incentives for effective PWP implementation and the promotion of 
social protection impacts are marginalised, in favour of the attainment of more limited and 
more easily measurable process indicators. This preoccupation with process over impact has 
been noted in PWPs internationally, and in the case of the South African EPWP this was 
described as a triumph of ‘form over function’ (LTF, 2006), with the agency responsible for 
programme implementation being more concerned with meeting the process or throughput 
targets in terms of days of employment and training offered, against which their 
performance was measured, than with assessing either the direct or indirect social protection 
impact of programme participation. 
In these ways, institutional and management modalities can serve to shift the relative 
importance of coexisting objective sets, reduce accountability, and undermine incentives for 
effective (in terms of social protection outcomes) programme implementation.  
3.4 PWP and Social Protection Conclusion  
PWPs may have a range of diverse direct and indirect social protection impacts which are 
fundamentally governed by the appropriateness of the type of PWP selected in relation to 
the particular labour market context in which it is implemented. A range of contextual, 
design and implementation factors can affect the social protection performance of a 
programme, with some programmes which are nominally concerned with social protection 
provision, for example, prioritising asset construction over sustained welfare benefits during 
implementation. To be effective, PWP design needs to take into consideration the key 
factors outlined above, and intended to form a significant component of national social 
protection strategies, PWPs must provide adequate levels of coverage. PWP design also 
needs to include appropriate incentive structures, and to ensure that implementing agencies 
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integration across the range of ministries and other players implied in the implementation of 
a PWP. Appropriate PWP design is critical in determining the eventual social protection 
outcome, and a mismatch between the labour market context and the type of PWP selected 
can severely undermine the social protection benefits experienced by participants. These 
issues of programme design and programme objectives are explored in detail in the 
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4 THE SOCIAL PROTECTION EVALUATION OF PWPs  
Having developed a typology of PWPs in chapter two, and explored the various objective 
sets associated with PWP performance, including both those which contribute directly to 
social protection outcomes, and those whose contribution is more etiolated, the previous 
chapter reviewed how different types of PWPs can deliver social protection outcomes in 
differing labour market contexts, and the design considerations which influence potential 
social protection outcomes, and this chapter now reviews the question of PWP performance 
evaluation. This chapter focuses on the international literature on PWP evaluation and 
questions the adequacy of the tools which are currently in use for making an empirical 
assessment of programme performance in terms of social protection impact.  
The assumption underlying much of the international literature relating to PWP evaluation 
norms, is that it is appropriate to evaluate PWPs primarily in terms of cost effectiveness. It is 
useful to recall that a cost effective action may be defined, at the simplest level, as one which 
is ‘economical in terms of the goods or services received for the money spent’47, having both 
a cost and an output component. This chapter identifies major problems with both 
components, with indicators of both cost and impact being loosely and inconsistently 
conceptualised and calculated. This chapter argues that these empirical problems are 
indicative of a more fundamental question of relating to programme incidence, which should 
be central to any evaluation of the social protection performance of a given instrument, but 
is overlooked or oversimplified in much of the literature relating to public works. Moreover, 
it is argued that the poor definition of programme objectives, or the inclusion of a plurality 
of objectives which are not adequately or explicitly prioritised can contribute to further 
confusion regarding the ascription of programme failure or success.  
4.1 PWP Cost Effectiveness  
In the PWP discourse, PWP cost-effectiveness is assessed on the basis of the cost of 
aggregate employment created, with the employment created either considered an end in 
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itself, the ultimate outcome, where employment creation is the primary objective, or a 
proximate outcome on the basis of the assumption that other desired benefits will accrue 
from the provision of that employment (for example, employment created is instrumental in 
delivering social protection benefits or reducing poverty). Central to such cost effectiveness 
evaluations are the key issues of cost and impact, inasmuch as they relate to employment 
created. This chapter critically reviews these issues of cost and impact in terms of the three 
main approaches used in PWP evaluation: i) calculation of the cost per job created, ii) the 
proportion of total programme cost allocated to labour, and iii) the cost per unit of income 
transferred to participants. All three approaches are adopted in the literature in an attempt to 
establish common performance indicators which can render programme performance 
comparable, facilitating analysis and comparison of PWP performance nationally and 
internationally.  
4.2 Cost per Job Created  
In order to assess the cost per job created, it is necessary to determine the amount of 
employment created, and then to analyse this in the light of the programme budget. This 
requires two sets of information; the quantity of employment created and the cost of 
creating it.  
Determining the amount of work created in a PWP for comparative purposes requires a 
definition of the terms ‘work created’ or ‘employment’. Across the literature a range of 
different units of measurement have been used to quantify the amount of employment 
created through PWPs, including ‘jobs’, ‘employment’, ‘workdays’ and ‘person years’ created. 
The term ‘jobs created’ is frequently adopted in the PWP literature (see, for example, Adato 
et al. (1999) with reference to South Africa), but such terminology is problematic in that it 
gives no indication of the nature of the employment created (duration of employment, short 
or long term, part or full time, etc.), rendering any attempt at an analysis of programme 
performance, or cost effectiveness comparison between programmes problematic. 
Consistent and quantifiable terminology is required to facilitate meaningful PWP 
performance analysis. This has been addressed in some of the international literature, 
notably that which is linked to the World Bank, by the adoption of ‘workdays created’ as the 
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(1997)). The reductionism of the concept of ‘workdays created’ is itself problematic 
inasmuch as the nature of the employment created can impact significantly on the social 
protection outcome; nevertheless, this approach does facilitate some degree of international 
performance comparison, in the absence of any alternative consistent descriptive framework 
for PWP employment performance. 
The cost of employment is conventionally measured by dividing the total PWP cost by the 
amount of employment created (however defined). An example of this approach is the 
analysis carried out by Adato et al. (1999), who calculated the cost per workday of 101 PWPs 
implemented as part of the national Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) 
in the Western Cape Province in South Africa during the late 1990s (see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1: Western Cape Cost/Workday and Labour Percentage of Total Cost 
  
Source: Derived from Adato et al. (1999:200). 
Adato et al. found an extremely wide distribution of costs ranging from R40 (US$7) for the 
Working for Water programme to R183 (US$30) for community-based programmes, R229 
(US$37) for National Public Works pilot programmes, and R749 (US$123) for programmes 
in the transport sector48(1999 prices).  
4.3 Percentage of Total Costs Allocated to Labour 
Adato et al. also calculated the percentage of total programme costs allocated to labour by 
estimating the cost of the wage transfer to participants as a proportion of total programme 
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cost. This is also illustrated in Figure 4.1, where the percentage of total costs allocated to 
labour in the form of wages ranges from 73% to 11%, decreasing as the cost per workday 
increases (ibid)49. These findings are of interest as they indicate that simultaneously there can 
be a significant range of cost per workdays provided through a PWP, even within a single 
geographical area, and a single national programme, with the most costly programmes 
absorbing up to 89% of workday creation cost in non-labour expenditure50. The most 
efficient programmes in terms of the cost of employment provision, with low cost per 
workday and a high percentage of total cost transferred as wages, fall in the upper left-hand 
quadrant of Figure 4.1.  
Such analysis of cost per workday and labour as a percentage of total cost over a range of 
programmes is almost unique in the PWP literature, as it is rare to have credible and 
comparable data on either programme performance in terms of employment created, or 
programme cost. It is also particularly unusual to have comparable data for a range of 
programmes in a single location. A recent study which attempted to carry out a cost-
effectiveness analysis of a range of PWPs in Malawi and Zambia highlighted the 
impossibility of gathering comparable basic data on total PWP cost from the main national 
and international agencies operating PWPs in the country, despite exhaustive attempts 
(White and McCord, 2006). For the great majority of PWPs, data about the structure of 
employment created, the number of workdays created, the wage level and administrative and 
management costs, are not available and hence, the proportion of programme cost allocated 
to wage transfer and management/materials cannot be calculated with any degree of 
confidence. This concern was highlighted by Devereux and Solomon in their 2006 review of 
international employment creation programmes: 
                                                            
49 The percentage cost of material inputs in a public works programme plays a key role in determining the 
proportion of programme costs being transferred to labour; the low material input costs in the Zibambele 
programme account for the high proportion of programme funds being transferred directly as wage costs.  
50 Discrepancies in the wage structure of these programmes (with wages ranging from R29 to R82 a day 
(US$5 to US$13), have implications in terms of equity and labour unrest as well as cost effectiveness, and 
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‘... there is a dearth of detailed disaggregated information on job creations [sic] costs, 
partly because the management costs are usually hidden in regular government 
administration.’ (2006:6) 
These concerns render analysis of the cost effectiveness of PWP and programme 
comparisons on this basis problematic.  
4.4 Attempts at International Comparison: Cost-Effectiveness Ratio Analysis  
A significantly more sophisticated appraisal framework for considering the question of PWP 
cost effectiveness has been developed by Ravallion (1998). This framework attempts to 
generate internationally comparable analyses of the cost-effectiveness of PWPs by calculating 
programmes’ ‘cost-effectiveness ratios’, which are estimated by modelling the net gain to 
poor workers arising from a PWP, and then by deriving from this ratio the unit cost of a 
transfer to the poor (Ravallion, 1998; Subbarao, 2001). This model represents a significant 
advance on the approaches discussed above, taking into account a number of critical factors 
which influence the social protection benefit, and which extend beyond the basic labour 
intensity of the intervention (percentage of costs to labour). Key considerations included in 
the model are an assessment of the proportion of the wages which go to poor workers, a 
calculation of the net wage gain (based on a consideration of the cost of participating, in 
terms of income forgone, which is derived on the basis of expected earnings outside the 
programme and the probability of finding such work), indirect benefits accruing to the poor 
when assets are created in their neighbourhoods, and the potential rate of cost recovery 
which might accrue to the state from the asset created.  
While the Ravallion approach offers greater insights than a simple cost per workday analysis, 
it is still dogged by a number of significant data and conceptual limitations. In terms of data 
constraints, the main problems remain the paucity of adequate and comparable basic cost 
data, and the lack of adequate data in most programmes to populate the targeting and impact 
components of the model, resulting in a reliance on heroic assumptions to populate key 
components of the methodology, particularly with regard to incidence (the effectiveness of 
poverty targeting and extent of leakage to the non-poor), the accuracy of assumed local 
unemployment rate, the benefit cost ratio (the extent to which projects produce benefits 
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participants), as discussed in McCord (2003). Changes in any of the assumptions informing 
these components of the model could significantly alter the model’s conclusions, and the 
number of programmes which could be modelled without recourse to assumed values in 
these areas is extremely limited. On this basis, it is argued that the meaningfulness and 
credibility of this type of cost-effectiveness analysis is severely constrained and of limited use 
in the development of an empirical evidence base to inform the relative performance of 
PWPs, and their selection as appropriate instruments for social protection (or other) 
purposes.  
Subbarao takes the criticism further by highlighting a number of conceptual, rather than 
empirical limitations to this approach: 
‘A word of caution is needed in interpreting the cost-effectiveness calculations cited 
in this paper [the Ravallion framework outlined above]. These calculations take into 
account only the transfer benefits conferred to the poor. The risk benefits to 
consumption smoothing are rarely factored into the calculations of cost-
effectiveness. [...] Another limitation of cost-effectiveness calculations is that only the 
direct transfer benefits are factored into account. Indirect benefits of workfare 
programs in terms of short- and medium-term impacts on the rural market wage rate 
and the (indirect) social beneficial impacts of female empowerment have not been 
taken into account in the available estimates of benefits and costs.’ (2001:viii) 
In relation to the three vectors identified in the previous chapter, it is clear that while the 
approach attempts to address both wage and to some extent asset benefits, the value of 
future gains from the assets created is a derived variable, rather than being empirically 
calculated on the basis of post hoc evaluation, and that the work experience vector is not 
included in the model. More fundamentally, the Ravallion model stops at the point of 
calculating the financial cost of a unit of transfer to the poor, rather than assessing the social 
protection meaning of the transfer, in terms of its impact in reducing the poverty gap 
experienced by participants, or the function of the transfer in terms of promoting any of the 
three possible social protection states identified in chapter three.  
4.5 Summary of Critique  
The key failings inherent in the dominant approaches discussed above may be summarised 










The Anatomy of Public Works   Chapter 4: The Social Protection Evaluation of PWPs 
 
  82
make heroic assumptions regarding the value of the asset to the community (in the case of 
the Ravallion framework), the lack of analysis of actual impacts (wage, asset and skills) and 
social protection outcomes, and the failure to examine incidence. The approaches fail to take 
account of the diversity of PWP design, with particular reference to the nature and quality of 
employment offered; factors which, as has been argued above, have a significant bearing on 
programme impact. The above approaches are weak in terms of evaluating impact and can 
establish only certain cost components, and these only to the extent that the data are credible 
and complete.  This situation is further compounded by profound data limitations and 
inconsistencies which render cross programme comparison problematic.  
There is a fundamental lacuna in the literature and the dominant evaluation methods 
adopted; while the ‘cost effectiveness’ of a programme may be established, inasmuch as the 
limitations of the three approaches allow, its poverty reduction or social protection impact is 
not included in conventional analytical approaches.  Instead these approaches focus on: i) 
the cost of transferring one unit of income to a household, or ii) the cost of creating 
employment, both of which are process rather than outcome indicators. For this reason it is 
argued that no significant conclusions regarding a programme’s social protection 
effectiveness can be drawn from the three approaches discussed. The implication of this is 
that even the Ravallion framework is an incomplete appraisal mechanism, which does not 
offer adequate insights into cost-effectiveness in terms of the provision of social protection, 
in as much as it does not include the poverty alleviation or social protection impact of an 
intervention, focusing instead on the cost effectiveness of the process of the transfer itself, a 
proximate, rather than ultimate outcome. In the Ravallion approach the only reference to 
impact other than the quantity of employment created is the assumed current and future 
benefits of the assets created, , but the estimation of these benefits is in most cases based on 
the adoption of heroic sets of assumptions rather than empirically determined. Addressing 
this failing is critical for meaningful appraisal of the social protection impacts of PWPs, 
given the explicit anti-poverty objective of most schemes.  
4.6 Factors Determining Cost Effectiveness  
The key problems with the approaches outlined above may be summarised as follows: i) they 
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terms of programme-specific objectives, and ii) they fail to take into account a variety of 
intermediating factors impacting on cost effectiveness, with the consequence that the 
resulting analysis may be neither internally rigorous or meaningful, nor comparable with 
other programme analysis. The core factors which would need to be included in a more 
meaningful assessment of cost effectiveness are discussed below. 
Objectives 
Firstly, a PWP’s cost effectiveness can only be assessed against the extent to which it 
achieves its objectives (Gottschalk, 1997), and to this end clarity on the explicit objectives of 
a programme and identification of the relative status of primary and subordinate objectives is 
critical, although often absent in both programming and the literature. Given the multiplicity 
of PWP design options, and the diversity of potential PWP objectives, set out in chapter 
two, the focus on job creation per se which dominates the literature as the measure of PWP 
performance, rather than performance against the other objectives which may be included in 
a PWP, either as direct objectives themselves, or proximate objectives contributing to social 
protection, is problematic. An illustration of the implication of the wide divergence in 
programme objectives for cost effectiveness analysis, and programme evaluation overall, is 
offered by comparing the NREGP in India with Ethiopia’s PSNP and South Africa’s 
EPWP. Within the policy rhetoric there is no expectation of ‘graduation’ from the NREGP, 
whereas within the PSNP and EPWP there is an anticipation that sustained livelihoods 
benefits will accrue to participants, and lead to sustained ‘transformative social protection’ 
outcomes after a limited period of employment in the programme. The NREGP is 
conceptualised as providing social protection through the provision of paid employment, as 
required, in order to prevent the distress selling of assets, etc., with no expectation that 
participants will experience transformative social protection benefits or graduate out of 
poverty as a consequence of programme participation. On this basis the programme offers 
repeated employment, up to a maximum of 100 days per annum, and the fact that the same 
participants might return to the programme each year would represent a success in terms of 
the programme’s objectives, inasmuch as it was offering repeated support to those in need. 
Such a scenario would, however, represent a failure in terms of the objectives of the PSNP 
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informal sector employment, through the process of transformative social protection 
resulting from PWP employment51.  On the basis of the Ravallion framework each 
programme would be equally ‘successful’ if the cost per job created were equal, irrespective 
of the differing relative priorities of the two programmes’ respective objective sets and 
anticipated social protection function, and performance against these objectives. This 
illustrates the fundamental importance of taking a PWPs’ explicit objectives into account 
when attempting to assess cost-effectiveness, and programme performance overall.  
The analytical approaches outlined above share the common assumption that the ‘creation 
of employment’ is de facto an ultimate objective, an end in itself, whereas within the social 
protection discourse, employment creation has an inherently instrumental function. If a 
programme’s objectives are limited to the promotion of aggregate employment, rather than 
the provision of social protection, the premise of these evaluation approaches may be 
appropriate. However, in terms of a social protection objective, creating employment is only 
of value in as much as it serves to reduce poverty, as ‘work does not necessarily guarantee a 
way out of poverty’ (Øyen and Wilson, 1999:207). This insight has been elaborated in recent 
work by Wood, who has developed the concept of ‘adverse incorporation’ (Wood, 1999). 
This concept implies that while workers may be included in the formal or informal labour 
market (or in a PWP), inclusion (set in contrast to the concept of ‘social exclusion’) may not 
necessarily guarantee adequate social protection outcomes, see du Toit (2004).  
An assessment of the impact of PWP participation in terms of the social protection impact 
on participants is essential if the success of the programme is to be assessed against social 
protection objectives. However, social protection impact is often omitted in the PWP 
evaluation literature, even where programmes have explicit social protection objectives.   
Social protection impact monitoring was not, for example, included in the Zibambele 
programme, or any other programmes within the South African EPWP, nor most PWPs 
internationally, despite their (direct or indirect) social protection objectives. It is proposed 
                                                            
51 Under the NREGP, households can reapply for EGS employment as long as they wish, while under the 
EPWP, participation is limited by statute to a maximum of two years, and under the PRSP it is limited by 
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that this omission occurs in part due to the assumption that employment provision, 
irrespective of quality, will have a significant impact on social protection; an assumption 
which, as has been argued above, is not supported from either a theoretical or empirical 
perspective.  
Actual Cost  
In order to assess cost effectiveness, it is essential that the actual costs of a PWP are known, 
but this in itself is problematic as there is no consensus on the appropriate set of costs for 
inclusion in PWP analysis, rendering any attempt at comparison, either nationally or 
internationally, problematic. As a consequence, costings tend to be idiosyncratic. There are 
several factors underlying this problem, relating to the complexity of PWP implementation. 
In part, the cost-data problem reflects the fact that PWPs are institutionally complex, often 
crossing several funding and expenditure jurisdictions as a result of the inherent complexity 
of PWP design and implementation. As a consequence of this complexity, there are a 
considerable variety of cost centres under which the diverse set of activities requiring PWP 
expenditure may be located (local government, Department of Public Works, Department of 
Planning, Department of Labour, Department of Education, NGOs, QUANGOs (Quasi 
Non-Governmental Organisations, which are state-funded organisations outside the normal 
governmental structure, and may be responsible for PWP implementation), PMUs (donor-
funded Programme Management Units, which implement PWPs in structures which are 
parallel to those of government), donors, advisors or consultants.)  
The costs of some of the diverse activities required for PWP implementation are often 
excluded from the PWP budget itself; PWP budgets frequently exclude costing of the 
administrative management costs of PWPs, particularly when implementation costs are 
incurred toward the bottom end of the state hierarchy, at district or village level, and where 
there is a general acceptance that the implementation tasks should be performed without 
budgetary allocations or incentives, even though they may be additional to the existing scope 
of responsibility, and fall to already overburdened local officials (UK DFID, 2003a; Karuri et 
al., 2008). In this way, many PWPs imply an additional set of work activities representing an 
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required to play a central, but unfunded, role in implementation (as in the case of the EPWP 
in South Africa and MASAF in Malawi (Karuri et al., 2007). As a result, when programmes 
are costed, the budget lines included as ‘PWP’ line items can vary greatly, and there may be 
potentially sizeable hidden costs. The extent to which these are or are not included in 
estimates of programme cost can have a significant impact on apparent cost effectiveness 
results. In this context it may be difficult to distinguish variation in cost effectiveness from 
noise. Often donors and implementing agencies themselves have difficulties in assessing the 
actual total cost of PWPs, including implementation, given the extent of the unknown real 
costs of local government management, technical design and monitoring, material costs, 
contractor costs, etc.  A recent attempt by DFID to make such a costing in Zambia and 
Malawi in order to compare the actual cost of the provision of social protection through 
PWP and alternative instruments such as social grants was ultimately abandoned due to the 
impossibility of garnering comparable or meaningful PWP data in either of the countries 
concerned (White and McCord, 2006). 
This problem also reflects the fact that different types of PWPs may be differently 
conceptualised in terms of their budgets. For example, WFP and USAID do not tend to 
monetise the food component of food-based PWPs (FFW programmes) with the result that 
the wage component in many PWPs implemented or supported by these agencies is 
considered ‘free’, rather than reflecting actual costs in terms of purchase value, shipping, 
storage, etc. For donors such as WFP, the disaggregation of specific programme costs, and 
attempts to monetise the value of the in-kind payment in PWPs is both technically 
problematic, and politically sensitive (ibid.). The consequence of WFP and other donors’ 
inability to share budgetary data on the true cost to the donor community of FFW 
programmes, in terms of food purchase, transportation or storage (or factoring the cost of 
downstream implications of massive food importation on the local economy and food 
producers), is a lack of transparency regarding the true cost of PWPs utilising donated food 
as the basis for the payment. 
The lack of any norms or conventions governing the selection of costs which should be 
included when assessing programme cost, is compounded by problems of data availability, a 
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derived in each instance. This has implications for any attempt to assess the cost 
effectiveness of individual programmes, and renders cross PWP comparison, and any kind 
of cost effectiveness across different social protection instruments, problematic. Together, 
these factors risk undermining the reliability of much current PWP comparative cost 
assessment analysis.  
Incidence Data  
Socio-economic data to indicate incidence are critical in any attempt to assess the 
effectiveness of any PWP in terms of social protection or poverty-related objectives.  
However, in most PWPs, particularly those offering short-term employment, or developed 
in response to an emergency, e.g. type A, programmes, even baseline socio-economic data 
are rarely gathered on programme participants, as argued by Ravallion: 
‘For safety-net interventions, such as workfare programs, that have to be set up 
quickly in response to a macroeconomic or agro-climatic crisis, it is often unfeasible 
to delay the operation in order to do a baseline survey.’ (2003:8) 
However, even large-scale programmes which have not been developed under emergency 
conditions, and which have had significant international guidance, typically have not 
gathered baseline socio-economic data on participants; neither the PSNP in Ethiopia, nor 
the CBPWP or EPWP in South Africa, nor the MASAF PWP in Malawi gathered baseline 
data from which programme incidence could be assessed. In most cases, it is simply assumed 
by implementing agencies that PWPs’ ‘less eligibility’ characteristics (the work requirement 
and low wage), will be sufficient to ensure that those for whom the programme was intended 
are actually participating in the programme. There is little evidence to suggest that this 
assumption is robust, and where tested post hoc, significant inclusion errors are found in many 
PWPs (Barrett and Clay, 2003; Devereux and Solomon, 2006; Lembani and Mandala, 2006). 
The absence of incidence data for most PWPs renders cost effectiveness impossible to 
assess for programmes in which objectives are related to poverty reduction or social 














If assessing the cost effectiveness of PWPs as components of a wider national social 
protection strategy, it would be necessary to include analysis of various dimensions of 
coverage, including geographical coverage, scale of operation, and universality and rationing, 
in addition to incidence (including consideration of targeting and inclusion and exclusion 
errors), in order to make an assessment of cost effectiveness which would be adequate to 
inform the policy choice. Unusually, in their analysis of the cost effectiveness of a PWP-
based approach to poverty reduction in India, Murgai and Ravallion explicitly take account 
of issues of PWP coverage and targeting and the resultant exclusion and inclusion errors. 
Taking these factors into account they conclude that the NREGP actually represents a 
significantly more expensive way of providing social protection to the poorest than a grant-
based alternative, questioning the cost-effectiveness of a PWP-based response to the 
problem of rural poverty (Murgai and Ravallion, 2005). 
Quality of Employment 
The quality of the ‘employment’ created in a PWP is also a critical determinant of the impact 
of the employment created. However, data on employment quality (duration of employment, 
nature of employment (full or part time), flexibility of working hours, predictability of 
payment, etc) are absent from the cost-effectiveness analysis discussed above. This issue is 
particularly piquant in relation to the ILO’s PWP discourse, with the ILO promoting 
‘decent’ employment, while also promoting PWP employment, which tends in many 
instances, including employment in the ILO’s own EIIP, to fall short in significant measure 
from the terms of employment conditions required under ‘decent work’ (McCord, 2007c). 
The question regarding the quality of jobs, and how different kinds of jobs impact 
differentially on poverty has also been extensively explored by the ILO within the ‘decent 
work’ debate (see, for example, ILO (1999)). The ILO has argued that ‘ “A job at any price” 
is not a strategy for a sustainable reduction in poverty’ (ILO, 2003:36), recognising that the 
quality of employment is a significant determinant of the potential for a job to confer 
income security and hence to contribute to sustained poverty reduction. The ILO argues that 
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‘... productive work in which rights are protected, which generates an adequate 
income, with adequate social protection. It also means sufficient work, in the sense 
that all should have full access to income-earning opportunities. It marks the high 
road to economic and social development; a road in which employment, income and 
social protection can be achieved without compromising workers’ rights and social 
standards.’ (1999, no pagination)  
Clearly there is a significant tension between the decent work identified by the ILO as 
necessary to contribute to sustained poverty reduction, and the quality of work offered in 
most PWPs. In all PWPs, data on the quality of employment created are relevant, since a 
programme offering a single short-term episode (type A, C or D) may have the same 
Ravallion cost-effectiveness ratio as one offering sustained ongoing employment (type B), 
whilst actually offering very different employment ‘products’ with divergent outcomes in 
terms of poverty reduction and social protection. From the ILO statement above, it is clear 
that types A, C and D PWPs are unlikely to conform to the definition of ‘decent work’, with 
the associated benefits.  
A key factor underlying the differential quality and impact of type A, C and D PWPs on the 
one hand and type B PWPs on the other is the dimension of employment duration, which is 
missing from the conventional conceptualisation of PWP employment adopted in 
programme evaluation. This is a critical omission which fails to recognise the impact of the 
duration of transfer receipt in determining both the consumption smoothing and the 
accumulation consequences of PWP participation, both of which are likely to impact 
significantly on social protection outcome.  
Assets 
The PWP work conditionality necessarily entails additional costs above any administrative 
costs common to both PWPs and alternative instruments, since the creation of assets and 
services requires significant additional material and management input costs, this is referred 
to as the PWP cost premium in the text below. The work conditionality also implies 
additional benefits in terms of the assets created, which may have a range of direct and 
indirect social protection benefits. For this reason an assessment of the cost effectiveness of 
a PWP needs to take into account not only the additional cost of asset creation, but also the 
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those assets accrue.  This is necessary if meaningful cost-effectiveness comparisons are to be 
made between PWPs, or between PWPs and alternative instruments. However, as we have 
seen, an analysis of the value of assets created, and the incidence of asset benefits, is absent 
from the commonly used cost-effectiveness approaches. Even in the Ravallion framework, 
the value of assets created is not empirically ascertained on the basis of the quality, 
appropriateness or sustainability of assets produced over time (be they services or physical 
infrastructure52). The time dimension is critical here, with most PWP evaluations ceasing at 
the point at which infrastructure construction is completed, frustrating any aspirations to 
assess the value of the asset created over time.  
It would be economically justifiable to spend more per unit transferred through PWPs, 
compared with alternative social protection instruments, if the assets created were of a 
current and future value which was commensurate with the premium (how a ‘commensurate’ 
value would be quantified is potentially an area of considerable debate, which will not be 
explored here53). There is a serious problem of data availability in this area, but 
notwithstanding this problem, the general omission of this issue from the PWP cost-
effectiveness literature is a major problem, representing PWPs as though they are closed 
systems, and largely disregarding the additional cost premium and unknown benefit impacts 
of the assets created. As a result, any conclusions regarding the ‘cost effectiveness’ of PWPs, 
or the desirability of PWPs over alternatives, remain highly compromised.  
4.7 The Real Value of the Wage Benefit  
Most evaluations adopt the PWP wage income (the gross income) as the value of the 
transfer to participants, and it is only in recent years that it has been acknowledged, although 
                                                            
52 Either physical or social infrastructure may be provided through a PWP, with the former referring to the 
physical assets conventionally created through PWPs (such as roads, bridges, irrigation systems), and the 
latter referring to social service provision in the form of home based care for those affected by HIV/AIDS, 
or the provision of Early Child Care and Development (ECCD) services, as in the case of the EPWP in 
South Africa (EPWP, 2004a).  
53 Factors which would need to be taken into consideration would include relative costs of 
construction/service provision/maintenance using labour rather than capital-intensive approaches (this will 
be in part a function of the relative labour and capital costs in any given context), the quality, sustainability 
and relevance of the asset created, rate of depreciation of the asset, implementation of maintenance plan, 
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still not universally operationalised, that the wage transfer may not be synonymous with the 
cash value of the transfer to recipients (see Van de Walle (1998)). In the social protection 
literature, a cash transfer is assumed to have a value to the participant which is functionally 
equivalent to the value of the transfer, on the basis of the assumption that access costs (such 
as travel, procurement of ID, registration, and any ‘emoluments’ paid to gate keepers), are 
minimal and diminish over time. However, in the case of a PWP, the net income value of the 
PWP wage has been found to be significantly below the gross value in all instances where it 
has been monitored, once income forgone has been taken into account. Typically, income 
forgone, based only on an assessment of wage labour opportunities forgone, reduces the net 
value of the PWP wage to 50% of the gross PWP wage (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003). While 
the inclusion of income forgone in a calculation of the real value of the PWP wage is 
important, this represents only one of a significant number of potential monetary and non-
monetary costs of PWP participation, which most PWP analysis fails to take into account. 
Pellisery (2008) identified a range of costs relating to non-wage domestic and subsistence 
activity forgone, transport, and the high cost of securing selection in the context of a highly 
rationed resource, as a result of the rents demanded by those controlling access to PWP 
participation, these costs are explored in detail in the following chapter. Although frequently 
overlooked, non-monetary costs may be significant in terms of the social, developmental or 
livelihoods impact of reduced domestic (for example, childcare) or subsistence activities, and 
in some cases extend to the demand for sexual favours in return for PWP selection.54 While 
this demand for ‘emoluments’ in return for PWP selection is symptomatic of a discretionary 
approach to rationed PWP employment, and may be contrasted with a demand-driven, 
rights-based approach to social protection as for example in the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Programme (NREGP) in India, Pellisery’s research, outlined above, indicates that 
even in employment guarantee programmes such as the Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme, there is still space for the extraction of rents in return for programme 
inclusion (Pellisery, 2008).   
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Together these considerations could potentially render the real cost of participation 
significantly higher than generally accepted, rendering the net value of the transfer lower 
than generally accepted in the literature. In the light of this, the issue of the net wage, and the 
assumed benefits thereof, remains problematic in the cost-effectiveness discourse, rendering 
even reductionist cost-effectiveness analysis, focusing exclusively on the employment and 
wage benefits, contestable. The largely unproblematised adoption of a PWP wage without 
taking these cost factors into consideration remains a significant weakness in the current 
evaluation literature.  
Notwithstanding these concerns regarding how an appropriate real value of the wage might 
be determined, after the costs of participation are considered, the fact remains that the wage 
impact of PWPs (in terms of both transfer and stabilisation benefit) is critical in terms of 
reducing the vulnerability of poor households in the context of chronic poverty55.  If the 
impact of PWP on social protection is to be adequately assessed, the impact of the wage, in 
terms of its function within the household economy needs to be included in the appraisal 
framework, in addition to the net value of the wage.  
Ravallion acknowledges that wage benefits from PWPs can be significant, but his work 
focuses primarily on the analysis of PWP transfer benefits, rather than their ‘insurance’ 
function in the context of chronic structural unemployment. This issue is addressed in part 
in Datt and Ravallion (1994a) which adopts a longitudinal approach to examine the poverty 
impact of PWPs, focusing on an income-based definition of poverty, and time allocation 
models. While this expands the conventional programme appraisal scope, it remains limited 
to an income-based conception of poverty, rather than a multidimensional approach, which 
would take into account the impact of the PWP wage transfer on household welfare, and any 
other attendant benefits (potentially the assets and skills development vectors) through 
which the social protection impacts of a PWP may be transmitted more broadly. However, 
the Datt and Ravallion analysis is based on a type B programme, offering ongoing 
employment, and focusing on examining participating households over time during an 
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extended period of PWP employment rather than examining longitudinal impacts extending 
post implementation in type A programmes typical of those implemented in sub-Saharan 
Africa. To assess the social protection impact of a PWP in line with this critique, significant 
additional contextual, programme performance and participant socio-economic data would 
be required, as well as post programme data to clarify cost, impact and incidence.  
For most PWPs, particularly those conforming to types A, C and D, monitoring and 
evaluation processes at best lag behind programme implementation (this problem is 
discussed in relation to diverse programmes in South Africa in Adato et al. (1999) and Karuri, 
et al. (2007)), or, in the case of post programme impact analysis, are not included in 
programme design at all (Ravallion, 2003). For most PWPs, no socio-economic data are 
available on programme participants.  
4.8 Summary of the Fundamental PWP Evaluation Problems  
Most importantly, the conventional approaches to PWP evaluation do not integrate impact 
into their models, in terms of the ultimate social protection outcome of the employment 
generated, the wages and skills transferred, or the assets or services created. The three 
fundamental limitations to the existing evaluation literature may be summarised as: i) 
evaluations tend not to take into account all three vectors of potential benefit transmission, 
focusing almost exclusively on the gross, or at best crudely defined net, wage transfer, ii) 
evaluations do not necessarily assess performance against objectives and frequently consider 
proximate rather than ultimate outcomes, and iii) evaluations typically cease to examine 
programme impacts at the time at which wage disbursements are completed. These 
limitations represent a significant research problem, in terms of assessing the sustained social 
protection outcomes of PWP implementation. The evaluation problem has been accurately 
described in the literature as: 
‘The impact of any intervention can be defined as the ‘difference between the 
outcome indicator with the program and its counterfactual value for participants in 
the absence of the program’ (Galasso and Ravallion (2003:15), cited in Devereux and 
Solomon (2006:24)). 
In the case of PWPs, this process for determining impact is rendered problematic in most 
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and the absence of adequate baseline data to facilitate the identification of an appropriate 
non-treatment group as a counterfactual. On the basis of an international PWP literature 
review, Devereux and Solomon contend that: 
‘Very few impact assessments of employment programmes have been conducted that 
follow this [Galasso’s] rigorous approach. In particular, most evaluations tend to 
assess the direct impacts of the programme on participants in the absence of a non-
participant control group, which makes it impossible to isolate programme impacts 
from the counterfactual.’ (2006:24) 
They also problematise the content of current PWP evaluation, stating that longer-term 
benefits accruing from assets created, training and skills transfer need to be considered in 
addition to PWP wage benefits, arguing that:  
‘... a programme’s overall success must assess the extent to which it is able to transfer 
all these benefits.’ (ibid, 2006:24) 
Devereux and Solomon confirm the argument that the current forms of PWP performance 
assessment are inadequate inasmuch as they understate the benefits of PWPs, by focusing 
almost exclusively on the extent of employment created, and in some cases also the cost of 
the wage transfer. Paradoxically, at the same time such assessments can overstate the social 
protection performance of PWPs, in the sense that they judge PWP success primarily in 
terms of employment created, irrespective of any critical consideration of the social 
protection objectives of the PWP, and the extent to which the achievement of the proximate 
goal of employment contributes to these objectives. 
4.9 Conclusion  
Evaluation of the social protection performance of PWPs is limited, tending to focus on the 
question of cost effectiveness rather than more complex and fundamental questions of 
impact, taking into account the range of potential vectors of impact, a temporal dimension, 
and also the potentially significant beneficiary costs associated with programme participation. 
The conventional approaches to PWP evaluation can establish cost effectiveness only to the 
extent that the data are credible and complete, and do not offer insights into i) the object of 
the cost, i.e. the purpose of the intervention, and what is actually being achieved in return for 
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corpus, the literature on PWP effectiveness tends not to make clear distinctions about the 
type of PWP under discussion, or programme objectives, leading to a pervasive problem of 
comparing non-comparable programmes with differently prioritised sets of objectives and 
widely varying design components.  
Given these limitations, the credibility of current cost effectiveness analysis is open to 
question, particularly analysis which attempts to include a comparative dimension. The 
results of much of the current cost effectiveness literature relating to PWP performance may 
not be generalised across the genre, and may not even offer meaningful insights into 
individual programmes, rendering analysis of the cost effectiveness and efficiency of PWPs 
as a social protection (or other) tool, highly problematic, and thereby undermining the 
potential for evidence-based social protection instrument selection.  
Even using the more complex Ravallion approach, in the absence of data on a range of 
critical issues, it is not possible to confirm whether nominally cost effective social protection 
oriented PWPs are actually having a significant positive social protection impact on 
participants, or whether incidence reflects the intended poverty targeting goals (see McCord 
(2003) for a discussion of the limitations of the Ravallion approach in relation to the South 
African Zibambele programme). The conventional analytical approaches fail to examine the 
meaning of the employment provided in terms of the functioning of the three vectors, wage, 
skills development and asset creation, or their respective social protection impacts. The 
implication of this is that there may be a methodological ‘blind spot’ in terms of critically 
assessing the impact of PWPs and appraising the resulting social protection outcome over 
time, and an equally problematic situation regarding programme cost. This renders both 
PWP ‘cost effectiveness’ analysis and also PWP evaluation as currently conceived extremely 
partial and inadequate instruments to judge programme performance or inform policy 
choice, particularly with reference to the social protection function of PWPs.   
Somewhat singularly in the literature, Devereux and Solomon confirm this analysis arguing 
that: 
‘An exhaustive literature search revealed a surprising dearth of detailed and credible 
evidence on the impacts of employment creation across the world.  We can only 
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employment creation programmes is to provide low cost jobs to large numbers of 
poor people.  Accordingly, a common design principle is that a high ‘alpha-ratio’ 
should be achieved (ie as high a proportion of the total budget as possible should be 
transferred to workers as wags or rations).  This leaves very little budget to allocate 
to a rigorous evaluation of impacts.  Typically, the budget line item for M&E [...] is 
for supervisions of workers and monitoring progress against targets (such as number 
of jobs created) and work norms (such as kilometres of road constructed). The 
broader impacts of the programme on agricultural production, labour markets and so 
on are rarely prioritised or rigorously evaluated.’ (2006:37) 
It is in response to these criticisms highlighting the inadequacy of the existing literature that 
the potential and actual social protection performance of each of the three vectors are 
interrogated in detail in the following three chapters. 
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5 THE THREE VECTORS: WAGE  
The previous chapter argued that existing approaches to PWP impact assessment and 
evaluation are limited inasmuch as they do not recognise the full range of potential sources 
of social protection benefits which were identified in chapter three (the three vectors: wage, 
skills and assets created), but instead focus primarily on the amount of employment created, 
and estimates of the net present value of the wage transferred. Chapters five to seven 
attempt to explore this lacuna in the literature by examining each of the three vectors in turn, 
analysing their potential social protection impact, reviewing the role that each can and does 
play in relation to the different types of PWP and range of PWP objective sets identified 
above. 
This chapter explores the question of how the vector of wage might provide social 
protection benefits. The wage acts directly to alleviate poverty during a period of reduced 
income or livelihoods activity, but it is argued in this chapter that, in addition to this, the 
wage can also serve a risk management function, and in this way provide differing social 
protection outcomes. This analysis is consistent with the analysis of wage by Subbarao 
(1997), who divides the wage benefit into two components: the ‘transfer benefit’ and the 
‘stabilisation benefit’. The transfer benefit is the direct function of the receipt of cash, food 
or in-kind goods into a household to increase consumption, and is generally perceived as the 
main benefit of the wage. Subbarao argues that the ‘stabilisation benefit’, which occurs 
through the provision of PWP employment when demand for labour is low, thereby 
facilitating consumption smoothing on the part of recipients, is a form of ‘risk benefit’ which 
represents an insurance function (ibid). Some argue that this function is at least as important 
as the transfer benefit to the poor (Dev, op cit). These dimensions of the wage impact are 
examined below in relation to the different types of PWP.  
The value of the wage is also explored in relation to the poverty gap, as the size of the wage 
in real terms will affect the extent of transfer and stabilisation benefits. The determination of 
the real value of the PWP wage entails a discussion of the net value of the wage, taking into 
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implied by PWP participation, and the examination of the resulting net wage in relation to 
the consumption gap of participating households.  
Finally, the issues which determine the selection of the wage in PWPs, and the social 
protection consequences of adopting wage levels on the basis of these considerations, are 
explored. These issues are examined below, drawing on empirical analysis from a detailed 
study of the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) PWP (drawing on McCord (2004b) and 
Chirwa et al. (2004a)) and the Zibambele programme in KwaZulu-Natal (McCord, 2002), to 
illustrate dilemmas in the process of wage setting and the social protection consequences of 
the resulting wage choices. 
The main argument outlined below is that the social protection function of the wage is 
contingent on the duration of the period of the wage transfer, and the wage level, and how 
these relate to the nature of the labour market crisis and the depth of the poverty gap 
experienced by participants. 
5.1 The Labour Market Context and the Duration of the Wage Transfer  
As discussed in chapter three, there is a critical relationship between the type of PWP 
selected, the wage level and the nature of the labour market context, in terms of a 
programme’s likely social protection impact. In the context of acute or transient shocks, the 
economic and labour market function of a PWP is to promote short-term consumption 
smoothing during a period of disrupted access to income, particularly where the problem is 
covariate, and in this way prevent or reduce distress selling of assets. In this context, type A, 
C and D programmes offering a single short-term episode of wage transfer can offer a risk 
coping function, providing wage income in response to acute or transient shocks which 
occur as single, once-off periods of heightened vulnerability, resulting from some exogenous 
event.  
While type A, C and D programmes may offer a wage which is sufficient to permit 
consumption smoothing in the short term, such a form of PWP employment (with its 
inherently limited period of wage transfer, which is accessible only on a once-off rather than 
repeated basis) is unlikely to result in sustained social protection benefits in the context of 
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sufficiently high to allow significant accumulation during the limited period of employment 
would the wage vector potentially provide social protection benefits which would be 
sustained after the episode of employment was completed. However, there is no evidence in 
the literature of the occurrence of such accumulation within the context of such 
programmes, with immediate consumption being the dominant use of PWP wage income 
(McCord, 2003; Devereux and Solomon, 2006:25). Hence, in the context of chronic 
unemployment, it is not apparent that in a PWP intervention offering a single episode of 
employment, the wage will confer sustained social protection benefits. The key factor 
inhibiting the poverty-reduction performance of such PWPs in the context of chronic 
poverty and unemployment, is that where PWP employment is short term and wages are 
low, the potential for accumulation is limited and as a result, the intervention is unlikely to 
result provide preventive or promotive forms of social protection, but only protective social 
protection, and a temporary reduction in poverty. The only other way that a short-term 
episode of employment could offer sustained benefits would be if the assets created had a 
significant and sustained impact on livelihoods of participants, or if the skills-development 
benefits were sufficient to improve worker employment performance subsequent to PWP 
employment; however, neither outcome has been documented in the literature. In this 
context, workers are likely to remain poor after PWP participation, with PWP income 
functioning primarily as a temporary wage shock (see, for example, McCord (2004a) with 
reference to South Africa).  
The ILO formally recognises the limitation of short-term employment in such contexts, 
arguing that employment on EIIP-type programmes may have only a temporary impact on 
poverty: 
‘After 25 years of pioneering work in the promotion of employment intensive 
infrastructure investment, the ILO has learnt a number of important lessons. [...] 
labour-intensive investment can open doors for community development and 
provide a temporary boost to the incomes of people living in poverty, but sustaining 
progress requires linked action to promote longer term employment opportunities, 
for example in micro and small enterprises.’ (ILO, 2003: 44, emphasis added) 
The ILO also argues that what is required to address poverty on a sustained basis is social 
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services’ (ILO, 2001:42). According to this approach, ‘income security’, the aspect of social 
security conferred through employment, is a subset of social security, and is defined below: 
‘Income security is about living in a situation in which basic needs, such as food, 
housing, health care and education, can be secured in an uninterrupted way.  This [...] 
requires having both an adequate and regular source of income;’ (2006:9).   
This indicates that the kind of employment required to contribute to social security, and by 
inference to deliver sustained social protection benefits, is employment which offers ‘adequate 
and regular income’. This analysis supports the argument set out above that, by definition, 
short-term type A, C or D PWP employment does not offer the form of regular income 
flow required to provide stabilisation benefits in the context of chronic unemployment. 
Hence, the critical determinant of an effective PWP in this sense is the matching of PWP 
duration with the duration of the labour market crisis. These findings are consistent with the 
international literature on PWPs, which highlights the importance of sustained employment 
for addressing the challenge of chronic poverty. Dev (1995) goes further, arguing that the 
sustained duration of wage income is more important than the gross value of the wage 
transfer, in terms of its social protection outcome. It is the risk insurance function of 
sustained employment which can offer a preventive or risk mitigation function, and 
potentially, although not necessarily, also enable the accumulation of assets such that 
promotive social protection outcomes could result.  
If transformative social protection outcomes are anticipated, the critical need is for PWP 
employees to be able to acquire the ‘minimum or threshold asset bundle that enables future 
accumulation’ (Carter, 2004). Unless the poor can accumulate sufficient resources to pass a 
critical asset threshold, they are very likely to fall back into poverty (Carter and May, 1997; 
Carter, 2004). Hence, in any type of PWP where the objective is a ‘treatment’ of participants, 
such that they move out of reliance on external provision of social protection (a process 
sometimes referred to as graduation (Slater and Sultan, 2005)), transformative outcomes are 
contingent on an accumulation of assets (in the form of material, financial or human capital) 
such that participants are not dependent on ongoing PWP employment. This accumulation 
is partly a function of the duration of employment, and partly a function of the wage level in 
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Devereux and Solomon noted the impact of employment duration on expenditure patterns, 
and the significant implications for investment decisions and capital accumulation:  
‘Workers employed for less than one month spending their wages entirely on basic 
consumption,[...], while others who were employed for longer [...] hired labour, 
purchased fertiliser and started or expanded small business enterprises’ (2006:25) 
This insight is reflected in PWPs offering ongoing employment in the form of EGS, type B 
programmes, in recognition of the need to adopt an appropriate type of PWP to match the 
chronic nature of the labour market problem and to provide an ongoing income. Such 
programmes are implemented in a small number of MICs, the foremost proponent of this 
approach being India, but are extremely rare in LICs. Evidence from the type B Zibambele 
programme in South Africa suggests significant benefits in terms of material and financial 
asset ownership, and the accumulation of human and social capital (see chapter eleven). 
These benefits resulted from a programme with relatively low monthly remuneration, with 
99% of participating households remaining below the poverty line even while employed in 
the programme (McCord, 2004a), but which provided employment security and extended 
employment duration56.  
However, most MICs and almost all LICs adopt type A, C or D PWPs such as the EPWP in 
South Africa, MASAF in Malawi, the Ethiopian national PWP prior to 2005 (when the 
PSNP was introduced), AGETIP in Senegal, and programmes supported by the ILO’s EIIP 
in general. In this way PWPs offering a single limited episode of wage transfer comprise the 
majority of PWPs implemented in developing countries, despite the chronic rather than 
acute nature of the labour market problem many are attempting to address. Hence, most 
PWPs implemented in situations of chronic poverty do not offer the regular or ongoing 
support which would be required to meet the ILO income security objective, or the 
objective of preventive or promotive social protection, and fail to provide any sustained 
social protection benefits (either transfer or stabilisation) in the medium to long term. There 
                                                            
56 Zibambele workers were employed on a part-time basis with contracts of one year, which are renewed 










The Anatomy of Public Works     Chapter 5: The Three Vectors: Wage 
 
  102
is no evidence of such programmes facilitating sufficient accumulation to ensure ongoing 
social protection benefits after the termination of PWP employment. 
The second key component of income security within this debate relates to the question of 
the ‘adequacy’ of the wage, which is the key determinant of the transfer benefit of the 
programme. This issue is explored in detail below. 
5.2 The Adequacy of the Wage  
The impact of the wage will vary depending on its magnitude, as argued by Devereux: 
‘Tiny transfers equal tiny impacts, but moderate transfers can have major impacts.’ 
(2002b: 672) 
In order to attempt any assessment of the ‘adequacy’ of a PWP wage (an inherently 
subjective judgement57) and its potential social protection function, it is necessary to calculate 
the real value of the wage. In order to achieve this first the net value of the wage must be 
ascertained, and then this must be reviewed in relation to the poverty gap experienced by 
participants. Only once this has been calculated can likely transfer and stabilisation impacts 
be assessed. In this respect, neither the transfer nor stabilisation benefits accruing from the 
wage paid to PWP participants are as simple to assess as is argued in much of the literature, 
where there is frequently an assumed equivalence between gross and net value of the PWP 
wage transfer which fails to take into account income forgone (see discussion in Van de 
Walle (1998) and chapter four above), and the contextual question of the net value of the 
wage in relation to the poverty gap is largely overlooked.  
An exploration of the transfer benefit of a PWP is complicated by the need to assess the net 
rather than the gross value of the PWP wage, taking into account only the value of the 
additional funds coming into a household as a result of PWP participation, once income 
                                                            
57 The ‘adequacy’ of a PWP wage is inherently subjective as there is no universal objectively measurable 
criterion against which the value of the wage may be measured. In instances where the wage is intended to 
purchase a defined basket of food and/or other commodities then its adequacy can be accurately assessed 
against this criterion, but such an objective is not frequently observed in the PWP discourse. The objective 
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forgone by those participating in the PWP, and any secondary effects on household labour 
allocations have been accounted for. In order to appraise the likely social protection impact 
of the net transfer benefit, it is also important to examine the meaning of the net wage, in 
terms of its value in relation to household consumption needs and the poverty gap, taking 
into account non-PWP household revenue and other non-monetary forms of income (such 
as own agricultural production). Only when such an analysis has been carried out can an 
assessment be made of the likely social protection impact of a given wage in any given 
context. 
Such an analysis of the real value of the PWP wage (in either absolute or relative terms) is 
rarely included in PWP design or evaluation, where the reductionist argument that 
‘something is better than nothing’58, is frequently cited to excuse the absence of empirical 
analysis to inform the setting of the wage in PWPs, or examination of the impact of the wage 
level on household consumption and intended social protection outcomes. The situation is 
further complicated if one attempts to assess the sustained social protection impact of the 
wage transfer in the context of PWPs which offer a single short episode of PWP 
employment (type A, C or D), as this necessitates attempting to analyse PWP wage impact 
beyond the period of programme implementation.  
5.3 The Real Value of the PWP Wage 
In order to ascertain the real value of the PWP wage there is a need to consider the 
opportunity cost of PWP employment in terms of i) total income forgone, ii) the value of 
non-monetary activities forgone, and iii) the expenditure (in cash or in kind) required to 
access PWP employment (rents), and then to calculate the net value of the wage taking these 
three factors into account. From this figure the real value of the net wage can be estimated in 
terms of its contribution to reducing the consumption gap experienced by participating 
households, as the value of the wage transfer is essentially a relative question: how does the 
value of the wage contribute to the reduction of the consumption gap?  
                                                            
58 Such an assertion is widely cited in policy discussions regarding the process for the determination of the 
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The Opportunity Cost of PWP Participation 
The question of income forgone by PWP workers has recently been addressed in some of 
the discussion around PWP (Van de Walle, 1998; Ravallion, 1998) but there are two other 
factors which need to be considered in terms of the opportunity cost of PWP participation if 
the real wage is to be assessed more accurately, both of which reduce the real value of the 
PWP wage and which receive little attention in the literature: i) the reduction of time spent 
engaging in own production subsistence agriculture and domestic activities, which may be 
experienced in terms of reduced current or future income or food supplies, or reduced 
investment in human capital, and ii) the costs incurred to access PWP employment 
opportunities. Each of these three issues is discussed below. 
Income Forgone 
Van de Walle argued in 1998 that the discrepancy between the gross and net value of a 
transfer through public works was given insufficient recognition in the evaluation of PWP as 
a form of social assistance (Van de Walle, 1998). Once income forgone is taken into account, 
the net value of a transfer through a PWP may be significantly less than its gross value, and 
the net transfer may not necessarily have the anticipated welfare impact of the gross transfer. 
The reality of income forgone by PWP employees is recognised by the World Bank: 
‘Since poor people can rarely afford to be totally idle, they often give up some form 
of income to join a workfare scheme.’ (2001:156) 
This assertion is supported by the findings which are consistent across a range of 
programmes, that mean income forgone by PWP employees represents a significant 
proportion of the value of the PWP wage transfer (Datt and Ravallion, 1994b). Studies have 
found a range of estimates of income forgone, for example, McCord found that 30% of 
participants in two programmes in South Africa had given up alternative paid employment 
to participate in the PWP, and that for these workers, the net value of the public works 
employment was between 30% and 50% of the gross transfer (McCord, 2004a:38-41). 
Similarly the World Bank estimates that forgone income could represent up to 50% of the 
wages paid by workfare schemes (World Bank, 2001:156), and Datt and Ravallion (1994b) 
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characteristics of the worker, the size of the programme, and demand for employment, with 
case study evidence from the EGS suggesting that income forgone may constitute 20% to 
30% of gross earnings (Datt and Ravallion (1994b)).  This literature implies that an 
understanding of income forgone is critical in assessing the potential social protection 
impact of a PWP intervention.59 
The Reduction of Own Production and Domestic Activities 
It is important to problematise the a priori assumption that PWP participation has a negative 
impact in terms of the reduction of own production and domestic activities, given the 
limited availability of rigorous data, and the fact that PWPs are often implemented in 
contexts of chronic unemployment or seasonal underemployment, situations in which there 
is not necessarily a trade-off between competing demands for household labour.  However, 
the limited number of cases where programme data are available indicate that the work 
requirement does lead to the widespread forgoing of alternative income-generating or 
subsistence activities (Datt and Ravallion, 1994b; McCord, 2004a), due to the desire to 
generate cash incomes and to optimise predictable household income in the short term, in 
the context of irregular and unpredictable employment opportunities outside the PWP. The 
extent to which this is problematic for livelihoods is contingent on the costs of moving in 
and out of own production.  
                                                            
59 It could be argued that one implication inherent in this discussion of income forgone is that involuntary 
unemployment may be more limited than is officially reported in many of the contexts in which PWP are 
implemented.  However, detailed analysis of survey data from the Zibambele and Gundo Lashu 
programmes in South Africa, discussed in chapters eight to eleven, suggests a more complex picture. While 
one third of the PWP workers reported income forgone, the kind of work forgone tended to be 
predominantly temporary, informal and survivalist in nature, consisting of forms of low quality 
employment which are not typically considered as ‘employment’ by programme participants (Adato, op 
cit), and would not therefore be recorded as employment in a labour force survey.  In this context the 
realities of the labour market and PWP participants’ location within it, combine with respondents own 
perceptions and definitions of ‘employment’, to result in a situation where high levels of involuntary 
unemployment coexist with a limited number of opportunities for survivalist and ad hoc employment.  This 
should not be taken to imply that involuntary unemployment does not exist to a significant level in this or 
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For households without access to sufficient resources for current consumption, the work 
requirement may lead to the diversion of labour away from own production activities 
(agricultural or small-scale household production) into PWP employment in order to gain 
immediate cash income, reflecting the time preference for immediate income rather than 
deferred income resulting, for example, from agricultural production, or sale of own 
production. In the case of a diversion of labour out of agricultural production, there are 
potentially negative medium to long term livelihoods consequences, which are particularly 
problematic in situations where programme implementation coincides with periods of high 
agricultural activity, prompting a direct trade-off between the two activities offering short- 
and longer-term income/consumption benefits, which may have negative consequences in 
terms of medium to long term production, e.g. through loss of own production and seed for 
the next season. Equally, the work requirement may lead to the foregoing of alternative ad 
hoc or temporary income-generating or subsistence opportunities which occur during the 
period of PWP employment, see, for example, Datt and Ravallion (1994b) or McCord 
(2004a).   
Survey evidence also indicates that where women are the main participants, PWP 
employment may lead to a reduction of time allocated to domestic activities such as child 
care (Chirwa et al., 2004a; McCord, 2004b), which may either lead to the reallocation of 
domestic responsibilities within the household, subject to household labour availability, or 
the ability to purchase domestic support using PWP income (this has not been documented 
in the literature, as little research examines the secondary intra-household labour market 
impact of PWP employment; or result in certain domestic activities being forgone, leading, 
for example, to reduced child-care activities or food preparation (McCord, 1995; UK DFID, 
2004b)60. Anecdotal evidence from Malawi suggests that this reallocation of labour away 
from domestic tasks by PWP workers may result in reduced quality of ECD and child 
nutrition, and may pass an increased burden for child care onto older siblings, which may 
have future negative human capital costs. This is an area largely unexplored in the literature, 
                                                            
60 Interestingly, the need to compensate for the reduction of household labour available for child care is 
explicitly recognised within the MEGS, where crèches are provided for the children of some PWP workers, 
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particularly with reference to sub-Saharan Africa where future research would be of great 
value.  
Other Costs of Participation  
The physical demands of participation in infrastructure PWP in particular may also lead to 
an additional opportunity cost of PWP participation, which is rarely acknowledged in the 
literature. These additional costs may be in the form of transaction costs to access 
employment, or additional costs in the form of increased calorific intake requirement, a cost 
which in many cases is borne physically by the worker. Transaction costs for PWP 
participation have only recently been systematically explored in the literature by Pellisery 
(2008) and Scandizzo et al. (2004). These can take the form of direct costs such as those 
incurred in travelling to work sites, etc., or a range of formal and informal rents extracted 
from those seeking to access PWP employment, ranging from bribes paid in order to 
procure documentation or secure PWP selection, to the provision of sexual favours in order 
to participate in the programme, in cases where employment is a highly valued and scarce 
commodity.  
In addition to the set of costs related to accessing PWP employment, there are also physical 
costs borne by PWP participants, an issue which has not been given adequate attention in 
the PWP literature to date. The energy cost of PWP participation can take the form of 
individual calorific dis-saving, in terms of increased calorific requirement on the part of 
workers as a consequence of the work requirement, which is not compensated by increased 
food intake resulting from the PWP wage. If the increased requirement were satisfied, this 
would represent a further ‘cost’ of PWP participation, and contribute to a reduction in the 
net value of the PWP wage. Where the additional calorific requirement is not satisfied, as is 
frequently the case, the cost takes the form of a deterioration in nutritional status of the 
worker (human capital asset deterioration) should be offset against the net value of PWP 
participation. Such an approach would be methodologically complex, and it falls outside the 
scope of this study to attempt to quantify the value of this hidden cost, nevertheless, it is 
important to acknowledge the implications of this cost if real value of the PWP wage is to be 
considered. This problem has been documented in Bangladesh where, while PWP 
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overall, women PWP workers were found to exhibit significantly increased levels of 
malnutrition after participating in the programme than a control group not participating in 
the PWP over the same period (Helen Keller International, 2007). A similar impact was 
documented in EIIP programmes in Ethiopia in 2005, where ILO PWP daily task rate 
norms (cubic metres of soil to be excavated within a given period) had to be reduced in 
order to accommodate the weakened state of the workers, as the PWP wage level was not 
adequate to enable adequate consumption to offset the calorific demands of programme 
participation.61 
5.4 Summary 
It has been argued above that when considering the wage vector and its social protection 
impact, it is critical to attempt to calculate the net rather than the gross value of the wage, 
and that in order to do this the opportunity cost of PWP participation, the reduction of 
engagement in own production and domestic activities, and additional costs incurred need to 
be taken into account. This represents the inclusion of a broader set of costs and 
opportunity costs than are usually considered in the literature, and it is argued here that it is 
critical to extend the concept of the opportunity cost of PWP employment in order to 
determine the net value of the wage more accurately. This chapter does not, however, 
attempt to propose how this reconceptualisation could be operationalised in terms of how 
each component of cost could be monetised and calculated. 
The preceding analysis suggests that the work requirement represents the introduction of a 
more significant opportunity cost than may have been recognised in the literature to date, 
particularly for labour-constrained poor households engaged in small-scale domestic 
production, with a range of domestic responsibilities.  
5.5 The Meaning of the Real Wage  
As suggested by the preceding analysis, the wage level has no inherent objective value to 
participants, but is only of value in relation to the needs it can satisfy. The social protection 
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value of a wage is contingent on the extent to which the wage enables a reduction in the 
consumption gap experienced by those participating, once the additional costs and forgone 
income resulting from PWP participation, outlined above, have been taken into account. A 
small reduction in the consumption gap is likely to have more limited impact than a larger 
reduction, and before the extent of social protection benefits can be assessed, it is necessary 
to examine the magnitude of the reduction in the poverty gap. 
The value of the wage is not just of academic interest. If set too low, PWP participation can 
directly result in increased malnutrition and associated morbidity, as discussed above. A low 
wage can also result in preventable fatalities among participating households; during the 
evaluation of a DFID-funded PWP in Malawi in 2004, it was found that deaths through 
malnutrition had been recorded in the households of PWP participants, during a period 
when an already low wage rate was further reduced through ‘forced savings’, an experimental 
programme initiative which reduced the effective wage rate in terms of resources available 
for immediate consumption, with the objective of promoting longer-term social protection 
benefits. Participants stated that had they received the full wage due, the deaths would have 
been prevented. 62 
In response to challenges to the adoption of excessively low wage levels which are in tension 
with the social protection rationale of PWP implementation, the defence is often put 
forward that ‘something is better than nothing’.63 However, this statement, which is 
frequently heard in the policy discourse, is problematic, and fails to recognise that the wage 
needs to be sufficient to offer transfer and stabilisation benefits, by promoting consumption, 
and possibly also accumulation, after the full costs of PWP participation to the participant 
have been taken into account, and that these benefits need to be significant to justify 
substantial programme delivery costs if the programme is to be economically viable as a 
form of social protection intervention. 
                                                            
62 PWP participant case studies prepared to inform PWP programme evaluation, CARE International, 
Malawi 2004.  
63 It is important to note that while this position is frequently articulated in verbal discourse by government 
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5.6 Setting the PWP Wage and Labour Market Concerns  
It was argued above that the wage level is a critical determinant of the social protection 
impact of PWPs. However, setting PWP remuneration at the appropriate level in terms of its 
social protection impact, may be problematic from a labour market perspective. A review of 
PWP implementation internationally suggests that the wage level is typically set on the basis 
of three related considerations, none of which is informed by social protection 
considerations: i) a concern to prevent labour market distortion, ii) the desire to promote 
self-targeting of PWP employment through the principle of less eligibility, and iii) the 
reduction of demand for participation in order to limit rationing. On the basis of these 
concerns the PWP wage would conventionally be set below the ‘prevailing wage’ (itself a 
contested term (McCord, 2004b)), however, a PWP wage set on this basis may or may not be 
sufficient to promote social protection outcomes. The dominance of labour market and 
targeting concerns, over social protection considerations in the setting of the wage, has been 
a neglected issue in the PWP literature to date. The three concerns (distortion, targeting and 
rationing) and their implications for social protection are examined below, together with an 
exploration of the tension between the downward pressure on the wage rate resulting from 
these concerns, and the resultant reduced social protection impact. 
Distortion 
There is a significant concern, reiterated throughout the PWP literature, that PWP 
employment may draw workers out of alternative market-based employment, distorting the 
functioning of the labour market, and resulting in an increase in the cost of labour of those 
eligible for PWP employment by creating a ‘wage floor’, below which labour would prefer to 
participate in PWPs rather than seek employment in the open labour market. For these 
reasons it is argued that the wage should be limited in order to avoid labour market 
distortion, so that only the poor who do not have access to alternative employment at the 
market rate will choose to participate in the programme.64 As summarised by Subbarao: 
                                                            
64 In reality, PWP wages internationally have been variously set above and below the prevailing wage (see, 
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‘In order to promote self-selection, it is best for a public works program to offer a 
wage slightly below the market wage, that is, to maintain the level of the wage rate 
low enough so as to attract only the poor to work sites’ (2001:7). 
Whether the feared labour market distortion, in the form of an elevated reservation wage, is 
interpreted as a positive or negative outcome of PWP implementation is to some extent 
contingent on ideological perspectives. It can be argued that if the labour market is highly 
segmented, with the lower segments being subject to exploitative rates of remuneration, such 
a distortion might not necessarily be seen as problematic. For example, in India the JRY and 
MEGS have pushed up the reserve wage for agricultural labour, reducing landowner profits 
and contributing to a reduction in local income inequality (Gaiha and Imai, 2005). However, 
such wage inflation is only likely to occur in the context of mass PWP implementation, with 
organised workers, and a highly segmented labour market, or where a PWP employs a 
significant number of workers in a particular geographical area. In Malawi 220,000 workers 
(approximately 4% of the labour force) participated in six major simultaneous and 
independently implemented PWPs, funded and implemented by a range of donors and 
INGOs, with varying levels of government participation (Chirwa et al., 2004a). The wage rate 
was set autonomously within each programme, resulting in a daily wage which varied from 
MK36 (US$0.34)65 to MK192 (US$1.79) for similar hours of employment (ibid:15). Adato et 
al. (1999) found similar levels of wage variation within contemporaneous PWPs in the 
Western Cape in South Africa, as discussed in chapter four. In these contexts wages were 
separately determined in each different programme, either by the implementing agents, or 
through a process of local wage negotiation. However, in neither instance was evidence of 
labour relocation found in response to these significant wage variations, nor evidence of 
workers moving out of alternative forms of regular market-based employment, nor local 
wage inflation in response to the PWP wage.66 This implies that in certain contexts labour 
markets may be able to absorb a range of PWP wage rates without evidence of distortionary 
effects. 
                                                            
targeting success.  
65 US$1=MK107 at 2004 prices. 
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It is likely that the critical contextual determinants of the impact of the PWP wage relate to 
the scale of the PWP labour ‘demand’ in relation to the supply of casual agricultural labour. 
In the Malawian context there is significant oversupply of casual agricultural wage labour, 
largely due to changes in agricultural production modalities and the traditional paternalistic 
relationship between labour and landowners in recent decades, and the bottom segment of 
the labour force has limited mobility, such that small-scale PWP implementation would offer 
alternative employment to only an extremely small percentage of those seeking casual labour, 
is unlikely to impact significantly on labour market prices (Chirwa et al., 2004a). This is likely 
to hold true in most PWPs offering employment to a small percentage of the bottom 
segment of the labour force, particularly where PWP employment is highly rationed and 
geographical coverage is patchy. This would include almost all PWPs currently implemented 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Self-Targeting through the Wage 
One of the perceived benefits of PWPs is the potential efficiencies they offer by self-
targeting, resulting from the provision of a low wage rate, to reach the poor, rather than 
using alternative targeting procedures which are often complex and costly to administer, as 
summarised by Subbarao: 
‘... it is important to bear in mind the savings in administrative costs effected by self-
selection.’ (2001:viii) 
This self-targeting aspect of PWP is based on the premise that the work requirement and 
low wages, conventionally set at or below the prevailing wage, lead to an outcome in which 
the poor self-select into the programme, leading the World Bank to assert confidently (and 
without concern at the potentially negative social protection implications of the statement) 
that: 
‘They [public works programmes] can easily be self-targeting by paying wages below 
market rates.’ (2001:155)  
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‘The best way to ensure that the program reaches the poor is to maintain the 
program wage at a level no higher than the ruling markets wage for unskilled labor’ 
(1997:77)67 
and  
‘maintaining a low program wage ensures that participation rates are low, attracting 
only the poorest to work sites.’ (ibid:78) 
Subbarao et al. continue their argument citing evidence from Kenya that when the wage is 
increased, non-poor inclusion errors also increase (Subbarao et al. (1997) citing Teklu (1994)). 
Similar arguments have been made on the basis of findings from the MEGS in India, where 
non-poor participation increased significantly after the upward revision of the public works 
wage (Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri, 1993).68 Hence, it is assumed that by the adoption of a 
low wage rate, the poor will self-select into programmes, while the less poor will find them 
unattractive and not seek to participate.69 According to PWP theory this then obviates the 
need for the administration of more complex poverty-targeting mechanisms, based on some 
form of community based selection or means testing, a principle fully discussed in Subbarao 
et al. (1997), which is at the heart of the PWP concept. Evidence of such successful targeting 
is presented in the literature, with Subbarao (2003) arguing that almost 100% of PWP 
participants in Chile, and 60-70% in India (taking into account both the JRY and MEGS) 
were ‘poor’ (cited in Vodopivec (2004:76)).70 This supposed ease of targeting is therefore a 
major factor in the selection of PWP as a social protection instrument, since it reduces the 
                                                            
67 It is important to note, however, that the PWP wage is not always set in relation to the minimum or 
prevailing wage. Subbarao found that out of ten programmes reviewed, only four paid wages less than the 
prevailing market wage, and four paid less than the minimum wage (there was some overlap between these 
two categories) (2003:7). 
68 Leakage to the non-poor increased significantly after the minimum wage which guided MEGS 
remuneration levels was increased above the ‘prevailing wage’ in the 1980s. 
69 The terms ‘poor’ and ‘less poor’ will not be further defined in this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is 
to explore participation in PWPs using a relational concept of poverty, based on the depth of poverty, since 
the majority of the population in many developing countries may be defined as poor, depending on what 
poverty line is adopted. In the light of this, it may be most useful to differentiate within the category of the 
poor rather than seek to define those who fall within or outside this category. 
70 The meaning of ‘poor’ in this context is not explicitly defined, and where a large proportion of the total 
population are poor, having the poor, rather than a sub-section thereof, representing a high percentage of 
participants may not be an adequate indicator of appropriately targeted resources; in this context an 
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need for the management of additional targeting processes. The implementation of 
alternative explicit targeting criteria would be costly in terms of both budget and skills, and is 
particularly problematic if the programme is to be implemented by the private sector; the 
social development skills required to ensure effective targeting within a community may 
typically be scarce among construction sector contractors, and there are no profit incentives 
for private contractors to expend resources on attempting to target their jobs to the poorest, 
rendering the ‘self-targeting’ nature of PWP a great benefit and an incentive for PWP 
selection over alternative instruments. It is assumed that in this context spontaneous 
poverty-related self-targeting will take place through the market, on the basis of the wage 
rate, resulting in low levels of leakage through both type one and type two errors (the 
inclusion of those who should have been excluded, and the exclusion of those who should 
have been included in the programme respectively).  
5.7 Critique of Effective Targeting Assumptions  
However, when Coady et al. (2002) compared a range of targeting approaches across 67 
programmes, they found that while a PWP, the Argentinian Trabajar programme, had the 
best targeting outcome, three PWPs were among the ten worst performing programmes, and 
concluded that it was programme implementation, rather than the method of targeting per se, 
which was the key determinant of successful targeting. This is consistent with a number of 
studies that suggest a significant degree of leakage to the non-poor, even in the context of 
PWPs offering ‘sub-market’ wage rates, which challenges the assumption of spontaneous 
self-targeting by the poorest (McCord, 2004b; Barrett and Clay, 2003; Lembani and Mandala, 
2006). Programme evaluations repeatedly indicate participation by those who may not be 
classed as among the poorest (those for whom the intervention was intended) is taking place, 
not only in terms of inclusion in the payment roster, but also in terms of physical 
participation. Devereux and Solomon cite evidence from the JRY in India suggesting that 
57% of workers belonged to non-poor families, and that only 5% of workers belonged to 
the poorest categories (‘very very poor’ or ‘destitute’) (Devereux and Solomon, 2006:8, citing 
MRD (1994) and Chellia and Sudarshan (1999)). Similarly, Suryahadi et al. (1999) found that 
between 64% and 100% of the participants in the Padat Karya were non-poor. The theory of 
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Clay (2003) argue that this premise is conditional on a perfectly functioning labour market, 
which is frequently absent in the contexts where PWPs are implemented. They suggest that 
the marginal value of labour varies considerably within and between households, contingent 
on the amount of labour available in the household, and access to productive assets such as 
land. This variation in the marginal value of labour renders PWP employment at a given 
wage potentially attractive as a form of supplementary income to surplus labour in less poor 
households, yet unattractive to poorer households with limited access to labour, even with 
PWP wage levels at or below the prevailing wage.71 When the imperfection of labour markets is 
taken into consideration, Barrett and Clay argue that economic theory confirms the empirical 
finding that self-targeting through a low wage may not be an adequate mechanism to target 
employment to the poorest. They argue moreover that a wage set at an extremely low level is 
contrary to the social protection objectives which were the initial rationale for programme 
implementation. This insight is echoed by Kaseke (2008), who argued that a ‘social 
protection intervention is not meaningful unless it provides a minimum level of protection’, 
i.e. there is a transfer level below which social protection transfer interventions cease to have 
a significant impact. This analysis is particularly relevant when a PWP wage is set at the 
prevailing wage level in a segmented labour market where the prevailing wage in the most 
poorly paid sector is extremely low, as in the ganyu (informal agricultural contract labour) 
system in Malawi, where the daily ganyu wage was approximately MK33/day (US$0.31) in 
2004 (Government of Malawi and the European Union, 2004). This wage is used to guide 
remuneration in the Social Action Fund PWP. Replicating this wage level in a PWP is 
problematic, since such a low wage seems unlikely to have a significant impact on chronic 
poverty and may create a tension between programme objectives and programme wage, 
within a programme with the objective of providing social assistance and addressing chronic 
poverty. This concern is rarely explored in the literature, and is examined in detail below, in 
an attempt to interrogate the social protection implications of a low PWP wage. 
                                                            
71 This theoretical analysis confirms empirical programme evaluation findings, such as the review of the 
DFID-funded Sustainable Livelihoods Through Inputs for Assets (SPLIFA) public works programme in 
Malawi, which found non-poor participants from labour-rich households self-selecting into the programme 
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Devereux and Solomon identify the same critical problem with using the wage to control 
PWP demand: 
‘The problem with using the wage rate as a self-targeting mechanism is that 
employment programmes are often introduced in situations of mass chronic poverty, 
where the only way to ration the number of jobs offered is to reduce the wage rate to 
unethically low levels.  In Burkina Faso in the early 1990s public works wages were 
set as low as one-third of the national minimum wage, in order to minimise ‘leakages’ 
to the non-poor (von Braun et al. 1991).  Although this strategy was successful in 
terms of targeting the “poorest of the poor”, the income transferred was so low that 
there was no discernible impact on poverty reduction, and even the ‘safety net’ 
objective was compromised.’ (2006:6). 
The assumptions underlying the self-targeting function of a low wage in PWP are currently 
subject to increasing criticism from a range of theoretical perspectives which take into 
account the imperfections of the labour market, and institutional barriers to programme 
participation. For example, Scandizzo et al. (2004) draw similar conclusions on the basis of 
institutional ‘process deficits’ and the theory of real options respectively, regarding the 
illusory nature of effective self-targeting in the context of imperfect labour markets with 
fluctuating wages, and high PWP entry and exit costs. 
In this context Subbarao’s assertion that a wage rate no higher than the prevailing market 
wage is an ideal PWP design feature, is problematic, as is his response to his own question, 
‘how low should the program wage be?’ (2003:14). Subbarao argues that the wage ‘should 
not be set at such a low level that it stigmatises the work, thus leading the “poor but proud” 
to go hungry’ (ibid:10), but fails to explore the fact that the social protection impact of PWPs 
is a function of the value of the wage.72  
Drawing on African experiences, Barrett and Clay present a fundamental challenge to this 
accepted, but problematic argument, and conclude that higher wages, together with 
alternative targeting mechanisms would be a more appropriate response when social 
protection outcomes are the primary PWP objective, since low wages in PWPs are neither 
                                                            
72 While Subbarao recognises that ‘a low wage rate will also result in low transfer earnings to each (poor) 
participant’ (Subbarao, 2003:4), he does not explore the consequences of this statement in terms of the 
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sufficient to ensure adequate poverty targeting, nor are they consistent with programme 
objectives relating to the sustained reduction of poverty. Similar conclusions were drawn by 
Mujeri with reference to PWPs in Bangladesh, who argued for more restrictive active 
targeting criteria, including means testing, rather than self-targeting through the wage 
(Mujeri, 2002:33, cited in Devereux and Solomon (2006:7)) and also by Chirwa et al.(2004a) 
with reference to the level of the MASAF PWP wage in Malawi: 
‘... there is evidence that PWP employment is attractive to the less poor as a form of 
secondary income for households which are not labour constrained (CARE, 2003 
and 2004). This underscores the fact that wage alone is not a sufficient mechanism to 
ensure the participation of the poorest, and that explicit poverty targeting is required 
to ensure that intended members of the community can access employment, in line 
with programme objectives.’ (2004a:27). 
5.8 Rationing  
As well as promoting targeting, the low wage is also presented in the literature as a way of 
controlling demand for PWP employment and ensuring that inclusion errors are avoided, see 
Subbarao:  
 ‘A relatively high wage rate is most likely to result in job rationing.’ (1997:6) 
The basis of the argument is that a lower wage will reduce demand for PWP employment, 
therefore reducing rationing of access to the programme, while at the same time, lower 
expenditure on wage per participant will enable greater coverage. However, this argument 
may be contested on two related grounds. The first is that the assumption that there is a 
simple linear relationship between PWP wage and demand for employment is not necessarily 
robust in imperfectly functioning and highly segmented labour markets with mass 
unemployment, as conceded by Vaidya and Ahmed (2007) in their attempt to model the 
impact of the wage level on PWP employment demand in South Africa. The second is that 
given the small scale of most PWPs, almost all entail rationing despite the adoption of low 
wages, with the effect of the capped wage being limited to reducing the extent of excess 
demand for PWP employment at best. These interlinked issues are explored below. 
The attempt to reduce demand through the ‘less eligibility’ condition, using capped PWP 
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between PWP wage and demand for PWP employment. This linearity is assumed in 
reductionist analyses of likely PWP demand which attempt to isolate the level at which a 
PWP wage should be set in order to limit potential PWP employment demand, and reduce it 
to a level at which a government feels able to deliver employment. Such analysis fails to take 
into account the imperfect functioning of labour markets in the context of mass poverty and 
unemployment, as argued by Barrett and Clay (2003), and the resultant failure of the labour 
market to signal clear reserve prices below which PWP employment ceases to be attractive. 
Evidence from Malawi explored in detail below (Chirwa et al., 2004a) indicates that even at 
below subsistence levels of remuneration, access to immediate cash income leads to demand 
for PWP employment among certain segments of the labour force in situations of extreme 
poverty.  Barrett and Clay’s analysis would suggest that employment at such rates may also 
be attractive to surplus labour with a low marginal value in less poor households, and in 
many instances anecdotal evidence suggests that the poor are not well placed to compete 
against less poor segments of the unemployment for PWP work opportunities .  
In situations of chronic poverty and mass unemployment/underemployment where the scale 
of PWP employment offered is trivial in relation to the scale of the unemployment and 
poverty problem, it is likely that competition for PWP employment among both the poor 
and less poor will erode any putative poverty-based self-targeting, in the absence of explicit 
poverty-targeting activities. In South Africa, for example, where the national public works 
programme aims to offer only 200,000 employment opportunities per annum in a context 
where there are more than four million unemployed, targeting problems are likely to occur, 
with the poorest not necessarily being best placed to access the extremely limited number of 
jobs available (McCord, 2003).  
Given that demand for PWP employment tends to exceed the supply of employment 
opportunities, and the pervasive leakage of employment opportunities to the non-poor 
inherent within a segmented labour market, even when wages are set low, Barrett and Clay’s 
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targeting mechanisms is strong, and offers an important alternative to the conventional PWP 
theoretical canon.73  
In addition to the limited targeting efficacy of a capped PWP wage, it is critical to consider 
that the consequence of utilising the less eligibility principle may be a wage can provide only 
marginal social protection benefits, once the costs of participation have been taken into 
account. It is questionable whether such a wage level is desirable and compatible with a 
programme nominally implemented to achieve social protection outcomes. 
5.9 Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) PWP Case Study 
The questions outlined above are explored below in relation to the World Bank and DFID-
funded Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) PWP, which is typical of type A donor-
supported PWPs in sub-Saharan Africa74. The programme is examined in order to shed light 
on the key issues outlined above which are at the heart of the question of setting the PWP 
wage, and the function of the wage in relation to social protection objectives.  The case study 
explores how the wage level is determined and what the social protection implications of a 
PWP wage resulting from this determination process are likely to be. The case study 
illustrates that the process of wage setting in a PWP can be subject to both ideological 
contradictions and empirical difficulties, and that how these dilemmas are resolved may have 
significant implications for the social protection outcome of the programme. 
MASAF has been implementing public works since 1995 and is the largest PWP employer in 
Malawi, with the aim of providing income and employment opportunities that contribute to 
longer-term economic growth (UK DFID, 2002). In line with the Malawi Poverty Reduction 
                                                            
73 One example of such practice is the Zibambele programme in South Africa, which has adopted a higher 
wage rate than most PWP in South Africa (set at the minimum wage) and includes explicit poverty 
targeting using community selection methods, in which 99% of the workers’ households fall below the 
poverty line. 
74 This exploration of the PWP wage draws on an analysis conducted into the MASAF PWP in May 2004 
as part of the ‘Study to Inform the Selection of an Appropriate Wage Rate for Public Works Programmes in 
Malawi’, prepared for the National Safety Nets Unit of the Government of Malawi, by Chirwa, McCord, 
Mvula and Pinder (2004).  The study was initiated in response to concerns expressed by a wide range of 
stakeholders, including workers, local government officials and donors, that the daily wage rate paid to 
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Strategy and the Malawi National Safety Net Programme of which it forms a part, MASAF’s 
objective is ‘improved livelihoods of vulnerable and marginalised groups in Malawi society 
by enhancing their productivity and thereby increasing their self-reliance’ (Malawi, Ministry 
of Economic Planning and Development, 2003), placing the programme explicitly within the 
social protection objective set. In terms of the social protection hierarchy outlined in chapter 
three, the programme objectives conform to those of ‘transformative social protection’, with 
their explicit aim of promoting sustained benefits to participants. To this end the MASAF 
programme developed a type A PWP, offering a single short term episode of PWP 
employment to participants.  This represents an inconsistency between the primary objective 
of the programme and the programme type selected, a tension between programme form 
and function which is present in many donor supported PWP in sub-Saharan Africa as 
discussed above, and which is exacerbated by the stringent wage capping policy adopted, 
which is explored below. 
PWP and the Prevailing Wage: Problematisation of Wage Setting Conventions  
Conventional PWP theory is based on the premise that in order for the PWP wage to 
function as a mechanism for self-targeting by the poor, the wage must be set no higher than 
the ‘prevailing market wage’. In this way it is assumed that the poor will select themselves 
into the programme, while those with alternative employment at or above the prevailing 
market wage will have no incentive to leave their work to participate in the PWP. Correctly 
identifying the prevailing wage is key in order to address the concerns relating to distortion, 
targeting and rationing objectives which underlie this approach. However, analysis of the 
Malawi situation indicates that identifying the prevailing wage in a segmented labour market 
may itself be problematic.  
The wage for the programme was set in 2002 at MK30 (US$0.28 at 2004 prices), broadly in 
line with the prevailing wage for casual agricultural labour (ganyu), and was increased to 
MK36 (US$0.33) in 2004 in response to the widespread criticism of the PWP wage, pending 
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rate (an increase of 20% compared with 47% rural inflation over the period 2002-2004).75  A 
re-analysis of the ‘prevailing’ wage in rural Malawi by Chirwa et al. (2004a) revealed a critical 
insight; in any given context there may be no single prevailing wage, due to a segmented and 
imperfectly functioning labour market. Zgovu (2000) recognised this problem (although not 
exploring it from the perspective of its implications for PWP) and argued that it may be 
more useful in analytical terms to identify two sets of prevailing agricultural sector wages; 
one wage for highly casualised and sporadic agricultural labour, known in Malawi as ganyu76, 
and one for ‘agricultural monthly wage’ employment, which he identified as a less 
exploitative form of agricultural employment. This immediately presents a dilemma in terms 
of the attempt to identify a ‘prevailing’ rural wage to inform the PWP wage in order to avoid 
labour market distortion, promote targeting, and induce rationing; the three benefits 
customarily associated with adopting the prevailing wage for PWP. 
The PWP wage of MK36 compares to a daily ganyu wage estimated to be between MK20 (in-
kind payment) and MK50 to MK70 in cash (US$0.19 and US$0.46-0.65) and an ‘agricultural 
monthly wage’ wage of MK2,400 (Chirwa et al. (2004a) based on Zgovu (2000) and CARE 
(2004) at 2004 prices).77 The market wage for construction employment similar to that 
provided by MASAF was between MK1,500 and MK2,000 per month (US$14.02 and 
US$18.69), with the rural construction industry norm being MK1,600 (US$14.95).78 While 
the wage data summarised above are problematic, and the various wage levels may not be 
directly comparable, the figures converge at between MK1,500 and MK2,400 (US$14.02 and 
                                                            
75 The daily rate is actually the rate for the completion of one task, as payment was on a task based rate, 
with one task being set per day, on the assumption that it would take a total of 4-5 hours of work time to 
complete, in conformity with ILO norms for task based PWP remuneration. 
76 Ganyu is occasional and temporary task based work, typically limited to one to three days’ duration, 
sought by the poorest in agricultural areas, and often remunerated in-kind through agricultural produce or a 
plateful of ground maize meal. It is widely considered in Malawi to be exploitative and over recent years as 
poverty has deepened in the country and the agricultural sector has experienced significant restructuring, 
the number of workers offering ganyu labour has increased and the number of employers seeking it has 
decreased, leading to a fall in ganyu wage rates in real terms. Since several days of work-seeking activity 
may be required for the attainment of one or two days of ganyu employment (see CARE (2003) and CARE 
(2004)), it could be argued that the real wage rate is lower than these figures indicate. 
77 It is important to note that this is an indicative figure only, since it is not known whether ‘monthly wage’ 
rural employment has kept pace with inflation. The data available suggests that for other kinds of rural 
employment the wage has not kept pace with inflation. 
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US$22.43), which is considerably higher than the monthly wage of MK792 (US$7.40) 
offered in the MASAF programme. 
If ganyu employment is considered a last resort for the very poorest who otherwise face 
destitution, then a PWP wage which exceeds the ganyu wage level should not be problematic, 
as an alternative to those in this sector where excess labour supply is forcing the wage 
downward. Drawing work seekers out of this sector would be of benefit to participants at 
the bottom end of the labour market, rather than a negative distortion. Research indicates 
that supply of ganyu labour exceeds demand significantly79, and hence paying a wage above 
the ganyu wage rate is extremely unlikely to have any significant distortionary effect on the 
ganyu labour market, or make any impact on the international competitiveness of Malawian 
labour; an argument advanced by the World Bank against an upwards revision of the PWP 
wage rate.80  
The second critical insight from the Malawi case study is the fact that replicating an 
exploitative prevailing wage in PWP employment could itself be highly problematic given 
that the PWP has explicit poverty reduction and livelihoods objectives. In the light of this, 
the ability of the PWP wage to contribute to these objectives should be central to the setting 
of PWP remuneration rates, as the critical question is whether the wage is sufficient to have 
a social protection impact in line with the programme’s objectives. When the objective of a 
programme is transformative social protection, the provision of a low wage, as in the 
MASAF PWP, may have serious social protection trade-offs (Devereux, 2000). Clearly this 
represents a dilemma, which may require a rethinking of PWP wage setting orthodoxy, both 
in terms of the theory, and also in programme design, where the maxim of setting a wage at 
or below the prevailing norm tends to dominate social protection considerations.  
                                                            
79 Qualitative research conducted by CARE into the rural labour market in Malawi indicated the 
desperation of those located within the ganyu seeking segment of the labour force, including reports of 
labourers leaving sick children untended and travelling three days walk from home to take up work offering 
a total remuneration of only three maize cobs. 
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The Wage and the Social Protection Objectives of Public Works  
Given the MASAF objective of improving the livelihoods of the most vulnerable and 
marginalised in the country, it is critical to examine the role of the restricted PWP wage in 
relation to this objective and its impact on the likelihood of realisation.  
The primary question is whether PWP income plays a role in promoting livelihoods. As 
argued above, it is assumed that this is contingent on whether the wage is sufficient at least 
to ensure that basic subsistence needs are met, following Devereux (2000) who argued that 
the poor use incremental income first to satisfy basic consumption needs, then to invest in 
human capital (education and health) and social capital, and only thereafter to invest in 
income-generating activities. The PWP wage only impacts on productive investment if it is 
large enough to ensure that consumption needs are met. 
Consumption Gap 
In order to assess the adequacy of the PWP wage in terms of addressing the programme’s 
social protection objectives, it is necessary to examine the value of the wage in relation to the 
consumption gap of participating households in order to explore the meaning of the wage 
transfer to participating households. Chirwa et al. (2004a) attempted to calculate the 
consumption gap for participating households, and while the analysis is an approximation 
given the data constraints, it offers an insight, however imperfect, into the meaning of the 
transfer in terms of the household economy. 
In order to calculate the monetary value of the basic consumption needs of participating 
households, the total monthly income required to provide subsistence for a household 
comprising 5.6 members, the average household size for the ultra poor who form the target 
group for this programme, was estimated.81 Three alternative subsistence-based poverty lines 
were derived, the first using the official Malawi poverty line based on the Integrated 
Household Survey, the second based on a costed ‘Subsistence Basket’, and the third based 
                                                            
81 This calculation takes into account only the total number of household members, on the basis of the 1998 
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on ‘perceived needs’ identified and costed by PWP employees themselves (CARE, 2003).82 
The three resulting monthly household poverty lines were MK4,099, MK2,917 and 
MK2,215 (US$38, $27 and $21 respectively) for food subsistence, and MK5,465, MK3,501, 
and MK2,745 when basic non-food costs were also included (US$51, $33 and $26).83   
Other Income and Own Production 
In order to use the poverty lines outlined above to assess the contribution of the PWP wage 
to reducing the consumption gap, other sources of household income, both own production 
and income for cash or goods in-kind, were taken into account. 
Recent survey work among PWP participants suggests that total monthly household income 
among households participating in the programme were in the range of MK200 to MK400 
for women workers (US$1.87 to US$3.74), and MK400 to MK700 for males (US$3.74 to 
US$6.54) (CARE, 2004).84 The non-PWP income reported by the labour-constrained 
households, the poorest group within the MASAF PWP participants, was minimal. Given 
the low levels of returns to economic activity by this sub-group, which represents the target 
group for the programme in terms of its safety net function, it is argued that the value of 
non-PWP income may be considered insignificant and so may be set aside in terms of 
calculating the impact of the PWP wage. If successfully implemented, participation in PWPs 
should enable the shifting of income-generating work from low to higher return activities, 
                                                            
82 The first poverty line used the 1998 Integrated Household Survey (IHS) inflated to 2004 prices, which is 
based on the purchase price of 2,100 calories per person per day. The 1998 IHS poverty line has been 
updated using the official rural consumer price index for 1999 to 2003 and a cost of living index for 
2003/4. The ‘Subsistence Basket’ poverty line was based on the purchase of a basket of basic rations 
required to meet a minimum calorie requirement in line with World Food Programme recommendations 
costed at 2004 prices, and the ‘Perceived Needs’ poverty line was derived from the cost of purchasing a 
basket of goods required to meet basic consumption needs, identified and costed by current PWP 
employees themselves (CARE, 2003). 
83 It is interesting to note that the IHS poverty line is significantly higher than both the Subsistence Basket 
and Perceived Needs poverty lines. This discrepancy suggests that there may be a problem with either the 
IHS data or the CPI, given the simple derivation of the Subsistence Basket Line. 
84 This suggests that female participants may be from poorer households than male participants, with more 
limited labour market options and extremely low returns to the activities in which they participate to 
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and should increase the level of non-PWP contributions to total household income, in this 
way contributing to improved livelihoods.85 
The second factor which must be reviewed when considering total household income is own 
production, which for most households will make a significant contribution to household 
subsistence requirements.86 The most recent Community Household Survey available at the 
time of the study (CHS, 2004) suggested that for the year 2004/5 own production would 
represent 3.5 months of household food consumption, on average.87 Many poor households 
currently lack sufficient labour, land or capital to ensure even these modest levels of own 
production, and so 3.5 may be taken as an upper limit of the period of own production 
consumption among the poorest.88 On the basis of these own production assumptions, the 
minimum daily PWP wage required to ensure sufficient cash income to supplement own 
production and meet basic household subsistence needs may be calculated.89 Daily wage 
rates which assume PWP employment for 12 months in a year are set out in Table 5.1 below 
(if the period of employment were less than 12 months, the wage would need to be increased 
proportionally to cover the annual consumption gap). 
                                                            
85 This was illustrated in a recent PWP in Malawi offering a wage rate significantly above subsistence level, 
in which part of the income was used to purchase basic capital goods which enabled workers to move away 
from the gathering and sale of primary materials (e.g. wood) to higher return production or commerce 
based economic activities (Pinder, 2001).  
86 90% of the poor have access to land, although many lack sufficient labour or capital to use all the land 
owned for agricultural production (Chirwa and Mvula, 2004). 
87 This is similar to the level projected for 2003 (FEWS, February 2003).  
88 The PWP wage could potentially contribute to the hire of labour (ganyu), purchase of inputs, and/or land 
rental where land access is currently insufficient, rendering participating households more likely to increase 
own production in subsequent years.  
89 It should be noted that the recommended daily wage rate would vary according to the period of 
employment offered within the PWP. The duration of employment has been found to be critical in terms of 
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Table 5.1: Daily PWP Wage Required to Meet Household Subsistence* (Malawi 
Kwacha) 
 Poverty Line (MK)
 IHS Subsistence Basket Perceived Needs
Food only 116 83 60 
Food & non-food 171 107 85 
Source: Chirwa et al. (2004a:23) 
*Assuming PWP employment is provided 12 months per annum 
 
These figures are set out alongside the current and inflation-linked MASAF wage rate in 
Figure 5.1 below. 
Figure 5.1: Daily PWP Wage Required to Meet Household Consumption Needs on 




























Source: Chirwa et al. (2004a:23). 
From Figure 5.1 it is clear that the MASAF wage is significantly below the monthly income 
required to meet even basic household subsistence needs according to official and derived 
poverty lines. The PWP wage represents only 30% and 40% of the income required to meet 
basic household food needs according to these two poverty lines respectively, and 20% and 
30% of food and non-food subsistence needs. If increased in line with rural inflation, the 
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food needs in terms of the IHS, indicating that it is set at an inadequate level to have a 
significant impact on poverty, even if inflation-linked.  
The Impact of a Low Wage on Programme Objectives  
With the wage of MK36 (US$0.34) PWP employment would reduce the depth of poverty 
experienced by participating households. However, the wage is significantly below that 
required to ensure that the poverty reduction objectives of the programme are met, and is 
unlikely to contribute significantly to the objective of livelihoods promotion or the 
transformative social protection outcomes anticipated in the programme rationale. This is 
confirmed by the findings of the 2003 beneficiary assessment which shows that the majority 
of PWP income is spent on food and basic provisioning, with only 6% of participants 
investing in livelihoods promotion, for example, purchasing farm inputs or livestock 
(MASAF, 2003). The main reason given by participants for this lack of investment was the 
low wage level. Hence, with the existing wage level, it is unlikely that the social protection 
goals of the MASAF PWP would be met, or that the programme would have a significant or 
sustained impact on poverty.  
5.10 Conclusion  
If sustained social protection benefits are to be achieved through a PWP, the wage needs to 
be sufficient to ensure that, at a minimum, basic household subsistence needs are met, as 
only then is accumulation of assets possible. Failing this, the wage transfer needs to be 
sustained throughout the period of vulnerability and need.  
The level of the PWP wage needs to be consistent with the livelihoods and poverty 
reduction objectives of the interventions, and take into account the nature of the labour 
market crisis whose worst consequences it is seeking to mitigate. The MASAF programme is 
typical of programmes internationally inasmuch as the restrictions placed on the wage rate in 
order to address concerns about disrupting the labour market render the programme highly 
unlikely to have any significant impact on social protection objectives, which is the core 
rationale for programme implementation; yet this paradox is not explicitly recognised by 
donors or implementing agencies, who insist on setting the wage on the basis of labour 
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line with the injunction that the wage should be set at or below the prevailing wage, no 
matter how low this may be relative to subsistence needs. This chapter argues that the 
question of wage setting should take into account the fundamental social protection 
objectives underlying the implementation of a PWP intervention, and the fact that setting a 
wage too low may undermine a programme’s social protection impact, as well as in some 
instances potentially discouraging the participation of the poorest, for whose benefit the 
intervention was initially designed.  
While a low wage is intended to prevent labour market distortion, reduce demand and target 
the poorest, this chapter argues that the available evidence calls into question the 
effectiveness of wage limitations in achieving any of these objectives, and asserts moreover 
that the adoption of this approach may, in many cases, be to the detriment of those 
participating in PWPs. Moreover, the net value of the PWP wage may be significantly 
overstated in the current literature. Once the full range of costs implied by the work 
conditionality are taken into account, the net value of the PWP wage may be significantly 
lower than its gross value, and its real value in terms of its social protection impact, may be 
correspondingly lower than is generally assumed. The result may be the implementation of 
programmes which may suffer internal tensions such that the ultimate net value of the 
transfer received by participants may be insufficient to result in significant social protection 
benefits, a problem which is particularly acute in the case of type A, C or D PWPs 
implemented in contexts of chronic poverty and unemployment. This chapter concludes by 
suggesting that it cannot be assumed a priori that the PWP wage offers an effective vector 









The Anatomy of Public Works     Chapter 6: The Three Vectors: Assets 
 
  129
6 THE THREE VECTORS: ASSETS   
In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the wage benefits of PWP participation are 
almost exclusively limited to the duration of the programme and are unlikely to confer long-
term benefits themselves, and that in some instances the wage is set too low to deliver 
significant social protection benefits, even during the period of programme implementation. 
Given these insights, the ability of PWPs to provide sustained social protection benefits in 
the context of chronic poverty is in part contingent on the ability of the second vector, 
assets created, to deliver significant medium to long term benefits. Within the PWP 
discourse it is anticipated that the creation of assets will confer social protection benefits to 
PWP participants, or communities more generally, through the promotion of livelihoods in 
various direct and indirect ways. In this chapter, the lack of critical thinking around the issue 
of the impact of assets on social protection outcomes in PWPs is highlighted, and then key 
questions which have been neglected in the conventional PWP literature are explored, 
relating to the role of asset provision in different types of PWPs, a critical analysis of the 
value of assets created, the question of incidence, in terms of identifying the key beneficiaries 
of the assets created, the cost of asset creation through PWPs, and the premium associated 
with the use of PWP to create infrastructure. Finally, the chapter examines the key 
determinants of the quality of assets produced through a PWP, and the implications for the 
social protection outcome.  
Assets are created in all PWPs as the product of the work requirement and can take many 
forms, the most typical being the creation of physical infrastructure, primarily roads, but 
also, in a small number of recent programmes extending the concept to the provision of 
what may be described as ‘social infrastructure’, in the form of social service provision, such 
as Home Based Care (HBC) for those affected by HIV/AIDS, or the provision of Early 
Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) services (McCord, 2005). The creation of assets 
is generally included as a key rationale for the selection of PWPs over alternative social 
protection assistance measures, as PWPs avoid the perceived trade-off between ‘productive’ 
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assistance and productive asset creation in one intervention. As Smith argues with reference 
to Malawi:  
‘... as far as possible, safety nets in Malawi need to be productivity-enhancing (for 
example in the form of public works […], rather than pure transfers […] to 
maximize long-term income growth among the poor.’ (2001:13) 
However, the beneficial economic and developmental value of the assets created through 
PWPs is frequently assumed rather than empirically established. In some instances, such as 
the flood- and drought-related assets created in Bangladesh and India which have a direct 
impact on mitigating future risk and promoting land productivity, the economic benefit of 
the infrastructure created is often readily apparent, in terms of a reduction in flooding and 
improved water harvesting opportunities. Where the assets created are intended to promote 
livelihoods and economic growth, however, rather than mitigate known environmental 
threats, the value of those assets may be less easily quantifiable and their impact on the 
livelihoods of PWP participants is frequently unobserved. Under these conditions asset 
impact evaluation is critical, yet such evaluation is rarely carried out, as there is an 
assumption among policy makers that the production of assets is de facto synonymous with 
growth and poverty reduction, without any consideration of the nature or value of the assets 
created, or the distribution of asset benefits across the population. This results in an often 
implicit analytical conflation of the provision of assets with the achievement of poverty 
reduction, livelihoods promotion and social protection outcomes, or even more 
problematically, a conflation of spending on asset creation and social protection outcomes90. 
An example of the conflation of PWP asset construction with poverty alleviation is to be 
found in the document produced by the South African government to celebrate ten years of 
democratic rule, which justifies the claim of poverty alleviation by stating the number of 
                                                            
90 A similar debate is currently underway in South Africa with regard to the provision of the ‘social wage’ 
(goods and services) for the poor, where the cost of provision has been equated with the value of the benefit 
experienced by the poor in some of the literature (PCAS, 2003) following the benefit incidence or cost 
apportionment method of estimating incidence of benefits (see for example, Demery (2000)), which is 
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assets constructed under the national PWP, and the funds spent on their construction, rather 
than assessing the impact of those assets on poverty: 
‘... these [public works] programmes have been successful in alleviating the asset 
poverty of communities. Over R6.5 billion of expenditure on infrastructure has 
provided 2,182 community assets.’(South Africa, PCAS, 2003:19) 
Such conceptual looseness in evaluating the asset impact of PWPs is typical within the 
literature, and is a major source of weakness in the current PWP discourse.  
6.1 Type of PWP and Asset Creation 
Given the inherently limited benefits accruing from the wage transfer alone, the asset vector 
is critical in the context of type A and C and D PWPs, if anything other than temporary 
(protective) social protection is to be achieved, It is important to note at this juncture that 
both the type of PWP implemented and the relative prioritisation of the objective sets 
associated with the programme, may affect the quality of the asset created, as well as the 
likelihood of it impacting significantly on social protection outcomes. Devereux and 
Solomon have argued that the creation of quality assets within PWPs is now central to all 
PWPs, and that the value of the assets created in PWPs is as important as the work created 
(Devereux and Solomon, 2006), but this assertion is challenged by evidence from several 
programmes in sub-Saharan Africa currently in operation such as the MASAF PWP in 
Malawi (UK DFID, 2003), the EPWP in South Africa (McCord, 2006a), and the PSNP in 
Ethiopia (McCord, 2005), where objectives relating to the provision of quality assets have 
been compromised by the requirement to furnish adequate numbers of employment 
opportunities.  This is a further example of the confusion wrought by lack of adequate 
differentiation of PWP types and the adoption of multiple objective sets simultaneously 
without ensuring adequate conceptual coherence.  
Before exploring these issues in more detail, it is useful to give a brief overview of the 
relatively new phenomenon of the provision of social, rather than physical infrastructure as 
the object of the PWP work conditionality. Given that the priority needs at community level 
in much of sub-Saharan Africa may currently be related to social service provision in support 
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asset provision through a different lens, in terms of support to the social infrastructure 
rather than the provision of additional physical assets. PWP employment to support the 
extension of social service provision, in the form of ECD and HBC, has been developed 
explicitly within the South African EPWP in the last five years (EPWP, 2004a), and similar 
initiatives have been identified in Malawi and Zimbabwe (McCord, 2005), while the MEGS 
also includes a social care component, although this is limited to activities directly relating to 
physical infrastructure programmes, such as the provision of day-care for the children of 
PWP workers. These programmes operate at the interface of government employment 
schemes and non-governmental service provision programmes, with the South African 
EPWP being the most developed example of social infrastructure provision qua PWP.  
There is considerable potential for expansion in terms of unmet demand for service 
provision through type B GEP programmes, and opportunities exist to absorb significant 
numbers of workers in the medium to long term in pursuit of the public good, for example, 
through support to the roll-out of TB and ARV treatment programmes, and the provision of 
improved HBC and ECD throughout the continent. However, there are quality concerns 
associated with the expansion of service delivery through PWPs, particularly in relation to 
potential compromises in service quality resulting from a significant and often rapid 
expansion of employment in the context of a type B (government employment) programme, 
in the absence of adequate training, management or supervisory capacity91. There is little 
impact evidence in the PWP literature relating to social infrastructure programmes, and 
monitoring of service quality, levels of take-up or user satisfaction tends to be weak or non-
existent; as a result, assessing the quality and impact of service provision is as problematic as 
assessing the quality and impact of physical infrastructure provision. 
                                                            
91 This issue was raised vociferously by representatives of the NGO Social Sector in South Africa, 
responsible for the implementation and extension of the social component of the EPWP, with particular 
reference to ECD and HCBC at the Second International Conference for Employment in Development, 
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The Importance of Asset Production in Different Types of PWP  
In attempting to introduce greater conceptual rigour into the debate relating to the function 
and value of PWP assets, it is critical to establish that asset creation can potentially have two 
fundamentally different roles within a PWP. Either asset creation can be the primary 
purpose of programme implementation, with labour market and indirect social protection 
impacts representing positive externalities, as in type C PWPs, or asset creation can be 
primarily a means of absorbing labour and satisfying the work requirement, with the assets 
created being a positive externality rather than the primary rationale for programme 
implementation, as with type A and B programmes, in which labour market or direct social 
protection objective sets dominate. 
In this way, PWPs tend to adopt either asset supply or labour market/social protection 
outcomes as their primary objectives, with labour market benefits and asset supply being 
considered the respective positive externalities, implying a significant difference in 
programme balance in the two cases, which, as will be discussed, may have significant 
implications in terms of the resulting social protection outcomes. In type A and B PWPs, the 
objective of employment provision dominates the objective of asset creation, whereas in 
type C PWP, the provision of infrastructure is the primary objective, to which employment 
creation and any social protect objectives are subordinate.  
This results in differences between the different PWP types in terms of how any social 
protection benefit is likely to be conferred. In type A and B programmes, it is primarily 
labour absorption considerations, rather than concerns with livelihoods promotion or 
economic growth, which lead to the selection of a particular asset for PWP construction. 
Subbarao and Smith noted this problem with PWPs in Ethiopia, observing that: 
‘Workfare programs are not integrated with activities at various levels of government 
[…] because there has been no integration of aid-funded projects with the broader 
developmental activity […] the program suffered from […] low productivity (did not 
lead to assets of the type found in India’s Maharashtra employment Guarantee 
Scheme).  The program is driven by the consideration of labor use […] rather than 
the creation of assets consistent with regional (community) needs and priorities […]. 
As a result [the] aim to use food aid as a ‘dual purpose instrument of relief and 
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This problem is particularly acute in the case of type B PWPs which require a large number 
of employment opportunities for an extended period. Only where sufficiently large numbers 
of labour-absorbing projects have been identified, designed and pre-approved and are 
maintained ‘on the shelf’ at local level for implementation at the time of demand for PWP 
employment has the provision of sufficient employment to meet demand been largely, 
although not universally, achieved. Examples of this approach are the MEGS programme in 
India, and the New Deal programmes in the US. However, many type B programmes (and 
also type A), have not succeeded in creating sufficient numbers of adequately selected and 
designed employment opportunities in this way, and a more frequent scenario is that the 
quality of assets or services created through PWPs has been undermined by the need to 
identify and execute significant numbers of employment opportunities in a limited time 
period. In these cases the constraint is not the lack of unmet needs, or of opportunities for 
productive employment, but the limited technical and administrative capacity to identify, 
design and execute projects.  
This represents a significant challenge when PWPs are repeated in the same location over 
many decades, and where technical capacity to design and select assets for creation under 
PWP is limited, as is the case in most developing countries. In some type B programmes this 
has led to the provision of private as well as public goods through PWP (CSE, op cit) but 
more generally, these constraints have resulted in the construction of substandard assets (in 
both type A and type B programmes), an issue which is widely reported anecdotally, but has 
rarely been formally documented in the literature, which remains largely silent on issues 
relating to the quality, as well as the impact of PWP asset provision92. This problem of asset 
quality is particularly acute where the act of asset creation is only required for the sake of 
providing a work conditionality for essentially ideological reasons related to concerns around 
dependency. In such situations there is not necessarily an expectation that the work 
component will result in the provision of assets which will have meaningful impacts on 
                                                            
92 Jenden (2002:4) argues with reference to a DFID-funded PWP in Wollaita, Ethiopia, that ‘while the 
[PWP] public goods are deeply appreciated by farmers and local government, there is little evidence that 
they are being appropriately maintained on any sustainable basis, or that the improved infrastructure has in 
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livelihoods. In these instances, the question of paying a premium for the utilisation of a PWP 
rather than alternative social protection instrument, on the basis that this approach is 
delivering both a cash transfer and economic assets, is particularly problematic (the issue of 
the PWP ‘premium’ is discussed later in this chapter). This situation is compounded by the 
lack of accountability on the part of PWP implementers regarding the quality of assets 
provided, and the lack of voice on the part of ‘beneficiaries’ to offer feedback on the actual, 
rather than anticipated value of the assets created. 
Some type B PWPs (the US New Deal and Argentinian Jefes PWP) managed to provide an 
adequate supply of employment while also creating economically and socially meaningful 
assets and services, simultaneously delivering on asset provision, employment creation and 
social protection objective sets. The New Deal programme explicitly included a capacity 
development component at the outset of implementation, while the Jefes programme was 
reliant on the capacity of local non-governmental organisations to administer micro projects. 
Here the fundamental constraint is the level of skills available to the programme, which 
would affect not only direct implementation capacity, but also skills development potential 
within the organs of state at all levels, and also civil society (being contingent on an adequate 
base level of literacy, numeracy, core skills, institutional development, etc). The unemployed 
in the US in the 1930s came from across the skills spectrum, creating a pool of skilled 
unemployed who could be deployed in programme design and implementation, and also 
skills development (Harvey, 2007a). Such a cadre of educated and skilled unemployed do not 
exist in many LIC and MIC contexts, and likewise civil society and the NGO sector are too 
weak, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, to play a major role in type B PWP implementation. 
As a consequence, lack of capacity to identify projects which are consistent with local 
development and service delivery needs, to design them and have them ready ‘on the shelf’ 
for implementation, with adequate management capacity, remains a key constraint to the 
provision of the quality assets and services which could potentially promote social protection 
outcomes through type A and B programmes.  
Type C PWPs, by contrast, tend to focus more on the quality of assets provided, as asset 










The Anatomy of Public Works     Chapter 6: The Three Vectors: Assets 
 
  136
externalities of the supply of assets. PWPs implemented under the ILO’s EIIP are typical of 
this kind of type C, labour-based infrastructure programmes (LBIP). The ILO is sanguine 
about the limited nature of the wage benefits accruing to participants from such 
programmes, arguing that this will only provide a ‘temporary income boost’ (ILO, 2003:44)); 
it is not PWP employment per se which will have a sustained impact on livelihoods, but rather 
the assets created through the programme. This idea is important to explore, and is clarified 
in the following description of employment in a typical ILO LBIP: 
‘The typical worker on a labour-based infrastructure programme is an 
underemployed casual labourer.  Care is taken to ensure that the wage is set at a level 
to help lift workers’ families out of severe poverty but avoid attracting employed 
workers away from other income-generating activities. [...] Poverty is reduced in the short 
term by the increased incomes of workers on the project and in the longer term through the 
provision of public goods vital to increasing income-earning prospects for the community 
as a whole.’ (ibid:43, emphasis added) 
This confirms the assertion that it is the assets provided through PWPs which are critical to 
the attainment of sustained social protection outcomes in the case of PWP offering short-
term type C employment. It is useful to highlight the fact that two different causal chains 
between PWP implementation and social protection outcomes are implied by the discussion 
in this chapter. In type A and B programmes, it is employment which is perceived as the 
primary means for addressing social protection, mediated through wage income, which in 
turn will promote social protection outcomes. By contrast, in type C programmes it is 
primarily the creation of assets which, it is assumed, will promote livelihoods, and in turn 
lead to social protection outcomes. These differing causal chains, however, need to be 
considered in the particular labour market context. For example, as argued in chapter five, 
the wage benefits accruing from any short-term PWPs are unlikely to confer significant 
social protection benefits in the context of chronic unemployment, and for this reason the 
function of the assets created also becomes a key determinant of any sustained livelihoods, 
and by implication social protection benefits, arising from short-term PWP employment in 
such a context. In this way, although asset creation may not be the primary objective of a 
type A PWP, the extent to which such a programme has a sustained social protection impact 
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6.2 Value of Assets Created  
The foregoing analysis has highlighted the critical importance of attempting to capture the 
value of the assets created, in order to explore their potential social protection impact. 
However, within the PWP literature, it is in most cases not possible to assess empirically the 
value of the assets created, in terms of their social protection or livelihoods impact, due to 
the scarcity of appropriate monitoring and evaluation data. As a result of these data lacunae, 
the impact of the asset vector of PWPs on social protection is frequently assumed, but 
cannot be directly evaluated in most cases. This is particularly problematic in type A and C 
PWPs, where the monitoring timeframe does not extend beyond the period of direct 
programme implementation. This problem has been identified by Ravallion who concedes 
that there is a need to consider a programme’s impact after the period of construction and 
wage disbursement: 
‘The study period is rarely much longer than the period of the program’s 
disbursements.  However a share of the impact on people’s living standards may 
occur beyond the life of the project’ (2003:10). 
While this approach recognises in principle the critical importance of post-PWP beneficiary 
impacts, Ravallion only includes within his subsequent discussion the ongoing effects of the 
episode of wage transfer, rather than also addressing the ongoing impact of the assets 
created. The lack of post-construction analysis of the productive value of assets created is a 
critical omission in the literature, rendering even the Ravallion PWP appraisal framework 
(discussed in chapter four above), which attempts to accommodate assets within the 
evaluation process, highly problematic, since it remains dependent on heroic assumptions 
about asset performance over time, rather than empirical evidence. The implications of these 
analytical constraints are explored in detail below. 
6.3 Livelihoods Benefits 
In the context of chronic or cyclical unemployment, sustained social protection benefits 
accruing from infrastructure provision are contingent on the impact of the intervention on 
livelihoods. This can be mediated through two channels: i) the direct and indirect income-
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from improved access to health care or education resulting from clinic or school 
construction, or improved road access to existing facilities). It is these ‘livelihoods effects’, 
which may or may not be significant, that are likely to be the primary determinants of the 
poverty alleviation and social protection impacts of type A and C PWPs over time (i.e. in the 
absence of an ongoing cash transfer). The lack of monitoring and evaluation of this aspect of 
PWP performance is problematic, but its significance is not recognised among donors or 
implementing agencies, who display a systemic lack of interest in the value of assets and 
services provided. This is illustrated by the fact that even in major current PWPs, such as the 
World Bank and DFID-supported Social Action Fund PWP in Malawi, the South African 
government’s EPWP and its predecessor, the Community Based Public Works Programme 
(CBPWP), evaluations of the productive value of PWP assets have not been carried out, 
despite the fact that the major rationale for the implementation of this form of social 
protection is the stimulation of local and national growth through the provision of public 
assets (see Malawi, Ministry of Economic Planning and Management (2003), and Phillips 
(2004) respectively). This lack of donor scrutiny undermines the possibility of assessing the 
role of PWP assets as a vector of social protection benefit transmission, as well as the cost 
effectiveness of PWP as social protection instruments more generally. As a consequence of 
this lack of scrutiny, there is little evidence of positive livelihoods impacts arising as the 
direct or indirect result of the creation of PWP assets in such programmes (or for that matter 
evidence to the contrary), since data are typically not gathered on this aspect of PWP 
performance, despite this being an intrinsic, albeit in some instances secondary, component 
of programme objectives.  
This failure to evaluate the benefits of infrastructural assets is partly due to methodological 
difficulties relating to the evaluation of infrastructure programmes more generally, a fact 
acknowledged in the 2004 World Development Report. Within the PWP discourse, this generic 
difficulty in attributing impacts to infrastructure provision is compounded by the implicit 
assumption that the creation of assets such as roads or community structures will de facto 
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There is little research indicating that the assets created in short-term PWPs offer direct (or 
indirect) benefit to poor communities or those participating in the PWP. In some instances 
the construction of a road may have positive direct and indirect effects for a community, but 
this cannot be assumed a priori, and it is critical that this assumption is evaluated. A recent 
study in South Africa highlighted the potential for discrepancies between the aspirational 
objectives and actual outcomes in a rural road-construction programme, attributing this to 
the inability of asset creation alone to promote livelihoods in the absence of coordinated 
rural development initiatives (Mashiri and Mahapa, 2002). The institutional and 
developmental ‘isolation’ of PWPs also contributes to the fact that assets created under 
PWPs are perceived, in many instances, to be white elephants, 93.largely as a result of their 
non-strategic selection and the fact that they are uncoordinated with other local 
development initiatives94, although it is not possible to substantiate this perception 
empirically, given the lack of analysis of the use of PWP assets post construction. This 
problem is particularly acute in situations where asset construction is the positive externality, 
rather than the primary PWP objective, since labour absorption, rather than strategic asset 
selection, is the priority in such instances; or where PWPs are implemented outside regular 
government structures, for example, through PMUs or NGOs whose activities may not be 
adequately aligned with local government infrastructure development priorities. These 
concerns illustrate the problem with the assumptions underlying the creation of assets 
through PWP, and raise the importance of the institutional location and the linkage of PWPs 
with other developmental initiatives if the potential benefits accruing from the assets created 
are to be captured. This issue of PWP institutional isolation – and the need for such 
programmes to be implemented with reference to broader social development plans – has 
been identified as a key factor undermining the potential impact of the South African EPWP 
                                                            
93 For a discussion of the political function of ‘white elephant’ projects see Robinson and Torvik (2005) 
who define such projects as ‘investment projects with negative social surplus.’ 
94 Reports of such constructions under the auspices of type A PWP are many. One example of this is 
multipurpose community centres constructed on the outskirts of many conurbations in Limpopo, South 
Africa under the national PWP (CBPWP) without adequate community ownership. The buildings were not 
used by the community, and left empty they were subsequently used for prostitution and drug selling (P. 
Ndhundhuma, Chief Executive Officer, Khanyisa Integrated Development and Social Research, Tzaneen, 
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in terms of livelihoods promotion and contribution to local economic development (Karuri 
et al., 2007; Phillips, 2008). 
The value of assets created is undermined in many cases by lack of clarity relating to 
ownership of a PWP asset post construction, which is particularly problematic when an 
asset, such as a road or dam, is created outside normal community or local government 
structures, for example, by an external donor or NGO. In many cases, failure to clarify issues 
relating to ownership and responsibility for PWP asset maintenance and repair, and the 
allocation of adequate budgetary allocations to cover the recurrent costs of PWP 
maintenance, are major factors contributing to the rapid deterioration of asset quality and 
viability in terms of contributing to improved livelihoods. This failing undermines the 
potential benefit of the asset vector of a PWP, and the resulting deterioration of assets 
created can reduce the cost effectiveness of asset creation through the PWP process (UK 
DFID, 2003a).  
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the general lacuna relating to the evaluation of the 
assets created under PWP. However, as has been argued above, the creation of a viable asset 
is not necessarily synonymous with livelihoods improvements; there is a need to go beyond 
the quantification of the economic value of the assets over time, and a need to interpret this 
in terms of the potential economic growth and livelihoods impact of these assets, and then 
to assess the likely social protection consequences. These issues will not be explored further 
in this thesis, but are identified as a critical area for future research, without which it is 
difficult to assess adequately the social protection impact of the asset component of PWP 
implementation. However, the related question of benefit incidence is explored further 
below, in terms of considering to whom the (putative) social protection benefits of the assets 
created will accrue. 
6.4 Incidence  
In assessing the social protection function of assets created under PWPs, it is essential to 
consider the question of incidence. The critical question is the incidence of any livelihoods 
benefits arising as a result of the construction of PWP infrastructure, i.e. which segments of 
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questions have experienced only limited critical scrutiny in the literature, and have not been 
explored in relation to type A and C programmes95. A related issue, which has also been 
largely ignored in the literature is the tension between the creation of assets which may 
promote development and sustainable livelihoods for the poor in the short term, such as 
improved irrigation, but may not contribute significantly to national growth, and those which 
may promote national growth, but may not have a significant impact on the livelihoods of 
the poor in the short to medium term, such as road infrastructure. These are some of the key 
questions which remain unexplored in the PWP discourse, and are often conflated in the 
popular political discourse around PWPs, leading to expectations that generic PWPs can 
contribute to both local and national growth and development objectives, irrespective of 
programme type, size or the relevance of the assets created. In most instances, the 
contribution of PWP assets to the livelihoods of intended beneficiaries remains 
unmonitored, despite the critical importance of the asset creation function of PWPs in the 
decision whether to adopt PWPs or alternative social protection instruments.  
6.5 Asset Costs and Benefits 
Assessing the value of the asset created through PWPs over time, and the distribution of 
resulting benefits, is of critical importance in determining the effectiveness of PWPs as social 
protection instruments, and is particularly significant given the high cost of the non-wage 
component in PWP budgets,96 which is consumed by material and management costs. This 
renders the net cost of a unit of currency transferred through a PWP significantly higher 
than if alternative measures were adopted,97 an insight accepted by the World Bank, who 
concede that:  
                                                            
95 Such analysis has been carried out primarily in relation to type B programmes, which with their longer 
operational timelines offer greater ease of analysis. 
96 Wages typically comprise only 30% to 60% of the total programme cost (Subbarao et al. 1997:80). 
97 Smith calculated a per unit cost of 13.9 to transfer a unit to the poorest in Malawi through public works, 
compared to 1.73 through cash transfers (Smith 2001:39). While it was argued in chapter four that such 
comparative analysis is fundamentally flawed, Smith’s analysis is nevertheless indicative of the significant 
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‘Workfare programs are not necessarily an inexpensive way of delivering benefits to 
poor people.’ (2001:155) 
While it may be possible to ascertain the cost of a unit of currency transferred through 
PWPs, however imperfectly, given the inconsistency in assessing PWP costs in the literature, 
as discussed in chapter four, and to argue that these costs are higher than those associated 
with alternative social protection instruments such as cash transfer programmes, this analysis 
is problematic as it excludes any consideration of the value of the assets created, effectively 
reducing their discount value to zero, and failing to take account of either the assets’ 
potential social protection impact, or their impact on broader economic growth.  
Since there are significant methodological problems associated with assessing the cost of 
assets created through a PWP, and frequently also a reluctance on the part of donors or 
implementing agencies to evaluate the quality of the resulting product, any attempt to 
compare the relative costs of asset production using conventional and labour-based PWP 
approaches is highly problematic, rendering the calculation of any possible premium 
associated with the adoption of labour-intensive, PWP approaches over alternative asset 
production modalities, problematic.98 Similarly, assessing the social protection impact of 
PWP assets, mediated through ongoing livelihoods improvement, is highly problematic, 
particularly on a comparative basis. Hence, attempting any meaningful cost effectiveness of 
the asset vector is an extremely complex operation offering only limited insights. It is, 
however, possible to argue that unless the assets or services provided through a PWP are of 
value in terms of promoting either livelihoods or growth improvements, then any premium 
associated with the adoption of LBIP over conventional construction methods, or PWPs 
rather than alternative social protection instruments, such as cash transfer, would be hard to 
justify in terms of economic efficiency99. 
                                                            
98 This problem does not occur in the case of social infrastructure provision (social service delivery) PWPs, 
as the provision of such services is de facto inherently labour intensive.  
99 The extent of such a premium will vary on a case by case and country by country basis, depending on 
consideration of relative factor costs, which will be informed by the wage level, accessibility of plant, 
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6.6 Determinants of Asset Quality  
The critical determinant of the social protection potential of the asset or service provided 
through a PWP is the quality of the asset created. Subbarao identifies this as a critical issue, 
arguing that: 
‘Careful attention to detail is needed to attain a high labor intensity without 
compromising the quality of assets created.’ (2001:vii) 
While this argument is generally made with reference to physical infrastructure, which 
accounts for the majority of PWPs, it also applies in terms of the quality of social service 
provided through PWP. The key factors influencing the quality of physical assets created are: 
appropriate asset selection, design, maintenance and usage, which together determine the 
sustainability of the asset provided, and its impact. These issues are discussed in turn below. 
6.7 Asset Selection 
The quality of assets created is determined a priori by appropriate asset selection, which is 
affected by whether the asset has been identified in local development plans, or is  integrated 
with these plans in some way, and whether the selection of the asset was owned or informed 
by the local community and/or local government.  The strategic function of the assets 
created, in terms of their potential impact on livelihoods, is also critical, as is consideration 
of whose livelihoods will be served by the provision of the asset. Within the CBPWP in 
South Africa, populations were given a menu of physical assets from which they could select 
the most appropriate for their community, resulting in the expression of a very constrained 
set of community preferences, which may not coincide with the priority needs within the 
community. Lack of local government and community involvement in asset selection is 
potentially a problem for PWP assets when programmes are implemented externally to 
government structures by parallel agencies, such as the Programme Management Units 
(PMUs) which are frequently tasked with implementing donor-funded PWPs, and stand 
outside regular government administrative structure, such as the MASAF and European 
Union (EU) PMUs in Malawi. The existence of such PMUs reduces the likelihood of PWPs 
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Once the asset has been selected, design considerations offer the next set of opportunities 
for asset quality to be compromised within a PWP. Operational pressures to implement 
programmes in situations of constrained technical capacity sometimes result in programmes 
which may not be sufficiently adapted to local requirements, and instances have been 
documented in type A PWPs where caps on non-wage spending have forced design 
compromises and the adoption of inferior and less sustainable construction methods. 
Expenditure restrictions on capital-intensive components of otherwise relatively low capital 
cost infrastructure such as roads, in order to comply with budgetary requirements for 40% 
of the programme budget to be allocated to unskilled labour have undermined the viability 
of some assets created under the MASAF programme, rendering some PWP roads unusable 
during the rainy season due to the lack of bridges (UK DFID, 2003a). Similarly in the case of 
the Gundo Lashu programme, the selection of road sealing materials was informed on the 
basis of cost rather than appropriateness or durability in order to retain the desired 
labour/material ratios.100 This issue is particularly problematic where fixed capital labour 
ratios are retained in the context of capital goods inflation which outstrips labour inflation. 
Even where assets are appropriate and have been correctly specified, implementation 
shortfalls may undermine asset value, given limited local engineering capacity for 
management and oversight, and may render PWP created assets inferior to those created 
using conventional planning and implementation approaches as part of ongoing 
governmental workplans. For example, in their evaluation of the second component of 
MASAF, the World Bank concluded that: 
 
‘There are [...] indications that MASAF structures may not meet strict technical 
standards, as low calibre inputs seem to have been used in a lot of instances. There is 
therefore need for MASAFIII to pay particular attention to issues of coordination 
and quality.’ (2004b:39) 
However, this issue is largely ignored in the literature, and there is little empirical evidence 
on which to assess the gravity (or otherwise) of the issue, or its implications for the 
continued adoption of PWPs. 
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6.8 Maintenance and Recurrent Costs 
Where physical infrastructure is created, the critical question of sustainability is frequently 
overlooked, and in the absence of adequate maintenance, assets and their potential positive 
livelihoods benefits deteriorate rapidly (see Jenden (2002)). One aspect of sustainability is the 
provision of funding for ongoing recurrent costs relating to the asset, in terms of 
maintenance in the case of physical infrastructure, and in cases where the assets which have 
been constructed are schools or clinics, sustainability requirements include the provision of 
funding for recurrent costs such as staffing and material costs, as well as the availability of 
the personnel required to run the utility. This is linked to the question of asset ownership, 
both in legal terms and in community terms, and raises the issue of responsibility for utilising 
and maintaining the asset once it has been created through the PWP. This is particularly 
problematic when PWPs are implemented outside the normal government structures for 
asset creation, often resulting in the creation of unfunded recurrent liabilities for local 
government, which can lead to poor asset management and maintenance post PWP 
completion. These issues are rarely discussed in the PWP literature, as the problems tend to 
emerge only after the programme implementation and evaluation timeframes have been 
completed. 
6.9 Usage  
In terms of ascertaining the social protection benefit of the asset created, ultimately it is 
necessary to know the benefit incidence, i.e. whether the asset is fit for purpose, by whom it 
is utilised, and what benefits it confers; questions which relate directly to whether the assets 
created have a ‘pro poor’ orientation (Devereux and Solomon, 2006:23). The potential social 
protection impact of the asset can be ascertained by assessing whether local users perceive 
that a viable asset or service been provided, and are using it, or whether the benefits accruing 
from the asset were limited to the period of wage receipt. However, this critical issue which 
can only be ascertained post asset completion, is typically excluded from PWP evaluation 
processes, rendering an assessment of the benefit accruing from the asset, and by which 
segments of the community the benefits are being captured, highly problematic. The 
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(Dev, 1995; PEO, 1980 cited in Devereux and Solomon, (2006)) but there is no comparable 
or detailed exploration of this issue in the literature with respect to assets created under 
PWPs in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of their quality, incidence and social protection 
impact101.  
6.10 Conclusion  
If the assets produced through a PWP were to be assessed as a potential vector of social 
protection benefit, it would be necessary to identify the form and cost of the benefit, to 
quantify its value over time, and to assess to whom the benefits accrue, in this way inserting 
PWPs into a conventional infrastructure evaluation framework. However, such an approach 
has been absent from the literature to date, (with the notable and single exception of WFP et 
al., (1985)102) and the data required to perform such an analysis are not available. In the light 
of these omissions drawing empirically based conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the 
asset creation vector in terms of its social protection impact is problematic.  
Where labour market outcomes rather than asset production are the primary objective, i.e. in 
type A and B programmes, the creation of assets is essentially a means to satisfy the work 
conditionality; a positive externality. In these instances, if the creation of quality 
infrastructure is not compromised by the dominant need to create large-scale work 
opportunities, the assets created may offer benefits to participants, but this outcome is 
contingent on the range of programme design issues outlined above. Where the production 
of the asset is the primary programme objective, as in type C programmes, and employment 
creation the externality, it is likely that asset quality would be superior, however even in these 
instances there is a lack of robust evidence on the impact of the assets created on 
livelihoods, and ultimately social protection. Even in instances where the limitations of the 
                                                            
101 There have been a small number of studies which have examined some of these issues on a limited 
scale, such as Jenden’s evaluation of a NGO-implemented PWP in Ethiopia, which includes some analysis 
of to whom PWP asset benefits accrue (Jenden, 2002). Recently, more work has been carried out by Sharp 
and others examining incidence, (Sharp, 2004, Sharp et al., 2006) but again, this has been limited to 
Ethiopia, and there is little such work in the rest of the continent.  
102 WFP, together with BIDS and IFPRI produced a report on an evaluation of food-for-work programmes 
in Bangladesh, which attempted to quantify the incremental income attributable to the construction of 
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social protection impact of the wage vector are acknowledged, as in short-term ILO EIIP 
PWPs, there is little focus on creating an evidence base on the socio-economic impact of the 
assets created; a position which is in tension with the inclusion of social protection 
objectives within the rhetoric surrounding such programmes. Recent exploratory research by 
the ILO in Ethiopia to examine the short-term effects of employment intensive projects has 
confirmed the argument outlined in this and the preceding chapters, that neither the 
construction of PWP assets nor the provision temporary employment which type C 
programmes offer, resulted in significant social protection benefits for participants, even in 
the short term: 
There has not been any noticeable change in aggregated measures of poverty, which 
is expected as improved performance in the study area would depend not only on 
the implementation of employment intensive road works, but on accompanying 
interventions to achieve sustained poverty reduction. (Osei-Bonsu and Mengesha, 
2007:18)  
The key problem, however, throughout all PWP types, is that empirical analysis of the 
livelihoods value of the assets created is typically not addressed in programme evaluations, 
and nor are questions relating to the incidence of asset usage. In addition to this, questions 
relating to identifying the cost premium (if any) of adopting LBIP compared to alternative 
more capital intensive modalities of asset production, are not routinely assessed. As a 
consequence, in many instances it is not known if there is a cost premium associated with 
creating assets using labour intensive PWPs rather than conventional means, or the 
magnitude of the premium (or the extent to which there is a commensurate cost in terms of 
quality reduction). McCutcheon and others have argued extensively that with the relative 
factor costs which tend to prevail in LICs in much of sub-Saharan Africa, there is no 
additional premium associated with LBIP if the techniques are appropriately applied 
(McCutcheon, 1995, 2001a, 2001b and 2001c). This conclusion is mirrored by Devereux and 
Solomon, who argue, on the basis of a range of comparative studies, that ‘labour-based 
options are, on average, about 10-30% less costly in financial terms than equipment-
intensive options’ (Devereux and Solomon, 2006:5). However, in some countries such as 
South Africa, the issue remains highly contested within the industry (Mabilo 2003; 
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costs of capital and labour intensive construction in that country has been ambiguous 
(Taylor et al., 2005). Devereux and Solomon endorse McCutcheon’s argument, suggesting 
that the key factors determining cost savings through LBIP are ‘careful site selection, close 
supervision of the production process, and application of proper production techniques’ 
(Devereux and Solomon, 2006:6). Unfortunately, these are just the conditions which tend 
not to prevail in many construction-based PWPs due to lack of adequate technical and 
administrative capacity. 
 
Lack of information on the impact and cost of social protection benefits accruing through 
the asset vector in PWPs render any general conclusions in this area problematic, and as a 
consequence, it is not possible to identify either what social protection benefits the asset 
vector might typically deliver in the different types of PWPs, to whom any such benefits 
might accrue, the additional premium associated with choosing to create assets in a labour 
intensive way through a PWP; or the relative cost effectiveness of attempting to deliver 
social protection benefits through PWPs rather than through alternative social protection 
instruments.  
Concerns about the efficacy of PWPs in relation to asset provision are largely based on 
anecdotal evidence, given the failure of implementing governments, NGOs or donor 
communities to examine these issues critically, or to evaluate PWP assets over time in terms 
of asset quality, usage and impact, after the period of PWP wage transfer has been 
completed. This represents a challenge in assessing the impact of infrastructure provision on 
livelihoods which extends beyond the confines of the PWP debate, but nonetheless this 
question is key in attempting to assess the potential social protection function of PWPs. 
Devereux and Solomon (2006) argue that there is evidence of PWP-created infrastructure 
directly contributing to livelihoods, and as evidence for this, cite a study carried out in 
Bangladesh into the impact of a PWP constructed feeder road which documented 
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it is notable that they draw on a study from 1983103 due to the lack of more recent evidence 
to support empirically their assertion that PWPs can have positive impacts on livelihoods, 
and the implication of this is not lost on them: 
‘Though more than 20 years old, this remains a pioneering study and one of the few 
comprehensive evaluations of the impacts of a rural employment creation 
programme. One obvious implication is that more studies of this kind are long 
overdue.’ (Devereux and Solomon, 2006:16). 
For PWPs providing social rather than physical infrastructure (social services, such as ECD 
and HBC), there is likely to be a significant impact on the poor, by relieving the domestic 
burden of caring for children and the sick and thereby freeing scarce labour for alternative 
household supporting activities. But again, no empirical evidence is currently available which 
attempts to quantify the social protection impact of such PWPs.  
The critical problem is that neither the cost premium nor impact of PWP assets is 
empirically assessed in the mainstream literature, and that this lacuna is not identified as an 
issue of concern or import within the social protection discourse. In the absence of such 
data, it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding the efficacy of the asset vector as a 
source of social protection benefits to those participating in PWP. 
There are only a very limited number of references to this research lacuna in the literature. 
Ravallion’s recognition that there is a need to consider a programme’s impact after the 
period of disbursement is almost unique in the literature, as evaluation tends de facto to be 
restricted to the period of programme implementation and disbursement, and so excludes an 
assessment of any sustained objectives ascribed to the programme, including benefits 
accruing from the livelihoods impact of assets created. This is a significant omission in terms 
of the preceding discussion of the social protection impact of PWP assets, as the ability to 
assess asset impact ‘beyond the life of the project’ is critical. Moreover, the assumed linkage 
between asset provision and livelihoods improvements is not empirically explored in the 
PWP literature, nor the secondary linkage between asset-based livelihoods benefits and social 
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protection, while the critical question of the incidence of these benefits, such as they might 
be, is largely absent from the discourse, compromising any attempt at an empirically founded 
analysis of the social protection benefit of PWP asset provision. A review of the available 
literature and existing PWPs suggests that, ultimately, the conclusion can be drawn that the 
assumptions within the literature and policy environment that the assets created through 
PWPs will contribute to sustained livelihoods benefits for participants may, in many cases, 
particularly in type A and B programmes, be little more than platitudes informed by wishful 
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7 THE THREE VECTORS: SKILLS 
The third vector though which social protection benefits may be conferred upon PWP 
participants is through skills development and work experience, on the basis of the argument 
that the acquisition of such qualities will improve the supply side characteristics of PWP 
participants and hence improve their employability, resulting in improved employment 
performance with social protection benefits accruing from increased wage income over time. 
In this way, the relationship between skills development and social protection is somewhat 
etiolated, yet remains at the heart of many PWPs, either as an explicit objective, or as an 
assumed beneficial externality. Increased ‘employability’ after PWP participation is assumed 
to occur through one of two distinct processes, either through self employment or through 
employment in the formal or informal sectors, and the aspiration is often articulated that this 
approach may be used to address both frictional unemployment, and also to stimulate 
aggregate increases in employment. These issues and the assumptions underlying them are 
explored in detail below, drawing on a case study from South Africa, the Expanded Public 
Works Programme (EPWP), and an attempt is made to assess the viability of the objectives 
associated with the PWP skills development argument, within the context of chronic 
unemployment. 
7.1 Conceptual Clarifications 
Before discussing the question in more detail, it is useful at this point to articulate the 
conceptual considerations underlying the broad ‘skills development and training’ approach, 
as used within the PWP discourse.  
There are two major assumptions underlying the labour market objectives of this form of 
intervention; the first is that skills development is an effective response to labour supply 
constraints, and that an intervention to address supply side issues will reduce frictional 
unemployment, and the second is that skills development can stimulate endogenous demand 
for labour, in part through the development of SMMEs and self employment opportunities. 
It is argued in this chapter that the probability of either of these assumptions being realised 
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A PWP with such objectives would conform to the type D PWP within the typology 
proposed in chapter two, and an example of such a programme would be the Irish 
Community Employment Programme (CEP)104. However, while type D PWPs which 
explicitly address skills development and frictional unemployment are widespread in OECD 
countries, they are rare in developing and middle-income countries. This type of intervention 
is associated in design and intent with the current European policy of labour market 
‘activation’, which aims to promote labour market participation by those perceived as 
‘disadvantaged’ in the labour market105. The dominant type D OECD PWP model provides a 
combination of work experience, skills development and labour market counselling in an 
attempt to assist the unemployed to take up existing employment opportunities, setting a 
time limit to the period of eligibility for receipt of the PWP wage as a further incentive for 
the unemployed to take up available work, thereby attempting to reduce ongoing frictional 
unemployment. This represents an attempt to simultaneously improve the quality of labour 
supply, lower frictional unemployment, and reduce dependence on government funded 
social assistance payments (and hence the cost to the fiscus). Such an approach is rare 
outside OECD countries, but the debate and terminology have entered the international 
PWP literature, with South Africa adopting PWPs in preference to alternative social 
protection measures for the working age poor unemployed, reflecting the OECD preference 
for addressing the needs of this group through ‘activation’ strategies to bring them into 
employment, rather than adopting social grant options (Taylor, pers. comm., cited in Karuri 
et al. (2007)). 
This approach is not limited to type D PWPs; there are many examples of other types of 
PWPs including skills development components. Examples include the type A EPWP in 
                                                            
104 The CEP was initiated in 1994 with the objectives of: providing temporary opportunities for long-term 
unemployed and socially excluded persons, providing opportunities for individual training and personal 
development, providing economic and social benefits to communities, contributing to the local 
development strategies, and increasing participants subsequent job/income prospects (Deloitte & Touche, 
1999:63). 
105 See, for example, the centrality of the activation concept in the UK’s active labour market policy as set 
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South Africa, mentioned above, the type C AGETIP in Senegal, and the type B Jefes 
Programme in Argentina (offering guaranteed employment, for a maximum period of five 
years) each of which explicitly includes among their stated objectives the reduction of 
frictional unemployment and expansion of aggregate employment through skills 
development. The term ‘type D interventions’ will be used in this chapter to include both 
type D PWPs (such as the Irish CEP) and also the skills development components of other 
types of PWPs with skills development objectives.  
7.2 Labour Market Assumption Underlying Type D Interventions 
It is interesting to note that skills development and training is not included as a vector of 
PWP social protection in the MEGS or the NREGP, which characterise the function of the 
PWP not as a ‘treatment’, with a transformational social protection outcome, but as a source 
of guaranteed and ongoing cash based state support. This contrasts with the belief inherent 
in type D interventions that through a treatment of the participants, their labour market 
characteristics can be improved such that their relationship to the market, post PWP 
employment, will alter significantly, with market clearing at lower levels of unemployment, a 
reduction in frictional unemployment and increased levels of aggregate employment. This is 
indicative of a fundamentally different conception of what a PWP is, its social protection 
function, and the potential of the market to offer a response to the unemployment problem. 
Type D interventions are based on a fundamental belief in the possibility of market-based 
‘solutions’ to unemployment, which by definition, do not require ongoing support from the 
state. 
Type D interventions dominate both the PWP discourse and programming, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and their success is contingent on i) the existence of frictional 
unemployment, and ii) the scale of such frictional unemployment relative to the level of 
unemployment, such that it has the potential to absorb a significant proportion of the 
unemployed. Any assessment of the extent to which type D interventions can address 
unemployment on a significant scale is then contingent on whether the scale of unmet 
demand in relation to the scale of unemployment offers sufficient space for significant levels 
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experience, such that labour exits programmes equipped with skills for which there is an 
unmet demand. These issues are examined in detail below. 
7.3 How Can Employability be Enhanced? 
Type D interventions can either attempt to promote skills relating to ‘employability’, 
resulting in participants attaining employment in the formal or informal labour market, or 
they can attempt to stimulate various forms of self employment, ranging from the 
promotion of subsistence agriculture or survivalist micro-enterprise106 to small and medium 
enterprise (SMME) development. Examples of PWPs aiming to promote survivalist or 
micro-enterprise activities are the PSNP in Ethiopia and the DFID-funded Central Region 
Infrastructure Maintenance Programme (CRIMP) in Malawi (Pinder, 2001), while the 
AGETIP in Senegal and the EPWP in South Africa are examples of PWPs with objectives 
relating to the stimulation of larger scale SMME development (McCord, 2007b). This 
chapter will primarily focus on examining the success of PWPs in relation to the first type of 
skills development, i.e. promoting employability, although the impact of PWPs on 
entrepreneurial activity ranging from survivalist to SMME activities will also be discussed, 
drawing on evidence from Malawi and South Africa. 
7.4 The South African Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
The South African EPWP is a type A PWP incorporating type D components and explicit 
skills development objectives. The programme was launched in 2004 with the aim of 
providing between 100,000 and 200,000 short-term jobs each year over a five year period, 
providing skills training and work experience during the episode of PWP employment. The 
EPWP is primarily a labour-based infrastructure programme (LBIP) PWP offering a single 
short-term episode of employment to participants. Some 75% of the ‘job opportunities’ it 
provides conform to conventional type A PWP employment in the construction sector, 
while the other 25% comprises employment in the social services (ECD and HBC) SMME 
development, and environmental rehabilitation (McCord, 2007a). The programme has a 
                                                            










The Anatomy of Public Works     Chapter 7: The Three Vectors: Skills  
 
  155
range of objectives, including the provision of a wage transfer, asset creation and skills 
development (Karuri et al., 2007). The type D ‘skills development’ component of the 
programme is premised on the assumption that the acquisition of skills and workplace 
experience during the period of PWP employment will be adequate to improve participants’ 
labour market performance, on the basis of the implicit assumption that the labour market 
problem is, to some significant degree, one of frictional unemployment.  
This approach is consistent with the overall South African labour market policy, which is 
focused on the promotion of GDP growth as the primary engine to increase aggregate 
employment, and the adoption of a high skills growth strategy (Kraak, 2005)107. In addition, 
there are a limited number of skills training interventions (although outside the EPWP there 
are no skills training programmes for which the unemployed are eligible), together with an 
emphasis on the development of SMMEs and the promotion of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE), in order to redress the economic and labour market exclusion and 
segmentation arising from over a century of racialised economic and labour market policies. 
Besides modest increases in government expenditure in infrastructure provision, and some 
reduction in labour market regulation (Growth and Development Summit, 2003; ANC, 
2005), the main government intervention for the unskilled unemployed is the EPWP, which 
is ascribed considerable potential in terms of addressing the core challenge of 
unemployment. 
However, despite the EPWP’s policy prominence, the labour market impact of the training 
component of this programme has not been studied systematically, from either a theoretical 
or empirical basis. This case study provides a critical analysis of the programme from both 
perspectives in an attempt to illuminate the key issues relating to skills development as a 
vector of social protection in PWPs generally. The case study findings suggest that short-
term PWPs are unlikely to have a significant impact on skills development or unemployment 
in contexts of chronic unemployment, excess supply of low and unskilled labour, or where 
                                                            
107 For a critique of the selection of a high skills growth strategy in the context of South Africa, given the 
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the overall government labour market strategy is founded on the premise of high skills 
growth.  
7.5 The Skills Development Objective of the EPWP 
The objective of the EPWP is to:  
‘... provide poverty and income relief though temporary work for the unemployed to 
carry out socially useful activities’ while at the same time equipping participants ‘with 
a modicum of training and work experience, which should enhance their ability to earn a 
living in the future.’ (Growth and Development Summit Agreement, June 2003)  
It is interesting to note that while the terms ‘training and work experience’ are often used 
almost as a collective noun in the PWP discourse (as implied in the quotation above), there 
is at the same time an explicit recognition in the EPWP documentation that without the 
skills development component, the work experience impact of temporary PWP employment 
would be of limited value: 
‘… job creation without skills development, upgrading and training, does not lend 
itself to sustainable employment and will have no long-term economic impact on the 
lives of the unemployed….’ (EPWP, 2004c, citing the Growth and Development 
Summit, 2003) 
This insight is important, suggesting that labour market experience alone, without explicit 
skills development components, may not be sufficient for a PWP to meet its supply side 
objectives.108 What is clear, in more general terms, from the quotations above, is that the 
EPWP has a transformative objective, with skills development being presented as the main 
vector for delivering this outcome. The objective of improving labour market performance 
through EPWP participation is reiterated throughout the EPWP documentation: 
                                                            
108 Notwithstanding this caveat, labour market experience was accorded high importance in EPWP design 
due to the elevated levels of youth unemployment in South Africa, and the high percentage of the 
unemployed who have never worked; ‘The EPWP is an important means of providing exposure to the 
world of work in a context where a very high proportion of the unemployed have never worked. Indeed, in 
the 16-34 age group (which constitutes the “youth” category in terms of the Youth Commission’s 
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The EPWP is a nationwide programme covering all spheres of government and 
state-owned enterprises, that aims to draw significant numbers of unemployed into 
productive work accompanied by training so that they increase their capacity to earn an income. 
(EPWP, 2005) 
This statement is reiterated throughout the EPWP literature which argues that the aim of the 
EPWP is ‘to utilise public sector budgets to reduce and alleviate unemployment’109, with the 
proximate goal being the provision of temporary employment and the medium term goal 
being: 
‘enhancing the ability of workers to earn an income, either through the labour 
market or through entrepreneurial activity’ (ibid) 
This represents a vision wherein the immediate and temporary benefit of PWP participation 
is mediated through the wage vector (as outlined in chapter five), while the medium to long 
term social protection benefit results from the skills development vector. This suggests that 
the skills development component of the EPWP is conceptualised as a form of ‘treatment’, 
resulting in improved labour market characteristics for those who have passed through PWP 
employment, which, it is assumed will result in improved labour market performance. In this 
model, PWP participants enter the programme with one set of labour market characteristics 
which are in excess supply, and exit with labour market characteristics for which there is 
unmet market demand, resulting in increased rates of employment among EPWP graduates.  
The analysis underlying this approach is predicated on the assumption that supply-side 
interventions can have a significant impact on unemployment among the unskilled or low-
skilled: 
‘Given that most of the unemployed are unskilled, the emphasis is on relatively 
unskilled work opportunities. All of these work opportunities will be combined with 
training or education or skills development, with the aim of increasing the ability of people to earn 
an income once they leave the programme. Together with the SETAs [Sectoral Education 
and Training Authorities], the Department of Labour (DOL) will coordinate the 
                                                            
109 The objective of ‘alleviating’ as opposed to ‘reducing’ unemployment is in itself problematic, and of 
limited value in the context of chronic, rather than cyclical unemployment. See McCord (2005) on the 
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training and skills development aspects of the programme.’ (EPWP, 2005, emphasis 
added) 
This statement reveals a series of prior assumptions which are implicit in the EPWP model 
and have a direct bearing on the potential of skills development to impact on employment; 
firstly, that the quality and quantity of skills or experience transferred is adequate to 
significantly alter the labour market characteristics of the participant; and secondly, that these 
additional skills or experience will translate directly into improved employment performance, 
with the latter assumption being conditional on whether the newly acquired skills match 
those for which there is frictional demand, and that the scale of frictional unemployment is 
sufficient to absorb all those who are newly skilled as a result of PWP participation. Each of 
these assumptions and contingencies is open to question, with the result that it is not 
axiomatic that PWP participation will result in improved labour market performance, and 
enhanced social protection. 
However, the fundamental insight from the EPWP quotations above is that the 
characterisation of unemployment implicit within this analysis is essentially ‘frictional’. This 
mirrors the analysis underlying active labour market strategies in many OECD countries, and 
informs the selection of skills promotions interventions in these contexts. Whether such an 
analysis and policy response is appropriate in the South African context, with significantly 
higher levels of unemployment which is primarily structural, is open to question. Bhorat has 
outlined the key economic considerations underpinning the assumption that supply side 
interventions promoting skills acquisition by the unskilled represents a viable means for their 
integration into the labour force, arguing that: 
‘... given the unevenness of the economy’s growth generation – both in terms of 
sectoral expansion and skills requirements – a fair degree of intervention is clearly 
required on the labour supply side. Put differently, the simultaneous existence of a 
skilled labour shortage and unskilled labour surplus, point to the importance of 
adhering to a policy framework that emphasizes both the need to kick-start 
economic growth as well as ensuring that the characteristics of the suppliers of 
labour match those in demand by growing sectors’ (2004:28) 
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‘Two fundamental strategies underpin the government’s approach to reducing  
unemployment. Firstly, to increase economic growth so that the number of net new 
jobs being created starts to exceed the number of new entrants into the labour 
market, and secondly to improve the education system such that the workforce is able to take up the 
largely skilled work opportunities which economic growth will generate. Short to medium-term 
strategies have been put in place to contribute towards these strategies. The EPWP 
forms one of government’s short to medium-term strategies.’ (EPWP, 2005a, 
emphasis added). 
The critical question, however, is whether improving the supply side characteristics of the 
unskilled mass of the unemployed through EPWP participation and training will enable 
them to take up the ‘largely skilled work opportunities which economic growth will generate’? 
Thus, one of the key questions in the current policy discourse is: are supply side 
interventions an appropriate and significant response to the structural unemployment which 
characterises the South African labour market? When specifically applied to the EPWP the 
question becomes, do the experience and training benefits of participation in PWP enable 
labour to take up the limited number of skilled  work opportunities for which unmet demand 
is known to exist? 
In an attempt to answer this question, which applies equally in all contexts where skills 
development is anticipated to provide a vector for the transmission of social protection 
benefits, first the objectives and content of the EPWP will be examined in detail, and then 
the nature of demand for skilled labour within the South African economy will be compared 
with the skills development provided in the EPWP. Finally, the limited empirical evidence 
available on the performance of skills development in PWPs in South Africa will be reviewed 
to see if this offers any further insights and corroborates the conclusions of the more 
theoretical analysis. 
7.6 Training in the EPWP 
The EPWP provides PWP employment in four sectors: infrastructure, environment, social 
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million work opportunities to be created between 2004 and 2009, while the goal is to create 
200,000 in the environmental sector, 150,000 in the social and 12,000 in the economic.110  
In each sector, training is recognised as central, as clearly articulated in the EPWP Social 
Sector Plan: 
‘One way of viewing the EPWP is as a bridge between unemployment and 
employment during which participants are equipped with skills and experience. As 
such the EPWP is exempt from much of the current labour legislation. In return for 
this exemption the programme is obliged to provide a higher level of training than 
participants would normally get in any other place of work. Training is therefore the 
backbone of the EPWP Code of Good Practice. Developing the capacity to deliver on this 
commitment is critical to the success of the programme.’ (EPWP, 2004a:28, emphasis added) 
In recognition of the unskilled nature of most of the work opportunities offered under the 
EPWP, and hence the limited value of job experience per se in promoting skills development, 
it was planned to combine all the work opportunities created in the Social Sector ‘with 
training or education or skills development, with the aim of increasing the ability of people 
to earn an income once they leave the programme’ (EPWP, 2004a). ‘Learnerships’ are the 
main vehicle of formal training offered under the EPWP, providing workers with a 
combination of on-the-job experience, a stipend and training, which leads to National 
Qualifications Framework (NQF) qualifications and ‘possible longer-term income opportunities’ 
(EPWP, 2004c).111 However, learnerships are only accessible for a small percentage of 
EPWP participants, and for the majority of participants, the training options are far more 
limited, as indicated in Table 7.1 below. 
                                                            
110 The figures discussed here are taken from the EPWP sector plans (EPWP 2004a, 2004b etc), and should 
be regarded as indicative only.  
111 Learnerships are a particular form of apprenticeship, which are defined within the EPWP thus, ‘A 
learnership combines work based experience with structured learning and results in a qualification that is 
registered within the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) by the South African Qualification 
Authority (SAQA). A learner who completes a learnership will have a qualification that signals 
occupational competence and which is recognised throughout the country. Each learnership consists of a 
specified number of credits and takes at least one year to complete. The learning may consist of a number 
of NQF aligned short courses, which make up the learnership curriculum. A learnership requires that a 
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Table 7.1: Total Employment and Learnerships in the EPWP 













Infrastructure 900,000 500 <1% 
Environment 200,000 400 <1% 
Social – (HBC and ECCD) 180,000* 37,000 20% 
Economic 12,000 3,000 25% 
TOTAL 1,292,000 40,900 3% 
Source: McCord (2005). 
Note: * Estimate based on outline in EPWP Social Sector Plan (EPWP, 2004a)112 
Table 7.1 highlights the fact that for most participants, the training component of the EPWP 
will not lead to the acquisition of qualifications which would pull them into a higher skills 
bracket. Interestingly, the situation differs across the different EPWP sectors, which 
conform to different types of PWP employment. These will be reviewed in turn below. 
7.7 EPWP Skills Development in the Infrastructure Sector 
The infrastructure sector of the EPWP is typical of type A PWPs in the developing world, 
with its focus on increasing the labour intensity of government funded infrastructure 
projects. The assumption at the heart of the EPWP strategy is that increased skill levels 
translates directly into improved labour market performance. Since the objective of the 
programme is increased employment, and it is widely acknowledged the country is 
experiencing a shortage of skilled labour (Kraak, 2005), there is a broad correspondence 
between the problem and the proposed PWP solution, on the basis of the assumption that 
                                                            
112 This estimate is derived from the EPWP Social Sector Plan which outlines the following potential 
employments through the ECD programme; 6,500 NQF level 1 and 8,800 learnerships at NQF level 4, plus 
training of 4,500 Grade R teachers, employment of 9,224 unemployed people in a work place employment 
and skills programme, 13,776 work opportunities in poor areas with subsidies and employment creation, 
and 3,000 3-month employment opportunities for unemployed parents, together with ECD support staff 
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by providing skills to the unskilled they will be able to take up unfilled positions in the 
economy. Thus it was supposed that as a consequence of PWP participation workers would 
be transformed from unskilled workers, to workers with skills which conform to unmet 
demand in the economy. While in the most reductive sense there is some correspondence 
between the problem and the proposed PWP solution, this analysis is problematic when the 
nature of the ‘skills delivered’, and the nature of the ‘skills deficit’ are compared and the 
relationship between the two examined in more detail.  
The analysis informing the EPWP seems to implicitly assume that there is some form of 
linear relationship between improved skills and improved labour market performance, with 
incremental labour market benefits accruing in line with incremental skills acquisition, failing 
to recognise the size of the skills gap which must be bridged before increased employment 
opportunities will be accessible by workers. Some insight into this may be offered by the 
somewhat analogous situation regarding challenges to the Mincerian assumptions regarding 
log linear returns to education. Recent analysis illustrates the more complex nature of the 
relationship between education (which may be replaced with skills acquisition in the case of 
PWP) and improved employment performance, with a certain threshold of education (skills 
acquisition) being required (in terms of both the level and the nature of skills) before 
increased employability is experienced (see Keswell and Poswell (2002)). This empirically 
challenges the conventional Mincerian log linear returns to human capital investment 
assumption, which also underlies assumption that participation in PWP training, irrespective 
of its content or duration, will improve labour market performance.  
Detailed labour market analysis also suggests that the picture is more subtle than a log linear 
assumption of returns to investment on an incremental basis would suggest. Unmet labour 
demand is primarily for labour with intermediate and high skills,113 and there is no easily 
identifiable unmet labour demand for unskilled or low skilled (as opposed to unskilled) 
                                                            
113In South Africa, intermediate skills are defined as those at NQF level 2-5 (equivalent to between Grade 
10 and matriculation plus a certificate or diploma). Kraak defines intermediate skills as those which ‘follow 
post-basic education; that is, after the first 9 years of compulsory schooling after which a child is deemed to 
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labour (Kraak, 2003). Hence, in order for the EPWP work experience and training to have a 
significant impact on employment performance, workers would need at least intermediate 
level skills, for which significant unmet demand exists.114 The construction industry is 
highlighting the lack of artisans with intermediate level skills, as well as highly skilled 
personnel such as engineers and contract managers, as critical constraints to their activities115. 
In order to test whether the training offered through the EPWP is sufficient to bring 
participants to this skills level, the nature of the training provided under the EPWP is 
examined in detail below.  
In the infrastructure sector, on-the-job training is provided by individual contractors in order 
to ensure workers are able to perform their allocated tasks (such as basic construction 
activities), while formal training (two days for every 20 worked) is provided under the 
auspices of the Department of Labour. Given that the mean duration of employment for 
most participants in this sector is four months, the average duration of the formal training is 
only eight days. In the light of this, the critical question becomes, what is the nature of the 
training offered in those eight days, and what is its value in terms of labour market 
performance?  
For more than 95% of infrastructure sector EPWP participants, the only skills training 
provided is the on-the-job training required for workers to perform their allotted tasks, and 
the formal training focuses on ‘lifeskills’116 rather than vocational skills, in recognition of the 
fact that the contact period for training within a short-term episode of PWP employment is 
not adequate to provide any significant degree of skills transfer.  
                                                            
114 Currently, there are no data on the skills levels of those entering the EPWP, as no baseline socio-
economic data on those entering the programme has been gathered. The simplifying assumption is made in 
this discussion that the programme is targeting the unskilled as intended in programme design.  
115 Workers with artisanal skills are not being produced in sufficient quantities in South Africa, and the 
shortfall is being met through the importation of artisanal skills from overseas. The construction industry 
argues that both engineering and construction skills are scarce, and that ‘specialist construction skills may 
have to be temporarily imported on selected contracts in the short term’ due to the lack of intermediate and 
high skilled labour available in South Africa (Brunjes, 2003). 
116 The term ‘lifeskills’ is used frequently in the EPWP literature, and in the PWP literature internationally, 
but does not have a generally agreed meaning or training content (see McCord (2006a) for discussion of 
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This critical limitation is recognised within the programme, which argues that:  
‘... the nature of the labour intensive construction industry is such that projects, and 
therefore employment opportunities for labourers typically last only 4 to 6 months.  
Based on the Code of Good practice for Special Works Programmes, this entitles 
labourers to only 8 to 12 days of paid training.  This is not sufficient to train unskilled 
labourers to become artisans. It has therefore, been agreed with the Department of 
Labour to create a generic 10 to 14 day training course that will consist of accredited 
unit standards on: general life skills, awareness of HIV and AIDS, and labour 
markets and the world of work.’ (Infrastructure Sector Plan for the Expanded Public 
Works Programme, EPWP, n.d.:8). 
This clearly articulates the fact that the amount of training provided during a short-term 
episode of PWP employment is not sufficient for workers to acquire significant additional 
technical skills117. The fact that this needs to be cited formally is due to the elevated 
expectations aroused by the EPWP in the policy discourse, that the training workers will 
receive while participating in the programme will be sufficient to enable them to take up the 
unfilled employment opportunities existing in the economy.  
In reality, the vast majority of workers will receive only lifeskills training through the EPWP. 
While these inputs may be of value in terms of certain aspects of their lives, it is not clear 
that this training will have a significant beneficial impact on labour market performance, 
particularly given that the main constraint to employment is net lack of demand for low 
skilled labour118. There is no evidence to suggest that lifeskills training will have a significant 
impact on labour market performance; this is not a criticism of lifeskills training per se, but 
rather a recognition that the objective of lifeskills training is not to promote labour market 
attachment. If however, PWP workers were successful in accessing employment after their 
training, in the absence of an increase in aggregate employment opportunities, this would 
                                                            
117 The skills gained through EPWP participation do not correspond with those demanded in the South 
African labour market, particularly the unmet need for artisans. This is not unexpected given the traditional 
five-year duration of the artisanal training or apprenticeship in South Africa and elsewhere.  
118 The work of Nattrass indicates that labour market information is important in terms of successful job 
search (Nattrass, 2000), and hence to the extent that this is included in the lifeskills training, this 
component may reduce frictional unemployment to the limited extent that it exists in the South African 
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represent the substitution of one set of low-skilled workers by another, rather than a net 
increase in employment. This problem of the displacement of existing workers by PWP 
substitutes, rather than the creation of real additional employment opportunities, has been 
found to be a significant issue in several EPWP projects (see, for example, McCord (2006a) 
with reference to the EPWP in the Western Cape Province)119.  
EPWP graduates perceived lack of jobs, funds for job search and skills as the major 
constraints to improved labour market performance, even after having acquired PWP 
experience and training (see, for example, McCord (2004a); Ndoto and Macun (2005)). In 
the light of this it is not clear that the training will contribute to the goal of increasing 
workers’ ‘capacity to earn an income once they leave the programme’, as anticipated by the 
South African President.120 Hence, it is unlikely that skills development operates as a 
significant vector of social protection impact in this type of short-term, type A, PWP. 
However, the other sectors in which the EPWP operates offer insights into the potential for 
PWP to confer benefits through skills development. 
7.8 EPWP Skills Development Outside the Infrastructure Sector 
The environment and social components of the EPWP offer insights into the potential, as 
well as the limitations, of PWP-based skills development initiatives.121 
The environment component122 aims to provide skills development during short-term 
episodes of PWP employment, type A, similarly to the infrastructure sector, although in 
some cases work is offered on a longer term, although not necessarily regular, basis, with 
some workers being offered multiple short-term episodes of employment when work is 
                                                            
119Also M. Mondlane, pers. comm., with reference to the Gundo Lashu programme in Limpopo. 
120 President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, quoted in This Day, 2003, Mbeki promises a million new jobs. 
12 November. 
121 The fourth sector of the EPWP, the economic sector, offers limited new insights into the skills 
development vector of PWPs, being primarily an SMME development initiative, and will not be discussed 
further in this thesis.  
122 The environment sector comprises the Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), 
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available in a certain area and sector (Ndoto and Macun, 2005). While the formal accredited 
training component is as limited as in the infrastructure sector, the skills development 
component in this sector is more focused on the transfer of specific skills (use of chain saws, 
tree surgery, removal of alien invasive species, etc.) and the intended exit strategy is for 
workers to ‘graduate’, being placed in permanent market based jobs in forestry, commercial 
fisheries, tourism and horticulture utilising the specialised skills gained during PWP 
participation (EPWP, 2005a). However, the anticipated market demand for such skills has 
not been realised in most cases, and lack of employment opportunities for exiting EPWP 
workers in this sector has led to the suspension of exit processes in a number of major 
EPWP initiatives,123 with workers being retained in the programme, or re-employed over a 
number of years, in the recognition of the limited market demand for workers with the skills 
acquired through EPWP participation (Ndoto and Macun, 2005; CASE, 2007).124 
The social sector represents a different type of PWP, more closely akin to a form of 
Government Employment Programme (GEP or type B programme).125 Within this sector, 
employment is offered on a medium term basis, up to the statutory EPWP maximum of two 
years, and a larger percentage of participants receive formal accredited training (25%), which 
is intended to develop intermediate and high level skills and qualify them for employment in 
the areas of either Home-Based Care (HBC) or Early Childhood Care and Development 
(ECCD). In this way the programme has the potential to confer both transfer and 
stabilisation benefits, and also skills development benefits which can translate into enhanced 
                                                            
123 This has occurred in both the Working for Water programme (established prior to the initiation of the 
EPWP in 1995 to clear alien invasive species, and subsequently incorporated into the EPWP as the main 
component of the environment sector) and the Working for Wetlands programme (established as a subset of 
Working for Water in 2000). (Marais, 2003, pers. comm, and Ndoto and Macun, 2005.) 
124 It would be possible to stimulate demand in this sector legislatively, for example, by legally requiring 
and subsequently enforcing the removal of alien invasive species under certain circumstances, but such a 
situation does not currently obtain in South Africa. 
125 The social sector is comprised of the Departments of Social Development, Health and Education and the 
social component of the EPWP has two components, Home Community Based Care (HCBC), and Early 
Childhood Development (ECD). Early Childhood Development is the process by which children from birth 
to nine years are nurtured to grow and thrive physically, mentally, emotionally, spiritually, morally and 
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employment opportunities, and hence social protection benefits can be conferred through 
two vectors simultaneously. In this context, however, rather than matching skills with 
existing market demand, the PWP matches skills with latent demand for ECCD and HBC 
provision, which requires government funding for its realisation, at least initially. The extent 
to which Saye’s law will operate in this context, with supply stimulating demand for ECCD 
and HBC services, is not known, and will be contingent on the affordability of the services 
provided. In the light of this, it is not known whether market demand will come to replace 
state funding for these posts over time, and it is likely that mass demand for these workers 
will, to some significant extent, be dependent on ongoing government expenditure. So the 
PWP represents an extension of government service provision, and the creation of 
additional aggregate employment in this sector is primarily contingent on increased 
government expenditure. Similar schemes have been carried out in countries such as Malawi 
and Zimbabwe, where latent demand for increased social service provision, particularly in 
relation to HBC responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, was funded using donor rather 
than government resources (McCord, 2005). These schemes are not typically labelled as 
PWPs, although they share many of the characteristics of the EPWP social sector 
programmes.  
The insight here is that increases in aggregate employment resulting from skills transfers in 
the social sector are not inherently or necessarily market driven, but are likely to be 
contingent on external (to the market) resource flows. Hence, the provision of skills may 
only translate into increased employment if additional resources are available to fund an 
extension of service provision. This issue is explicitly recognised in the EPWP Social 
Protection Plan: 
‘The key challenge here is to translate work opportunities into long-term livelihoods. 
The premise of the programme is that skilling on the job will assist workers to find 
more permanent employment.  Whilst every effort has been made to carefully 
consider exit opportunities, few of these are available in the private sector and therefore, it is 
highly likely that the primary financial burden will remain with government.’  
(EPWP, 2004a) 
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services may occur are i) the quality of the training provided, which in is in part contingent 
on the availability of appropriately qualified trainers, and ii) the availability of both 
institutional and management capacity to ensure an adequate quality of service provision 
through the programme. Both of these concerns are particularly acute in the context of a 
PWP, which is contingent on the rapid and mass expansion of service delivery in these, as in 
the case of the EPWP.126  
7.9 Conclusion: EPWP and Training Provision  
Having reviewed the skills development component of the EPWP in the context of the 
South African labour market, it seems unlikely that it will translate into improved labour 
market performance for participants, as was explicitly anticipated by programme managers:  
‘EPWP is not a solution for poverty in South Africa; the main aim is to create job 
opportunities and improve the level of education and training.’ (Sean Phillips, Head of the 
EPWP, cited in BuaNews, March 10, 2005, emphasis added) 
However, as argued above, the formal training offered to the majority of workers is not 
skills-oriented and the on-the-job training tends to be low skilled. At best the ‘training and 
work experience’ provided through the EPWP may lead to labour substitution rather than 
increased employment, as a consequence of the lack of demand for low and unskilled 
labour.127  No skills shortage has been identified for the genre of low-level skills acquired by 
most workers through participation in the EPWP,128 and given the high skills growth strategy 
adopted by the government, it is unlikely that demand for low and unskilled labour with the 
skills and experience acquired through participation in the EPWP will increase significantly 
in the short or medium term. 
                                                            
126  See footnote 90. 
127 However, such a benefit would only be palpable from an individual perspective, and has an associated 
cost from the perspective of workers outside the EPWP. 
128 With the notable exception of those participating in the social sector of the programme, with its 
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7.10 Empirical Perspectives on PWP Skills Development  
EPWP research findings corroborate the arguments set out above. The work of Ndoto and 
Macun (2005) which draws on quantitative and qualitative survey work on three EPWP 
projects in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Gauteng carried out in 2004, offers perceptions 
of the training offered in the environment sector of the EPWP from the perspective of 
participants129. Based on this research, Ndoto and Macun argue that ‘It would appear that the 
programme’s intervention has not made significant difference with regards to skills 
provision’ (ibid: 31). They concluded that:  
‘the programme improved people’s livelihoods, in terms of income [during the 
period of employment], and removed some constraints to accessing education and 
improved nutrition. [...] The situation was however different with regard to skills. We found that 
although the programme provides some technical (e.g., construction skills) and life skills (e.g., First 
Aid, Health and Safety, etc.), they did not feel outright that these skills were likely to improve their 
employment prospects.’ (Ndoto and Macun, 2005: 32, emphasis added) 
Given the importance of perception and confidence in labour market performance, Ndoto 
and Macun conclude that: 
‘The beneficiaries’ failure to acknowledge the skills [training provided during 
participation in the EPWP] would seem to suggest that more work needs to be done 
along the lines of ensuring that the beneficiaries recognise the training they are 
provided with if the programme’s impact is to be sustainable. Failure to do so would 
render the training provided to the workers worthless and taken for granted’ (ibid:33) 
It was argued above that in the absence of unmet demand for workers emerging from PWPs 
with low skills levels, most workers, upon emerging from PWP employment, are likely to 
return to their labour market status quo ante. This situation was presented by a worker from 
Bushbuckridge currently employed in the Working for Wetlands programme, cited in Ndoto 
and Macun: 
‘[Working for] Wetlands is boosting us, so if this contract gets terminated, it means 
that we are going to have to go back where we were … because there will not be any 
income.’ (ibid:35)  
                                                            
129 The research examined projects within the Working for Wetlands programme which forms one 
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This suggests that the primary vector of PWP impact is the wage, in the form of the transfer 
benefit, rather than enhanced ‘employability’ resulting from PWP skills development. 
Workers anticipated that upon exiting the programme, they would return to a reliance on a 
combination of horizontal social support (parents and family) and engagement in the 
secondary segment the economy for their survival:  
‘I’ll sell some sweets’ and ‘I’ll open a small market at home, sweets, bread and fish… 
I’ll sell these things, life goes on’ (ibid:35) 
Rather than moving up the hierarchy of the labour market from survivalist micro-enterprise 
to more profitable self employment or employment, once they have their ‘foot on the 
employment ladder’ as anticipated in the programme rhetoric (see, for example, South 
Africa, Department of Public Works, 2004), indications from the Working for Wetlands 
research suggests that in fact workers return to the same labour market ‘rung’ from whence 
they came into the programme.  
7.11 Implications for Skills Development in Type D Interventions  
Notwithstanding the negative conclusions regarding the likely performance of the EPWP, 
the programme offers some key insights into skills development which are generalisable 
across PWPs, in part resulting from the fact that the different sectors of the EPWP offer 
varying forms of skills development resulting in divergent likelihoods of this having a 
positive effect on future employment. Hence, skills development as a vector of social 
protection is contingent on the type of PWP, and not just the nature of the labour market 
context. The key insights which may be derived from the EPWP experience are set out 
below, although it is important to note that due to the lack of quantitative evidence on the 
employment impacts of skills development and work experience post-PWP participation 
generally, for example through tracer studies, much of the discussion is based on qualitative 
insights and theoretical arguments.  
The EPWP illustrates the difficulty of attempting to provide formal skills development in 
PWPs unless the period of employment is sufficiently extended to allow for adequate 










The Anatomy of Public Works     Chapter 7: The Three Vectors: Skills  
 
  171
employment episodes, which is particularly acute with PWP employment in the construction 
sector.  
Where skills training is provided in a PWP, it may not correspond, in terms of content or 
level, with existing market demand for skills. Hence, the effectiveness of skills development 
as a vector of social protection in PWPs will be influenced by the extent to which the skills 
provided through the PWP match unmet labour demand in the economy. 
The adoption of social service delivery, rather than physical infrastructure delivery as a 
sphere of PWP operation, offers an opportunity to address both these concerns, offering at 
the same time more sustained employment, thereby increasing potential training contact 
time, while also offering an extension of critical services in demand. However, with 
particular reference to the social sector, demand for additional social sector workers may be 
latent rather than patent, and may be contingent on either additional recurrent government 
expenditure or external funding in order to be realised. 
Whatever the type of PWP or sector of PWP operation, the feasibility of the mass delivery 
of skills training is a critical consideration. This was a key constraint the case in the EPWP, 
where demand for both lifeskills and social sector training significantly outstripped the 
capacity of existing accredited service providers to deliver (see McCord (2005)).130 In this 
case, on-the-job training by employers may be the only viable option for skills transfer, but 
here there are no incentives for the skills transferred to extend beyond the specific skills 
required for completion of allocated tasks. It was recognised in the initial stages of 
implementation that ‘efficient, to scale and quality training’ was core to the success of the 
EPWP (EPWP, 2004a), and the consequences of failing to achieve this were clearly 
articulated: ‘Should this not be realised, the projections of what can be achieved through this 
                                                            
130 The capacity concern is not exclusively limited to the training component of PWPs, but applies equally 
to all aspects of programme management and implementation which typically have serious workload 
implications at both central level in terms of programme development, and also at provincial and district 
level in terms of implementation, spheres where overload and lack capacity are frequently problematic, as 
in the South African context (see, for example, McCord (2005)). These capacity constraints have negative 
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programme will be significantly affected’ (ibid). This raises a further question regarding 
PWPs as a vehicle for skills transfer; whether skills development should be associated with 
PWP interventions, or in some cases, given the inherent time limitations in certain types of 
PWPs (notably types A, C and D), which offer limited training contact periods131, whether it 
might be more effective to address skills development for the unemployed through a 
separate institutional instrument (Karuri et al., 2007). If the constraints of operating within 
the institutional framework of a PWP compromise the effectiveness of training delivery,132 it 
is not apparent that it is useful to maintain the link between PWPs and skills development.  
Finally, as in many PWPs, the skills development offered in the EPWP is not sensitive to the 
heterogeneity of the unemployed, and the profoundly different labour market options 
available to different segments of the labour force. A crude distinction was drawn by Bhorat 
(2001) between the young mobile unemployed, and older rural unemployed workers with 
limited education and mobility, whom he characterised as ‘unemployable’ in terms of 
existing demand in the formal sector, and for whom formal skills training was not an 
appropriate policy response. Lee and Woolard (2002) took the analysis further, developing a 
typology of the unemployed, based on education, age, gender, work experience and 
urban/rural location. The implication of this analysis that it is critical to recognise the 
heterogeneity of the unemployed labour force, the source of PWP participants, and to reflect 
this diversity in the skills development options included in a PWP.  
7.12 Skills Development in the Informal Sector and Self-Employment  
Martin and Grubb’s multi-country study supports the argument that PWPs tend not to 
achieve much success internationally in terms of promoting aggregate formal sector 
employment (Martin and Grubb, 2001).   Given the lack of unmet demand for low-skilled 
labour in much of sub-Saharan Africa, even if PWPs were successful in terms of increasing 
                                                            
131 Total training contact time was limited to an average of eight days in the infrastructure component of the 
EPWP. 
132 Evidence of the failings of skills development in the EPWP is set out in McCord (2004a, 2005, 2006a) 
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the employment of graduating participants, through marginal skills improvements or access 
to labour market information, this employment would be largely at the expense of other 
workers, leading to the substitution of one segment of low-skilled or unskilled labour by 
another, with a zero net social or labour market benefit. This finding would hold true in 
most situations of elevated low-skills unemployment, where a PWP did not result in an 
aggregate increase in employment. If, however, a PWP were able to offer skills which led to 
the creation of additional informal sector employment and self employment opportunities, 
rather than aspiring to promote formal employment in sectors where demand is seriously 
constrained, then the potential aggregate and social protection benefits could be significantly 
greater. Skills development leading to increased or more productive participation in the 
informal segment of the labour market could also represent a benefit for those exiting from 
PWPs. This is particularly important if the limited demand for low and unskilled labour 
throughout developing and middle-income countries is taken into consideration.  
PWP skills training has the potential to promote the expansion of self-employment through 
both survivalist and small-scale enterprises, as well as increases in domestic production, all of 
which would all confer social protection benefits to PWP participants. Examples of such 
approaches are to be found in a variety of PWPs, primarily type B programmes, offering 
sustained periods of employment and, therefore, greater potential contact time for training 
and development activities. Examples are the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in 
Ethiopia, which includes a complementary programme offering agricultural training to 
promote subsistence agriculture (McCord, 2005), while the Improving Livelihoods Through 
Public Works Programme (ILTPWP) in Malawi, with its entrepreneurial training component 
and extended duration,133 also attempted to stimulate micro-enterprise activity among 
programme participants (UK DFID, 2003a). Both programmes were designed explicitly to 
include skills development components in recognition of the limitations of the wage 
component of PWPs, as discussed in chapter four. The PSNP includes a complementary 
agricultural extension component designed to promote subsistence agricultural production 
                                                            
133 Although a type A programme, the ILTPWP, administered by CARE International, extended the 
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during the five-year PWP contact period, in order to promote sustained social protection 
benefits after the period of PSNP participation and PWP employment, while the ILTPWP 
was designed to facilitate micro-enterprise activity among the poorest during an extended 
period of PWP employment. The PSNP, however, has been undermined by the inability of 
the state to roll out agricultural extension services on the scale required by a mass GES (with 
over 5 million participants per annum),134 and although ILTPWP offered a more extended 
period of PWP employment than typical in infrastructure programmes, it was still found to 
provide inadequate contact time and support to ensure sustained impacts (UK DFID, 2005). 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the PSNP and ILTPWP, approaches offering skills 
development focused on enhancing livelihoods and informal economic activity have the 
potential to be responsive to the needs of segments of the unemployed labour force, for 
whom skills development aimed at employment in the formal sector may not be relevant. 
Such initiatives may be particularly appropriate for less mobile workers, unable, for reasons 
of age, infirmity or domestic responsibility, to migrate in search of work; those whom Bhorat 
has described as ‘unemployable’ (Bhorat, 2001:40)135. However, the viability of this approach 
is again contingent on both the quality of inputs, and critically, the duration of training 
contact time which can be accommodated within the PWP.  
The impact of such trainings is in part contingent on the potential of participants to 
accumulate the productive assets required to engage in such activity.  PWPs offering 
primarily short-term employment do not enable participants to accumulate sufficient 
resources to enter or expand survivalist activities, or to move up the value chain, from local 
level production and sale of natural products (e.g. firewood, clay or reed products) to the 
production and marketing of goods requiring capital for material purchase, or for 
transportation to more distant markets where greater profits may be realisable. For these 
                                                            
134 Devereux, 2007, pers. comm. 
135 Bhorat describes as 'unemployable' the group comprising older unemployed individuals with very little 
formal education residing in deep rural areas, who are ‘never going to find sustainable, long-term 
employment in their life times’ by virtue of their lack of skills and the remoteness of their rural location in 
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reasons, short-term PWP employment (types A, C or D) is unlikely to stimulate significant 
sustained increases in survivalist or micro-enterprise activities, whether this is the explicit 
objective of the programme or not. Strategies for addressing this might focus on 
coordination with other development initiatives such as savings or microcredit and the 
provision of materials or other physical assets to stimulate production and marketing.136  
7.13 Conclusion 
The rationale for implementation of the EPWP, and other PWP with type D components, is 
predicated on the assumption that supply-side interventions can have a significant impact on 
poverty and unemployment among the low skilled.  This rationale is problematic in contexts 
where the training is limited and of poor quality, and the fundamental problem is the 
constrained demand for low skilled workers. There is little evidence to support the aspiration 
that ‘participants in the EPWP are able to translate the experience and either enabled to set 
up their own business/service or become employed’ (EPWP, 2004a) and to date, the limited 
evidence available suggests that as with many PWP internationally, programme graduates are 
likely instead to return to the pool of the unemployed, from whence they came. 
There are two key problems with the type of PWP which attempts to promote employability 
in the context of structural unemployment. The first is that this approach can only be 
effective in contexts of frictional unemployment, where adequate numbers of unfilled jobs 
are available, for which workers can be skilled through work placements and training. Unless 
sufficient jobs exist, waiting to be filled, and the training provided is explicitly linked to the 
prevailing skills shortages, the programme is unlikely to have an impact on aggregate 
employment and is likely to result, at best, in substitution of PWP workers for others.  
The second problem is that even in OECD countries experiencing low levels of 
unemployment which is primarily frictional, skills training through work placements has a 
poor record, with experience across the OECD summarised as follows: 
                                                            
136 See, for example, the Jua Kali programme in Kenya, focused on addressing practical constraints to 
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‘The vast bulk of studies converge in terms of a conclusion on outcomes; this 
measure [an episode of PWP employment] has been of little success in helping 
unemployed people get permanent jobs in the open labour market’ (Martin and 
Grubb, 2001)137 
In countries where unemployment is primarily structural rather than frictional, a situation 
prevalent in much of the developing world, the number of low-skilled unemployed tends to 
far exceed the number of jobs which remain unfilled due to skills shortages. In such 
contexts, the ability of PWPs effectively to provide meaningful skills development is limited 
by constraints internal to the PWP model (primarily the short duration of most PWPs (types 
A, C and D) which limits the extent of skills transfer), and also by constrained demand. In 
this context, the critical question is whether the training and work experience gained through 
PWP participation provides the skills in demand in the economy. Crucially, the likelihood of 
success is determined by the duration of PWP employment, which dictates maximum 
potential contact time, the quality and relevance of the training provided, the extent of 
unmet demand in the market (patent or latent), and the availability of funds, either donor or 
government, to cover the cost of employment in areas where market demand is inadequately 
developed. 
Ultimately, the success of such initiatives is linked to the extent of unmet demand in the 
economy, and whether PWPs can provide training at an adequate level to enable those 
exiting the programme to take up the jobs which are available. Outside these constraints the 
main option is to stimulate self-employment, but this is also contingent on adequate contact 
time, and the availability of complementary resources and support services, offering for 
example, savings opportunities, start-up capital and appropriate training. 
More fundamentally, while PWPs offer a potential mechanism for the state to access the 
unemployed and incorporate them into skills training policies, the benefit of providing skills 
development through the medium or short-term PWPs is not always clear, since operating 
through the limitations of the PWP institutional structure, timeframe and scale of operation 
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may constrain effective skills development programming, and result in limiting, rather than 
extending access to training programmes on the part of the unemployed (as illustrated in the 
case of the EPWP, Karuri et al. (2007)). The result of a forced union between PWP and 
active labour market policies to promote skills development may be problematic, and many 
PWP ‘exit strategies’ such as those of the EPWP may be unrealistically optimistic, with the 
outlook for PWP graduates remaining bleak in most contexts. For these reasons it is not 
clear that skills development represents a significant vector for the transmission of social 
protection benefits, particularly when type A or C programmes are implemented in contexts 
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8 CASE STUDY OVERVIEW: CONTEXT AND  
METHODOLOGY  
Having critically reviewed the key concepts within the PWP discourse, created a PWP 
typology and schema of objectives, and examined the main vectors of potential social 
protection transmission, this thesis now explores these issues in detail from an empirical 
perspective, drawing on original survey data and focus group research carried out in South 
Africa in 2003 and 2004. The survey presented and analysed in this chapter and the three 
which follow was conceived, designed and executed in order to respond to the many 
questions raised by the existing literature and the data and analytical lacunae highlighted in 
the preceding chapters, with the objective of contributing to the establishment of a more 
robust and critical engagement with PWPs in general, and PWP evaluation in particular 
within the future discourse.  
This chapter and the three which follow provide an empirical study of the contribution of 
PWPs to social protection in South Africa, drawing evidence from two case studies, the type 
A Gundo Lashu programme in Limpopo, and the type B Zibambele programme in 
KwaZulu-Natal. It attempts to provide some initial responses to the two central questions 
identified above; PWP incidence and impact, with reference to the typology and vectors of 
impact outlined above. These chapters are intended as a contribution to the development of 
the national and international evidence base, drawing on two case studies to explore the core 
issues of i) incidence, in terms of which segment of the population is participating in 
PWPs138 and ii) impact, in terms of whether PWPs are having a significant impact on social 
protection through significant temporary or sustained poverty reduction and employment 
outcomes, mediated through the three vectors outlined above. By analysing their 
microeconomic and labour market impacts, this study contributes to the evidence base 
informing the international policy debate, and identifies the key policy lessons arising. The 
study is presented over four chapters, with chapter eight providing contextual details of the 
South African social protection and labour market context, an overview of the two 
                                                            
138 Little detailed baseline socio-economic data have been gathered on participants in PWPs in South 
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programmes under examination, and details of the survey and analytical methodology 
adopted. Chapter nine presents a discussion of the key findings on incidence, and chapter 
ten explores the labour market characteristics of PWP participants and the impact of 
programme participation on labour market performance. Chapter eleven outlines the key 
conclusions on impact overall, drawing together the policy implications of the findings. 
This study focuses in particular on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of 
PWP participants, as in many PWPs no baseline data on participants were collected 
(Ravallion, 2003). Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain a priori who the beneficiaries of 
the programmes are; a situation which fundamentally challenges any attempt to assess the 
social protection impact of such an intervention, or to assess incidence. The research 
interrogates the assumption that the ‘less eligibility criteria’ (the work requirement and low 
wages) will lead to participation of the poorest, attempting first to ascertain who the 
participants in the programmes are, and then to assess whether significant social protection 
benefits accrue to these participants. 
The study draws on two contemporaneous PWPs, both implemented under the aegis of the 
EPWP, implemented in discrete areas of South Africa with similar poverty and 
unemployment profiles, one of which conforms to a type A PWP and the other type B, with 
significantly different design components, conforming to the different PWP types. This 
offers the opportunity to explore the consequences of different design modalities on 
outcome, and provides insights into how programme design can affect social protection 
impact and incidence. 
The findings are put in context in this chapter with a brief overview of poverty and 
unemployment, and an outline of the social protection policy framework in South Africa. 
Next, an overview of the two programmes is presented, together with a detailed discussion 
of the survey methodology and analytical approach adopted, and an outline of the structure 
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8.1 The Unemployment and Social Protection Context 
After rising for 30 years, unemployment reached a plateau in the mid 2000s, standing at 23% 
in September 2007 by the narrow definition, and 36% by the broad (StatsSA, 2008a).139 At 
the time of the PWP Survey in 2003 the unemployment rates were 31% and 42% 
respectively (StatsSA, 2004). Unemployment is disproportionately concentrated in the black 
population. Structural changes in the economy, arising from shifts in labour intensity and 
declining primary sector activity, are having a significant impact on both total employment 
rates and the composition of labour demand, leading to slow employment growth and rising 
unemployment among the low and unskilled during the 1990s and early 2000s (McCord and 
Bhorat, 2003) a situation described by Kingdon and Knight in 2000 as ‘catastrophic’ (2000: 
13)140. Since the mid 2000s, levels of demand for unskilled labour have been sufficient to 
absorb additional workers entering the labour force, but have only been able to make a 
limited impact on reducing the massive stock of the unemployed within this group (Meth, 
2008b). Economic growth rates are insufficient to absorb the current pool of unemployed 
labour, and given the current South African growth trajectory, it has been estimated even 
with optimistic growth projections of 6% per annum that broad unemployment among the 
semi-skilled and unskilled is unlikely to fall significantly below 30% in the medium term 
(Lewis, 2001:55).  
Out of a total population of 45 million, it can be estimated using the 2005/6 Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) (Stats SA, 2008b:31) that 19 million live below a per capita poverty 
line of R430 a month, based on Hoogeveen and Ozler’s 2005 poverty line inflated to 2005 
values (Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2005), with 3.3 million people living in the bottom decile 
(mean per capita income of R128), and a further 3.9 million in the next decile (mean income 
of R242). Estimates of the number of people living below the poverty line vary significantly, 
                                                            
139 The official or narrow rate of unemployment is calculated by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA, 2002) on 
the basis of those unemployed who a) did not work during the seven days prior to the interview, b) want to 
work and are available to start work within a week of the interview, and c) have taken active steps to look 
for work or to start some form of self-employment in the four weeks prior to the interview, while the broad 
or expanded unemployment rate excludes criterion c).  
140 However, recent research in South Africa indicates that self-employment, subsistence agriculture and 
casual employment may not always be considered as ‘work’ (see, for example, Adato et al. (2004)). This 










The Anatomy of Public Works  Chapter 8: Case Study Overview: Context and Methodology  
  181
depending on the specification of the poverty line selected141. However defined, it is clear 
that poverty is a severe problem in South Africa. 
Poverty levels are closely correlated with unemployment in South Africa (Leibbrandt and 
Woolard, 2001). At the time of the PWP Survey, the poorest experienced unemployment 
rates of more than 70% (Samson et al., 2003) and the majority of households in the bottom 
four income deciles had no members in employment, leading to the conclusion that most 
poor households are poor because of the absence of wage income (Nattrass and Seekings, 
2001). These findings are supported by research which indicates that job creation is the 
priority demand households are making on the state, in terms of improving welfare levels 
(Klasen, 1997; Clark, 2000). Given the strong correlation between wage income and poverty, 
responding to unemployment is clearly a key policy challenge, and some form of state 
response to the issue of the working age poor unemployed is required, since the market is 
unlikely to address this group’s needs by offering employment in the medium term. 
While South Africa provides an extensive social assistance programme for various categories 
of the vulnerable, providing grants to more than 12 million recipients, no social grants are 
available for the working age unemployed poor. Rather than addressing the needs of this 
group directly through large-scale social protection interventions, the policy strategy is to 
promote GDP growth, on the assumption that this will provide additional employment 
opportunities in the medium to long term, and in this way the working age poor will be 
supported. The only significant social protection intervention accessible for the working age 
unemployed poor in the short term, pending the success or otherwise of the national growth 
strategy, is the national PWP (the Expanded Public Works Programme or EPWP, discussed 
at length in chapter seven) which aims to provide between 100,000 and 200,000 short-term 
jobs each year, with the triple objective of providing wage income, skills development and 
creating infrastructure. Given the limited number of short-term employment opportunities 
to be offered, in the context of 2 to 4 million unemployed, it is crucial to examine which 
                                                            
141 There is no nationally agreed poverty datum line in South Africa, and consequently the extent of poverty 
in South Africa, and shifts in poverty over time, remain contentious, and are highly sensitive to the poverty 
line selected, and also assumptions relating to under-reporting of income, the estimation of the child cost 











The Anatomy of Public Works  Chapter 8: Case Study Overview: Context and Methodology  
  182
groups are likely to benefit from participation in such a programme, and the nature of the 
benefits accruing to them. Hence, the two PWPs which formed models for the development 
of the national EPWP are examined in this study in order to assess the efficacy of such a 
programme in terms of its social protection impact.  
8.2 PWP Survey Methodology  
The empirical component of this study is based on quantitative and qualitative research 
carried out with current and former PWP employees and members of their households 
between June and September 2003, in rural areas of Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal which 
share similar unemployment and poverty profiles. The quantitative research was based on a 
survey which was conducted on participants in two different PWPs, Gundo Lashu in 
Limpopo and Zibambele in KwaZulu-Natal, both of which won national awards for 
innovation and were used as models in the development of the national EPWP.142 The two 
PWPs differ significantly in their design and implementation modalities, and conform to 
different PWP ‘types’ identified in chapter two, with the KwaZulu-Natal programme 
offering ongoing part-time employment (type B), and the Limpopo programme offering a 
single short episode of full-time employment, consistent with type A, C and D programmes. 
The simultaneous implementation of these different PWP types, offered an excellent 
opportunity to examine and compare these different PWP approaches in similar contexts.  
For the quantitative component of the research a household survey was administered, and 
this was complemented by pre- and post-survey qualitative work, based on semi-structured 
focus group discussions.  The research was designed and managed by the author and 
implemented in the Limpopo province by two local social development agencies; Khanyisa 
Integrated Development and Social Research and African Renaissance Development 
Consultants in collaboration with the Roads Agency Limpopo.  In KwaZulu-Natal the 
research was implemented by staff of the Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit of the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal with the support of CORD, and in collaboration with the 
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport.  
                                                            
142 In both provinces the research was carried out in partnership with provincial authorities, the Roads 
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The survey was designed to explore the demographic, labour market and socio-economic 
identities of participants in the two programmes in order to gain insights into the issues of 
incidence and also the impact of programme participation on participants, using a range of 
poverty indicators. The questionnaire was developed in a format compatible with the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS)143 in order to facilitate the use of LFS data for rural Limpopo and 
KwaZulu-Natal for comparative purposes. Also included were elements designed to yield the 
information necessary to promote insights into the potential social protection function of 
different types of PWP in order to inform policy and programme development.  The survey 
was comprised of fourteen modules;   
• Household Composition  
• Health 
• Employment and wage income 
• Transfers, state and private 
• Agriculture 
• Remittances 
• Financial assets 
• Material assets 
• Credit 
• Changes in household circumstances 
• Impact of additional income 
• Secondary programme impacts, (this module explored workers’ perceptions of the 
impact of  i) the physical assets created under the programme and ii) the work 
experience gained through participation, on their livelihoods 
• Nutrition, and  
• Education 
 
The survey was field-tested and revised after focus group work with a sample of the 
respondents. 
Summary details of the sampling process are given in Table 8.1, and the approach is 
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Table 8.1: Summary of Sampling Information  
 Zibambele Gundo Lashu 
Total number of programme 
participants* 13,865 1,700 
Number of sample households  413 348 
Sample fraction 3.0 20.5 
Traced households 413 268 
Percentage of sample households 
traced 100% 77% 
Observed sample fraction 3.0 15.8 
Number of interviews conducted 413 268 
Standard error with 95% confidence 
interval 5.4% 4.8% 
Gender of interviewed workers: 
     Female 93% 48% 
     Male 7% 52% 
* For the Zibambele programme this figure represents the total number of current PWP employees, as in this programme 
employment is sustained once workers have enrolled, rather than being limited to a single employment episode after which 
workers exit. For the Gundo Lashu programme however, this figure indicates the total number of workers who are either 
currently employed, or have previously been employed in the programme, since data disaggregating these two groups was 
not available at the time of sample frame creation. 
 
The sample was selected from a sample frame including all employees recorded in both 
programmes, and the survey was administered to a total of 676 households (containing 4,792 
individuals), on the basis of a one-stage random selection process in Limpopo, and a two-
stage random selection process in KwaZulu-Natal. The KwaZulu-Natal sample was drawn 
from throughout the province in areas where the programme was operational, while the 
Limpopo sample was drawn from the two clusters within the District of Capricorn 
(Mankweng and Sekhukhune) where the programme was implemented. In all cases, the PWP 
workers themselves were the sampling unit, and information was also collected on all 
members of their households. In the Limpopo survey all workers were interviewed in their 
homes, but in the KwaZulu-Natal survey this was not always possible because of 
implementational constraints144. When the interview took place at home, all household 
members present were invited to participate, and in all cases respondents were asked to 
provide information about absent household members. 
                                                            
144 In some instances where the households were considered by the fieldwork agency to be too remote to 
access efficiently, Zibambele participants were interviewed at their work stations or invited to travel to 
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The total Gundo Lashu (Limpopo) PWP worker population numbered 1,700, and the survey 
sample was based on a one-stage random selection from lists of programme participants. 
This approach was viable because of the concentration of all the workers in two small and 
easily accessible clusters within Capricorn District. Of the 348 households in the sample, 
only 268 were interviewed (77%), because of problems with unknown workers,145 and of 
these, 263 surveys were of sufficient quality to be used in the subsequent analysis.146 
The Zibambele (KwaZulu-Natal) PWP worker population numbered 13,865, distributed 
throughout the province. Due to the large number of workers and their dispersion, a two-
stage sampling methodology was used, with an initial random selection of 15 of the 31 Rural 
Road Network Transport Fora147 in the province, and a subsequent randomised cluster 
selection of roads. A selected number of workers and their households from each of the 
selected roads were interviewed, with a final sample size of 413 workers/households.148 The 
total number of households surveyed was 676, and of these 263 households were from 
Limpopo and 413 from KwaZulu-Natal. The 263 households from Limpopo included 340 
PWP workers, as some Gundo Lashu households had multiple PWP employees. The 
Limpopo sample included 132 current PWP workers and 208 workers whose PWP 
employment had been completed at the time of the interview. Of the 263 Gundo Lashu 
households, 149 (57%) had no current PWP workers at the time of the interview, and 114 
had current workers (43%). The 413 Zibambele households included 415 PWP workers, all 
of whom were employed at the time. Only two households had more than one PWP 
employee. 
After a preliminary analysis of the survey data was performed, using Stata, qualitative 
approaches were then adopted in order to verify and explore the initial findings, involving a 
series of semi-structured focus group discussions with PWP participants, eight in each 
                                                            
145 It is likely that the 23% failure rate is the consequence of a combination of ‘ghost workers’ (fictitious 
workers for whom wages were falsely claimed by contractors), and the employment of workers who were 
attracted from outside the area to work on the scheme, who then left the area once their employment was 
completed – a scenario which is likely since local labour supply was reported not always sufficient to meet 
the demand. 
146 This sample size resulted in a 95% confidence interval with a standard error of 5.4%.  
147 The Rural Road Transport Forum is the administrative unit into which the KwaZulu-Natal Department 
of Transport divides the province for the purposes of the PWP.  
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province, and also a smaller number of focus group discussions with other community 
members who were not participants, but would have the potential to observe the impact of 
the programme from a diverse set of external viewpoints, including school teachers,  local 
traders and local government officials. These focus group discussions were led by members 
of the teams responsible for the implementation of the quantitative survey work in each area 
who were native speakers of the local languages149.  The discussions were also observed by 
the author.  The insights arising from the focus groups were valuable in interpreting and 
understanding the data. Further Stata analysis of the data was then carried out in order to 
extract the descriptive and econometric insights required to answer the key research 
questions. Data were not weighted in either case, as both samples are assumed to be 
representative of their population. 
8.3 Analytical Methodology 
This analysis of incidence and impact is based on descriptive statistics and econometric 
analysis, using data from the PWP Survey described above, together with data from the 
March 2003 Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the national Census of 2001, referred to in the 
text as LFS 2003 and Census 2001 respectively.  The research findings presented illustrate 
the key issues emerging from the survey, and offer insights into the performance of two 
different types of PWPs in terms of social protection provision.  
The analysis falls into three sections; the first addresses the question of incidence, examining 
the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the PWP workers and their 
households, the second explores incidence and impact from a labour market perspective by 
focusing on the labour market characteristics of PWP workers, their households, and the 
wider community, and the third examines various dimensions of programme impact. 
8.4 Incidence 
The study first examines the characteristics of the PWP workers and their households, in 
order to determine which segment of the population is participating in PWPs and what 
targeting of PWP employment is taking place. The characteristics of the workers and their 
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households are identified in terms of a number of demographic and socio-economic 
indicators, and compared with data for the local population in the programme areas derived 
from both the 2001 Census, and the March 2003 LFS, which are used as comparators.150 
Propensity score matching techniques are then adopted to identify PWP-matched 
households within the Census 2001 and these are then compared to non-matched 
households in these areas in order to assess the relative income status of PWP-participating 
households, and carry out an income-based poverty incidence assessment.  
8.5 Labour Market Incidence and Impact  
Next, labour market aspects of the two programmes are explored, in terms of incidence and 
impact, primarily exploring the question at an individual level, in terms of both PWP 
participants, and members of PWP households. The labour market characteristics of PWP 
participants and household members are reviewed in detail and compared, making use of 
within household comparisons to benefit from household fixed effects, while also 
recognising the complexity of the fact that the behaviour of PWP and non-PWP labour 
within a household is mutually linked. Initial attempts are made to identify the labour market 
characteristics of PWP participants, and PWP households, and to explore the relationship 
between prior labour market position and PWP participation. Next, the impact of 
programme participation on labour market performance is explored, in terms of whether 
labour market ‘exposure’ and training led to improved employment performance, as 
anticipated in the policy discourse, and whether PWP employment stimulated informal 
micro-enterprise and local economic activity. 
8.6 Impact 
The social protection impact of participation in the PWP is then examined in terms of a 
range of monetary and non-monetary indicators of poverty. Impact is reviewed in terms of 
the impact of the wage and asset vectors by exploring multiple dimensions of poverty, with 
particular emphasis on i) income, ii) consumption, iii) ownership of material and financial 
assets, iv) human capital in terms of nutrition and access to education, v) psychosocial 
                                                            
150 While the March 2003 LFS represented the closest temporal and design match to the PWP surveys, this 
data cannot be analysed at a district level, and for this reason the Census 2001 data were also used in the 
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benefits, and vi) participants’ own assessments of the medium-term impact of programme 
participation. The income poverty impact is examined by assessing the values of both the 
PWP wage transfer and income forgone, and calculating from these the net wage benefit 
accruing to households from participation. The total household income is then calculated 
and considered in relation to the poverty line, and Poverty Impact Curves (PICs) derived to 
illustrate programme impact, following Ravallion (2003). The discussion of consumption 
explores the primary uses of the PWP wage, in relation to material and financial asset 
ownership, and the human capital discussion examines changes in investment in nutrition 
and education as a consequence of participation in the programme. Psychosocial dimensions 
of programme participation are also briefly reviewed, highlighting the role of PWP income in 
facilitating the observance of social norms and customs. Finally, a brief discussion of the 
impact of assets created on participants is offered. 
The conclusion pulls these threads together in order to make an overall appraisal of the role 
of the two PWPs in addressing social protection through each of the three vectors: wage, 
assets and skills, and the key policy implications arising from the analysis are outlined. 
8.7 Data Constraints 
In conducting this analysis, a number of data constraints were faced, relating to the lack of 
comparator or control data in the PWP Survey, as a consequence of the lack of initial 
baseline data on participants, poor quality income data in the key national surveys used for 
comparison (LFS 2003, and Census 2001), lack of geographically disaggregated data in the 
LFS 2003, lack of PWP Survey panel data, confusion regarding the employment status of 
PWP employees included in the sample, and lack of a nationally agreed poverty line. These 
issues are discussed below. 
Lack of Baseline Data 
The lack of baseline data on PWP participants in the two programmes posed a serious 
methodological constraint. A ‘difference-in-difference’ (DD) methodology would have been 
the most appropriate way to evaluate the impact of the programmes, using as a control 
households with similar pre-programme characteristics to those of the households ‘treated’ 
by becoming PWP participants. However, this approach was not feasible due to the fact that 
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non-treatment control group in the survey impossible; the identification of the characteristics 
of participants itself formed one of the critical questions which the study set out to examine. 
In the absence of a control group, the survey was conducted only on households with 
members who participated in the PWPs, the ‘treated’ group. Comparative analysis was then 
carried out post hoc using data from both the March 2003 LFS and the 2001 Census, once the 
characteristics of the PWP workers had been identified from the PWP Survey data, on the 
basis of both direct comparison of the overall population with the PWP sample, and 
matching techniques.  
The PWP Survey was designed to be directly comparable to 2003 Labour Force Survey 
(LFS),151 implemented biannually by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA). However, there are 
two key constraints relating to the use of the March 2003 LFS for control data; the limited 
geographical disaggregation possible with this survey, and the quality of the income data. In 
terms of the first constraint, it is not possible to disaggregate the March 2003 LFS data to 
district level, or to specify ‘rural’ as a condition152. While the KwaZulu-Natal programme was 
implemented across the province, and so provincial comparator data are acceptable, analysis 
at district level is necessary in the case of the Limpopo survey, as the programme was 
concentrated in a single district, and yet could only be compared to province-wide data if the 
LFS data were adopted, thereby risking a reduction in the quality and nuance of analysis. 
Using provincial LFS data would be particularly problematic as Capricorn District, where the 
programme was implemented, is significantly less poor than other districts in Limpopo, by a 
range of indicators (such as lower unemployment rates than the provincial mean, and 
significantly higher incomes,153 see discussion in Elsenburg, 2005). In order to avoid the risk 
of biasing an interpretation of incidence and impact, it is not appropriate to compare survey 
findings with provincial level data from the LFS. For this reason, where possible, data from 
the 10% sample of the 2001 Census, disaggregated to district level and limited to rural 
                                                            
151 The March 2003 Labour Force Survey was the seventh round of a twice-yearly household survey 
implemented by Statistics South Africa. The survey examines the extent of employment in the formal and 
informal sectors, and the extent of unemployment, gathering data from 69,000 adults aged between 15 and 
65 from 30,000 dwellings around the country. 
152 The 2003 LFS adopted an urban/non-urban dichotomy, rather than an explicit identification of ‘rural’.  
153 Mean household income in agricultural households in Capricorn was ZAR 19,345, compared to a 
provincial norm of ZAR 14,186, and for non-agricultural households ZAR 30,361, compared to ZAR 
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respondents, have been used for comparative purposes.   Compared to the provincial means, 
the Limpopo PWP participants were not poor in relative terms, on the basis of a range of 
non-income poverty indicators, but it is necessary to compare the PWP respondents with the 
norm of the district in which the programme was implemented in order to make an 
assessment of incidence within the programme. In this way, the socio-economic status of the 
PWP participants can be assessed in relation to the district population overall, which enables 
a more accurate analysis of incidence. 
Limited Income Data 
The second major data constraint relating to the 2003 LFS is that the income data are not 
sufficiently detailed to offer meaningful comparisons with the PWP Survey data. While the 
LFS provides only limited summative income and social grant receipt data, the Census 2001 
income data are also limited, with income data restricted to broad income bands, rendering 
any matching or incidence analysis based on monetary indicators problematic. In order to 
carry out an incidence analysis without recourse to income data, a set of non-monetary 
indicators of poverty have been used for both descriptive and econometric analysis which 
relate to individual and household material and human capital characteristics (asset 
ownership, nature of dwelling, gender of household head, educational attainment of 
household head, educational attainment of household head). In addition to descriptive 
comparisons of the non-monetary characteristics of the treatment and control groups, a 
model has been developed based on propensity score matching using a core set of 
characteristics to ascertain the relative socio-economic status of PWP participants, in order 
to assess targeting and incidence in relational, if not absolute, income terms. 
Geographical Disaggregation 
Where Census 2001 has adequate variables it has been used as the comparator of choice, 
using data aggregated at province level for the Zibambele analysis, as the survey groups were 
drawn from each of the province’s districts, and district level for Gundo Lashu analysis, as 
the PWP was implemented in Capricorn District alone, with both survey clusters falling 
within this district. In each case, only rural Census data were used, reflecting the rural focus 
of the two PWPs. Where the LFS has been used as the comparator, the data have been 
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Panel Data 
The absence of panel data is problematic in terms of an assessment of programme impact 
over time. In order to address this constraint, recall questions were included in the PWP 
Survey relating to nutrition, savings, education, asset ownership and perceptions of poverty.  
Employment Status of PWP Participants 
An unanticipated data constraint emerged during survey implementation, relating to the 
employment status of PWP participants. Within the Zibambele sample, all households 
surveyed included current PWP participants, but within the Limpopo sample, baseline 
participant data were of insufficient quality to differentiate between households with current 
and former PWP participants. Hence, households with both current and former participants 
were included in the sample. This in effect created two subgroups within the Limpopo 
sample, and the analysis had to be carried out in such as way as to ensure that the data from 
the two groups was kept discrete where the current status of the PWP participant could have 
an impact on the outcome. 
8.8 Poverty Line 
While several different poverty lines are in use in South Africa, this chapter makes use of a 
version of the Household Subsistence Line (HSL) for analytical purposes.154 The HSL is a 
measure of the theoretical monthly cost of basic needs derived from a basket of goods and 
services, comprising food, housing, fuel, light and transport. The figure for 2003 has been 
derived from the HSL for low-income households calculated by Potgieter (2003) and 
adjusted in line with revisions to this methodology by Meth (see Meth (2004a)), to arrive at a 
low-income HSL of R486 (US$65 at 2004 prices) per adult equivalent.155  
                                                            
154 While recognising that the choice of a poverty line offers an inherently subjective definition of poverty, 
nevertheless the selection of a consumption based HSL offers a useful insight into the material poverty of 
programme participants. 
155 This figure is derived for urban households, but, given the lack of a rural HSL for South Africa, it will 
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8.9 Overview of the Case-Study Programmes 
The two PWPs under review are the Gundo Lashu programme in Limpopo, and the 
Zibambele programme in KwaZulu-Natal.156 The programmes were selected because of their 
high profiles, differing design and implementation modalities, and the use of components of 
the programmes in the EPWP, with the Limpopo programme being used as a model for the 
labour-intensive construction component of the national EPWP. The operational areas of 
the two programmes are illustrated in Figure 8.1. The Gundo Lashu programme was 
implemented in just one area, Capricorn District (shaded), while the Zibambele programme 
was implemented throughout the province. 
The Characteristics of Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal 
Limpopo has a population of 5.4 million (12% of the total population of South Africa), and 
KwaZulu-Natal has a population of 9.8 million (21% of the total) (Stats SA, 2004). Limpopo 
and KwaZulu-Natal are two of the poorest provinces of South Africa, with the highest 
unemployment rates in the country, at 38% and 36% respectively by the narrow definition, 
compared with a national figure of 31% (Stats SA, 2003b). In both provinces employment is 
dominated by elementary occupations, which account for 33% of workers in Limpopo, and 
25% in KwaZulu-Natal. Both provinces have traditionally been highly dependent on 
agricultural employment and remittances from migrant labour, and the structural shifts in the 
national economy in recent decades have had a major negative impact on both poverty and 
formal sector employment (Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001). The historical nature of 
disadvantage in the two provinces is illustrated by the fact that, among those aged 20 and 
over, 33% of the Limpopo population and 22% in KwaZulu-Natal have no schooling, 
















The Anatomy of Public Works  Chapter 8: Case Study Overview: Context and Methodology  
  193












Note: The dotted areas represent the districts where the two programmes are implemented 
Programme Objectives and Modalities 
The goal of the Gundo Lashu programme is the ‘improvement of livelihoods in rural 
communities in the Northern Province’, and the purpose ‘employment creation within the 
rural communities … skill transfer from private contractors to community members … [and] 
enhancement of livelihoods for those community members providing labour to the 
programme’ (Roads Agency Limpopo, 2003), which may be characterised as sustainable 
poverty reduction and improved labour market performance. The programme is 
implemented by the Roads Agency Limpopo,157 with support from DFID and the ILO, and 
is focused on both employment creation and the training of contractors and consultants in 
labour-intensive road rehabilitation. It was initiated in 2000, and had employed a total of 
1,700 labourers at the time of the survey. 
The programme was implemented through private contractors who directly recruited PWP 
labour with support from social facilitation agencies which managed the contractors’ 
relations with the communities supplying the labour. The period of employment ranged 
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between less than one month and four months, and labour was recruited on the basis of the 
‘Special Public Works Programme’ Code of Conduct, gazetted in 2001, which sets out 
participation targets (60% women, 20% youth and 2% disabled), prohibits employment 
exceeding 24 months in duration, and also allows for a derogation from national minimum 
wage legislation in favour of a locally negotiated wage, in return for training inputs for 
workers of two days for every 20 worked. In the Gundo Lashu programme, a task rate of 
R30 (US$4.05 at 2003 rates)158 was negotiated, which in most cases translated into a daily 
wage of R30.159 Wage payments were made directly to labourers by the contractors in cash, 
and training inputs were delivered by the Department of Labour.160 Where PWP 
employment was oversubscribed, rationing was carried out using a lottery, with ownership of 
an identity card being the condition for consideration, thereby excluding those without such 
documentation who tend to be among the poorest. Demand for labour exceeded the locally 
available supply during the construction of highly labour-absorbing components of the road, 
and at these times all available labour was employed, compromising any attempt at targeting, 
in the interests of the exigency of the construction process.  
The Zibambele programme in KwaZulu-Natal was also initiated in 2000, with the goal of the 
‘creation of sustainable job opportunities for poor rural families through the maintenance of 
rural roads’ (South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport, 2002). The objectives 
of the programme were to:  
• ‘Maintain the province’s rural road network  
• Provide destitute rural households which have no other source of income with a 
regular income  
• Put people to work who are unemployable due to their poverty  
• Improve the life chances of the contractors and their children (nutrition, education, 
dignity and economic activities)  
• Enable contractors [PWP participants] to organise themselves into credit unions and 
invest savings in other productive activities  
                                                            
158 US$1 was R7.4 in May 2003. 
159 It was possible to earn more than R30 if more than one task was completed in a day. 
160 It should be noted that the training package offered to the Gundo Lashu workers was recognised as not 
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• Create sustainable work opportunities’  
(South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport and Public Works, 2002). 
 
The programme was implemented directly by the Provincial Department of Transport, and 
provided permanent employment through labour-intensive road maintenance (rather than 
construction, as in the Gundo Lashu programme) for 14,000 workers on a part-time basis 
(eight days per month), with a large degree of flexibility regarding when the hours were 
worked during the month. The programme targeted the poorest members of communities, 
particularly female household heads, who were selected by community representatives using 
community institutions developed over several years by the Department of Transport.161 
Zibambele employment was oversubscribed and selection was made on the basis of 
community identification of the poorest with no alternative forms of income or support. 
Workers were contracted directly by the Department of Transport, and paid at the minimum 
construction industry wage (R5.57 per hour (US$0.75 at 2004 prices)) for the 60 hours a 
month they worked on the basis of twelve-month annually renewable contracts, totalling 
R334 a month (US$45). Wage payment was made monthly through electronic transfers to 
the workers’ bank accounts in the nearest town,162 and training was delivered on an ongoing 
basis by the Department of Transport and its social development consultants. The 
Zibambele contract was given to a household rather than to an individual, so that if the 
primary worker were sick or had passed away, employment in the PWP would shift to 
another household member.  
8.10 Introduction to Analysis 
The key findings from the PWP Survey are presented in the following three chapters, with 
chapter nine exploring the question of socio-economic incidence, chapter ten examining 
labour market incidence and impact, and chapter eleven attempting to examine the question 
                                                            
161 These institutions are called Rural Road Transport Fora (RRTF), and they are charged with a range of 
transport-related tasks including the selection of priority roads for maintenance, in addition to the selection 
of PWP participants.  
162 Many participants without identity cards were helped to procure them by programme staff in order to 
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of social protection impact overall, in terms of both monetary impacts and household level 
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9 PROGRAMME INCIDENCE 
This chapter explores the critical issue of analysing the identity of the case study PWP 
participants, in order to establish the incidence of PWP participation, a question which is 
central to assessing the social protection impact of PWPs. As with many PWPs, no baseline 
information on the socio-economic characteristics of those included and excluded from the 
programmes was gathered in either programme. This makes an assessment of incidence 
problematic, and renders attempts to assess the effectiveness of the programmes as social 
protection instruments somewhat heroic. In this chapter, this problem is addressed by 
analysing a number of key demographic and socio-economic indicators drawn from the 
PWP Survey data in order to locate the participating households within the South African 
socio-economic distribution, and comparing them to independent census and survey data 
using both direct comparison and matching techniques. 
9.1 Structure of the Chapter 
The chapter starts by reviewing the targeting and rationing approaches used to control access 
to both programmes, as these are likely to be the key determinants of programme incidence. 
Once the modalities of each programme have been discussed, the chapter then reviews the 
PWP Survey data in a number of different ways in order to construct an assessment of 
incidence. The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the PWP participants in 
each programme, and the households to which they belong, are extracted from the survey 
data. These are then compared to provincial and district data on the same variables from the 
LFS and the 2001 Census. First the demographics of the PWP participants from the two 
programmes are reviewed in terms of age, gender, location within household structure, 
education and literacy. These characteristics are compared between the programmes, 
revealing significantly different characteristics. Next the characteristics of PWP households 
are reviewed and compared to LFS 2003 and Census 2001 data as appropriate, in order to 
locate the PWP households within the populations from which they are drawn, first focusing 
on the characteristics of the household heads, looking at gender and education level, and 
then examining household characteristics (including household size and asset ownership, 
which was found to be a good proxy for household income, and social grant receipt). Finally, 
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households with households in the Census 2001 on the basis of key household variables. 
The validity of the matching exercise is checked by analysing the basic household 
characteristics of PWP and matched households, to ensure consistency with the prior 
analysis, and then the income data for the matched households are used to draw some 
conclusions on the poverty targeting of both programmes. These findings are then reviewed 
in the light of programme design factors. 
9.2 PWP Access: Targeting and Rationing Practices  
In the context of mass unemployment and extremely low informal sector earnings, it is not 
evident that the principle of ‘less eligibility’ through the work requirement and low wage will 
ensure that the ‘poorest’ will succeed in accessing PWP employment. Hence, the modalities 
of targeting and rationing become critical determinants of the extent to which such 
programmes reach intended vulnerable groups. In the case of South Africa, access to PWP 
employment is strictly rationed, due to the large scale of the unemployment problem, and 
the relatively limited scale of PWP employment. Full implementation of the national EPWP, 
of which both case study programmes form a part, would absorb less than 1% of 
unemployed workdays per annum (McCord, 2003). Since the EPWP is the only significant 
policy response to the social protection needs of the unemployed working-age poor, it is 
particularly important to examine the efficacy of different EPWP interventions in reaching 
the poorest within this group. This is not to suggest that all the poor are not in need of social 
protection support, but rather that in the context of a highly rationed resource, it is 
important to know what proportion of the transfer is reaching the poor, and whom among 
the poor are the beneficiaries, in terms of their relative poverty. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the two case study programmes adopted different 
targeting mechanisms and participation criteria, with the type A Gundo Lashu programme in 
Limpopo adopting conventional PWP targeting practices, based on a restricted wage, while 
the type B Zibambele programme in KwaZulu-Natal uses community-based targeting 
together with a higher hourly wage, although given the part time nature of the employment, 
it should be noted that this results in a lower total monthly wage. These different modalities 
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The Gundo Lashu programme adopted a restricted wage as the primary mechanism to target 
the poor. The Gundo Lashu wage is set below the minimum wage, on the basis that this 
would deter all but the poorest from self-selecting into PWP employment, in line with the 
principle of ‘less eligibility’. In contrast, in the Zibambele programme the wage is set at the 
minimum wage for the rural construction sector. In addition to the wage, the case-study 
programmes both adopt additional demographic targeting criteria. The Gundo Lashu 
programme nominally adopted the official EPWP participation targets with quotas for the 
employment of women (60%), youth aged between 18 and 25 years (20%), and those with 
disabilities (2%) (South Africa, Department of Labour, 2002b).163 It is interesting to note that 
membership of a broad demographic grouping, rather than poverty, is the criterion for 
inclusion in the programme. There is no explicit adoption of eligibility criteria based on 
poverty, as it is implicitly assumed that poverty targeting is sufficiently addressed through the 
reduced wage level.164 In the Zibambele programme, in contrast, poverty is explicitly used as 
the targeting criterion which is implemented by community groups, and within the group 
identified as the ‘poor’, the poorest were explicitly targeted, using membership of female-
headed households as a secondary criterion to reach the subset of the most disadvantaged. 
The outcomes of these differing eligibility criteria and targeting methods are empirically 
tested in the analyses below by comparing the characteristics of the PWP participants and 
their households with those of the population of their respective catchment areas drawing on 
the 2001 Census as a comparator, and also by comparing matched samples with the overall 
population. By comparing the characteristics of participants and locating them in their 
respective district and provincial contexts in this way, the targeting performance of the 
PWPs can be assessed as a means to gauge programme incidence, and as a first step towards 
evaluating the two programmes’ social protection performance.  
During the implementation of the Gundo Lashu programme, mobile labour from outside 
the immediate programme area complemented local labour supply at times when local labour 
supply was insufficient to meet construction demand, with participants being selected on the 
                                                            
163 These quotas are articulated in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997. 
164 Everatt suggests that the expectation of positive poverty outcomes from programmes with limited or 
inconsistent definitions of poverty, and hence a limited poverty focus, may not be uncommon in the South 
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basis of availability, rather than other explicit targeting criteria. The migrant labour which 
participated in the PWP during periods of peak labour demand was not captured in the 
survey, which was limited to those domiciled in the intended target area. The fact that 15% 
of those on the payment roster sample frame were ‘not known’ in the host communities 
during the survey process, implies that the extent of migrant labour included in the 
programme was significant. While the existence of this problem was identified by 
programme managers during implementation, the extent of the participation of participants 
from outside the local communities had not been recognised. The inclusion of migrant 
labour in PWP is not de facto problematic. However, the resultant exclusion of those living 
outside the programme area from the survey does impact adversely on the ability of the 
survey to adequately assess the characteristics of programme participants, since 15% of 
participants are excluded from the analysis.  
At other points in the construction cycle, when the local labour seeking employment 
exceeded PWP job availability, job rationing was required, and ownership of an ID card was 
reported in most cases to be the initial criterion for eligibility165, with selection subsequently 
proceeding on the basis of a lottery, 166 with exigency once again overriding the more 
complex participation criteria set out in the SPWP.167  
Hence, in the Gundo Lashu programme, the degree of participation by particular target 
groups at any point in the implementation cycle was contingent on the size of the available 
labour supply in relation to demand, and also on the commitment, interest and time invested 
in the targeting component of the recruitment process by the contractors. Contractually 
there were no incentives for the private sector contractors executing the programme to meet 
either explicit demographic or implicit poverty targets in their recruitment processes. This 
insight has negative implications for the degree of poverty targeting, and targeting to the 
poorest likely to occur in such programmes, and this highlights the critical importance of the 
institutional processes through which targeting takes place, and also the phasing and scale of 
                                                            
165 Focus group discussions, Capricorn District, May 2003.  
166 This process was reported by focus group participants in both the Gundo Lashu clusters. 
167 At these times of insufficient local labour supply, additional labour was recruited from outside the 
project areas, pers. comm., May 2003, Mbongeni Mondlane, ILO Social Development Adviser to the 
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labour demand in relation to supply in a given area, if poverty-related targeting of PWP 
employment is to be achieved. Both these scenarios, excess demand for PWP employment 
leading to a lottery-based allocation, on the basis of the assumption that the wage level itself 
will exclude the non-poor; and excess demand for labour outstripping local labour 
availability, leading to participation of migrant labour in PWPs, are common in type A and C 
programmes. The implication is that the targeting nuances incorporated into type A or C 
programme design may be compromised by the exigencies of differential labour demand 
throughout the construction process.  
In the Zibambele (type B) programme, excess demand for PWP jobs led to high levels of 
competition for employment, and as a result access to employment was strictly rationed. In 
this case, each applicant was considered on the basis of strict poverty criteria (based on a 
combination of factors such as household labour availability, wage income and grant 
income) by community representatives from the RRTF which included representatives of 
the poor within the community. The extent of community participation in the selection 
process was feasible due to the long-term relationship between the community and 
government implementing agencies, as the RRTF institutions adopted for PWP selection 
were functioning prior to the implementation of the PWP (McCord, 2003). The extent of 
active governance of the programme by the community resulting from this institutional 
setting was illustrated by a report given by one focus group that one Zibambele participant 
had been invited, by the community who had previously selected her for participation, to 
step down from the Zibambele programme upon receipt of a pension by a household 
member, on the grounds that she no longer conformed to the poverty selection criterion, 
since her household now had access to an alternative form of income. This is indicative of 
the effective community ownership and commitment to the programme’s purpose and the 
objective of selecting the poorest for participation. 
This description of the two programmes implies different targeting outcomes. The survey 
findings are examined below to assess whether they indicate different incidence outcomes 
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9.3 The Characteristics of PWP Participants 
The age and gender of PWP participants is set out in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Age and Gender of PWP Participants 














45 19-63 2 72 93 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003. 
The mean age of the Gundo Lashu participants was 35, with 29% of the participants being 
above the age of 40.  This was significantly higher than the mean age of the Zibambele 
participants was 45, with 72% being over 40.168  In terms of the programmes’ respective 
targets, the Gundo Lashu programme met its youth target, with 22% participation by those 
under 25, compared with a target of 20%. However, the programme failed to meet its female 
participation target of 60%, with only 48% of the Gundo Lashu workers being female. The 
Zibambele programme aimed to employ women, and succeeded in this respect, with 93% of 
the Zibambele sample being female. In this way the demographics of the PWP participants is 
consistent with the differing age and gender distributions which would be expected, given 
the programmes’ respective targeting objectives and implementation modalities, since the 
Zibambele programme explicitly focused on reaching poor female-headed households169, 
while the Gundo Lashu programme nominally prioritised ‘youth’ as a target group and in 
practice, accepted all comers on a first-come, first-served or lottery basis170.  
                                                            
168 t=14.45, df=753, p<.05 
169 If age and gender are considered together, it is evident that male PWP participants in the Gundo Lashu 
programme were concentrated in their twenties (43% of the total), while female Gundo Lashu participants 
were older, being concentrated in their thirties (38%). Both male and female Zibambele participants were 
concentrated in their forties (31% and 38% respectively), with 68% of women being in their forties and 
fifties. This also reflects the Zibambele policy of recruiting female household heads as their priority 
employees, as, de facto, household heads are likely to be older than other household members. 
170 The preceding analysis makes the simplifying assumption that demographic characteristics are similar 
across the two provinces and therefore any disparities are not a consequence of provincial differences in 
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The demographic difference between the two programmes is further illustrated by an 
analysis of the position of participants within the household structure, see Table 9.2.  













22 (n=75) 20 (n=68) 45 (n=153) 13 (n=44) 100 
Zibambele 
(n=415) 
68 (n=282) 24 (n=100) 4 (n=17) 4 (n=17) 100 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003. 
Comparing participants who are either household heads or partners of households heads 
with all other participants across the two samples, a chi-square test indicates a significant 
difference between the two samples.171 Some 68% of the Zibambele participants were 
household heads, and a further 24% were the spouses of household heads, rendering 92% of 
all participants household heads or spouses of heads. Only 42% of their Gundo Lashu 
counterparts fell into this category, with the participants more likely to be the children of 
household heads. This suggests that the two programmes were recruiting different 
household segments, participants of differing ages and positions within the household 
hierarchy, and consequently, it may be imputed, with different labour market functions and 
responsibilities within the household. 
These demographic findings are consistent with the Gundo Lashu practice of employing i) 
all available participants seeking full-time work, or ii) randomly selected participants who 
were available for full-time work, but not explicitly the poor, while the Zibambele 
programme focused on recruiting poor rural female household heads who, by definition, 
would tend to be older, and comprise a group for whom full-time work, such as that offered 
in the Gundo Lashu programme, may have been unattractive due to competing domestic 
                                                            
approach is refined in the following analysis. 
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responsibilities; a factor which would not represent a similar constraint for younger 
household members without the same burden of domestic responsibility.  
It could be argued that extending PWP employment to the different groups of participants 
identified above is appropriate given the elevated unemployment rate in rural areas and the 
pervasive difficulties of gaining access to employment. However, these demographic 
incidence differences are problematic if the objective of the programme is the provision of 
social protection, rather than employment provision per se, particularly given the limited scale 
of PWP employment and the extensive rationing of PWP employment which this implies.  
In addition, the social protection discourse suggests that transfers to women tend to deliver 
greater human and social capital benefits at a household level than transfers received by men 
(Appleton and Collier, 1995:563; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). This supposition is 
supported with reference to South Africa by Duflo (1999), who found that the welfare 
impact of pensions received by women had a significantly greater impact on household 
welfare than those received by men. This was affirmed during focus group discussions 
conducted among PWP participants in Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal where female 
participants argued that PWP wage transfers received by men (and youth) had a more limited 
impact on household welfare than those received by women.172 This challenges the limited 
participation target for women in the Gundo Lashu programme, given the objective of 
poverty reduction. It also highlights the potential tension between the objectives of poverty 
reduction and enhancing labour market participation among the youth (McCord, 2003). 
The human capital indicators, maximum attained education level and literacy, may also be 
used to contribute to the socio-economic profiling of PWP participants. The Gundo Lashu 
participants had a modal education level of Grade 8 to 10 (36%) while for Zibambele 
participants the mode was ‘no education’ (31%) (see appendix 3). 
                                                            
172 The reduced welfare benefits accruing to households where youth and males were the PWP participants, 
were voiced by female participants in the Gundo Lashu programme during focus group discussions in 
Sekhukhune, Limpopo, in April 2003. Participants in the Zibambele programme also highlighted, during 
focus group discussions in Eshowe and Mapumulo, the more limited household benefits accruing from 
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When these findings were disaggregated to control for age and gender, it was found that in 
every age cohort the modal level of education of Zibambele participants was lower than that 
of Gundo Lashu participants (see appendix 4). Literacy rates follow a similar pattern when 
disaggregated by age and gender, with Zibambele participants again having lower literacy 
rates than the Gundo Lashu participants in all age categories (see appendix 5). A chi-square 
test indicates that while literacy rates are not significantly different between male Gundo 
Lashu and Zibambele workers, except in the 30–39 age category, for female workers 
between the ages of 20 and 50 literacy rates are significantly different between the two sets 
of workers.173   
These findings are also consistent with the greater emphasis on poverty targeting in the 
Zibambele programme and support the argument that the participants in the two different 
programmes may come from different socio-economic population segments. 
These individual differences offer insights into the different targeting outcomes of the two 
programmes, and in order to explore these insights in more detail, it is necessary to locate 
the participants within their household context and identify their socio-economic location 
within their communities. To achieve this, an analysis of the characteristics of the 
households to which PWP participants belong is carried out, first using simple comparative 
analysis, and then using a propensity score matching approach. 
9.4 PWP Household Characteristics  
In this section, the characteristics of households within which the PWP participants were 
located are identified, and compared to the general population using key household variables, 
in order to assess their relative socio-economic status. Comparison is made to the Census 
2001 10% sample for rural Capricorn district data for the Gundo Lashu programme, and 
rural KwaZulu-Natal provincial data for the Zibambele programme, including only black 
rural census respondents in both cases.  
                                                            
173 For men in the 30–39 age category, χ=6.45, p=0.011, while for female workers in the three categories 
between the ages of 20 and 50 χ=4.03 and p=0.045, χ=7.45 and p=0.006, and χ=5.35 and p=0.037 
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Household Head Characteristics 
First the characteristics of the household heads are examined by reviewing their gender and 
education attainment.  
The incidence of female headed households was significantly different in the two samples.174  
40% of the Gundo Lashu households were female-headed, compared with a 54% prevalence 
in Capricorn District, Limpopo, implying that fewer female-headed households were 
included in the programme than would be expected if PWP employment were randomly 
distributed among the population. By contrast 70% of the Zibambele households were 
female-headed, compared with a provincial prevalence of 58%, suggesting that the policy of 
targeting female-headed households in this programme was successfully implemented175. 
These findings are notable given the positive correlation between female-headed households 
and poverty in Africa (IFAD, 1999), suggesting that there may be a greater poverty focus in 
the Zibambele targeting. 
The maximum educational attainment of household heads in each programme is compared 
by gender with the respective provincial/district levels, in Tables 9.3 and 9.4. Table 9.3 
illustrates that while fewer male Gundo Lashu household heads have no schooling than 
household heads overall in Capricorn district (20% and 30% respectively), this is not 
reflected in the case of female Gundo Lashu household heads whose rate of ‘no schooling’ 
may be compared to that of female household heads in the general population (48% and 
44% respectively).  For both genders, Gundo Lashu households report a lower percentage of 
household heads having completed secondary or tertiary education than the district mean. 
                                                            
174 χ=69.01 at 0.05 significance level, with df =1 
175 Given South Africa’s history of migrant labour an elevated female household head rate is prevalent in 
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Table 9.3: Household Head Education Level in Capricorn and Gundo Lashu 
Households by Gender 
 Capricorn District Gundo Lashu 
Education Level of 
Household Head 





No schooling 30 44 20 (n=31) 48 (n=49) 
Some primary schooling 21 15 23 (n=35) 22 (n=23) 
Complete primary schooling 8 6 8 (n=12) 7 (n=7) 
Some secondary schooling 27 24 36 (n=55) 17 (n=18) 
Grade 12 / Standard 10 10 7 5 (n=8) 1 (n=1) 
Higher education 4 4 1 (n=2) 0 (n=0) 
Other   7 (n=11) 5 (n=5) 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003 and Census 2001. 
Table 9.4: Household Head Education Level in KwaZulu-Natal and Zibambele 
Households by Gender 
 KwaZulu-Natal Province Zibambele
Education Level of 
Household Head 




No schooling 41 52 38 (n=46) 35 (n=100) 
Some primary schooling 25 23 33 (n=40) 42 (n=120) 
Complete primary schooling 7 5 8 (n=10) 8 (n=23) 
Some secondary schooling 19 14 20 (n=24) 13 (n=37) 
Grade 12 / Standard 10 6 4 1 (n=1) 1 (n=3) 
Higher education 2 2 0 (n=0) 0 (n=0) 
Other   0 (n=0)  1 (n=3) 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003 and Census 2001.  
The percentage of Zibambele household heads with no schooling was lower than average in 
the province, particularly among the women (35% compared with 52%), suggesting that at 
the bottom end of the education distribution the level of household head education may be 
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taken into account, both groups (PWP household heads and overall household heads) have 
similar education profiles, with 75% and 77% of women respectively having no or 
incomplete primary education, and 70% and 71% of men, respectively. It is interesting to 
note that the percentage of PWP households attaining Grade 12 or above is below that for 
the overall population for both sexes, suggesting that the PWP households may be less well 
educated than the provincial mean.176 Overall, at the bottom end of the education 
distribution Zibambele household heads have attained higher levels of education than the 
provincial norm, and at the top end lower levels, which may indicate a narrower distribution 
of educational attainment among this group.  
Asset Ownership 
Households were asked to report on ownership of a list of eleven items, in order to assess 
their levels of material asset ownership (the full responses are outlined in appendix 6).  The 
Zibambele households had lower levels of ownership of assets in all categories, and chi-
square tests indicate that the difference in asset ownership between the Gundo Lashu and 
Zibambele groups was significant in all categories excepting ownership of books and beds 
(see appendix 7).  In order to compare asset ownership with the control populations, 
television and radio ownership is compared to the Census 2001 data for the rural Capricorn 
district and KwaZulu-Natal province, in Table 9.5. Only these two assets have been selected 
out of the full set included in the PWP Survey, as these are the ones which are included in 
both the PWP Survey, and the Census data on asset ownership. 
This Table indicates that the material asset base of the Gundo Lashu households is similar to 
or superior to the average for the Capricorn population, while that of the Zibambele 
households is significantly below the KwaZulu-Natal average. Regression analysis taking the 
log of household income as the dependent variable and asset ownership as the explanatory 
variable using the Census 2001 data, indicated that radio and television ownership were both 
closely correlated with log household income, with the coefficients of impact on log 
household income being 0.38 and 0.46 for radio and television respectively for Capricorn, 
                                                            
176 It should be noted however, that given the low number of data points in the higher education categories 
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and 0.48 and 0.63 for KwaZulu-Natal. This indicates that these two variables may be useful 
proxies for assessing relative household income in the absence of comparable household 
income data, with ownership of either asset indicating a higher level of household income 
than non-ownership, and television ownership being associated with greater household 
income than radio, adding an additional level of nuance to the analysis. The implication of 
this is that low relative asset ownership among Zibambele households compared to the 
Census 2001 data, and the high relative asset ownership levels in the Gundo Lashu 
households compared to Census data, again suggests that the Zibambele participants were 
drawn from a poorer segment of the local population than the Gundo Lashu households.  
Table 9.5: PWP and Census Asset Ownership 




 % households reporting ownership
Television 40 (n=105) 39 14 (n=58) 28 
Radio 80 (n=210) 71 57 (n=235) 67 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003 and Census 2001. 
Social Grant Receipt  
A range of social assistance grants are provided in South Africa for the indigent, and the 
linkage between grant receipt and household poverty reduction in South Africa has been well 
documented, with households in receipt of higher value grants (such as the Old Age Grant) 
by definition falling outside the poorest decile, by virtue of the value of the transfer 
(Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001).  In order to capture the extent of grant receipt among the 
PWP households, each household was asked what grants they received.  The Old Age Grant, 
Disability Grant, Child Support Grant, Care Dependency Grant and Foster Care Grant were 
the main state transfers reported by respondents and the two most significant transfers in 
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49% of Gundo Lashu households and 28% of Zibambele households received the Child 
Support Grants for one of more children, with Gundo Lashu households having a 66% take-
up rate, and Zibambele households 36%.177  These take-up rates may be compared with the 
overall (rural and urban) provincial take-up rates of 48% in Limpopo and 62% in KwaZulu-
Natal in February 2003 (Guthrie, 2003).178 Hence, among the Gundo Lashu households take-
up is higher than the provincial average (66% compared to 48%) while among Zibambele 
households take-up is significantly lower than the provincial norm (36% compared to 62%).  
Interestingly the 36% rate of take-up among Zibambele children is consistent with findings 
in rural KwaZulu-Natal by Case et al. (2002) who found a 33% take-up rate, suggesting that 
the rural/urban location of the PWP sample has a significant impact on take-up rates.  Given 
the link established between grant income and poverty reduction this low grant take-up rate 
serves as an indicator of the poverty of Zibambele households in relation to the provincial 
population overall, compared to Gundo Lashu households who were significantly more 
successful in accessing the grants to which they were entitled.   
For both groups, take-up rates decreased as the number of eligible children increased; in 
Gundo Lashu households, take-up was 72% when one child was eligible, falling to less than 
17% when three or more children were eligible. Among Zibambele households, take-up rates 
were 40% when one child was eligible, falling to less than 6% of full take-up when three or 
more children were eligible. The issue of grant take-up was explored in the focus group 
discussions. This revealed that, while most participants were aware of their rights in terms of 
eligibility for the Child Support Grant, discouragement during the application process as a 
result of bureaucratic delays, and the opportunity cost of continuing with the process in the 
face of these delays was the primary factor limiting grant take-up. 
                                                            
177 There were 256 eligible children in Gundo Lashu households of whom169 received grants, and 462 
eligible children in Zibambele households of whom 165 received grants. 
178 These figures apply to take-up rates among ‘poor’ children, defined as those living below a poverty line 
of R400 per month in 2002. 99% of the sampled Zibambele households, and 93% of Gundo Lashu 
households, fell below the HSL of R473 in 2003, and so the simplifying assumption has been made that it 
is appropriate to consider all the children in the sample poor for the purpose of comparison with national-
level take-up of the CSG. Using an alternative poverty line, derived from the 2000 Income and Expenditure 
Survey, and January 2003 SOCPEN data, Samson et al., (2003) found similar provincial take-up rates, 58% 
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Receipt of an Old Age Grant has been found to have a significant impact on welfare (Case 
and Deaton, 1998; Duflo, 1999), and so identification of Old Age Grant receipt in PWP 
households is a useful proxy indicator of household economic status. Thirty-two percent of 
Gundo Lashu households received state Old Age Grants, compared with only 9% of 
Zibambele households, reflecting a lower number of pensioners179 in the Zibambele 
households and lower take-up rates.  
The household take-up rate for the Old Age Grant was 80% in Gundo Lashu households180 
and 58% in Zibambele households181. This reflects the greater emphasis on poverty targeting 
in the Zibambele programme, where receipt of a state transfer was in some instances 
adopted as a criterion for exclusion from the programme. Hence, the low rate of pensioners 
and Old Age Grant take-up among the Zibambele group is indicative of the programme’s 
successful targeting. The high incidence of pensioners and take-up rates among the Gundo 
Lashu group suggests less of a poverty focus in this programme 
The low Child Support and Old Age Grant take-up rate among the poor is paradoxical, as is 
the implication that poorer households in the sample have lower take-up rates than the 
better-off households, although when this is considered in the context where receipt of a 
transfer, such as a Old Age Grant or multiple Child Support Grants, is sufficient to move a 
household above the poverty line, this effect is not surprising. This research suggests that the 
low grant take-up among the poor is the consequence of both supply-side problems such as 
bureaucratic delays, and demand-side problems such as lack of documentation among the 
poor.182  
                                                            
179 The number of pensioners in the Gundo Lashu households was significantly higher than in the 
Zibambele households, with 0.45 pensioners per household, against 0.15 for the latter. A higher percentage 
of Gundo Lashu households included pensioners than the regional norm, with 38% of Gundo Lashu 
households containing members of pensionable age compared with the rural Limpopo figure of 33% (Stats 
SA, 2003a). By contrast, only 14% of Zibambele households included pensionable members, compared 
with a provincial rural norm of 39% (ibid).  
180 While 98 Old Age Grants were recorded and 118 household members were of pensionable age, four of 
those who reported pension receipt were not eligible, and were excluded from the analysis, see Case and 
Deaton (1998), and Ardington and Lund (1995), for a discussion of the payment of Old Age Grants to non-
eligible recipients. 
181 Three of the 38 reported as receiving pensions were not eligible and were therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
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9.5 Propensity Score Matching to Assess PWP Incidence 183 
Thus far, only demographic and basic household data have been used to inform the 
discussion of incidence, based on descriptive analysis and direct comparison with Census 
and LFS data. In order to assess income incidence, which is critical in terms of assessing the 
poverty targeting of the two programmes, propensity score matching techniques are used in 
order to construct an income profile of PWP participants which may be reviewed in the 
context of the income distribution of the population from which participating households 
are drawn. 
In this section, a propensity score matching (PSM) approach is adopted to gain further 
insight into the incidence of the two programmes in terms of the relative economic status of 
PWP workers. Direct comparison of income data between the PWP Survey and in the 2001 
Census is not appropriate, since although income data are available in both, the Census 
income data are limited as they do not provide detail on income from different sources and 
offer only banded income data. In addition, the income inflation during the two-year period 
between Census and survey implementation also makes direct comparison between the two 
surveys invidious. To overcome this problem, PWP Survey households were matched with 
Census households on the basis of a number of household characteristics excluding income, 
using a technique called propensity score matching (PSM), developed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). The income distribution of the matched households was then compared to 
that of the other households in the survey areas in order to assess incidence. Other 
household characteristics were also compared across the two groups. 
PSM is typically used to evaluate programme impacts by identifying a ‘control’ group with 
similar characteristics to the ‘treatment’ group and comparing the outcomes of the groups on 
a particular variable, such as unemployment status. In this case, however, the aim was not to 
select a comparator group for purposes of impact evaluation, but rather to identify 
                                                            
poor households in the hope of promoting eligibility for PWP employment, particularly given that in the 
Zibambele programme, receipt of a state transfer is a criterion for exclusion from the programme. However, 
given the close community scrutiny of income flows within Zibambele households indicated above in the 
focus group discussion, this explanation does not seem likely in this instance. (G Kingdon, May 2004, pers. 
comm.) 
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households similar to the PWP households in the Census, in order to ascertain their income 
status relative to the overall population, to provide an insight into incidence.  
The use of PSM in the analysis of characteristics of households taking part in PWPs in 
KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo is not typical, in that i) it is not being used for programme 
impact evaluation, and ii) PSM is most often used to match individuals with other 
individuals, rather than matching households as in this instance. However, the use of PSM in 
a non-evaluation method is not problematic, as the basic assumption, that the probability of 
selection into the treatment group is the same for participants and non-participants, is not 
broken. Also, many examples can be found in the literature where matching has been used 
for households (and other units of analysis), such as Mendola (2007) in Bangladesh; Arun et 
al. (2006) in India and Guarcello et al. (2003) in Guatemala. What is important in determining 
the unit of analysis is that the unit is appropriate given the particular area of interest and that 
the unit of analysis does not compromise the quality of the match. For example, in this case 
the aim is to compare the household characteristics of PWP-participating households with 
other households in the local area. This could be done by matching households (which is the 
method used) or matching the individuals who are PWP workers and then comparing 
household characteristics. The second method is less satisfactory in this case because there is 
insufficient comparable individual level information in the Census which would compromise 
the quality of the match. Thus, in order to compare the characteristics of households, it is 
most appropriate to match at household level rather than individual level.  
Matching Households 
The first step in the matching process is the generation of a propensity score for each case in 
the PWP Survey and the Census by running a probit model with the binary outcome variable 
equalling 1 where the household is drawn from the PWP Survey and 0 where the household 
is not a PWP household (i.e. drawn from the Census). The resulting propensity score can be 
interpreted as the probability that any household (from the Census or survey) will contain a 
PWP participant. For each of the PWPs, survey and Census cases were pooled and a 
separate probit model run for each PWP group, the one using Census data from the rural 
Capricorn district, and the other from rural KwaZulu-Natal province overall. The propensity 
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variables in the model are the characteristics on the basis of which the households are 
matched. The following characteristics were used: 
• Age of head of household 
• Gender of head of household 
• Highest level of education achieved for head of household 
• Number of people in household 
• Dependency ratio (the number of dependents in the household divided by the 
number of ‘working-age’ members – dependents are under 15 or over 64) 
• Type of dwelling (traditional or non-traditional) 
• Household ownership of a television 
• Household ownership of a radio 
The survey cases included in the model were all cases without missing variables on any of the 
matching characteristics. To be included in the pool of possible Census matches, households 
had to fulfil certain conditions, namely: 
• Their accommodation type is a ‘housing unit’ (other accommodation types such as 
hostels and student accommodation were excluded) 
• The head of the household was Black African 
• The household resided in a rural area 
• The household included at least one person of working age (aged 15-64) 
• The household had no missing values for any of the matching characteristics 
• The household resided in the Capricorn District (for Limpopo only) 
The resulting sample comprised 238 survey and 17,440 census households in Capricorn 
District, Limpopo and 400 survey and 66,841 census households in KwaZulu-Natal 
province. The matching specification employed was nearest neighbour matching where the 
census household with the propensity score closest to the PWP household was selected into 
the comparison group. The data were randomly sorted prior to running psmatch2 as the sort 
order can impact upon the selection of households into the matched group. The ‘no 
replacement’ option was used, meaning that each matched household can only be selected 
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allowing replacement simplifies the calculations as it means that matching weights do not 
have to be taken into account.  
The linear prediction of the propensity scores for each group is shown in Figures 9.1 and 
9.2. As might be expected, the distribution of propensity scores is wider for the census 
households than for the PWP Survey households. Critically, the PWP Survey households all 
lie within the range of ‘common support’, such that each PWP household can be matched to 
a Census household with a similar propensity score.  This result indicates that the Census 
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Figure 9.1: Propensity Score Distribution for Census and Survey Households – 
Capricorn  
 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using PWP Survey 2003 and Census 2001. 
Having generated a propensity score for each household, the next step of the matching 
process was to use the programme psmatch2184 to match households from the PWP Survey 
with similar households from the Census according to the propensity scores of the two sets 
of households. The result was the selection of households within the Census who were 
assumed to be similar to the households in the PWP Survey.  
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Figure 9.2: Propensity Score Distribution for Census and Survey Households –
KwaZulu-Natal 
 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using PWP Survey 2003 and Census 2001. 
The characteristics of the matched and survey group were very similar, indicating that the 
matching technique worked successfully and that the matched cases are sufficiently similar to 
be used in further analysis to assess programme incidence. The matched and PWP groups 
differ slightly in their values for the dependency ratio, with the matched households 
containing more children and fewer adults than the PWP households, resulting in a slightly 
larger dependency ratio. This may be an artefact of a difference between the Census and 
PWP Survey questionnaires in terms of the definition adopted for assessing the number of 
people normally residing in the household185. In the analysis that follows, the assumption was 
                                                            
185 The Census only records people staying in the household on the census day, while the PWP survey 
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made that the matches are appropriate and successful, despite the weighting of the Census 
cases not being taken into consideration186. 
Data Analysis 
After selecting a matched group of households, a number of comparisons were made 
between the characteristics of the matched households and those of other households in the 
local area in order to assess incidence, firstly in terms of a variety of household 
characteristics indicative of socio-economic status, and then in terms of income. The 
following groups are referred to in the text below and are defined as follows: 
• ‘Matched’ – all matched households drawn from the Census (note that this only 
includes households with at least one working age member) 
• ‘Non-matched’ all non-matched households from the original Census matching pool, 
including households without any working-age members  
• ‘Census’ – ‘Matched’ and ‘Non-matched’ groups as defined above, combined 
• ‘Non-matched working age’ – as ‘Non-matched’ but excluding households with no 
working-age members 
Matching Results: Household Characteristics (Non-income) 
Tables 9.6 and 9.7 show the household characteristics for the household groups outlined 
above. As would be anticipated, these results are consistent with the profile emerging from 
the comparative analysis above. 
                                                            
186 One difficulty here was that the objective is to compare the income distributions of the matched and 
non-matched group, and, as the Census data is a 10% sample, this can only be correctly done by applying 
the appropriate household weights. Unfortunately, psmatch2 does not take account of the household 
weights and each Census case is taken to represent a single household (when in practice it generally 
represents around 10 households). However, examining the Census weights it can be seen that the majority 
are very close to 10, and a comparison of the characteristics of the survey group with the matched group 
with and without applying the Census weights indicates that this does not significantly alter the closeness of 
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Mean age of head of 
household 
56.24 47.85 46.90 47.96 
Mean household size 
(persons) 
7.02 4.39 4.50 4.42 
Dependency ratio* 0.72 1.06 1.06 1.05 
Dependency ratio (whole 
population)** 
0.67 0.96 0.91 0.95 
Traditional dwellings 11.22% 9.58% 9.56% 9.60% 
Owning a TV 40.72% 39.42% 40.03% 39.44% 
Owning a radio 85.71% 71.52% 71.91% 71.70% 
Female-headed household 43.20% 58.58% 58.09% 58.38% 
Household heads with no 
schooling 
35.79% 39.10% 37.94% 39.05% 
Household heads with some 
primary schooling 
26.75% 17.02% 16.83% 17.14% 
Household heads with 
complete primary schooling 
5.02% 7.09% 7.18% 7.07% 
Household heads with some 
secondary schooling 
28.22% 24.92% 25.65% 24.96% 
Household heads with Grade 
12 / Standard 10 
3.77% 7.83% 8.16% 7.78% 
Household heads with higher 
education 
0.44% 4.05% 4.24% 4.00% 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
Notes: * The household dependency ratio cannot be calculated for households with no working age 
members. 
 ** The whole population dependency ratio is the total number of dependants in the group divided 
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Mean age of head of 
household 
48.64 48.27 47.61 48.27 
Mean household size 
(persons) 
7.09 5.09 5.20 5.10 
Dependency ratio* 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Dependency ratio (whole 
population)** 
0.81 0.85 0.82 0.85 
Traditional dwellings 87.52% 55.20% 54.85% 55.38% 
Owning a TV 13.35% 27.23% 27.76% 27.16% 
Owning a radio 57.36% 67.45% 67.97% 67.40% 
Female-headed household 73.25% 53.90% 53.51% 54.01% 
Household heads with no 
schooling 
34.88% 46.96% 46.19% 46.90% 
Household heads with some 
primary schooling 
44.41% 23.68% 23.80% 23.79% 
Household heads with 
complete primary schooling 
5.38% 5.82% 5.90% 5.81% 
Household heads with some 
secondary schooling 
13.63% 16.28% 16.62% 16.26% 
Household heads with Grade 
12/ Standard 10 
1.69% 5.15% 5.30% 5.13% 
Household heads with higher 
education 
0.00% 2.12% 2.18% 2.11% 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
Notes: * The household dependency ratio cannot be calculated for households with no working age 
members. 
 ** The whole population dependency ratio is the total number of dependants in the group divided 
by the total number of non-dependants, including households with no working-age members. 
 
In Limpopo, matched households have older household heads, are larger, are less likely to be 










The Anatomy of Public Works  Chapter 9: Programme Incidence  
 
  221
terms of education levels the households are fairly similar. The matched households have 
fewer household heads with further or higher education. The dependency ratio for the 
matched population is much lower than the dependency ratio for the census as a whole. This 
indicates that matched households have relatively more working-age than non-working age 
members.187  
Table 9.7 indicates that in KwaZulu-Natal, matched households are larger, more likely to live 
in a traditional dwelling, and more likely to be female-headed than the overall population, 
reflecting the targeting of women in the Zibambele programme. The matched households 
are less likely to own a TV or radio but the household head is more likely to have had some 
primary education, and less likely to have completed secondary education. The dependency 
ratio for the matched population is similar to the overall Census dependency ratio of 0.85, 
which is higher than the figure for the whole province reported above (0.63), mainly due to 
the exclusion of urban households. 
9.6 PWP Incidence on the Basis of Income Distribution  
The primary purpose of the PSM exercise was to locate the PWP households within the 
overall population income distribution in order to assess programme incidence in terms of 
the income status of participating households. Having identified adequate matches for the 
PWP Survey households, as indicated above, the final step was an assessment of incidence 
on the basis of income, to compare the income distributions of the Census households in 
the matched group with the other households in the comparison areas for each PWP. The 
matched households were compared to the sample from which the match was originally 
drawn. 
                                                            
187 It should be noted that at 0.95, the Census population dependency ratio is higher than the figure reported 
for Limpopo province above (78.7) (Health Systems Trust, 2003). This is likely to be largely the result of 
excluding particular groups from the census population, as excluding urban households increases the 
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The income distributions for matched, non-matched, non-matched working-age and Census 
households are shown in Tables 9.8 and 9.9 below188. These tables indicate that 35.2% of 
PWP households in Capricorn and 57.1% of households in KwaZulu-Natal fall in the 
bottom 40% and 45% of the income distribution respectively. 




Matched Non-matched Non-matched 
working age 
Census 
No income 35.2% 40.1% 41.6% 40.0% 
R1-R400 9.7% 14.5% 14.8% 14.5% 
R401-R800 41.7% 33.3% 31.0% 33.4% 
R801-R1600 7.5% 5.3% 5.5% 5.4% 
R1,601-R3,200 5.0% 3.8% 4.0% 3.9% 
R3,201-R6,400 0.9% 2.2% 2.3% 2.2% 
R6,401-R12,800 0.0% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
R12,801-R25,600 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
R25,601+ 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
                                                            
188 Inclusion of the household with no working age members group does not significantly alter the results 
and the values for the Census group are very close to the value of the non-matched group: this is due to the 
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PWP Non-PWP Non-PWP 
working age 
Census 
No income 57.1% 44.7% 45.6% 44.8% 
R1-R400 15.0% 13.8% 14.0% 13.8% 
R401-R800 19.8% 29.7% 28.4% 29.7% 
R801-R1600 5.0% 5.9% 6.1% 5.9% 
R1,601-R3,200 2.2% 3.8% 3.9% 3.8% 
R3,201-R6,400 1.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 
R6,401-R12,800 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
R12,801-R25,600 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
R25,601+ 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
The income distributions for the matched and Census groups are shown graphically in 
Figures 9.3 and 9.4. The two groups differ in that the Capricorn matched households appear 
generally to be better off across the distribution, having fewer households in the bottom two 
income groups and more households in the third income group. In KwaZulu-Natal, the 
matched households are generally poorer than the non-matched households, with almost 
75% of the PWP group in the bottom two income groups. In terms of the incidence of 
poverty amongst the general population, in both Capricorn and KwaZulu-Natal more than 
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Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001.  
 


























































Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
A chi-square test confirms that the income distributions of the matched households are 
significantly different from the non-PWP households for both groups; for Capricorn the 
results were χ=33.48, p=0.0399, and for KwaZulu-Natal χ=70.93, p=0.0001 (null hypothesis 
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Table 9.10 shows the estimated mean income per month for households in each of the 
groups. Interestingly, if the mean household income between matched and non-matched 
households are compared189, the difference between the mean household income for 
matched and non-matched households in Capricorn is significant only at the 5% level, 
whereas the difference for KwaZulu-Natal is statistically significant at the 1% level and the 
gap between matched and non-matched household incomes is much wider.190  
Table 9.10: Mean Household Income  
Mean household income  
(R per month) 
Capricorn KwaZulu-Natal 
Matched 521.25* 307.34** 
Non-matched  624.52* 620.00** 
Non-matched working age 626.90* 623.00** 
Census 623.20 618.32 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
Notes: * Significant at the 5% level. 
 ** Significant at the 1% level (matched and non-matched groups are compared). 
 
Mean equivalised household income is also compared between the different groups of 
households. As the matched households tend to be larger, this results in the equivalised 
income for matched households being lower than for the non-matched households. The 
difference is statistically significant for both groups at the 1% level. However, the difference 
is much larger for households in KwaZulu-Natal. 
                                                            
189 This is done by assigning the mid-point of each income band to each household in that income band. 
190 It should be noted that the income of the non-matched working age group is only slightly higher than 
that of the group including households with no working age members. The reasons for this are that 
household sizes tend to be large with several generations living together so there are relatively few 
households with no working age members. In addition, households containing pensioners may be in receipt 
of an Old Age Grant and so may even have higher household incomes than households containing working 
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Table 9.11: Mean Equivalised Household Income 
Mean equivalised household 




Matched 141.74** 74.89** 
Non-matched  281.25** 266.54** 
Non-matched working age 273.64** 261.22** 
Census 279.47 265.51 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
Notes: * Significant at the 5% level.
 ** Significant at the 1% level (matched and non-matched groups are compared). 
 
Given that i) the matched households were slightly larger than the survey households as they 
tend to contain more adults and fewer children and ii) that the calculation is based on 
banded income data, the results should be treated with caution. However, it is clear that 
matched households in KwaZulu-Natal are relatively poorer compared to non-matched 
households than is the case in Capricorn where the income of matched and non-matched 
households are closer together (though still significantly different from one another at the 
5% level).  
Cumulative Distribution  
The cumulative distribution of the household income of matched households is presented in 
Figures 9.5 and 9.6. This illustrates the differential poverty incidence in the two programmes, 
based on PSM income bandings for matched households. These figures indicate that on the 
basis of the PSM matching, the lower income bands were under-represented in the Gundo 
Lashu programme, relative to their share of the overall population, whereas in the Zibambele 
programme lower income bands were over-represented among participants, with the 
percentage of PWP households exceeding the percentage of members of the overall 
population in the lower income bands illustrating a greater degree of poverty targeting in the 
Zibambele programme. Only 45% of Gundo Lashu matched households had an income of 
R400 or less per month compared to 55% of the total number of households in the sample, 
while in contrast, 72% of the Zibambele matched sample had an income of R400 or less, 
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Figure 9.5: Cumulative Distribution of Census Income and PWP Matched Income - 
Capricorn 
 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
Figure 9.6: Cumulative Distribution of Census Income and PWP Matched Income – 
KwaZulu-Natal 
 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
The cumulative distribution of income in matched households illustrated in Figures 9.5 and 
9.6 can be used to draw some conclusions regarding incidence of the two programmes, 
linking the PWP Survey analysis and PSM results with current research into assessing social 
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Gundo Lashu programme, 35.2% of programme households were below the 40th income 
percentile, while for the Zibambele programme, 57.1% of households were below the 45th 
income percentile (the 45th percentile is adopted in place of 40th as it is the closest 
approximation possible given the banding approach adopted in the Census, rather than 
continuous variable, which a 40th specification would require). Caldes et al. (2004) cite work 
by Coady et al. (2002) who reviewed more than 100 social protection programmes and found 
that the ‘median targeting performance was consistent with 50% of programme benefits 
accruing to the poorest 40% of the population’ (Caldes et al., 2004:31). On this basis, 
Zibambele programme incidence would fall above this median targeting performance at 
57%, and Gundo Lashu below, at 35%, with the poor receiving 1.27 times their population 
share in the case of the Zibambele programme, and 0.875 in the Gundo Lashu programme, 
representing a significant difference between the two programmes. This confirms the 
incidence conclusions drawn from the demographic data, that the Zibambele programme 
was more effectively targeted at the poor than the Gundo Lashu programme 
9.7 Comparing PWP ‘Matched’ Households and Non-PWP Households Using 
Logistic Regression  
It is possible to explore differences in the characteristics of the matched and non-matched 
households in more detail using a logistic regression model. Such a model is beneficial as it 
controls for the effect of other variables, making it possible to estimate the independent 
impact of each independent variable, while controlling for other factors. A logit model is run 
for each group with a binary dependent variable indicating matched or non-matched status, 
using the characteristics outlined in Tables 10.6 and 10.7, together with household 
equivalised income191, based on the Census income bands, as the independent variables. A 
household (rather than population) dependency ratio has been included as an independent 
variable, and in this case the groups compared are the matched and the non-matched with 
the working-age members group, as the dependency ratio cannot be calculated for 
households with no working-age members. 
                                                            
191 Equivalised household income is calculated following Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001, where E=(A + 
αK)θ, E=the number of adult equivalents, A=number of adults, α=the child cost ratio, K=number of 
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The odds ratios and β coefficients from the logit models are shown in Tables 10.8 and 10.9. 
In KwaZulu-Natal In KwaZulu-Natal the effect of education level on participation in the 
PWP was found to vary by gender of the household head so an interaction between 
household head gender and education level was included in the model.192 
In both Capricorn District and KwaZulu-Natal equivalised household income was found not 
to be a significant predictor of PWP participation. This implies that if there were two 
households with otherwise identical characteristics and one contained PWP participants and 
the other did not, the participating household could not be reliably identified on the basis of 
equivalised household income. In the earlier analyses asset ownership (specifically ownership 
of a TV and/or radio were identified as being good proxies for income. However, here 
income and assets appear to have quite differing effects. Whilst both are able to predict 
participation in the absence of any other control variables, once other characteristics are 
controlled for income has a non-significant effect regardless of the inclusion of asset 
ownership in the model and the significant impact of asset ownership does not depend upon 
whether or not household income is included in the model. This suggests that the 
relationship between income and assets is not straightforward. 
Table 9.12 shows that as the household size increases by one person and the age of the 
household head increases by one year, a household is respectively 1.41 and 1.04 times more 
likely to have a PWP participant. Education seems to play a significant role: households 
where the head has some primary education are twice as likely to have PWP participants 
compared to households where the head has no schooling, and households where the head 
has some secondary education are three times more likely to have PWP participants. As 
illustrated in Table 9.8, households that have no dependent members are 3.5 times more 
likely to have members participating in a PWP than those households that have equal 
numbers of dependents and non-dependents193, possibly illustrating the Barrett and Clay 
                                                            
192 Other interactions were explored in the analysis, but this was the only one that was found to be 
significant. 
193 The coefficient of 0.29 relates to the ratio of the odds that a household with equal numbers of 
dependents and non-dependents will take part to the odds that a household with no dependent members will 
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thesis (Barrett and Clay, 2003) that PWP participation may be an attractive option where 
there is surplus household labour with low marginal value.  
The impact of assets and income is particularly interesting as households with a TV are less 
likely to participate (as we might expect as these will be high income households) whereas 
households with a radio are twice as likely to participate. This seems to indicate that the 
poorest households (i.e. those owning neither a TV nor a radio) and the richest (those 
owning a TV) are less likely to participate. Households who are poor but still able to afford 
some assets (i.e. a radio) are the most likely to participate. 
                                                            
part relative to a household with equal numbers of dependents and non-dependents which, as quoted in the 
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Table 9.12: Household Characteristics, Logistic Regression - Capricorn 
Characteristic Odds ratio β Standard 
Error 
Mean age of head of household 1.0372** 0.0366** 0.0050 
Mean household size (persons) 1.4143** 0.3467** 0.0266 
Dependency ratio 0.2859** -1.2522** 0.1761 
Traditional dwellings 
(reference – not living in a traditional dwelling) 
1.0960 0.0914 0.2239 
Owning a TV 
(reference – households without a TV) 
0.7472* -0.2914* 0.1415 
Owning a radio 
(reference – households without a radio) 
1.9990** 0.6925** 0.1993 
Female-headed household 
(reference – male-headed households) 
0.7875 -0.2388 0.1419 
Household heads with some primary schooling
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
2.1830** 0.7805** 0.1827 
Household heads with complete primary 
schooling 
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
1.1938 0.1772 0.3263 
Household heads with some secondary schooling
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
2.9714** 1.0890** 0.1981 
Household heads with grade 12 / standard 10
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
1.7487 0.5589 0.3788 
Household heads with higher education 
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
0.2999 -1.2045 0.8746 
Household equivalised income 0.9999 -0.0001 0.0002 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
Notes: * Significant at the 5% level 
 ** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 9.13: Household Characteristics, Logistic Regression – KwaZulu-Natal 
Characteristic Odds ratio β Standard 
Error 
Mean age of head of household 0.9933 -0.0067 0.0033 
Mean household size (persons) 1.1810** 0.1664** 0.0118 
Dependency ratio 0.7097** -0.3428** 0.0610 
Traditional dwellings 
(reference – not living in a traditional dwelling) 
4.9515** 1.5997** 0.1590 
Owning a TV 
(reference – households without a TV) 
0.4421** -0.8163** 0.1539 
Owning a radio 
(reference – households without a radio) 
0.6949** -0.3640** 0.1050 
Female-headed household 
(reference – male headed households) 
1.7984** 0.5869** 0.1911 
Household heads with some primary schooling 
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
2.0744** 0.7300** 0.2334 
Household heads with complete primary schooling 
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
0.6681 -0.4033 0.6033 
Household heads with some secondary schooling 
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
1.7210 0.5429 0.2911 
Household heads with grade 12 / standard 10 
(reference – household heads with no schooling) 
1.0990 0.0943 0.5959 
Household heads with some primary 
schooling*female-headed household 
1.8106* 0.5940* 0.2678 
Household heads with complete primary 
schooling*female-headed household 
3.8001* 1.3351* 0.6572 
Household heads with some secondary 
schooling*female-headed households 
1.1458 0.1376 0.3460 
Household heads with grade 12 / standard 
10*female-headed households 
0.7889 -0.2371 0.7862 
Household equivalised income 0.9996 -0.0004 0.0003 
Source: McCord and Wilkinson (2009) using Census 2001. 
Notes: * Significant at the 5% level 
 ** Significant at the 1% level 
  Number of observations=66,839, population size=2,102,960, F(16,66823)=34.83, p<0.01 
 
The effect of the education level of the head of the households is particularly interesting 
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the education levels of the heads of matched and non-matched households. Finally, when 
controlling for other characteristics there is no effect of household income, thus, household 
income does not appear to have a significant influence on a household’s decision to 
participate in a PWP. Although the likelihood of participation decrease as income increases, 
the effects are small and insignificant. 
Table 9.13 indicates that an increase in the size of the household also increases the likelihood 
of PWP participation in KwaZulu-Natal, but the age of the head of the household is not 
significant. Again, the education level of the head of the household is important, with 
households where the head has some primary education approximately twice as likely to 
have PWP participants compared with households where the head has no schooling. 
Female-headed households are also almost twice as likely to be PWP participants (reflecting 
the targeting of women-headed households). The impact of the education level of the head 
of the household varies by gender: female-headed households with some primary education 
are 3.75 times more likely to have PWP participants compared to female-headed households 
with no schooling194 and 3.25 times more likely to have participants than male-headed 
households with an equivalent level of schooling. As supported by the cross-sectional 
analysis, matched households have fewer dependent members, are more likely to live in a 
traditional dwelling and are less likely to own a television or a radio. Again, controlling for 
other factors, household income is not a significant factor in the participation decision, 
although the (non-significant) coefficient on income suggests that the likelihood of 
participation does decrease as income increases. 
9.8 Discussion of Incidence Analysis 
The main conclusions from the preceding analysis are that the Gundo Lashu households 
appear, on average, to be better off across both the income distribution and a range of other 
socio-economic indicators than the overall population from which they are drawn, while on 
the same basis, the Zibambele households are much poorer than the overall population. 
Logistic regression analyses comparing matched and non-matched households whilst 
                                                            
194 The odds ratio for female-headed households with some primary schooling relative to female-headed 
households with no schooling is calculated by multiplying the odds for households with some primary 
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controlling for their different characteristics indicate that the level of education of the head 
of the household appears to be important, with household heads with some basic education 
being more likely to contain a PWP participant, compared with household heads with no 
schooling. In KwaZulu-Natal, the impact of education varies according to the gender of the 
household head, with the strongest effects seen for female-headed households, where having 
some basic education makes participation much more likely.  
In both cases, after controlling for other household characteristics, household income 
appears not to have a significant impact on whether or not a household participates in PWP. 
This is a particularly interesting finding given that there are significant differences in the 
income levels of the matched and non-matched households. One explanation for this could 
be that PWP employment was not provided on a sufficient scale to absorb all households 
living in poverty, and so the available jobs were distributed between poor households. The 
regression analyses indicate that whilst there appeared to be no variation in income between 
households that did participate and those that did not, controlling for other characteristics 
shows that certain types of poor households were more likely to participate than others. The 
income analysis confirms that the PWP households are poorer than the non-PWP 
households, as would be expected, but when the analysis is extended it indicates that 
although the PWP households are poorer they are no poorer than would be expected given 
their characteristics, and whilst PWP participation appears to be random on some variables 
(for example income) others such as education level and dependency ratios have a significant 
impact, indicating that some types of poor households are missing out because of particular 
characteristics. These findings would merit further analysis into factors which may exclude 
certain types of poor households from gaining access to employment through PWPs. Other 
factors may also be acting to exclude households from participation. Whilst an excess of 
labour supply (meaning that some poor households had to be excluded) seems plausible in 
the case of the Zibambele programme, in the Gundo Lashu programme it was reported that 
the recruitment of sufficient labour in the local area was problematic, and as a consequence, 
immigrant labour from outside the project area was recruited. While this appears to be 
contradictory to the findings set out above that there were still large numbers of poor 
households who did not take part in the programme, in part it may be possible to explain 
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may also indicate that the ‘local’ poor were less able to compete successfully with less poor 
‘outsiders’ in terms of gaining access to PWP employment. Again, this would be an 
interesting area for future study. 
The findings regarding the impact of the effect of the dependency ratio on the participation 
decision may be related to the relationship between income and the participation decision. In 
both cases it was found that, as the number of dependents in the household increased 
relative to the number of non-dependent persons, the likelihood of PWP participation 
declined. The effect was much stronger in Capricorn than in KwaZulu-Natal, which may 
reflect the fact that the Gundo Lashu programme only offered full-time employment whilst 
the Zibambele programme provided more flexible part-time employment. The findings here 
suggest that the ability of a household to care for non-dependent members may have a 
significant impact on a household’s ability to participate in a PWP.  
The interpretation of these results relies on how well the matching characteristics used 
allowed selection of similar households from the Census data. Comparison of the matched 
group with the survey group indicates that they are very similar, aside from small differences 
in the dependency ratio already discussed, but it is important to consider that the groups may 
differ on unmatched characteristics that may impact upon the income distribution and other 
characteristics of the households selected. It is likely that households similar across a number 
of characteristics will also be similar across unobserved factors, but this cannot be 
guaranteed. Further matching variables would have been desirable but could not be 
generated in a consistent form from both data sets. Because of this, the results should be 
treated with a degree of caution. However, given that the match is robust and the results 
confirm findings from other analyses of the data, they are considered to provide a reasonably 
reliable view of the income status and general characteristics of PWP households in relation 
to other households in the same area. On this basis it can be concluded that the analysis in 
this chapter has illustrated consistently that, over a range of different indicators, the poverty 
incidence of the Zibambele programme was significantly superior to that of the Gundo 














The conclusion drawn from this case study exploration of PWP targeting and incidence is 
that both programme design and implementation modalities have a significant impact on 
programme poverty incidence. Empirical analysis of the PWP Survey revealed that 
significantly different demographic and socio-economic segments of the population 
participated in the two different case study programmes. In the type B Zibambele 
programme with explicit poverty targeting objectives, utilising community selection 
techniques, and offering flexible employment, the poor received 1.27 times their population 
share of the PWP employment. By contrast, in the type A/C Gundo Lashu programme, 
which relied on self-targeting and offered full-time non-flexible employment opportunities, 
the poor received only 0.88 of their population share of employment. This low share is 
particularly noteworthy given the fact that the demand for labour in the latter programme 
exceeded locally available supply at times but even so, the poor were unable to access their 
share of employment, highlighting the relative failure of the poor to compete successfully for 
PWP employment.  
The case study has suggested that active poverty targeting, rather than reliance on the work 
conditionality, is required to promote the share of programme benefits transferred to the 
poor, and that by tasking community groups with selection, where community groups enjoy 
a degree of programme ownership in the context of a long-term relationship between local 
communities and implementing agencies, it is possible to promote the participation of the 
very poor, a relationship which, by definition, is more likely to be achieved in type B 
programmes. By contrast, in the context of the short-term case study programme 
(conforming to PWP types A and C) which was implemented by contractors without explicit 
poverty targets or incentives, the poverty incidence of participants was significantly lower, 
with the poorest being under-represented in the PWP participant group.  
The case study also suggests that the quality of employment provided may impact on 
incidence, with labour-constrained households in particular, which are likely to be among the 
more vulnerable, experiencing some degree of exclusion from PWP participation. This 
indicates the need to consider the quality of employment provided in terms of flexibility, 
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disincentives for labour-constrained households, and promote PWP participation among the 
more vulnerable.  
The demographic characteristics of the PWP workers differ in the two programmes, with the 
Zibambele workers being predominantly female, household heads, and significantly older 
than the Gundo Lashu participants, who tended to be the children of the household head, 
and of equal gender proportions. Also, while the Zibambele households had only one PWP 
worker, multiple PWP employment was common in the Gundo Lashu households. The data 
analysis, PSM analysis, and direct comparison with Census 2001 and the LFS 2003 all suggest 
that different segments of the population were being targeted in each programme. 
These differences are consistent with the targeting and rationing methods used in each case, 
and the fact that the Zibambele programme was explicitly (and exclusively) poverty-targeted, 
while the Gundo Lashu programme was more plural in its objectives, aiming to address both 
poverty and labour market issues through the same intervention.195 The effectiveness of the 
community-targeting mechanism in the Zibambele case was contingent on significant 
investment in social development by the implementing agency over a period of years, which 
was possible because of the extended duration of the programme and hence, the sustained 
nature of the relationship between the workers, the programme, and the community 
institution managing the programme at the local level.196 It is not clear whether such issues 
can be addressed in the context of short-term employment projects, particularly when they 
are implemented by the private sector, and when neither targets nor incentives for targeting 
the poor are in place, particularly given the additional expenditure on social development 
required. The limited poverty focus of the Gundo Lashu programme is illustrative of this 
problem, confirming research on the MEGS in India, which has also found evidence of the 
negative implications for poverty targeting of private sector implementation, due to the 
                                                            
195 For a discussion of the conceptual and implementational difficulties and inefficiencies arising from PWP 
programmes with plural objectives, see McCord (2003). 
196 A further indication of the community ownership of the programme was the social regulation of the 
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inherent tension between profit-based incentives and the social investment required to 
ensure the inclusion of the poorest.197 
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10 LABOUR MARKET INCIDENCE AND IMPACT  
Having ascertained the incidence of the two case study PWPs in the previous chapter, in 
terms of the demographic and socio-economic status of participating households, 
programme incidence is now examined from a labour market perspective by examining the 
labour market characteristics of PWP participants and their households. Also, an assessment 
is made of the impact of PWP skills development and work experience (the second vector of 
social protection transmission) on the employment performance of participants in each 
programme.  
Despite the fact that PWPs are frequently presented as labour market, rather than social 
protection interventions (Vodopivec, 2004; Martin and Grub, 2001), there is a limited 
literature in this area, exploring the empirical realities of which segments of the labour force 
PWPs actually attract, and their labour market impact. There is little empirical analysis of the 
prior employment status of PWP participants (most frequently it is assumed, rather than 
empirically tested, that if targeted correctly, participants will be predominantly drawn from 
among the unemployed), or the household employment context to which PWP participants 
belong in terms of the labour market status of household members. Likewise there is limited 
research addressing the impact of PWPs on the subsequent labour market performance of 
participants, despite the fact that improved performance after PWP participation is a critical 
condition for the realisation of the ‘graduation’ objective so prevalent in the PWP rhetoric. 
Inasmuch as PWPs are included in the general ALMP cannon, there is some literature on the 
impact of type D PWPs (see, for example, Martin and Grub, (2001) and discussion in 
chapter seven), but the focus is primarily on PWPs within an OECD, rather than developing 
country context.  
Hence, there is not an established literature in these areas, nor are there agreed 
methodological approaches to exploring them, and the available data are limited. In this 
context, the challenge is how to assess labour market incidence and impact, given the fact 
that within the PWP Survey there is a rich source of data on the case study PWP participants 
and their households’ labour market status, which offers the potential for insights into not 
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issues of PWP-related household labour adjustment, another critical issue on which the 
current literature is silent. The aim of this chapter is to examine the data available from the 
two case studies, to see what insights and tentative conclusions can be drawn, although given 
the methodological and data constraints, it is not possible to draw robust statistical 
conclusions. Nevertheless, the exploration of the conceptual issues and questions in this area 
itself represents an important contribution to the literature, as is the explicit identification of 
these critical research lacunae. In this chapter, labour market impacts are also considered 
primarily at an individual level, taking into account both PWP participants and non-
participant members of PWP households, in contrast to the previous chapter which 
examined household level income and other poverty indicators of incidence, and the 
following chapter, which examines programme impact in terms of household effects. Within 
this discussion it is recognised that individual actions have significance for household labour 
allocations, and that the household level response to PWP employment will, to a large 
extent, dictate the social protection impact on the household, given the mutual linkages 
between the labour market responses of PWP participants and other household members, in 
terms of substitution. 
10.1 Structure of the Chapter 
First, the labour profile of PWP workers and households members is sketched, examining 
labour force participation rates, the distribution of PWP and market employment, 
dependency ratios and unemployment rates. A detailed analysis of characteristics of PWP 
workers and their households is carried out and some initial conclusions regarding incidence 
are drawn based on these characteristics. Next, the labour market origins of PWP workers 
are examined in order to gain further insight into PWP incidence, and PWP participants’ 
engagement with local labour markets. Questions relating to the second round intra-
household labour substitution and employment implications of PWP employment are then 
explored. This analysis also offers some illumination of the question of PWP incidence in 
terms of the extent to which PWPs are i) bringing the unemployed into employment, as 
generally anticipated, ii) increasing participation rates, or iii) repositioning those already in 
employment. The impact of the training and work experience component of PWPs is then 
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to assess whether PWP participation confers the additional labour market returns anticipated 
in the literature, in terms of the ‘ladder into the labour market’ function. Finally, the 
constraints to employment as reported by the PWP participants themselves in the survey and 
focus group interviews are explored in order to assess programme performance in relation to 
workers’ own labour market experiences.  
10.2 The Labour Profile of PWP Workers and Households Members 
The labour profile of PWP workers and household members is set out in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: Labour Market Characteristics of PWP Workers and Household Members 



































Unemployed & seeking 
work (n) 
 
413 411 304 181 304 
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Source: Own calculation from PWP Survey 2003. 
Notes: * All workers in Zibambele households excluding the PWP workers
 ** All workers in all Gundo Lashu households excluding current and former PWP workers 
 *** All workers in all Gundo Lashu households excluding current PWP workers 
 
The participation rate among all members of Gundo Lashu households was 63%, and 56% if 
current PWP participants were removed from the analysis. For Zibambele households, the 
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compared with the national (broad) rate of 68% (Stats SA, 2004). In both groups the higher 
participation rates with the inclusion of PWP participants could be explained in two ways, 
either i) in terms of the PWP participants having higher rates of participation within the 
household, reflecting a pre-existing labour market difference between PWP and non-PWP 
household members, or ii) it could be an artefact of the fact that the PWP is actively bringing 
non-participants into the labour force. Since no baseline data are available on PWP 
participants, it is not possible to identify the relative importance of these two factors, 
although it is possible to draw some inferences from PWP participants’ responses to 
questions relating to work forgone. This is discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
Increased levels of labour force participation among PWP participants may not be the 
consequence of the same processes in both programmes, given the demographic differences 
between the two groups. The higher participation rate is particularly striking in the 
Zibambele programme: an increase of 13%. This increase in female labour force 
participation resulting from the PWP was noted in focus group discussions in KwaZulu-
Natal, where participants stated that the Zibambele programme had made possible the entry 
of women into the labour market, for whom alternative opportunities were not available. 
The impetus for the increased female participation rates is explained by Posel and Casale in 
the following terms:  
‘Changes in household composition and marital rates, together with increasing job 
and income insecurity and rising levels of male unemployment, […] placed increased 
pressure on women to earn or generate an income’ (2003:469-70) 
When suitable part-time employment became available in remote rural areas through the 
implementation of the PWP, it was possible for women to respond to this pressure by taking 
work which was compatible with their domestic responsibilities. It is interesting to note that 
this effect has been observed elsewhere as a consequence of the implementation of PWPs 
offering employment of a kind which is accessible to women (for example, in terms of 
flexible or part-time hours). An example is the Jefes programme in Argentina, the 
implementation of which directly led to a significant rise in female labour force participation 














The dependency ratio is the ratio of the economically dependent part of the population to 
the productive part,198 which indicates the economic burden the productive portion of a 
population must carry, with a higher figure indicating a heavier burden of care on those who 
are of working age. The dependency ratio within the Gundo Lashu population is 0.67, which 
may be compared to a provincial dependency ratio for Limpopo of 0.79 (Health Systems 
Trust, 2003), and a dependency ratio of 0.95 for the black population of rural Capricorn 
(Census 2001). This indicates that the Gundo Lashu dependency ratio is significantly below 
both the provincial norm, and also the directly comparable rural district figure, suggesting a 
higher number of working age members per dependent in Gundo Lashu households than in 
the overall population, and implying a lower degree of vulnerability among this subgroup of 
the Limpopo population. By contrast, within the Zibambele population the ratio is 0.84. 
While this is significantly higher than the ratio of 0.64 for provincial rural KwaZulu-Natal 
province (ibid)199, it is consistent with the ratio of 0.85 for the black population in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal (Census 2001). This implies that the Gundo Lashu households may have a 
significantly lower proportion of dependants than in the local population, while the 
Zibambele households may be broadly consistent with the local population in terms of 
dependants, possibly confirming Barrett and Clay’s assertion regarding the potential for 
PWPs to attract surplus labour, rather than drawing participants from labour constrained 
households.  
Employment History  
The employment history of PWP and non-PWP household members is outlined in Table 
10.2 below.200  
                                                            
198 The dependency ratio is calculated on the basis of the number of those not of working age, divided by 
the number of those of working age, defined as those between 15 and 64.  
199 The provincial figures are taken from the Health Systems Trust website, 
http://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/23/data/geo, and are based on Stats SA 2003 Mid Year Estimates P0302 
2003. Downloaded on 24 January 2008.  
200 Former rather than current Gundo Lashu household data have been used in this discussion, as current 
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Table 10.2: PWP Workers’ and Household Members’ Employment Experience 








































































Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
Among former Gundo Lashu PWP participants, 37% had never been employed before 
engagement in the PWP, and 17% had not been employed for two years or more prior to 
their PWP participation. This compares with 24% and 44% respectively among the 
Zibambele participants. In both cases the difference between the two samples was 
significantly different, with the Zibambele workers including significantly fewer of those 
who had never been employed, and significantly more long term unemployed, with previous 
work experience.201  This higher percentage of Gundo Lashu participants without previous 
labour market experience is consistent with the greater proportion of youths in the 
programme. In terms of previous work experience, among non-PWP members of former 
Gundo Lashu households, 80% had never worked before and 12% had not worked for two 
years or more, while in Zibambele households the figures were 76% and 12% respectively. 
Chi-square tests indicate that in neither case were the experiences in these two groups 
                                                            
201  χ=27.86 at 0.05 significance level, with df =1 for those who had never been employed before, and 
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significantly different, with both sets of households displaying similar patterns of labour 
market engagement.202  
Distribution of Employment  
The distribution of employment (both PWP- and market-based) among PWP households is 
set out in Table 10.3. Some 149 Gundo Lashu households had no members currently 
employed as PWP participants, as their PWP contracts had been completed prior to the 
interview. These are referred to as former Gundo Lashu households in the text below. 
Among former Gundo Lashu households, 47% reported no currently employed members, 
39% one employed member, and 14% two working members or more, while among those 
with current PWP employment, 56% of households had one person employed and 44% two 
or more employed. Among Zibambele households 82% reported only one working 
household member (the PWP participant), with only 18% having two or more. This implies 
a particularly heavy reliance on PWP employment within the Zibambele households. It is 
interesting that a comparison between former and current Gundo Lashu household 
employment data gives no indication of employment substitution. While it is likely that intra-
household labour substitution did take place to some degree, this table suggests that it may 










202 χ=2.27 at 0.05 significance level, with df =1 for those who had never been employed before, and χ=0.1 
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Table 10.3: Total Number Employed per Household (Including PWP Employment) 
No. employed per 
household 
Gundo Lashu Zibambele 
 Former 
(% of households) 
n=149
Current 
(% of households) 
n=119
 
(% of households) 
n=413 
0 47 (n=70) 0 (n=0) 0 (n=0) 
1 39 (n=58) 56 (n=67) 82 (n=339) 
2 11 (n=16) 35 (n=42) 14 (n=58) 
3 or more 3 (n=4) 9 (n=11) 4 (n=17) 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003 
Employment Patterns  
In the Gundo Lashu households 30% of all labour market participants reported having 
worked during the last seven days, in response to the question:  
‘During the past seven days did … work for Zibambele/Gundo Lashu, work on 
subsistence agriculture, on a kitchen garden or plot, work for wage income of any 
kind (regular or casual), or engage in any kind of self-employment or income-
generating activity, however small?’ (PWP Survey, 2003) 
However, if this is broken down by the PWP participant status, only 21% of former Gundo 
Lashu participants reported having worked recently,203 compared with 35% of labour force 
participants who were not PWP participants. This challenges the notion that participation in 
PWP activity will significantly enhance labour market performance, at least in the short to 
medium term. It could be argued that this low level of employment immediately after PWP 
participation could be an artefact of ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’, the name given to the frequently 
observed phenomenon of former PWP participants experiencing low employment rates 
immediately after the cessation of PWP employment, during the period of job search and 
relocation in the labour market, reflecting a form of temporary or frictional unemployment, 
                                                            
203 It should be noted that exit from the programme was involuntary, resulting from the short-term nature of 
the employment offered under the Gundo Lashu programme, and as such does not represent a voluntary 











The Anatomy of Public Works  Chapter 10: Labour Market Incidence and Impact 
 
  247
rather than an accurate indicator of a steady state of unemployment among recent PWP 
graduates (Ravallion, 2003). However, if the employment performance of former Gundo 
Lashu participants is analysed on the basis of the period of time between completion of 
PWP employment and the survey interview, no such effect can be identified. Forty-eight 
percent of former PWP participants had completed employment less than three months 
prior to the survey and 52% three months or more (up to nine months previously), and the 
respective employment rates were 19% and 18%, indicating no discernable Ashenfelter’s dip, 
but rather a uniformly poor labour market performance across all former PWP participants. 
The reason cited by respondents for their poor labour market performance after 
participation in the PWP was primarily lack of demand for labour (75%).  
What is clear from the PWP Survey is that levels of unemployment among non-PWP 
participants were extremely high. Only 35% of Gundo Lashu and 18% of Zibambele non-
PWP participants had worked recently.  Of the non-PWP participants in Gundo Lashu 
households who reported working recently, 49% were engaged in regular wage labour, 26% 
in casual wage labour, and 12% in both subsistence agriculture and non-farm enterprises. If 
disaggregated by gender 53% of men and 43% of women reported engaging in regular wage 
labour, and 24% and 28% respectively in casual wage labour. 
By contrast, only 18% of Zibambele household members reported being employed in regular 
wage labour, If this figure is decomposed by gender, 21% of men and 15% of women were 
found to be engaged in regular wage labour, with 67% and 56% respectively being engaged 
in casual wage labour. A higher percentage of female participants than male were active in 
non-farm enterprises: 15% as against 5%. Zibambele labour market participants faced a 
more insecure relationship with the labour market than those from Gundo Lashu, as 63% of 
Zibambele employment was in the form of irregular casual labour, compared with 26% of 
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the Zibambele areas, with less access to agricultural sector employment than in the Gundo 
Lashu catchment area.204  
Interestingly, a small number of Zibambele participants (n=11, 2.7% of the total number of 
PWP workers) reported temporary work activity (RDP housing construction, factory work, 
temporary farm labour, domestic work and domestic production) which they carried out 
while engaging in PWP employment, and offered as a reason for not finding additional 
‘employment’. This suggests that the extent of temporary or episodic employment may be 
greater than is captured in the survey, in terms of respondents offering a negative response 
to the questions regarding recent employment, while simultaneously engaging in a range of 
informal or temporary activities. This finding is consistent with the work of Adato et al. 
(2004) which characterises much employment as episodic and short-term, and not 
considered by respondents as ‘work’.205 This indicates that the relationship between PWPs 
and the labour market may be more complex than is often assumed, inasmuch as i) PWPs 
participants may not necessarily be unemployed prior to PWP participation, even if that is 
how participants perceive themselves in terms of their own definition of ‘work’, and ii) PWP 
workers may engage in a range of concurrent activities during PWP participation, if the 
programme can offer sufficient flexibility. 
The PWP Survey revealed high levels of engagement in subsistence agriculture at a 
household level in both groups, with 67% of Gundo Lashu and 87% of Zibambele 
households reporting domestic agricultural production.206 These figures indicate that 
domestic household production was taking place in the majority of the households whose 
members engaged in PWP employment, as a complement to both formal and informal 
sector waged employment. Notwithstanding the high numbers of households reporting 
subsistence agriculture activity, levels of agricultural output were perceived by respondents 
                                                            
204 Access to alternative employment opportunities was discussed in focus groups with Gundo Lashu 
participants in December 2003, and with Zibambele participants in February 2004. 
205 This is also indicated by the spike in informal sector employment recorded in the LFS (February 2002), 
which was carried out subsequent to an additional survey on informal sector work, which shifted 
conceptualisation of informal work as ‘work’ in the minds of respondents. 
206 Zibambele levels of subsistence agricultural engagement were significantly higher than Gundo Lashu, 
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to be limited by external factors. The main factor limiting agricultural activity among Gundo 
Lashu households was insufficient access to land (53%), followed by lack of cash to 
purchase inputs (18%), and lack of water (14%); the last-mentioned concern related to the 
occurrence of a drought during the two years prior to the interview (2001 and 2002). During 
focus group discussions the drought was raised as a serious concern, with the last significant 
harvest in the area having taken place in 2000. It is likely that this factor has seriously 
inhibited domestic agricultural production among the Gundo Lashu households. The same 
three factors were identified by the Zibambele households, but the order of importance 
differed, with lack of cash for inputs being identified as the primary constraint (33%), 
followed by insufficient access to land (31%), and then lack of water (10%). The implication 
of these findings is that access to cash through PWP wages could potentially have a positive 
impact on domestic production by enabling the purchase of agricultural inputs. 
Unemployment 
The broad unemployment rate among all Gundo Lashu household members, including 
current PWP participants, was 54.2%.207 This may be compared to a rate of 59.7% for the 
rural provincial population, derived from the March 2003 LFS (Stats SA, 2003a), see Table 
10.4. The presence of current PWP employment in the labour market obscures the 
underlying unemployment rate among participating households, treating PWP participants as 
participants rather than members of the unemployed who are engaging in temporary PWP 
employment. If it is assumed that there is no substitution of employment (for example, 
swapping non-PWP employment for PWP employment, and shifting of labour and domestic 
work between household members), the prevailing unemployment rate in the PWP 
households can be ascertained by excluding current PWP employment. In this case, the 
broad unemployment rate among Gundo Lashu household members would be 69.7%. 
                                                            
207 The broad rate of unemployment will be used as the basis of discussion in this section since it is more 
appropriate than the narrow rate in a context where extremely high unemployment may lead even those 
who genuinely want work to become ‘discouraged’ and stop searching, as a rational response to the known 
unavailability of employment, following Kingdon and Knight (2000); and Nattrass (2000). The fact that 
participants are discouraged does not imply that their joblessness is of less policy concern, and hence it is 
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However, it is likely that intra-household labour substitution would take place, which would 
imply a lower unemployment rate, although there are no data to indicate the extent of this.  






























All Male Female     
59.7 51.0 65.8 54.2 65.2 69.7 78.6 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003 and LFS March 2003 (Stats SA, 2003). 
Interestingly, this rate falls to 65% if all PWP participants (past and present) are excluded, 
since unemployment is higher among former PWP participants than non-PWP participants 
(79% as against 65%).208 If it is assumed that there is some degree of substitution of 
employment among PWP participants, the underlying, non-PWP unemployment rate within 
Gundo Lashu households would fall between 54.2% (assuming 100% substitution) and 
69.7%.  
Unemployment among the Zibambele households is set out in Table 10.5. The broad 
unemployment rate among all Zibambele household members was 47%. If PWP workers are 
excluded, the figure is 82%, which is 24% above the rural provincial mean. Since only one 
third of Zibambele (and Gundo Lashu) participants reported employment substitution, in 
terms of giving up some form of alternative remunerated employment in order to participate 
in the programme,209 it may be assumed that the underlying non-PWP unemployment rate 
                                                            
208 This may suggest that the PWP participants themselves comprise a group which is less successful in the 
open labour market than their non-PWP household colleagues, which could be an artefact of their particular 
demographic and individual skills and experience. 
209 Three quarters of participants in both programmes reported giving up some form of alternative activities, 
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prevailing in Zibambele households falls towards the upper end of the range between the 
PWP and non-PWP unemployment rates, i.e. between 47.3% and 81.5%.  
Table 10.5: KwaZulu-Natal Unemployment (Broad) add n 




members (including PWP 
participants) 
Zibambele household 
members (excluding PWP 
participants) 
% unemployed 
Total Male Female Total Total 
57.8 54.3 60.8 47.3 81.5 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003 and LFS March 2003 (Stats SA, 2003). 
In both instances the ‘non-PWP’ unemployment rate is likely to fall between the inclusive 
figure, which takes into account PWP employment, and the exclusive figure, which assumes 
all PWP employment is additional. The actual extent of unemployment, whether it 
approaches the higher or lower bounds, is dependent on the extent to which labour 
substitution is taking place and PWP employment is replacing market-based employment, 
and also the degree of homogeneity between the PWP and non-PWP participant groups in 
terms of characteristics affecting labour market performance. If PWP participants are 
excluded, the unemployment rates are 10% and 24% in excess of the broad provincial 
figures in the Gundo Lashu and Zibambele programmes respectively, suggesting that 
unemployment in both case-study groups may be greater than the provincial norms, 
particularly in the case of the Zibambele households. This would be consistent with the 
expectation that the unemployment rate among PWP households would be greater than 
among non-PWP households because of the likely self-selection of households experiencing 
higher rates into PWPs. However, to the extent that PWP participants were employed prior 
to PWP participation, and are substituting PWP for alternative employment, excluding these 
workers could artificially inflate the estimate of unemployment in participating households in 
the absence of the PWP. Unfortunately, however, with the data available it is not possible to 
assess accurately the extent of employment substitution among PWP workers in terms of 
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10.3 Labour Market Origins of PWP Workers  
In reviewing incidence, it is useful to attempt to gain insights into the labour market origins 
of the PWP workers. Conventional PWP theory argues that PWP workers would be drawn 
primarily from among the unemployed. The PWP Survey data analysis outlined above 
indicates that there may in fact be three potential sources for the case study workers: i) the 
unemployed (or discouraged); ii) those drawn out of alternative employment, in which case 
work substitution is taking place; and iii) non-labour market participants, drawn into the 
labour market by the PWP.  The data indicate significantly different prior labour market 
status patterns in the two programmes. Using a chi-square test to compare the three 
categories of participants in both programmes suggests that the distribution of labour market 
origins of participants in the two programmes is significantly different,210 reflecting both 
programme design and implementation differences. It is important to note however that 
these findings should be treated with caution, as the three states may not necessarily be 
discrete, and a degree of noise is anticipated in relation to each of the three prior labour 
market states.  Each of the three potential sources of PWP participants are discussed below. 
The Unemployed  
As reported above, among former Gundo Lashu workers, 17% were long-term unemployed, 
having not worked for more than two years, and 37% reported never having worked, while 
48% of Zibambele workers were long-term unemployed, and 24% had never worked.   In 
these cases PWP contributed to a net reduction in unemployment.  
Those Drawn out of Alternative Employment 
Where workers were drawn out of alternative employment, work substitution is taking place 
as a result of the PWP, with workers repositioning themselves in the labour market, rather 
than a net reduction in unemployment. This is likely to occur in the case of workers for 
whom employment was remunerated at extremely low levels or was precarious or 
unpredictable. One third of PWP workers reported giving up remunerated employment to 
participate in each of the programmes. Among the Gundo Lashu participants, casual wage 
                                                            
210 A 3x2 test gives χ=6.99 at 0.05 significance level, with df =2 (the critical value of the chi-square statistic 
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labour was the main form of employment given up (reported by 16% of workers), with 13% 
giving up non-farm activities (making goods for sale or providing services) and just 6% 
reporting giving up regular wage employment. Among the Zibambele participants, none 
reported giving up regular employment, 24% reported giving up casual labour employment 
and 14% non-farm activities. The reasons offered in the focus groups for this substitution 
were primarily that the PWP employment represented either i) better wages than their 
previous employment, or ii) an improved quality of work, with greater likelihood of ongoing 
employment and the attendant consumption smoothing potential compared to the sporadic 
employment offered in the market. Even though the Gundo Lashu programme did not offer 
guaranteed ongoing employment contracts, it did offer the potential for multiple month 
employment for some workers, and hence it may have been worth taking even temporary 
employment in the hope that the worker would be one of those able to secure longer term 
employment. It is possible also that the promise of training and construction work 
experience served as an incentive to forgo alternative work, on the basis of anticipated future 
labour market benefits in terms of potential integration into labour market resulting from 
increased skills and experience, although no evidence was found to support this contention.  
It is possible and indeed likely, where household labour availability permitted, that some 
labour substitution was absorbed within the household, by a process of reoptimisation of 
labour allocations, with other household members taking up the activities forgone by the 
PWP participant. In this context, PWP-induced labour substitution might not represent 
employment (or income) forgone at the household level. However, the extent of this intra-
household reallocation of labour is not indicated by the survey data. It is interesting to note 
that PWP households had a lower dependency ratio than the overall population, implying 
that the availability of labour in a household may have been a prerequisite for PWP 
participation, and hence may render such substitution more feasible, due to the presence of 
additional working age members. However, it is possible that this was due to the need for 
participating households to contain non-PWP household members of working age to take 
up the forgone domestic and unpaid labour burden of PWP participants, rather than to take 














From the PWP Survey data, it is not possible to identify with certainty non-participants who 
entered the labour market as a result of the PWP work opportunity. However, 37% of 
Gundo Lashu workers and 24% of Zibambele workers reported having never worked 
before, and it is likely that some of these are non-participants.  
Given that the mean age of those reporting no previous labour market experience in the 
Zibambele group was 44, this may represent workers entering the labour market for the first 
time, rather than unemployed workers (the mean age of those with no labour market 
experience in the non-PWP workers group was 22, which is likely to represent unemployed 
youth rather than non-participants). By contrast, the mean age of the Gundo Lashu workers 
entering the labour market for the first time was lower, at 31, although this could still include 
some non-labour market participants entering the labour market, rather than youth 
unemployed, since the mean age for those who had not previously worked in the Gundo 
Lashu non-PWP worker sample was only 25.  
Conclusions Regarding Prior Labour Market Status 
While data constraints prohibit any robust analysis, they indicate differing patterns in the two 
programmes. Approximately one fifth of Gundo Lashu PWP participants were long-term 
unemployed, two fifths had not previously participated in the labour force, and the same 
number had engaged in labour substitution. By contrast, just less than half the Zibambele 
workers were long-term unemployed, one quarter had not previously participated in the 
labour force and approximately one third had engaged in labour substitution. So, while both 
groups had 30% of workers substituting PWP employment for prior employment (although 
the quality and remuneration of this employment was significantly different, see the 
following chapter), Gundo Lashu households had a significantly lower percentage of long-
term unemployed, and a larger share of young labour market entrants without work 
experience. By contrast, the Zibambele programme seems to have brought significant 
numbers of older women into the labour force. These findings are broadly consistent with 
the differing programme objectives, with Gundo Lashu providing employment for the youth 
unemployed without previous employment experience, and the Zibambele offering support 
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of labour substitution in both programmes is interesting, perhaps indicating the poor quality 
of alternative employment open to participants. Whether such distortion is perceived as 
problematic or a positive artefact of the programme, is contingent on one’s ideological 
stance, but in social protection terms it indicates that the PWP participation is perceived as 
offering greater household benefits, however defined by participants, than alternative 
market-based employment options.  
10.4 Second Round Intra-household Labour Substitution and Employment 
The foregoing analysis and discussion provokes a major question relating to intra-household 
labour effects, recognising that PWP-related labour substitution is not exclusively an 
individual, but rather an intra-household phenomenon. However, there is limited 
information on labour substitution within the PWP Survey, which only examined first round 
labour substitution effects at an individual level, i.e. substitution on the part of the PWP 
participant, and failed to examine secondary and subsequent intra-household substitution 
effects, and the reoptimisation of household labour allocations as a result of PWP 
employment. For this reason, it is difficult to know the extent to which PWP-induced 
employment substitution (both paid and unpaid) was absorbed within the household, or 
whether such substitution represented net losses in terms of total household employment 
activity and as a result, net losses to the household economy. This is an important area for 
future analysis which is not currently addressed in the PWP literature.  
10.5 The Incidence and Impact of Training and Work Experience 
The incidence and impact of programme participation on labour market performance are 
now explored, in terms of whether labour market exposure and training led to improved 
employment performance, as anticipated, and an exploration of whether PWP employment 
stimulated any forms of informal and self employment. It is not possible to draw statistically 
robust conclusions regarding the impact of the training, given the limited data available, but 
the findings do offer insights into the participants perceptions of the training provided, and 
together with reported labour market performance of PWP graduates discussed above, these 
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the training211 are explored. Overall, 38% of Gundo Lashu and 81% of Zibambele 
participants reported that they had received training212. The subjects in which training was 
reported are set out in Table 10.6.  
Table 10.6: Training Received by PWP Workers 
 Gundo Lashu Zibambele
Subject Workers recalling training in specific areas as a % of 
those reporting receiving training 
 n=129 n=336 
Technical road 
maintenance/construction  
27 (n=35) 99 (n=333) 
Supervision 13 (n=17) 15 (n=50) 
Entrepreneurship 74 (n=95) 13 (n=44) 
Life skills 8 (n=10) 3 (n=10) 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
It is noteworthy that the majority of the Gundo Lashu workers reported no training in areas 
of technical skills. It is also interesting that despite the very different percentages reporting 
training in entrepreneurship (74% of Gundo Lashu workers, and 13% of Zibambele 
workers), the reported outcome, in terms of engagement in micro-enterprise, is similarly low, 
in both cases, with only 12-14% of workers reporting increased micro-enterprise activity. 
The impact of training on labour market performance was assessed through a direct question 
in the survey, ‘Has this training enabled the worker to find additional wage employment?’ 
Only 6% of formerly employed Gundo Lashu respondents and 4% of Zibambele 
respondents replied positively, implying that for 95% of PWP workers the training had not 
had an impact on labour market performance. In interpreting these findings it is important 
to note that 63% of the Zibambele workers who answered the question about work-seeking 
                                                            
211 On-the-job and any additional training provided were considered together for the purposes of this 
analysis. 
212 Interestingly, PWP participants were sometimes uncertain as to whether they had received training or 
not, and had poor recall of the content, suggesting that the significance ascribed to this input by the 
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reported looking for work while participating in the programme.  In the light of this, the low 
percentage reporting that the PWP training promoted their labour market performance 
challenges the assumption frequently made in relation to PWPs in South Africa (and 
elsewhere), that PWP participation and related training will ‘increase their [workers’] capacity 
to earn an income once they leave the programme’ (President Mbeki, announcing the launch 
of the EPWP, 11 November 2003). 
The primary explanations given by workers for why the training had not enabled them to 
find employment, were lack of employment opportunities (given as the primary reason by 
61% of Gundo Lashu and 82% of Zibambele respondents) and lack of resources for job 
search (reported by 29% of Gundo Lashu and 7% of Zibambele respondents). The emphasis 
on lack of employment opportunities represents a realistic analysis of their labour market 
prospects on the part of the workers, given the levels of unemployment prevalent in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. The critical issue is that no skills shortage has been identified 
for the genre of skills acquired by workers through participation in construction or 
maintenance-based PWPs; these are not the skills for which a significant unmet demand is 
apparent.213 
Under the SPWP [Special Public Works Programme] Conditions of Good Conduct (South 
Africa, Department of Labour, 2002a and 2002b) a derogation from the minimum wage was 
agreed by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) for EPWP participants 
as quid pro quo for the training benefits each participant would receive (McCord, 2007a). 
Accordingly in the Gundo Lashu programme workers were paid 75% of their regular PWP 
wage while receiving training, on the basis of an imputed value to the participants of the 
training. However, this was questioned by several respondents, who expressed a preference, 
both in the survey and the focus groups, to remain working on the PWP, earning a full wage, 
                                                            
213 The government has identified the key areas of skill shortages in the economy as ‘financial service and 
information and communication technology skills’, which it describes as ‘mid-level skills accessible to 
matriculants and diplomates’ (PCAS, 2003). It is interesting to note that these are not the skills accruing 
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rather than participating in training activity which they did not consider valuable, and 
undergoing what they perceived as a ‘wage deduction’ for doing so.214  
In recognition of the negligible value of limited skills training, ‘life skills’215 training was 
introduced into the Gundo Lashu programme in place of formal skills training, subsequent 
to the survey. While PWP participants did not place a significant value on the training 
provided, it is interesting that, among both groups of workers, the focus group discussions 
revealed that workers themselves had identified the key areas in which they felt training 
would be effective, relating in particular to problems of asymmetry in labour market 
information, expressed as a perception that lack of labour market information and of social 
networks was problematic in terms of accessing employment opportunities216. This suggests 
that PWP participants would value the provision of labour market information as one 
component of a training package. However, this would only serve to reduce frictional 
inefficiencies, rather than increasing the net amount of employment available, unless 
significant self-employment resulted (see discussion below). Workers also highlighted a need 
for information and access to microfinance institutions and the formal banking sector, in 
order to access funds for micro-enterprise, factors which could be addressed through the 
training component of PWP programmes.  
Contracting and Micro-enterprise Development  
Another aspect of the perceived beneficial impact of PWPs on labour market performance is 
that, as a consequence of labour market exposure and skills development, workers may 
become ‘contractors’, entering into market-based relationships with employers, and moving 
up the hierarchy of the labour market, once they have their ‘foot on the employment ladder’ 
                                                            
214 It is interesting to note that the ‘beneficiaries’ of the programme were unable to exercise their consumer 
power in this instance, in terms of (i) choosing training relevant to their own analysis of their labour market 
potential, and (ii) selecting who from within the household would be able to maximise returns from 
training. Several respondents in the survey reported using PWP income to fund training in specific areas 
where they had identified work opportunities; one had paid for a family member to be trained as a security 
guard, another had paid for a son to have driving lessons. 
215 The value of such an intervention is contingent on both the content and quality of the ‘life-skills’ 
training offered, however, the term is not clearly defined either within the two case study programmes or 
the broader EPWP of which they are a part. 
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(Phillips, 2004). In order to explore this assumption, workers were asked whether they had 
aspirations to become contractors. Fifty-eight percent of Gundo Lashu and 72% of 
Zibambele workers stated that they would like to become contractors. However, lack of 
access to finance and lack of technical knowledge were stated as constraints to the realisation 
of this ambition. Given the lack of availability of both capital and skills training in contractor 
development for the workers, their aspirations are unlikely to be met as a result of PWP 
participation alone. It is also interesting to note that between one-third and one-half of 
workers did not aspire to move up the labour hierarchy, but preferred to remain as 
labourers. Both these findings challenge the policy assumption that workplace participation 
will promote the development of small, medium and micro-enterprises in the construction 
sector. 
The spontaneous development of micro-enterprise activity, as a result of increased 
availability of cash at the local level, is another outcome often ascribed to the 
implementation of PWPs. In order to assess the extent of micro-enterprise activity resulting 
from PWP participation, households were asked whether they had used PWP income to set 
up or expand small business enterprises. Some 14% of Gundo Lashu households and 12% 
of Zibambele households responded positively. The income-generating activities initiated 
among Gundo Lashu households were primarily focused on small-scale trading (54%), 
service provision (30%), agricultural production (9%) and household production (7%). 
Among the Zibambele households, small-scale trading was also the most common (50%), 
followed by agricultural production (26%), service provision (12%) and household 
production (10%). Focus group discussion among the Zibambele workers revealed that 
limited markets were a significant constraint to the development of micro-enterprise in their 
areas, but that the main factor preventing the development of micro-enterprise was the lack 
of credit and capital, highlighted by 83% and 87% of respondents respectively, followed by 
lack of business/technical skills, which was seen as the primary constraint by 12% of Gundo 
Lashu and 6% of Zibambele respondents. The limited levels of investment in micro-
enterprise found in the survey are consistent with findings by Devereux, 2000, who argued 
that the poor use incremental income first to satisfy basic consumption needs, then to invest 
in human capital (education and health) and social capital, and only thereafter to invest in 
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only if it is large enough to cover consumption needs. Devereux found that ‘high value 
transfers are associated with higher propensities to invest in agriculture, social capital 
(including in financial assistance to relatives), education and acquisition of productive assets’ 
(ibid: 4), while low value transfers, by contrast, are mainly consumed in the form of food and 
clothing. The survey findings conform with this stepped model of the impact of a wage 
transfer, indicating increased expenditure on basic consumption needs and human and social 
capital, but no significant increase in income-generating activity.  
The focus group discussions indicated that where a microfinance component (group savings 
and micro-enterprise training) had been added to the PWP package, subsequent to the 
implementation of the survey, enthusiasm for micro-enterprise increased significantly, with 
the workers explaining this in terms of the fact that, while they had considered their 
individual savings too small to be of use in terms of developing an enterprise, group-level 
savings would increase the feasibility of the purchase of stock, equipment, etc. While these 
putative group projects have not yet been realised, and so cannot be evaluated, it is clear that 
microfinance inputs have the potential to shift the perceptions of workers, in terms of their 
estimate of the feasibility of investing in viable business ventures. This insight is supported 
by findings from one NGO-implemented component of the MASAF PWP in Malawi 
(ILTPWP), which indicated that inputs in areas such as microfinance, credit, savings, group 
formation, and enterprise development play a critical role in the stimulation of micro-
enterprise, which cannot be achieved through PWP wage transfer alone (UK DFID, 2003a). 
10.6 Participants’ Perceptions of the Constraints to Employment  
In both the Gundo Lashu and Zibambele focus groups, workers stated that the experience 
of working in the PWP, and the skills gained through participation, had not significantly 
enhanced their employment prospects, due primarily to the high rates of unemployment and 
lack of demand for labour with the skills they had gained during participation in the PWP. 
This corroborates the findings outlined above that former PWP workers in Gundo Lashu 
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only 19% of former PWP employees working at the time of the interview, compared with 
17% of Gundo Lashu households members without PWP employment experience.217  
In terms of the impact of PWP income and experience on household-wide employment 
performance more generally (mediated through improved information networks, increased 
resources available for job search, transport, etc., as mooted by Posel et al. (2006)), the data 
do not suggest that the inflow of resources and contacts has had a significant impact. Of the 
Zibambele households, only 4% had household members who had found work since a 
household member joined the PWP, and only 8% of households with former Gundo Lashu 
workers and 6% of households with current Gundo Lashu workers reported that one or 
more family members had found work since a household member had joined the PWP. It is, 
however, difficult to draw conclusions from this data, as it is not clear in either case that this 
employment is a consequence of a household member participating in the programme or the 
additional household income available for job search.  
The classic labour market rigidities articulated by PWP participants as the main constraints 
to successful labour market participation are explored below. These rigidities are critical as 
they illustrate the limitations of a PWP’s potential to promote successful labour market 
participation, or graduation, in the context of chronic unemployment; as well as the fact that 
factors external to the PWP are key in determining its labour market impact. 
                                                            
217 If the broad unemployment rate among former Gundo Lashu workers is taken into consideration, this 
picture becomes increasingly stark, with unemployment rates of 80% among former PWP employees, 
compared with 65% among non-PWP participants, and a mean rate of 60% among the rural Limpopo 
population (see Table 10.4). This represents a rate of unemployment among the former PWP employees 
which is significantly worse than for those who had not participated in the programme, and suggests that, 
contrary to the objectives ascribed to PWP participation in the policy discourse, employment in a PWP may 
not lead to a significantly enhanced subsequent employment performance. It is possible, however that the 
two groups have significantly different labour market characteristics, and hence a direct comparison 
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Reasons for Discouragement 
Among labour market participants who had not worked recently, 75% of Gundo Lashu and 
65% of Zibambele household members reported that the main reason for not looking for 
work was that no jobs were available in their area. This supports the argument for the use of 
the term ‘discouraged unemployed’ for this group, and suggests that their inclusion in the 
unemployment statistics is appropriate (see Kingdon and Knight (2000)). Some 25% and 
15% respectively gave lack of money to pay for transport to look for work as the main 
reason, and, in addition, 12% of the Zibambele group reported having lost hope of finding 
any kind of work.  
Among the Zibambele PWP participants who were not engaged in work-seeking activity, the 
dominant reasons given for not seeking employment, were the lack of employment 
opportunities in the area, ‘family considerations/child care’, and ‘ill-health/disability’ 
reported by 28%, 24% and 22% of respondents respectively.  These findings suggest that 
some Zibambele participants may not have the mobility to engage in work-seeking activity 
away from home, and that domestic responsibilities limit their ability to participate in the 
labour market.  They also indicate that the Zibambele programme may have included those 
with physical infirmities which could preclude conventional labour market participation. 
These health and domestic care constraints on labour market participation may have 
implications for the likelihood of the progression of PWP participants to employment in the 
open labour market. It may be that those targeted for PWP participation on the basis of their 
poverty face health, domestic responsibility or labour constraints which limit their potential 
participation in the labour market, particularly if employment were not available in the 
immediate vicinity 
Mobility and Domestic Responsibilities.  
The issue of labour mobility was explored further in the survey, with the respondents being 
asked if they sometimes travelled away from home and stayed away from the household to 
look for employment. Fifty four percent of unemployed Gundo Lashu household members 
reported that they sometimes did so, compared with only 36% of Zibambele household 
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employment. It is likely that this low mobility among Zibambele participants is primarily a  
consequence of their PWP employment obligations, but given the flexibility offered within 
the Zibambele programme (in terms of worker substitution) and participants’ reported desire 
to seek additional employment, gender could also be a factor, inasmuch is it implies a set of 
social and domestic constraints to mobility (93% of the Zibambele participants are female). 
Todes, quoted in Posel and Casale (2003:466), noted the impact of gender on migration in 
her study of migration in Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal: 
 
‘It was rare for women to experience the freedom of movement that men did. 
Women’s mobility varied according to their position in the household. Married 
women could not move at will - their husband’s power in this regard was clearly 
apparent. Unmarried women were freer to move, but this depended on their position 
and conditions within the household. They were frequently constrained by their roles 
as care-givers - responsibility for children, the sick and disabled, and for old parents.’ 
(2001:17-18) 
In both sets of households a higher percentage of men than women reported travelling in 
search of work, confirming the findings of Todes (2001) and Posel et al. (2004).218 For both 
sexes, travelling in search of work was significantly less frequent among the Zibambele 
unemployed than the Gundo Lashu, perhaps due to the greater inaccessibility of some 
remote rural Zibambele programme areas, compared with the Gundo Lashu area. 
When asked why they did not travel in search of work, lack of money for job search 
expenses and lack of work availability again were the dominant responses among the 
unemployed in both Gundo Lashu and Zibambele samples. The emphasis given to lack of 
capital for job search is interesting, and it may be that grant or PWP wage income could 
potentially help to relieve this constraint (see, for example, Samson (2002) and Posel, 
Fairburn and Lund (2004), who argue that the receipt of social grant contributes to increases 
in employment search activities). However, the fact that this constraint was identified in 
households already receiving the PWP wage, indicates that the wage was not sufficient to 
resolve this problem within the households in these instances.  
                                                            
218 Among the Gundo Lashu unemployed, 59% of men travelled in search of employment compared with 
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Among Zibambele PWP participants themselves, however, the pattern differs, with 
household responsibilities being the main constraint to travelling in search of employment 
for 63% of women, and 43% of men. Lack of work availability was the main reason given by 
22% and 15% of male and female Zibambele participants respectively, and lack of funds for 
job search 17% and 15% respectively. These responses again indicate that Zibambele 
participants may be combining domestic responsibilities with the PWP employment, in a 
way which would be impossible if they were employed in the mainstream labour market. 
Appreciation of the availability of Zibambele employment in the participants’ immediate 
vicinity was also highlighted in the focus group discussions, and comparisons were made 
with alternative and less attractive employment opportunities, such as agricultural labour on 
sugar cane plantations, which might be some distance from the home, and was therefore not 
accessible to women with infirmities or domestic responsibilities. This consideration was a 
deliberate component of the Zibambele programme design, which aimed to provide work 
for those in areas where other work might be inaccessible and which would require no 
participant to travel more than two kilometres to her work station.219  
In both cases, financial constraints were the main factor inhibiting job search activity away 
from the home. If this is considered in relation to the perceived (and real) lack of 
employment availability, and the recognition that lack of social networks in urban areas limit 
both access to information about job availability and also help from ‘contacts’ who might 
facilitate access to jobs, a factor which emerged from the focus group discussions, it is clear 
that, even with the cash injection of the PWP wage, job search activity with an uncertain 
outcome was not seen as a rational use of scarce financial resources in the PWP households. 
This realistic assessment of labour demand, and of the critical role of social networks in 
securing employment, corresponds to findings by Nattrass (2000), and suggests that a 
combination of high levels of unemployment, limited capital and poor access to labour 
market information serve to influence labour market choices and constrain job search 
activity.  
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10.7 Conclusion  
While it is not possible to identify the impact of the programme in terms of unemployment 
among former PWP workers, due to the lack of baseline data on their prior employment or 
labour force participation status, the extremely high unemployment level prevailing among 
former PWP workers challenges the assumption that PWP participation has a significant 
beneficial impact in terms of subsequent employment performance, in the short to medium 
term.220  
The Department of Public Works characterises the post-PWP employment options as 
‘graduating to employment under normal conditions’ and a choice between ‘moving to a new 
employer, further education, better equipped job seeking, remaining with the same employer 
under normal employment conditions, or self-employment’ (Phillips, 2004). The evidence 
from the survey suggests that workers may rather graduate to ‘unemployment’ under normal 
conditions, returning back to the status quo ante in terms of their labour market performance. 
The survey findings indicate that unemployment among former Gundo Lashu workers is 
higher than among household members without PWP experience. The training received by 
workers appears to have had little impact on employment, largely due to the fact that there is 
limited demand for semi-skilled construction workers in the programme areas. The majority 
of workers aspire to move up the labour market hierarchy to develop SMMEs, but recognise 
that lack of skills and access to capital renders this unlikely. Equally, micro-enterprise activity 
by workers using wage income as capital is also limited, again largely due to capital 
constraints and the lack of complementary social development and microfinance inputs. The 
Zibambele programme appears unlikely to have created significant local secondary 
employment, owing to the fact that the workers do not form a concentrated local market, 
and that the bulk of their wage expenditure is made in the local town as a consequence of 
the payment modalities of the programme. The Gundo Lashu programme was found to 
                                                            
220 It should be noted that this finding implies poor labour market performance in the short to medium term, 
and that frictional unemployment may account for part of this high rate. The longer-term employment 
implications of PWP employment cannot be inferred from this study, as none of the former PWP 
employees interviewed had been unemployed for longer than nine months. This finding indicates the 
importance of medium to long-term tracking of the labour market performance of former PWP workers in 
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create local demand, both in terms of local food purchasing, and also in terms of creating an 
additional workplace consumer demand. However, the duration of these benefits was limited 
to the period of employment. In neither case was significant local economic development 
evident as a consequence of the wage transfer. 
The fact that the survey gave no evidence of improved labour market performance as a 
consequence of PWP labour market experience or training is not surprising, given the 
elevated levels of rural unemployment and the limited demand for low- and semi-skilled 
workers. Likewise, skills training was not seen as a contributor to improved labour market 
performance by workers. It is not clear that either on-the-job experience or formal training 
would enable the transfer of sufficient skills to impact significantly on labour market 
performance, particularly given the limited time investment allocated to training in both 
programmes, and the limited duration of employment in the Gundo Lashu programme.  
The labour market situation facing PWP graduates, revealed by the empirical and qualitative 
findings set out in this chapter, challenges the argument that participation in the EPWP is a 
‘stepping stone’ to employment in the open labour market (Phillips, 2004). A combination of 
low demand for labour in programme areas, the mobility constraints implied by household 
obligations, and limited resources for job search, together suggest that the anticipated exit 
and graduation scenario for former PWP participants may not be realised. While 
unemployment rates remain high and the outcome of job search uncertain, the rational 
response may be to conserve scarce financial resources for immediate priority needs, and 
possibly continue to engage in ad hoc local employment and home production activities, 
rather than risking them on investment in job search, particularly when the inhibiting effect 
of lack of social contacts is well understood. In the focus group discussions, participants in 
Limpopo also reported that the range of employment for which they might migrate was 
shrinking as a consequence of the introduction of the minimum wage for domestic 
participants221. Interestingly, a similar shrinkage of employment in the agricultural sector, 
which was also subject to the introduction of minimum wage legislation at the same time, 
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was not noted, although an increase in the casualisation of employment, in order to avoid 
the wage legislation, was noted.222  
These findings confirm the argument put forward by Bhorat (2001), highlighting the critical 
importance of considering labour mobility and the heterogeneity of the labour market 
characteristics of the unemployed when designing labour market interventions. This is 
particularly true in the case of PWPs, and the foregoing analysis has indicated that the 
expectation that PWP employment will lead to enhanced labour market engagement after 
PWP graduation has been shown to be overly optimistic, as PWP participation does not 
significantly address the primary constraints to successful job search: lack of employment 
opportunities, lack of skills to match the jobs that are available, lack of funds for job search, 




222 The Gundo Lashu focus groups reported a decrease in contract based agricultural employment by large 














Having reviewed the incidence of the two case study PWPs and their labour market impacts 
at an individual level in the previous two chapters, the PWP Survey analysis is concluded in 
this chapter which examines the social protection impact of the programmes. The social 
protection function of each programme is examined in detail in terms of its impact on a 
range of poverty indicators, focusing initially on an exploration of the function of the PWP 
wage in terms of household income poverty, and then looking at what this means at a 
household level, as indicated by a range of non-income dimensions of poverty, in order to 
assess the relative social protection performance of the two different types of programmes in 
the context of chronic poverty. 
11.1 Structure of the Chapter 
The impact of the PWP wage on income poverty is examined by reviewing the PWP wage 
transfer in relation to income forgone, and calculating the net value of the PWP wage, which 
represents the financial benefit accruing to households from PWP participation. This is 
reviewed in the light of total household income which is calculated on the basis of detailed 
information on a range of household income sources in the survey. The contribution of the 
net PWP wage is discussed in relation to total household income and a household 
subsistence poverty line. Poverty Incidence Curves are calculated for both programmes to 
estimate and illustrate the income impact of programme participation, following Ravallion 
(2003).  
After this the impact of PWP participation is discussed in detail in terms of a range of non-
monetary poverty indicators: i) food consumption, ii) ownership of material and financial 
assets, iii) human capital in terms of nutrition and access to education, iv) the psychosocial 
benefits, and v) participants’ own assessments of the medium-term welfare impact of 
programme participation. The discussion of consumption explores the primary uses of the 
PWP wage, in relation to material and financial asset ownership, and the human capital 
discussion examines changes in investment in nutrition and education as a consequence of 
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participation are briefly reviewed, highlighting the role of PWP income in facilitating the 
observance of social norms and customs. In conclusion an appraisal is made of the overall 
social protection impact of the two programmes and the key policy implications arising. 
11.2 The Income Poverty Impact of the Case Study PWPs 
The PWP wage 
In order to assess the income impact of the PWP intervention, the wage derived from PWP 
participation is first explored. The distribution of wages in both programmes is illustrated in 
Figure 11.1.  
Figure 11.1: Box Plot of Distribution of Monthly PWP Wages (Rands) 
  
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003 
The mean monthly PWP wage for current Gundo Lashu workers was R579, with a wide 
distribution of values (s.d. 111) made possible by the task-based payment modality, under 
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some working 24 days per month, and others working for shorter periods.223 The modal 
wage reported was R600, which was reported by 67% of the sample. The mean monthly 
PWP wage for Zibambele workers was R329, with a significantly smaller range (s.d. 22), 
reflecting the uniform monthly contract. The small variation in the reported Zibambele wage 
may be due to the net amount available once bank fees of between R15 and R25 have been 
deducted, since all employees were paid a uniform R334 per month.224 
In order to consider the function of the PWP wage, it is useful first to compare it to the 
wage income of non-PWP workers, see Table 11.1.  The total income of PWP participants 
earning additional income by engaging in non-PWP employment at the same time as 
participating in the PWP is also included in the table.   
Table 11.1: Monthly Wage Income for PWP and Non-PWP Workers (Rands) 
  Mean 
PWP 
wage 





























327      
(n=99) 
40-2000 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003 
Notes: * 7% of Gundo Lashu workers reported additional wage income
 ** 28% of Zibambele workers reported additional wage income
Since Gundo Lashu employment was ‘full-time’225 and physically demanding, participation in 
the programme left little time for additional income-generating activity. This is reflected in 
the fact that only 7% of current Gundo Lashu workers reported additional wage income 
                                                            
223 The Gundo Lashu programme was designed with the objective of each worker completing one task per 
day in order to attain the daily work rate (R30). In some cases, wage records suggest that workers were able 
to complete more than one task per day, and hence earn in excess of R30 per day. 
224 Zibambele wages are paid electronically through the formal banking network in order to reduce 
opportunities for theft and corruption; the loss of between 4% and 7% of the Zibambele wage on bank 
charges represents a significant cost to PWP workers. 
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from other sources.226 For these workers, the mean total income from all employment was 
R886, which was 53% above the mean Gundo Lashu wage. A higher percentage, 28%, of 
Zibambele workers reported additional income reflecting the part-time nature of Zibambele 
employment. For these workers, the mean monthly wage income was R492; 49% higher than 
the mean PWP wage. 
In the Gundo Lashu programme, workers reliant on the PWP wage alone had a significantly 
lower wage income than non-PWP workers, while in Zibambele, the wage income was 
similar for both PWP and non-PWP workers. PWP workers who had additional wage 
income reported higher total wage income than non-PWP workers by a margin of 50% in 
the Gundo Lashu programme, and 30% in the Zibambele programme. 
Figure 11.2 illustrates the distribution of non-PWP worker income in the two programmes. 
The distribution of incomes in the Gundo Lashu programme is more widely spread, with a 
mean which is twice that of the Zibambele programme (R674 compared to R327), indicating 
that the Zibambele group is more homogenous with significantly lower wage incomes. This 
is consistent with the incidence findings in chapter nine, suggesting that the Zibambele 
programme may be more focused on a poorer population subgroup than the Gundo Lashu 
programme.  
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Figure 11.2: Distribution and Means of Non-PWP Worker Wage Income (Rands) 
 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003. 
Total Household Wage Income  
For households with current Gundo Lashu workers, the mean total monthly household 
wage income was R856 (s.d. 591). Thirty-nine percent of former Gundo Lashu households 
reported a wage income,227 with a mean wage income of R787, ranging from R100 to R2,640. 
It is interesting to note that the household wage income of households with current Gundo 
Lashu employment is only 8% higher than for the former Gundo Lashu households 
reporting wage income. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, for those households with access to 
work, the total monthly wage income may not be significantly altered by PWP participation, 
possibly implying a more significant degree of labour substitution than was captured 
elsewhere in the survey. The mean total wage income for Zibambele households, including 
the PWP wage, is R436 (s.d. 249). 
                                                            
227 It is assumed that these households are dependent on non-wage income in the form of remittances, 
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The contribution of PWP income as a percentage of the total household wage is shown in 
Figure 11.3. 




















Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003. 
The PWP wage represented 71% of total household wage income in Zibambele households, 
and 68% in Gundo Lashu households. It may be instructive to make an adjustment to 
compensate for the anticipated under-reporting of wage income in household surveys in 
order not to overestimate the value of the PWP wage as a percentage of total wage income 
(see discussion in Deaton (2003)). There is no formal estimate of the level of income under-
reporting in South Africa, but drawing from the 1996 census and the 2000 Income and 
Expenditure Survey, Simkins has proposed that the actual income may be approximated by 
inflating reported income by a factor of 1.6228. If this inflator is adopted for the non-PWP 
wages only, the PWP wage forms 43% and 58% of the total wage income for the Gundo 
Lashu and Zibambele programmes respectively, still a highly significant proportion of overall 
wage income. 
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Income Forgone  
In order to assess the wage impact of participation in a PWP in the context of the dynamic 
processes of labour substitution which occur at household level in response to PWP 
employment, it is necessary to take into account wages forgone (Van de Walle, op cit). This 
consideration has been omitted from many previous evaluations of the impact of PWP (see 
discussion in Devereux and Solomon (2006), and chapter four of this thesis). This omission 
warrants serious criticism of the literature of this genre of social protection interventions. 
Wages forgone represent a directly measurable private opportunity cost for programme 
participation,229 which is particularly relevant when considering the net labour market and 
income impacts of PWPs as a component of social protection.230  
Ideally, the pre-PWP household wage income should be reviewed in order to calculate 
income forgone. In the absence of a baseline study, this information has to be inferred from 
the recall data included in the survey. Such data are not ideal as i) they are subject to recall 
error and ii) they do not allow the complexity of intra-household labour shifts arising from 
PWP employment to be modelled. Notwithstanding these limitations, this process is 
attempted, and critically discussed below. 
An important caveat to the forthcoming analysis is the fact that it is possible that the degree 
of labour market distortion in the form of the substitution of one form of employment for 
another, may be greater than indicated by the survey findings, as many respondents might 
not consider ‘piece work’ or casual work to be ‘work’ and worthy of reporting (as argued by 
Adato et al. (2004)). Also, the findings could potentially be biased by a concern among 
respondents that admitting to prior work participation might lead to exclusion from future 
PWP employment. Focus group work confirmed that these factors were likely to result in 
the under-reporting of work forgone. Given this potential bias, the estimates in this chapter 
                                                            
229 As discussed in chapter five it is important to note that income forgone is not the only private 
opportunity cost of programme participation, (see for example discussion of the variety of informal rents 
paid in order to participate in the MEGS in India, Pellisery (2008), and Sharp et al. (2006)) but it is the 
principal cost, and one which is most readily measurable through survey analysis. 
230 Datt and Ravallion (1994) also suggest the possibility of examining utility forgone, assessed in terms of 
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are at the upper limits of the net financial value of PWP employment, representing the 
maximum possible benefit, and as a result the most optimistic scenario of the net financial 
impact of the programme.  
In addition the question of household level PWP-induced labour substitution and 
reoptimisation raised in the previous chapter has a bearing on the accuracy of the analysis of 
income forgone in this chapter. Given the limitations of the data available, it is only possible 
to examine income forgone at an individual level, and so this chapter does not take account 
of whether the activities forgone are adopted by other household members, which would 
mean that income forgone did not represent a net income loss to the household, but only to 
the PWP participant. This analytical gap relating to the relationship between household level 
labour availability, intra-household labour substitution and the likely net gains from PWP 
participation is indicative of a broader research lacuna in this area. 
Labour Market Substitution 
The number of PWP participants reporting reducing or giving up alternative activities in 
order to participate in the PWP programme was high, with 81% of all Gundo Lashu and 
72% of Zibambele workers reporting giving up some form of work.231 It is interesting to 
review the kind of work given up, both paid and unpaid, in order to gain insights into the 
nature of the changes in household labour allocations taking place. The results are set out in 
Table 11.2. 
                                                            
231 The response rate to the question regarding ‘work given up’ was 78% among Gundo Lashu workers, and 
88% among Zibambele workers. This includes unpaid domestic work. Not all those who reported reduced 
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Table 11.2: Categories of Work Forgone 
 Gundo Lashu (n=275) Zibambele (n=299) 
 % of workers answering yes to each category 
Regular wage employment 5.8 (n=16) 0 (n=0) 
Casual wage labour 15.9 (n=44) 24.0 (n=72) 
Subsistence labour 10.0 (n=28) 21.0 (n=63) 
Non-farm activity 12.8 (n=35) 13.8 (n=41) 
Domestic activity 34.6 (n=95) 25.1 (n=75) 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003. 
Note: Numbers do not add up to 100% as categories were not exclusive. 
Chi-square tests indicate that there was a significant difference in the work forgone between 
the two groups in every category, with the exception of except non-farm activity.232  Among 
Gundo Lashu workers reporting having given up alternative work, one-third reported giving 
up domestic activity, compared with between 10% and 16% reporting giving up casual wage 
labour, non-farm activity and subsistence and only 6% giving up regular wage employment. 
The pattern was different for the Zibambele workers, for whom domestic and casual wage 
labour and subsistence labour were the dominant categories of work forgone (between 21% 
and 25%), with no workers reporting giving up regular wage employment in favour of PWP 
participation. The relatively low total monthly remuneration for Zibambele employment 
would not compensate for the loss of regular wage employment, and it is unlikely that if a 
Zibambele worker had had regular wage employment, this would have been given up for 
Zibambele employment.233  
Among Gundo Lashu workers only a small percentage of either sex reported giving up 
regular wage labour, reflecting the limited access to regular wage employment in the area. 
For men the most frequent kind of work forgone was casual wage labour, with 27% of those 
                                                            
232 For casual wage labour χ=5.80, at significance level 0.05, df=1, for subsistence labour χ=12.73, for non-
farm activity χ=0.12, and for domestic activity χ=6.15. 
233 It is also unlikely that a worker with such employment would have been selected by the community for 
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who gave up work reporting this as an activity forgone, while only 6% of women reported 
work forgone in this area. For women, the most frequent area of work forgone was non-
remunerated domestic work, which 50% mentioned, compared with only 17% of men. The 
second most important category for women was non-farm income-generating activity, which 
was given up by 17% of women, compared with only 8% of men.  Chi-square tests indicate a 
significantly gendered difference in work forgone by Gundo Lashu workers in the categories 
of casual wage labour, engagement in non-farm activities and domestic work.234  This is likely 
to reflect the gendered allocation of labour within the households of participating workers. A 
statistical analysis of the gendered division of type of work given up is not possible in the 
case of the Zibambele workers, owing to the small number of males participating in the 
programme (7%). 
The survey findings suggest that significant labour market substitution occurred as a 
consequence of the introduction of the PWP in both groups. In the focus group discussions, 
participants stated that many Gundo Lashu workers had worked on an informal basis 
immediately prior to participation in the programme, confirming the survey findings. Focus 
group discussion indicated that this substitution is related to the extremely low wage levels 
prevailing in the area, in both the local informal sector and the informalised component of 
the agricultural sector,235 and the relative ease with which workers can move in and out of 
low-paid informal sector work.  
Among the Zibambele PWP workers, 31% reported having given up alternative paid work 
activities (regular or casual labour or non-farm activities, defined in the survey as ‘things to 
sell, selling things, providing services, etc.’), compared to 36% of the Gundo Lashu workers, 
a difference which is not statistically significant.236  The similarity between the Gundo Lashu 
and Zibambele workers in terms of the percentage of workers reporting substitution is 
                                                            
234 χ=25.00, χ=6.22 and χ=37.65 respectively, at the 0.05 significance leve, with df=1. 
235 The introduction of the minimum wage in agriculture was perceived as having little impact on the highly 
casualised lower end of the agricultural sector, in which workers are recruited and paid daily on a task 
basis, with no employment registration or documentation of their employment. Wages in this sector were 
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surprising, given the differential in labour market characteristics of the two groups, although 
the amount of reported income forgone is significantly different, at R380 and R158 
respectively.237 Since Zibambele employment is part-time and Gundo Lashu employment is 
full-time, it would have been predicted that a larger amount of work would be forgone 
among the Gundo Lashu workers, who would find it harder to maintain concurrent 
alternative employment. One explanation for the similarity in reported work forgone may be 
the more limited work opportunities available to Zibambele workers, which would mean that 
there were fewer work opportunities for them to forgo. This explanation was implied in the 
focus group discussions which revealed extremely limited employment opportunities in both 
the formal and informal sectors for Zibambele workers, particularly in areas where access to 
agricultural employment or raw materials for domestic production (materials such as grass 
and clay) was limited. Only informal short-term employment, frequently paid in-kind, was 
available within many Zibambele communities, and access to wage labour was extremely 
limited and ad hoc, confirming Muller’s characterisation of employment in the South African 
informal sector as ‘survivalist, offering poor job security and yielding low returns’ (Muller, 
2003:1). In this context, security of employment was perceived as the core benefit of 
participation in Zibambele. Workers argued that they would give up or refuse higher paid 
temporary employment in favour of PWP employment, if engaging in such temporary work 
entailed giving up the security offered by PWP participation.238  
Where Income Forgone Exceeds the PWP Wage  
For a small proportion of the workers the reported value for income forgone was greater 
than the value of the PWP wage (2.7% of Gundo Lashu workers, and 1.4% of Zibambele 
workers239). There is a need to look at the rationale for this behaviour separately from that of 
the workers for whom PWP participation represented a net gain in income. While the 
number of workers reporting this is low, it may indicate a preference for PWP work which 
was perceived as higher quality work than the work forgone. The focus group discussions in 
                                                            
237 Two-sample t-test, df =158, t=7.98, p = 0.000, using current Gundo Lashu reported income forgone. 
238 Focus group discussions, Eshowe and Mapumulo, KwaZulu-Natal, February 2004. 
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both case studies revealed that the work available in the area tended to be sporadic and 
irregular, varying in terms of availability and duration of employment, as well as 
remuneration and certainty of being paid for work performed.240 For these reasons, forgoing 
uncertain, but sometimes higher paid, work in favour of lower paid employment of 
potentially several weeks, months, or, in the case of the Zibambele programme, ongoing 
duration was a rational deployment of labour.241 This issue is consistent with the ‘quality of 
employment’ argument outlined above, and focus group discussions suggested that the 
incidence of income forgone exceeding PWP income may be more widespread in reality than 
was captured in the survey, since a high premium was placed on the value of extended or 
permanent employment over higher wages for a temporary period. 
The Quality of Work 
The workers argued that their labour market decisions were not driven exclusively by the 
goal of maximising the current wage, thereby challenging the assumption that labour 
behaviour is primarily a function of the wage rate, but also by consideration of the security 
of their income stream over time, and the quality of the employment. The fact that quality 
and duration of employment play such a key role in informing labour behaviour, offers a 
critical insight into the household labour dynamics informing PWP participation. In the 
focus group discussions, workers highlighted the high value they attributed to the quality of 
the employment, in terms of the stability of the income flows offered, over income. This was 
particularly the case among the Zibambele workers who defined the attributes they valued in 
the PWP employment as i) the regular wage, ii) a stable and predictable wage level, iii) the 
permanent nature of employment provided, iv), the flexibility of working hours (enabling 
PWP participation to be combined with other household responsibilities or work 
opportunities, thereby allowing the labour-constrained household which might not be able 
to participate in full-time employment, or employment with set hours of participation, to 
                                                            
240 The difficulty in ensuring payment for informal work carried out within the community was raised as a 
concern among some of the PWP workers. 
241 Since this response was not anticipated in the survey design, the issue was not explored further in the 
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benefit), and v) the acceptance of labour substitution from within the household . This latter 
factor is particularly important as it sanctions the reallocation of the PWP job within the 
household in the case of sickness or death on the part of the nominated worker, reinforcing 
the stability of the benefit even at times of household stress. This concession also enables 
PWP workers to take up occasional full time temporary work outside the PWP, if the 
opportunity arises, without sacrificing the security offered by PWP participation.242  These 
unusual design elements mean that the programme maximised the potential for participation 
by labour-constrained households, and enabled poor households to optimise their wage 
income through participation in locally available transient employment opportunities 
through intra-household labour reallocation. Recognising this, workers were keen to 
maintain their employment in the scheme rather than engage in alternative, less-secure 
employment with higher remuneration.  
These findings are consistent with the arguments of Devereux (2000) and Dev (1995), that 
predictability of income flows may be more important than the net amount of the transfer, 
with a stable income flow enabling improved household-level financial planning 
(consumption smoothing through saving, borrowing, etc.), which is denied to poor 
households for whom income is erratic (as described by Adato et al. (2004)). Drawing on 
experience from the MEGS, Dev argued that it is the stabilisation effect rather than the 
immediate transfer which has the most significant impact on sustained poverty reduction, 
stating that ‘reducing fluctuations in income can be as important to the poor as raising 
average incomes’ and that ‘reduction in income fluctuations can prevent acute distress to the 
poor and preclude the need for costly forms of adjustment, such as selling productive assets’ 
(Dev, 1995:126, 136). He went on to assert that ‘even if the increase in income is not very 
large compared with the aggregate need, the existence of any form of income or 
employment insurance could be quite significant’. The implication of this argument is that 
the insurance function of a PWP is critical in terms of promoting a sustained social 
protection outcome. However, a PWP can only provide this insurance function if it can 
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guarantee employment on a sustained basis to all who seek it, in the form of a universal type 
B programme. This represents a significant challenge in countries facing the fiscal, 
administrative and technical constraints which characterise most MIC and LICs243.  
The findings highlight the critical importance of the quality of PWP employment, and the 
fact that this in itself has a value to programme participants, and influences their labour 
market behaviour, independently of the monetary value of programme participation. It is 
important that these factors are taken into account in the PWP debate in order to inform 
appropriate programme selection and design.   
The Value of Income Forgone 
The actual values of income forgone are reviewed below as the first step in assessing the net 
value of the PWP wage. Among the Gundo Lashu sample, the value of income forgone was 
significantly different between current and former workers,244 and the mean reported value 
of income forgone was R380 for current (n=45), and R289 for former workers (n=39) (s.d. 
240 in both cases).  This represents 66% and 50% of reported PWP income respectively. 
The figure for those previously employed is likely to be less accurate due to poor recall. 
Among current workers the figures are R453 (s.d.265) for men, and R311 (s.d.198) for 
women. In the Zibambele programme, the mean value of income forgone was R157 (n=115, 
s.d. 113), which represents 48% of reported PWP income, with figures of R123 (s.d.68) for 
men, and R158 (s.d.115) for women. The distribution of income forgone in the two 
programmes is illustrated in Figure 11.4. 
If instances where the value income forgone exceeds the value of the PWP wage are 
excluded from the analysis, the value of current Gundo Lashu income forgone falls 
                                                            
243 The problematic nature of PWP as a mass social protection instrument is explained by Barr, who asserts 
that ‘Private insurance requires, first, that the probability of the insured event for any individual is 
independent of that for anyone else. This condition is necessary because insurance depends on the existence 
in a given period of a predicable number of winners and losers. If, in the extreme, individual probabilities 
are completely linked, then if one person suffers a loss so does everyone else. Thus actuarial insurance can 
cope with individual shocks but not with common or systemic shock’ (Barr, 1998:114).  
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significantly from R380 to R284 (s.d.141) and Zibambele income forgone falls from R157 to 
R140 (s.d.75).  
 













Current Gundo Lashu Zibambele
 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
There is a significant gender difference in the mean monthly value of income forgone in 
both programmes.245 Among current male Gundo Lashu for whom PWP income exceeded 
income forgone, the mean monthly value of employment forgone was R326 (s.d. 155), while 
for female workers the figure was significantly lower at R250 (s.d.121), 77% of the male 
                                                            
245 It is interesting to note that 27% of the male sample had reported income forgone which was greater 
than PWP wage in this instance, compared to only 13% of the female sample, although the sample sizes are 
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value. Among male Zibambele workers the value was R145 (s.d.89)246 while for female 
workers the corresponding figure was R140 (s.d.74), 97% of the male figure.  
Net PWP Income Value 
In the light of the reported income forgone discussed above, estimates can be made of the 
net income gain to households from PWP participation by subtracting income forgone from 
the reported PWP wage. From this, a net financial benefit ratio can be derived (McCord, 2003), 
which indicates the percentage of the value of the gross PWP wage transfer which 
constitutes additional household income247. This ratio is calculated for each of the 
programmes below. 
The mean net income gain from participation in the PWP for current Gundo Lashu workers 
reporting having given up work, and for whom income forgone did not exceed the PWP 
wage, was R292 (s.d.136, n=32), 50% of the mean PWP wage of R579, implying a mean net 
financial benefit ratio (NFBR) for current Gundo Lashu workers of 0.50.248 Gross and net 
monthly PWP income are illustrated in Figure 11.5 below.  
Calculated by gender, the mean net income gain for men was R242, and for women R330, 
resulting in a NFBR of 0.42 for men and 0.57 for women, suggesting that female participants 
may have benefited more in direct financial terms from participation in the programme, 
largely due to the lower values of income forgone. It is important to treat this finding with 
caution, however, because of the small numbers of data points (n=14 for men and n=18 for 
women).  
                                                            
246 It should be noted that n=8 for this group, with men constituting only 7% of the total Zibambele 
workforce.  
247 This ratio is calculated on the basis of the simplifying assumption that intra-household labour 
reallocation did not take place, such that another household member took up the activities forgone. This 
simplifying assumption has been adopted throughout this chapter due to the lack of data on intra-household 
labour reallocations. It should, however, be noted that this caveat applies to all discussion of income 
forgone and total household income in the chapter, and could potentially lead to an understatement of the 
net PWP income impact, if significant levels of intra-household reoptimisation of labour allocation were 
taking place. 
248 The household-level processes resulting in levels of income forgone which exceed PWP income are not 














Figure 11.5: Gross PWP Income for Current Gundo Lashu Workers and Net PWP 













Gross PWP Income Net PWP Income
 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
Note: * n=45 
A similar process was followed to calculate the mean net income gain and NFBR from 
participation in the PWP for the Zibambele participants. On this basis, the gross income 
gain from PWP participation was R330 compared to a mean net income gain of R190 
(s.d.80, n=108), indicating a NFBR of 0.58. The mean net monthly income gain for men was 
R199, and for women R190, resulting in NFBR of 0.60 for men and 0.58 for women, 
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Figure 11.6: Gross PWP Income for Zibambele Workers and Net PWP Income for 










Gross PWP Income Net PWP Income
 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
Note: *n=108 
On the basis of reported employment forgone, the Gundo Lashu net financial benefit ratio 
is 0.50, and the Zibambele 0.58, implying a slightly greater net income gain in the Zibambele 
programme. However, these ratios are only meaningful for those workers reporting income 
forgone. In order to calculate the programme-wide net financial benefit ratio, the fact that 
only one third of programme participants reported income forgone needs to be taken into 
account (28% of Zibambele and 33% of Gundo Lashu workers reported forgoing 
employment with monetary remuneration, and gave values). For the workers who reported 
no income forgone, the net income gain was the full amount of the transfer, and the net 
financial benefit ratio would be unity; this would apply in the case of 89 of the current 
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Combining the analysis for those reporting income forgone, and those not reporting it 
would result in an overall programme wide mean net income benefit of R507 (compared to 
from R579 gross benefit) in the case of current Gundo Lashu workers, with a net financial 
benefit ratio of 0.88. In the case of the Zibambele programme this would result in a mean 
net income benefit of R294 for each worker (compared to a R330 gross benefit), 
representing a net financial benefit ratio of 0.89. However, as discussed above, the degree of 
labour market substitution taking place may be greater than the figures reported in the 
survey imply, and hence these calculations may underestimate the extent of income forgone, 
exaggerating the NFBR of these projects. Hence the figures of 0.88 and 0.89 can be taken to 
represent a best case scenario or upper limit of the actual net financial benefit ratios 
prevailing in the two programmes respectively, while the pattern of income forgone reported 
by one third of the workers can be used to set lower limits of 0.50 and 0.58 respectively. 
From this analysis it can be concluded that the net benefit ratio falls between 0.50 and 0.88 
for the Gundo Lashu programme, and between 0.58 and 0.89 for the Zibambele 
programme. If however, significant intra-household labour reallocation was taking place to 
accommodate work forgone by the PWP participant, the extent of income forgone at a 
household level would be lower than the NFBR range calculated above would suggest  
11.3 Total Household Income  
Having examined the net wage impact of PWP participation, it is now necessary to review 
this in the context of total household income. In addition to employment-derived income, 
state and private transfers play a critical role in household welfare. These include state grants, 
transfers and social insurance, and a range of community or family-based transfers such as 
remittances, loans and gifts within the community (vertical transfers), as well as transfers 
marking events such as marriage or the birth of a child. These additional forms of household 
income are explored below. 
State Social Grants and Insurance 
In order to capture the value of state transfers received in the PWP households, each 
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members. In this chapter the aggregate value of state grants and insurances is calculated as 
one component of total household income. 
The transfers accruing to the largest number of household members were the child support 
grant and state old-age pension. All other state grants and insurances received by a negligible 
percentage of the sample249. The incidence of social insurance was extremely limited, with 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) payments reported by only one household in the 
whole survey, confirming the limited penetration of this contributory insurance; the only 
formal social protection instrument designed to support the working age unemployed in 
South Africa.  
In total 67% of Gundo Lashu households and 37% of Zibambele households received some 
form of state transfers. The mean value of state transfers to Gundo Lashu households was 
R620, while the mean value for Zibambele households was significantly lower at R416. 
Private Transfers 
Several forms of private transfers were captured in the survey, although in very small 
numbers compared to the reported incidence of state grant receipt. While private transfers 
play a role in household survival strategies and contribute to the diversified income base of 
the poor (Habib and Maharaj, 2007), they are rarely captured in conventional surveys. Those 
with the highest incidence were private maintenance grants for children or spouses,250 but 
workplace pensions and retirement benefits,251 bride price (lobola) and compensation for 
illegitimate children, injury or theft were also reported. The relatively low coverage of 
workplace pensions would be expected given the labour market segment from which most 
of the PWP workers were drawn, the reported incidence of the other major forms of social 
redistribution, such as lobola, is low given the demographics of the sample, and it is likely that 
                                                            
249 169 child support grants and 98 old-age pensions were reported in the Gundo Lashu sample, and 161 
and 38 respectively in the Zibambele sample. A detailed discussion of social grant and insurance receipt 
among PWP households, including take up rates, is provided in chapter nine.  
250 The numbers of private maintenance grants reported were n=21 in Gundo Lashu and n=13 in Zibambele 
households, representing receipt by 8% and 3% of households respectively. 
251 The number of reported pensions and retirement benefits were n=6 for Gundo Lashu and n=5 in 
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there was significant under-reporting of this form of social transfer. It is interesting to note 
the high value of the transfers in the cases where figures were reported, for example, the 
Zibambele transfers included compensation payments from the fathers of illegitimate 
children, three in the form of cows, valued at between R700 and R3,000, and others in the 
form of cash payments of R1,000, R1,700 and R2,000, while the Gundo Lashu sample 
included a lobola payment of R800. The mean annual values given for workplace 
pensions/benefits were R670 in the case of Gundo Lashu and R1,772 in the case of 
Zibambele. It is important to note the significance of the value of both workplace insurances 
and social redistributive processes, in the context of the household monthly wage income 
levels of only R466 in the case of Zibambele, and R858 in the case of Gundo Lashu.   
Remittances  
Remittance income was included in the survey in order to accommodate as many of the 
diverse sources of household income prevalent in South Africa as possible. This information 
is often omitted in current national household survey work, and for this reason there is little 
direct comparative data (see Posel and Casale (2003) for a full discussion of the constraints 
to analysis of remittance behaviour in current household survey instruments). Even when 
included in a survey, however, remittance income may frequently be under-reported due to i) 
problems of recall and ii) the inclusion of goods in-kind, which may be difficult to remember 
and to value in monetary terms, and may as a consequence lead to an undervaluing of the 
contribution of remittances to household income.  
Notwithstanding these concerns, 28% of Gundo Lashu households and 12% of Zibambele 
households reported remittance income from household members. These figures are 
consistent with the percentage of households reporting migrant workers, which in the case 
of Gundo Lashu is 28%, and in the case of Zibambele, 7%. Of the Gundo Lashu 
households reporting remittance income, 44% (n=33) gave details of the amounts remitted 
over the prior twelve-month period. The mean value of remittances was R3,041, ranging 
from R250 to R12,000. For the Zibambele households reporting remittance income 39% 
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to R1,500. The latter figures are considerably less widely distributed than the Gundo Lashu 
figures, indicating a more homogenous population with fewer outliers.  
Community Contributions 
In order to explore the issue of horizontal intra-community transfers, and complete the 
review of potential sources of household income, households were asked whether they were 
in receipt of contributions in the form of financial or non-financial gifts from non-
household members of their community (community contributions).252 This information is 
not normally collected in national surveys in South Africa, and is interesting because it sheds 
light on households’ coping strategies under conditions of extremely high unemployment 
and impoverishment.  
Among current Gundo Lashu households, only 7% reported receiving community 
contributions, while the figure was 20% among households with former Gundo Lashu 
workers. This suggests that household receipts from community members may be lower 
during the periods of PWP employment. The mean monthly value of these contributions for 
households with current workers was R123 per month (ranging between R200 and R4,000 
annually). Among households with former workers the mean monthly value was R55 
(ranging from R50 to R2,400 annually). Among former Gundo Lashu households the mean 
value of community contributions was 45% of the value for those with current PWP 
employment. This suggests that a higher proportion of former than current Gundo Lashu 
households received transfers from the community, but that the value of the transfer was 
significantly less, i.e. households without current PWP employment report significantly lower 
levels of community support in absolute cash terms, but a greater percentage receive 
assistance. There are many possible explanations for this pattern, which may be indicative of 
different types of horizontal transfer processes within the community, contingent on regular 
wage income and repayment potential, or differential characteristics of households retaining 
PWP employment over a longer period. This is an area for further research; it will not, 
                                                            
252 This question was answered by 255 out of a total of 263 Gundo Lashu households (97%), and 408 out of 










The Anatomy of Public Works  Chapter 11: Impact  
 
  290
however, be explored further in this thesis. Twenty-eight percent of Zibambele households 
received community contributions, indicating a significantly greater reliance among 
Zibambele than Gundo Lashu households on community support, even during programme 
participation. However, while a higher percentage of Zibambele households received help 
from the community, the level of assistance was significantly lower than among Gundo 
Lashu households, with a mean monthly value of R25, ranging from R10 to R3,848 per 
annum. This may be linked to the fact that, even when participating in the programme, 
almost all Zibambele workers remained under the poverty line (see McCord, 2004a), and 
hence in need of ongoing support from the community. 
The main benefactors of both groups were neighbours and relatives who were not members 
of the household, which suggests that the majority of horizontal transfers within the 
community were based on social networks and flow through relatives and neighbours rather 
than other formal institutions. The survey findings are consistent with findings by Moller 
(1992) and Hofmeyr (1985) cited in Nattrass (2000), which highlight the critical role of gifts 
from relatives and neighbours in the survival strategy of the poorest.  
PWP households also played a role as donors of community contributions, with 24% of 
Gundo Lashu households and 28% of Zibambele households reporting giving financial or 
material support to non-household members253. The mean monthly amount given by Gundo 
Lashu households was R44, and by Zibambele households R18, and the main recipients of 
this assistance were relatives living outside the household and neighbours (see appendix 11).  
These findings suggest that significant horizontal redistribution is taking place, with 
households focusing their gifts on relatives and neighbours. The Zibambele households 
focused more exclusively on assisting neighbours,254 reflecting focus group discussions in 
                                                            
253 Interestingly, the data indicate that PWP employment status does not make a significant difference to the 
number of Gundo Lashu households acting as donors, with 23% of households with current PWP 
employment making contributions compared with 28% of former PWP households.  
254 Chi-square tests indicated that there was a significant difference between the two groups in terms of the 
support offered to relatives outside the household, and support to neighbours (χ=24.378, p=0.000, and 
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KwaZulu-Natal where former workers stated that they perceived it as being both their 
responsibility to assist other community members since they were receiving PWP income, 
and also a matter of social pride that they were now able to give support to other community 
members, rather than being in the position of mendicants themselves, as they had been prior 
to PWP employment. These findings suggest the operation of community-level mutual 
insurance against risk of unemployment; during periods of unemployment and financial 
hardship the Zibambele workers received support from the community, and when they had 
access to employment they reciprocated with gifts to others in the community, both those in 
need and those who had assisted them in their times of hardship. 
Total Household Transfers Value  
For households reporting transfers, the total mean monthly value of state and private 
transfers to Gundo Lashu households, , was R645, ranging from R100 to R2,360, and to 
Zibambele households R469, ranging from R50 to R5,000. In both cases the data were 
skewed by a small number of high private transfers (private maintenance, pensions and other 
transfers).  
Total Household Income 
Total household income was calculated by aggregating income from all the sources discussed 
above; wage, the net PWP wage,255 state social grants and insurances, private transfers, 
remittances and community contributions, including imputed values where incomes were 
reported but values not provided, based on the adoption of the mean value for that form of 
income. Among current Gundo Lashu households, mean total monthly income was R1,467 
(s.d. 895). Among the 149 former Gundo Lashu households, 8% (n=12) reported no income 
of any kind, these households have been excluded from the ensuing analysis.256 The 
                                                            
255 The net PWP wage used here is based on reported PWP wage, less reported value of income forgone. 
256 The existence of 8% of households without any form of income suggests that not all forms of income or 
income in-kind may be being picked up in the survey. The lack of income data is thought to represent a 
failure to disclose rather than a total lack of either earned income, transfers or remittances, in cash or kind, 
since while it is possible that the households were surviving solely on household domestic production, this 
is unlikely, given that the survey was conducted during the drought period of winter 2003 in Limpopo, and 
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remaining former Gundo Lashu households reported a mean total income of R1,071 (s.d. 
688). For Zibambele households the total mean income was R656 (s.d. 454). The total 
household monthly incomes are significantly different between the two groups of currently 
employed PWP households,257 and indicate a mean adult equivalent per capita income of 
R246 (s.d. 214) for former Gundo Lashu households and R338 (s.d. 214) for current Gundo 
Lashu households. The mean per capita figure for Zibambele households is R154 (s.d. 96). 
These figures are illustrated in Figure 11.7. 















Current Gundo Lashu Zibambele
 
Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
As discussed in chapter eight, these figures cannot be directly compared with the distribution 
of total income reported in either the LFS 2003 or Census 2001, as the LFS collects data 
only on primary income, and excludes remittances and community contributions, while the 
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Census gathers only limited and banded income data, which was used in the earlier PSM in 
order to provide an indication of relative household poverty, but cannot be used for direct 
comparative purposes. However, while they are not directly comparable to LFS or Census 
data, the PWP Survey data give a detailed indication of total income received by the PWP 
households, and the diversity of income sources.  
11.4 The Impact of PWP Participation on Income Poverty  
The impact of PWP participation on household income poverty is illustrated by calculating 
Poverty Incidence Curves (PICs) for the two programmes, following Ravallion (2003), and 
then total income in the PWP households is reviewed in the light of a poverty line, using 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) indices to estimate the incidence and depth of poverty 
within the sample groups. Finally, some conclusions are drawn regarding the role of PWP 
income in reducing income poverty.  
Poverty Incidence Curves  
These findings are illustrated graphically in the PICs set out below. The PICs calculated for 
each programme illustrate the impact of the intervention on headcount poverty. The upper 
curves on each figure illustrate total monthly income per adult equivalent, including the PWP 
income; and the lower curve the ‘estimated counter-factual PIC, after deducting the imputed 
income gains from the observed (post-intervention) incomes’ (Ravallion, 2003:2). Income 
forgone has also been added to the counterfactual PIC, in order to more closely model the 
income reality.  
The vertical line represents a poverty line of R486. Several poverty lines are currently in use 
in South Africa, offering differing estimates of the proportion of the population living in 
poverty, and for this analysis, a version of the Household Subsistence Line (HSL) was 
selected. The HSL is a measure of the theoretical monthly cost of basic needs derived from a 
basket of goods and services comprising food, housing, fuel, light and transport. The figure 
for 2003 was derived from the HSL for low-income households (Potgieter, 2003), and is 
based on the 2002 low-income HSL (Meth, 2004a), inflated to 2003 prices. This results in a 
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indicator of household poverty. The shift of the curve to the right in both cases confirms the 
positive impact on poverty reduction of programme participation.  
Figure 11.8: Poverty Impact of Disbursements Under the Gundo Lashu Programme 
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Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
Note: * Current Gundo Lashu households only 
Figure 11.8 indicates that approximately 5% of the Gundo Lashu sample have been brought 
out of poverty by participation in the programme, on the basis of the R486 poverty line. 
Depending on where the poverty line is set, it would be possible to estimate the 
corresponding reduction in headcount poverty achieved through programme 
implementation. 
While the Gundo Lashu programme had a marginal impact on headcount poverty reduction, 
Figure 11.9 illustrates that the Zibambele programme had no impact on headcount poverty, 
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the poverty gap in both instances, reducing the intensity of income poverty experienced in 
PWP workers’ households in both programmes. 
Figure 11.9: Poverty Impact of Disbursements Under the Zibambele Programme 
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Source: Own calculations from PWP Survey 2003.  
Foster-Greer Thorbecke (FGT) Exploration of PWP Household Poverty 
Using the adult equivalent figure, the incidence of poverty P(0) was first calculated in order 
to derive a headcount estimate of poverty within the sample households. This revealed that 
even with PWP income, 99% of Zibambele households and 86% of current Gundo Lashu 
households fell below the monthly HSL poverty line of R486, as did 91% of the former 
Gundo Lashu households. Participation in the PWP has not moved these households out of 
poverty.  
The adult equivalent income for the same households before and during PWP employment 
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(DID) analysis conducted. However, as discussed above, the lack of baseline data made the 
inclusion of a non-treatment control group in the survey impossible, since the characteristics 
of PWP participants were not known a priori. It is interesting nonetheless to compare the 
poverty headcount among former and current Gundo Lashu households. This is not a 
technically robust approach, since the former and current Gundo Lashu households may 
have differing characteristics which may influence their total income independently of the 
PWP programme, but this caveat notwithstanding, it is of interest to note that while 86% of 
current Gundo Lashu households fell below the per capita HSL of R486, the figure was 91% 
for former households. These figures may indicate that Gundo Lashu employment has 
reduced the headcount poverty incidence among participating households, and the implied 
percentage reduction is consistent with the PIC estimate of a 5% reduction in poverty 
among current Gundo Lashu participants, illustrated in Figure 11.7 above, however, this the 
change in headcount poverty is not statistically significant.258  The headcount poverty 
findings overall make it clear that, with all sources of household income taken into account, 
PWP participation fails to bring the majority of workers’ households in either programme 
above the R486 adult equivalent poverty line.  
The Depth of Poverty P(1) 
The second Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index, (P1) which calculates the poverty gap ratio may 
be used to assess the depth of poverty experienced by participants in the two programmes, 
This index is particularly useful given the high incidence of households falling below the 
poverty line, and the need for a more nuanced understanding of their poverty status. 
The poverty gap, the distance between adult equivalent household income and the poverty 
line, was first calculated for both sets of households. For current Gundo Lashu households, 
the mean shortfall for those beneath the poverty line is R227 per adult equivalent per month 
(ranging from R424 to R11), and for households with former Gundo Lashu workers it is 
R322 (ranging from R473 to R0.3). For Zibambele households the mean shortfall is R332 
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per adult equivalent per month, ranging from R436 to R7. The poverty gaps in both 
programmes are illustrated in Figure 11.10, which indicates that a greater proportion of the 
Zibambele sample falls further below the poverty line, with a greater mean shortfall beneath 
the poverty line than the current Gundo Lashu sample, and that they have a more 
concentrated distribution of income.259  
Figure 11.10: Shortfall Between Adult Equivalent Income and the Poverty Line (R486) 
 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003. 
The poverty gap ratios calculated on the basis of these figures indicate a P1 value of 0.48 for 
current Gundo Lashu households, and 0.72 for Zibambele households, indicating a 
significantly greater depth of poverty among Zibambele households. 
11.5 Income Poverty Conclusion  
A key insight from the FGT analysis was that most participants in the Gundo Lashu 
programme, and almost all of those in the Zibambele programme were living below the HSL 
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poverty line, even while in receipt of the PWP wage. However, while participation in the 
PWP did not move these households above the poverty line, it did contribute to a reduction 
in the poverty gap, and hence reduced the intensity of poverty experienced in workers’ 
households.  
Interestingly, the FGT analysis indicated that while participants in both programmes were 
poor, on the basis of the HSL poverty line, the Zibambele programme is reaching those who 
are experiencing a significantly greater depth of poverty.  This raises the broader question of 
whether reaching ‘the poor’ is in itself an adequate measure of programme success, in a 
context where a large proportion of the population are poor, and whether the key question 
might rather be, what sections of the poor are being targeted. The PIC analysis confirms that 
both PWPs have had a positive impact in terms of the poverty experienced by participating 
households. However, while PWP participation has successfully reduced the depth of 
poverty endured by participants, the impact in terms of reducing headcount poverty has 
been negligible, due to the low value of the transfer relative to the prevailing poverty gap in 
each case. 
11.6 The Impact of PWPs on Non-Income Indicators of Poverty 
The PWP literature tends to assess impact in terms of the value of the wage transferred. 
However, the value of the PWP wage is essentially a proximate, rather than ultimate 
indicator of impact, and having reviewed the income implications of PWP participation, the 
impact of the wage on a range of non-monetary and socio-economic indicators will now be 
examined, with a focus on consumption, financial and material asset ownership, and human 
capital formation (education and nutrition). In addition, reported impacts relating to psycho-
social well-being, access to state grants, and the assets created through the PWP are 
reviewed, as well as the implications for the local economy. This analysis has not been 
designed as a formal evaluation, but rather as an opportunity to explore from a primarily 
descriptive perspective the areas in which the PWP transfer has impacted on the lives of 
participants.  
Research in this area was subject to methodological limitations due to the lack of baseline 
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were largely phrased in terms of current and previous experience, and hence were reliant on 
recall rather than panel information for the same households over time. It should also be 
noted that PWP employment may not be the sole or even primary causal factor informing 
the changes reported, and exogenous factors, such as the increased roll-out of social 
protection grants (see Guthrie (2003)) may also have influenced the welfare of households 
during the PWP employment period. However, the effect of transfer income on non-income 
indicators of poverty is unlikely to be significant for the Gundo Lashu workers during the 
limited period of PWP employment, and should not be overstated for the Zibambele 
households, who showed a low level of grant take-up. In the light of this, where positive 
changes have taken place in socio-economic indicators over the period of PWP employment, 
it is likely that these changes are indicative of a causal relationship, although exclusive 
causality cannot be assumed. 
Consumption  
All respondents were asked about the main use of the additional income earned through 
PWP employment in their household. Food purchase was the main use of additional PWP 
income in both groups, in 100% of Zibambele households and 79% of Gundo Lashu 
households, with clothing (13%), and education (4%) being the other main uses.  
In terms of non-principal use of the income, additional PWP income was reportedly used to 
pay for education by 82% of Zibambele households and only 37% of Gundo Lashu 
households, possibly indicating a greater prior shortfall in Zibambele education expenditure 
(see the following section for further discussion of this issue). The fact that only 13% of 
Zibambele households spent PWP income on burial societies, compared with 42% of 
Gundo Lashu households, was investigated in the focus group discussions, where Zibambele 
workers reported investment in burial clubs as an aspiration rather than a current option, 
given their income levels.260 They reported that, in the absence of formal burial club 
                                                            
260 This confirms findings by Ardington and Leibbrandt (2004:11) calculated from the October 2000 IES 
and the September 2000 LFS, which show that the proportion of households with insurance increases with 
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membership, mutual self-help was their primary coping mechanism, derived from the 
increased social capital arising from membership of a local Zibambele road maintenance 
team. 
Financial Assets 
Households were asked to compare their current situation, in terms of ownership of 
financial assets (formal or informal savings, insurances, etc.), with their situation prior to 
joining the PWP. Thirty-six percent of current Gundo Lashu households reported increased 
financial assets, and 18% of former Gundo Lashu households (possibly reflecting poor 
recall, or diminution of financial assets since the termination of PWP employment). By 
contrast, 64% of Zibambele households reported an increase in financial assets since joining 
the programme. A chi-square test indicates that the difference in the responses between 
those currently employed on the Gundo Lashu and Zibambele programmes is significant.261  
This reflects Devereux and Solomon’s suggestion that savings are likely to increase with 
longer programme duration (Devereux and Solomon, 2006). Although the monthly wage 
transfer was significantly smaller in the Zibambele programme compared to the Gundo 
Lashu programme, the sustained duration of the employment resulted in a greater increase in 
financial assets. Also, the analysis above suggests that the Zibambele households were from 
a poorer socio-economic stratum than the Gundo Lashu households, and, consequently, the 
impact of the transfer is likely to have been greater. The linkage of payment modalities to 
formal sector banking in the case of the Zibambele workers is also likely to have promoted a 
growth in ownership of financial assets (in terms of holding a bank account), which may 
previously have been extremely limited, and which may possibly indicate greater linkage to 
financial assets, rather than actual increases in asset ownership. The focus group discussions 
also revealed that one consequence of the social capital constructed between the workers as 
a result of sustained employment and social facilitation by the Department of Transport, was 
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clubs) among groups of workers. These groups offered informal financial assistance at times 
of financial stress, for example, by providing the goods required for funeral ceremonies. 
Material Assets 
In terms of material assets, the results mirror the changes in financial asset ownership among 
Gundo Lashu households. Only 20% of former Gundo Lashu households reported an 
increase in material asset ownership (cooking implements, furniture, etc.), while among 
current Gundo Lashu households the figure was 35%. The fact that current Gundo Lashu 
households reported a more positive impact in terms of material asset ownership than 
former households, suggests that either the benefit itself, or the perception of the benefit, 
decreased after the period of employment and the associated wage income. Among 
Zibambele households, by contrast, 65% reported an increase in material asset ownership, 
and the difference between current Gundo Lashu and Zibambele household reporting of 
material asset ownership was significant.262   
These findings may illustrate the positive impact of sustained employment on accumulation 
(in terms of both financial and material assets), although it needs to be considered in the 
light of the lower socio-economic status of the Zibambele households in general, and the 
fact that, as a consequence, their initial asset ownership status was likely to be lower, and by 
implication, their prioritisation of the accumulation of basic household assets greater. 
Human Capital Formation  
Education  
A key area of expenditure reported by both Zibambele, and to a lesser extent Gundo Lashu 
workers, was education. In order to examine the impact of programme participation on 
children, the extent of regular school attendance by all children in the PWP households was 
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explored in the survey.263 Each household was asked whether all school-age children 
attended school regularly264 at the time of the survey, and prior to PWP employment. The 
results are presented in Table 11.3. 
Table 11.3: Impact of PWP on Regular School Attendance 
 Households with 
former Gundo Lashu 
workers (n=128) 
Households with 










94 (n=120) 89 (n=91) 66 (n=257) 
At time of interview
 
93 (n=119) 94 (n=96) 89 (n=350) 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003. 
Ninety-eight percent of current Gundo Lashu households with school-age children reported 
that all the children were attending school regularly at the time of the interview, while for 
former households, the rate was 96%, rising from 93% and 95% respectively prior to PWP 
employment. These attendance rate changes are not significant for current or formerly 
employed Gundo Lashu households, and there is no indication of a change in attendance 
after PWP participation.265  
For Zibambele households however, the impact of PWP participation on education is 
significant;266 participation in the PWP raised the percentage of households with regular 
                                                            
263 ‘Regular participation by all children’ was adopted as the education indicator in preference to the more 
conventional but less sensitive usage of ‘enrolment’ due to the high levels of enrolment (and drop out) in 
South Africa (Van der Berg, 2007), which undermines the usefulness of the indicator in terms of the 
formation of human capital.  
264 The regularity element was included in the question in order to identify regular and consistent 
participation in education, as distinct from the erratic participation at times of income availability reported 
in focus group discussions prior to the survey development (Mankweng cluster, Limpopo, March 2003). 
265 The results of chi-square tests are χ=1.6 and χ=0.06 for current and former Gundo Lashu households 
respectively, at significance level 0.05, df=1. 










The Anatomy of Public Works  Chapter 11: Impact  
 
  303
school attendance by all children from 67% to 90%.  Moreover, 26% of households where 
only some children used to go to school, shifted into regular school attendance for all 
children, subsequent to PWP employment (not illustrated in Table 11.3).  
The findings suggest that for Gundo Lashu households, regular school attendance levels 
were high prior to employment in the PWP, and PWP participation did not have a 
significant impact on raising them further. However, in Zibambele households where the 
initial levels of attendance were considerably lower, attendance rates rose significantly after 
PWP employment. The reasons given for children in Gundo Lashu households not regularly 
attending school prior to participation in the PWP, were the cost of school materials 
(uniforms, text books, pencils, etc.) and the need for children to engage in domestic or paid 
work to support the household. Likewise, in Zibambele households, the lack of money for 
school materials was mentioned as the key constraint, while hunger and the need for 
children to work or look after the family were reported as the main constraints in 7% of 
households.267 This indicates that poverty remains a serious constraint on school attendance, 
notwithstanding the policy of fee waivers for the poor. The reason for the continued non-
participation in education for some children, even after their households enjoyed PWP 
employment, was in both cases cited as lack of money for school equipment, while in 
Zibambele households, the need for children to work to earn income to support the family 
was also raised as a key constraint.  
These findings were borne out by focus group discussions with the Zibambele workers. 
While households could sometimes earn money through casual work to pay for school fees, 
they were often unable to afford consumables, such as stationery or uniforms, and in these 
instances children were required to leave school after a period of grace. Equally, hunger was 
associated by mothers with poor school attendance; one reported boiling a pot of water on 
the fire before sending the children to school, in order to encourage them and give the 
                                                            
267 In one of the few areas where detailed ‘other’ responses were recorded by the interviewers, the surveys 
contained specific quotations from the respondents including; ‘Children did not have enough food’, 
‘Children were hungry and preferred not to go to school’, ‘They were hungry and preferred not to go’, 
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impression that there might be food upon their return, despite their having gone to school 
with empty stomachs. 
Nutrition 
In the same way that households were asked about education, so three questions exploring 
nutrition were posed, concerning household nutrition prior to PWP participation and at the 
time of the interview. The first asked about the frequency of adults skipping meals because 
of lack of funds, the second explored an indicator of more severe poverty – the incidence of 
adults not eating for a whole day due to lack of funds, and the third explored the impact of 
lack of funds on the provision of meals for children. The pattern of responses was similar 
for all three questions, and responses to the first question regarding the frequency of adults 
skipping meals due to lack of funds are set out in Table 11.4.268 
Table 11.4: Impact of PWP on Frequency of Adults Skipping Meals Due to Lack of 
Funds 
  Before PWP During PWP 
  (% of households reporting this 
behaviour) 
Current Gundo Lashu 
(n=114) 
Most of the time 13 (n=15) 7 (n=8) 
Sometimes 32 (n=36) 18 (n=20) 
Never 55 (n=63) 75 (n=86) 
Zibambele 
(n=413) 
Most of the time 49 (n=204) 1 (n=6) 
Sometimes 41 (n=166) 18 (n=74) 
Never 10 (n=43) 81 (n=333) 
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Table 11.4 indicates that in all cases there was a significant improvement subsequent to 
programme participation,269 however, the impact on those regularly skipping meals, who may 
be assumed to be the poorest, was only significant for Zibambele households, and marginal 
among the Gundo Lashu households.270 
Responses to all three questions indicated a positive correlation between improved 
household nutrition and PWP participation. This effect is particularly striking among the 
Zibambele households where the initial nutrition situation was significantly worse than 
among the Gundo Lashu households. It is noteworthy that the Zibambele households 
reported adult nutritional behaviour characteristic of chronic under-nutrition, prior to 
participation in the programme, with adults reporting a high incidence of skipping meals for 
whole days (49% of households reporting this occurring frequently) and not eating for whole 
days (40%), while 34% of households reported reducing the size of children’s meals. The 
reported impact of participation in the programme on nutrition was statistically significant in 
each case for the Zibambele households, but not for the Gundo Lashu households, and is 
consistent with the primary use of PWP income being food for the Zibambele households. 
Psychosocial Well-being  
Psychosocial programme impacts were raised by participants in both the Gundo Lashu and 
Zibambele focus groups. Participants reported that prior to participation in the programmes 
they had engaged in activities of which they were ashamed, such as begging for food, 
sending children to school hungry, and wearing ragged clothes. They were not able to pay 
school fees on a regular basis, and even when the fees were waived in many cases, children 
were eventually excluded from school because of their inability to purchase the materials and 
uniforms required.  
                                                            
269 3x2 chi-square tests give χ=10.25 for current Gundo Lashu households, and χ=445.62 for Zibambele 
households, at significance level 0.05, df=2. 
270 2x2 chi-square tests on the incidence of regularly skipping meals gave χ=250.33 for Zibambele 
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In the Zibambele focus groups, women reported that their poverty had prevented them 
from participation in social processes, such as activities which represented an expression of 
their belief systems, including performing appropriate burials, making spirit offerings, and 
holding the ceremonies required to mark the anniversary of family deaths. The consequence 
of the failure to observe these customs was social stigma and shame, conforming to the 
social dimension of poverty characterised by Sen in terms of social ‘functioning’. Sen defines 
this class of functionings as ‘achieving self-respect or being socially integrated’ (Sen, 1993: 
31), and argues that it is of greater complexity than elementary functioning, such as being 
adequately nourished or in good health. Subsequent to their PWP employment, the workers 
reported giving food to the needy in their communities, which they regarded as an 
illustration of their changed social as well as economic status within the community.  
Access to Grants 
One unanticipated further indicator of welfare explored in the survey is access to grants. 
Since joining the PWP programme, 15% of Gundo Lashu households reported increased 
access to government grants, compared to 28% of Zibambele households. In part this 
reflects the successful efforts of the Department of Social Welfare to promote grant take-up 
(Guthrie, op cit). However, the differing incidence of increases in grant take-up may also be 
attributable in part to the different design components of the two programmes. One design 
factor contributing to the significant increase in grant take-up among the Zibambele 
households was likely to be the payment modality, with workers paid almost exclusively 
through bank transfers. This payment modality required workers to hold bank accounts, 
which in turn required possession of an identity document, and the programme included 
assistance in acquiring identity documentation. An additional benefit of identity document 
ownership was an increased opportunity to claim grants which were previously inaccessible 
(McCord, 2002). In the Gundo Lashu programme, by contrast, ownership of identity 
documentation was reportedly a pre-requisite for eligibility, with ID books being used as the 
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were implicitly excluded from the selection process.271 Hence, the initial levels of grant take-
up were likely to differ, with the Zibambele workers having lower levels of take-up due in 
part to their lack of documentation. Also, the social facilitators working with the Zibambele 
group informally provided information on grant eligibility and access, an input which was 
not included in the Gundo Lashu programme. It is interesting to note that notwithstanding 
this 28% increase in grant take-up, the levels of take-up of pensions and child support 
among Zibambele workers remain below average (Noble et al., 2005). This is partly due to 
the fact that those in receipt of the larger grants, such as pensions, may be excluded from 
programme participation. 
Impact of Assets Created 
Finally, while the survey did not attempt to address the question of the socio-economic 
impact of the assets created or maintained through the PWP, recipients were asked whether 
the asset had benefited the household. The response was overwhelmingly positive, with 90% 
of Gundo Lashu and 97% of Zibambele respondents responding positively, with improved 
transportation being the major benefit identified by over 70% of respondents, and improved 
school access by a further 10-15%. Unfortunately, it was not possible to verify or quantify 
these benefits, or to assess the quality of the asset created or its sustainability. 
11.7 The Local Economy  
An attempt was also made to review the broader economic impact of the programmes on 
the local economy. In order to gain an indication of the extent of income flows to the local 
economy arising from the PWP wage transfer, respondents were asked where they 
purchased most of their food, the major item purchased with the PWP income. Sixty-seven 
percent of Gundo Lashu respondents reported purchasing most of their food from local 
shops, 23% from shops in town, and 10% from local informal traders or neighbours, 
implying that almost 80% of the PWP households injected their PWP-funded food 
expenditure into the local economy. By contrast, 91% of Zibambele respondents purchased 
                                                            
271 It should be noted, however, that no reports of exclusion from the programme due to lack of identity 
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most of their food in town, with only 9% buying most of their food in local shops or from 
informal traders and neighbours. This reflects the fact that the Zibambele wage is paid 
through the commercial banking sector, and therefore wages are accessed in the local towns. 
This indicates that payment modalities can be a critical determinant of the location of 
spending and of resulting multipliers. In the case of Zibambele, the expenditure of the PWP 
wage is unlikely to stimulate local informal sector growth by increased demand, since so little 
of the wage income enters the local economy. However, the Zibambele workers reported 
significant savings both from the economies of scale inherent in being able to purchase food 
in bulk, due to increased access to cash, and also due to purchasing in towns where prices 
were reported to be up to 50% lower. 
The focus group discussions revealed that local micro-enterprises sprang up around the 
Gundo Lashu work teams, with small businesses selling snacks to workers at break times,272 
and small markets arising spontaneously on pay day, similar to those noted by Ardington and 
Lund around pension points on pay day (Ardington and Lund, 1995). However, these were 
reported to have ceased trading once the period of employment was completed. Zibambele 
workers reported no such growth of enterprise to service them. This difference is probably 
attributable to the fact that the Zibambele workers were working part-time flexible hours 
and individually or in small groups, and not concentrated into work teams in a particular 
area, like the Gundo Lashu workers. 
The other vector through which PWPs have the potential to stimulate the local economy is 
the economic benefits accruing from the asset created. This impact is contingent on i) the 
strategic value of the asset created, and ii) the quality and durability of the asset. These 
factors are in turn contingent on the initial asset selection processes, the adequacy of 
technical aspects of construction and the subsequent management of the assets produced, 
which is largely determined by local government performance.273 These factors were not 
                                                            
272 For example, the marketing of vetkoeke (fried dough balls) to PWP workers was reported in the Gundo 
Lashu focus group discussions. 
273 The contingency of indirect positive social and economic outcomes from infrastructure provision on a 
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within the scope of the survey, and consequently, the indirect economic benefits arising 
from the provision of infrastructure are excluded from this analysis. This omission is 
sanctioned by Datt and Ravallion who go so far as to assert that ‘it is theoretically possible 
that a workfare scheme dominates alternatives [social protection instruments], even if the 
assets created or other indirect effects have no value’ (1994a: 436). While it is possible to 
question the validity of this assertion, it serves to illustrate the primary importance ascribed 
to the direct (wage) rather than indirect (asset) vectors of social protection transmission in 
the conventional PWP canon. 
11.8 Conclusion  
The PWP Survey offers an insight into the relative incidence and impact performance of 
differing PWP responses in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment, and the 
appropriateness and limitations of each model. The Zibambele programme was a type B 
programme, while the Gundo Lashu programme was a type C programme, with elements of 
A and D, with the typical characteristics of the short term construction-based PWP which 
dominates the genre in sub-Saharan Africa. The survey indicates that both programmes had 
negligible impact in terms of reducing headcount poverty. However, both programmes 
contributed to reducing the depth of poverty experienced by participating households, and 
addressing other, non-monetary aspects of poverty. 
Despite the continued high levels of income poverty, participation in both programmes had 
a beneficial impact on all the dimensions of poverty examined; income, asset ownership, 
access to services, and the capabilities and psychosocial aspects of poverty. The initial 
situation of the Zibambele households was consistently found to be one of greater poverty 
than for the Gundo Lashu households, whichever dimensions of poverty were explored, and 
consequently benefits which were, in many cases, marginal for Gundo Lashu households 
were significant among Zibambele households,274 despite the significantly higher wage 
                                                            
274 It is interesting to note that the significant impacts of the PWP wage in terms of nutrition and education 
etc. discussed above were achieved with a per capita transfer which is below the level of the proposed 
Basic Income Grant of R100 (see Samson (2002)). In the light of this, the poverty-related impacts noted for 
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offered in the Gundo Lashu programme. Also, the benefits in the case of the Gundo Lashu 
participants were limited by the short duration of the employment. For these workers the 
benefit would have the characteristic of a wage shock rather than a sustained wage increase, 
a consideration which would engender different economic behaviour and use of the wage 
transfer compared with the Zibambele workers with sustained access to income. 
In the case of the Zibambele programme, there are indications that PWP participation, with 
its open-ended guarantee of employment, impacted significantly on factors which influence 
the reproduction of poverty, examples being the reduction in chronic under-nutrition and 
increased participation in education.275 However, no evidence was found in the survey to 
suggest the existence of significant sustained social protection benefits accruing through the 
Gundo Lashu programme. This is consistent with the theoretical argument outlined above 
that type B PWPs were more likely than short-term type A, C or D programmes to confer 
sustained benefits in situations of chronic poverty. 
This is highlighted by responses to a question concerning the sustained impact of 
participation in PWP employment on poverty, subsequent to the ending of PWP 
employment.276 Gundo Lashu households were asked whether participation in the 
programme would lead to a sustained reduction in household poverty, after the programme 
                                                            
grant. This offers a challenge to the argument frequently asserted by the South African government that a 
transfer of R100 would not have a significant impact on poverty; following the July 2003 Legkotla 
President Mbeki was quoted as saying that ‘if you give everybody a R100 a month (sic) it will not make a 
difference [to poverty]’ (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 1-7 August 2003:6), sentiments echoed by Minister 
Trevor Manuel who argued that ‘someone had to explain how R100 a person would make a difference to 
the lives of the poor’ (Business Report, 25 August 2003:12) and reiterated in July 2004, when Mbeki was 
quoted as arguing that a grant set at this level would not have a significant impact on poverty, in an article 
entitled ‘Mbeki rejects “much vaunted” grant’ (This Day, 13 July 2004). The findings above indicate that 
while this might be true in terms of reducing headcount poverty, the number of people living beneath a 
given poverty line, this level of transfer would reduce the intensity of poverty, and could have a significant 
impact on critical dimensions of poverty such as education and nutrition. 
275 It is interesting to note, however, that it is unclear in the context of mass unemployment whether 
education does have a significant role to play in reducing poverty. For example, see Keswell and Poswell 
(2003) for a critical discussion of the applicability of assumptions of Mincerian returns to education in the 
context of mass unemployment in South Africa, and a suggestion that, to the contrary, the rate of returns to 
education may be negative for certain levels of education. 
276 This question was only asked of Gundo Lashu households, out of sensitivity to the anxiety expressed by 
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was completed. Among households with members currently employed by the PWP, 45% of 
respondents stated that programme participation would lead to a sustained reduction of 
poverty, but among those for whom PWP employment had been completed this figure fell 
to 33%. This indicates that after completion of the PWP employment, only one-third of 
participants in the programme anticipated that employment in the PWP would have 
sustained anti-poverty benefits. For these workers, the income benefit of programme 
participation had the characteristics of a ‘wage shock’ rather than a sustained increase in 
income, engendering different usage of the wage transfer compared with the Zibambele 
workers for whom access to income was sustained. 
Where significant benefits were identified in terms of material and financial asset ownership, 
human and social capital improvements, and perceptions of sustained poverty reduction, 
these were concentrated in the Zibambele programme, offering lower remuneration but 
greater employment security and, most importantly, extended employment duration. These 
findings are consistent with the findings of Dev (1995) and Devereux and Solomon (2006) 
who highlight the importance of sustained employment for addressing the challenge of 
chronic poverty.  
11.9 Programme Design Implications 
Many programme design issues have arisen from the discussion of the PWP Survey in the 
preceding chapters, which have been highlighted in the text as they have arisen. However, 
there are three fundamental insights which emerge from the analysis: i) wage targeting does 
not ensure the participation of the poorest, and may be less effective than community based 
selection procedures, ii) the social protection impacts of PWPs may be marginal if they are 
not targeted at the poorest, and iii) the duration of social protection benefits arising from 
PWP employment may be limited to the period of programme implementation, with 
sustained benefits only accruing if the transfer period was sufficient to promote 
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nutrition and sustained investment in education).277 This empirically confirms the core thesis 
set out in this work, that a short-term period of employment in a PWP is unlikely to have 
significant sustained social protection outcomes beyond the period of programme 
implementation, in a context of chronic poverty, as the income is primarily used for 
consumption purposes.  
If sustained social protection outcomes are desired, conferring preventive or promotive 
social protection benefits, then a medium-to-long term intervention is required which will 
either provide ongoing transfers to enable consumption smoothing as long as the need for 
support exists, or, if benefits are to be sustained after the completion of the programme, 
accumulation in some form is necessary. These benefits were identified in the type B 
Zibambele programme, offering sustained employment and accumulation, but were not 
apparent in any significant degree in the short-term Gundo Lashu programme. These 
findings represent an empirical insight into the limitations of short-term PWPs as an 
instrument of social protection in the context of chronic poverty, and a challenge to the 
assumptions of the current policy discourse. 
                                                            
277 It is interesting to note that in order to have a sustained impact on physiological and mental 
development, improved child nutrition must occur prior to the age of three, and so the sustained nature of 
any gains resulting from improved child nutrition is conditional on the inclusion of children within the 
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12 CONCLUSIONS  
The thesis has attempted to illustrate that the assumptions underlying PWP choice are 
problematic and open to criticism, that type A, C or D programmes are unlikely to deliver 
the goals of social protection and development frequently ascribed to them in the policy 
discourse, and that type B programmes have their own associated shortcomings relating to 
cost and operational feasibility. 
The prevailing problem relating to PWPs in sub-Saharan Africa in particular is the 
widespread adoption of a social protection response (a short term PWP) which may function 
well in terms of consumption smoothing in the context of short-term labour market 
disruptions, but fail to meet ongoing and longer-run social protection policy objectives in a 
chronic poverty context, offering only palliative inputs of limited significance. PWPs appear 
to be protected from the scrutiny and criticism to which other social protection instruments 
are subject, with the shortcomings in their performance frequently overlooked, in deference 
to a set of often unfounded assumptions about how PWP are believed to operate.  
12.1 Summary of the Key Arguments  
It is interesting to note that the Social Protection Sector of the ILO (in a statement which 
indicates some tension with the perspective promoted by the Employment Policy 
Department, responsible for promoting initiatives such as the EIIP) has been forthright in 
its criticism of the reality, as opposed to the ‘public image’ of PWPs, as exemplified in this 
passage which confirms and summarises much of the critique set out in this thesis: 
‘In sum, public works have long appealed to those concerned with poverty and 
unemployment. They are frequently used in developing countries, and are often 
presented as the means of creating public infrastructure, generating jobs and 
‘targeting’ the poor. Unfortunately, there are reasons for skepticism about the wilder 
positive claims made for public works. One is that that they use up a lot of scarce 
resources, and result in low productivity work being done. Another is that they are 
not very good at ‘targeting’. The poorest and most insecure are likely to be at the end 
of the queue for these casual jobs. Yet another is that such schemes are prone to 
political corruption. And perhaps above all, they have to be massive schemes if they 
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While the statement above sets out a critique of PWP design, implementation, and 
performance, reflecting one of the key strands of argument in this thesis, the other strand, 
which is not found elsewhere in the literature, is a critique of the conceptual weakness of the 
PWP debate, particularly in relation to the social protection agenda, and it is this weakness 
which the thesis has sought both to illustrate, and address in some measure. Conceptual 
frameworks have been presented for codifying the different types of PWPs and also their 
varying sets of objectives, and a theoretical case has been made for the argument that certain 
PWP types are more appropriate in particular circumstances than others, in an attempt to 
differentiate the range of forms and functions of PWPs internationally, and to link particular 
forms of PWPs with particular functions and contexts, and assess their likely outcomes. The 
core argument is that short-term, types A, C and D PWPs can potentially function 
acceptably in acute labour market crises, but that there is no evidence or theoretical basis for 
expectations that such programmes will be effective instruments in sustained or repeated 
labour market crises. This analysis holds true for the situations of chronic elevated 
unemployment and underemployment which prevail in many developing countries, and in 
particular, in much of sub-Saharan Africa. 
It was argued that in terms of providing social protection, a PWP has the potential to confer 
benefits through the three vectors: the wage transfer, the assets created, and the skills or 
training transferred during PWP employment. However, when examined empirically it was 
found that the means of assessing PWP performance in each of these areas is constrained, 
and documentation of impact, beyond days of employment created, or wages transferred, is 
scarce in the literature. There are limited data on the impact of assets created over time, and 
the impact of skills development and labour market experience. Inasmuch as data are 
available, they indicate that skills development only has the potential for significant impact in 
contexts of frictional, rather than structural unemployment, and as such may not be well 
suited to the sub-Saharan African context. Even with the wage transfer, the simplest vector 
of social protection, detailed analysis suggests that benefits may be significantly overstated, 
with the net PWP income gain comprising only 30-50% of the gross wage in some instances. 
Even the adoption of the restricted wage as a form of targeting was found to be problematic, 
leading to the exclusion of labour constrained households from programme participation 
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Mirroring the conceptual lack of clarity, and the poor evidence base for PWP evaluation, an 
interesting and complex picture emerges in relation to PWPs and poverty reduction in the 
literature, exemplified by the argument put forward by the World Bank’s Vodopivec, who 
initially concedes that; 
‘direct evidence for the effects of public works programs on poverty reduction is 
scant’ (2004:74) 
But then goes on to argue that:  
‘The scope for reducing poverty through public works programs also appears to be 
large.....due to the temporary nature of most of these programs, their impact on 
poverty is often transitory’. (ibid:74-75) 
Despite the scant evidence, Vodopivec retains his confidence that PWPs’ potential for 
reducing poverty is large, even while conceding that in reality, the impact is transitory in 
most cases. This typifies the confusion at the heart of the PWP discourse, which this thesis 
has set out to expose and illuminate.  
12.2 Problem Areas in the Current Literature  
The limited analytical work which is available on PWPs is primarily focused on Asia, relating 
to the MEGS and JRY in India, and to a lesser degree the PK in Indonesia, and programmes 
in Latin America, with particular reference to the Trabajar and Jefes programmes in 
Argentina. Most of the detailed research into impact analysis has focused on type B 
programmes, EGSs or GEPs, offering longer-term time horizons and hence greater 
opportunities to monitor and assess impact. However, even within this literature, the focus is 
still primarily on immediate, rather than sustained benefits. Most PWPs in sub-Saharan 
Africa may be characterised as types A, C and D, offering short-term PWP employment. 
There is little detailed empirical analysis into such forms of PWP, or analysis about these 
forms of programme in general. 
There is also little analysis in the literature of the impact across any vectors other than the 
wage, and even this vector is itself inadequately interrogated, in terms of the actual cost of 
participation. Income forgone, has been increasingly addressed in the literature following 
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accessing PWP employment (Pellisery, 2008; Gaiha and Imai, 2005; Sharp et al., 2006), and 
the human, physical costs of participation (Helen Keller International, 2007) remain largely 
ignored in the mainstream PWP literature. 
There are key evidence gaps in the literature both in terms of impact, as discussed above, 
and also in terms of incidence, or who participates in PWPs. Neither of these gaps however 
are highlighted as a problem in the existing literature, despite their critical importance for 
assessing the efficacy of the PWPs’ social protection function. While there is some research 
into these questions in the Asian context, there is little empirical evidence relating to the 
incidence of PWP participation in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of the socio-economic 
profile of workers, due to the lack of baseline data gathered on PWP participants, and lack 
of subsequent survey work to rectify this initial omission. The short-term nature (type A, C 
or D) of most programmes in the continent mitigates against the gathering of such data, 
which tends not to be included in monitoring schedules, as socio-economic data collection is 
often perceived as an additional cost burden, rather than an essential prerequisite for 
meaningful programme impact assessment. These data omissions undermine any attempt to 
assess the functioning of PWPs as instruments of social protection, and together with the 
lack of data on performance, render any assessment of the effectiveness of PWP impossible, 
since it is not possible to calculate either the impact or benefit incidence. In addition, the 
data on PWP cost are highly problematic. Inasmuch as the data exist, they imply that the 
cost per unit transferred may be greater than for the cash transfer alternatives, (see, for 
example, Smith (2001)) however whether such a (putative) premium is acceptable is 
contingent on the value of the assets created, another area which suffers from a critical data 
void. Together, these critical areas of data failure undermine the potential for evidence-based 
policy selection in relation to PWPs. The limited empirical evidence which is available, 
together with a theoretical analysis based on labour economics, suggests that PWPs may be 
costly, poorly targeted, and have limited sustained social protection impact, particularly in 
cases where the form of PWP does not match the form of labour market failure, but more 
data on these empirical questions is needed. 
Frequently PWPs represent the intervention of choice to address the needs of the working 
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vulnerable groups (such as children or the elderly), on the basis of the assumption that the 
principle of ‘less eligibility’ mediated through the work requirement and low wage leads to 
effective targeting to the intended group. However, the limited evidence available in the 
literature indicates that, particularly in the context of highly rationed access to PWP 
employment resulting from the low coverage of project-based PWPs which tends to typify 
PWPs in sub-Saharan Africa, wage targeting and the work requirement are often not 
adequate to prevent significant inclusion and exclusion errors. In this case, additional 
investment in explicit targeting mechanisms, such as demographic or poverty criteria, 
possibly using community based selection mechanisms, is required.  
This question of incidence was explored in detail in the two South African case studies. The 
type B Zibambele case study, offering a higher wage rate together with community based 
targeting mechanisms, had superior poverty targeting outcomes compared with the Gundo 
Lashu case study programme, which was implemented on the basis of more conventional 
wage targeting. This finding supports arguments set out by Barrett and Clay (2003) and 
Mujeri (2002) that it is not adequate to rely on the functioning of the market to ensure the 
participation of the poorest in PWPs, as the provision of a low wage can provide additional 
opportunities for cash income for surplus labour in less poor households, while failing to 
offer wages which match the marginal value of labour in the labour-constrained households 
which are often among the poorest. Major inclusion errors have been identified in the 
literature, and given the level of rationing suggested by the scale of many programmes, which 
is not empirically recorded in the existing literature, this implies commensurately high 
exclusion errors. The conclusion from this is that PWPs are not necessarily an effective tool 
for reaching poor, especially labour-constrained households.  
In terms of impact, the empirical evidence supports the theoretical argument put forward in 
the early chapters of this thesis, that PWPs can have short-term impact on consumption 
smoothing, and possibly also some asset and skills benefits, but that this is contingent on the 
type of PWP and the nature of the labour market context. As anticipated in the literature 
review, and theoretical analysis of PWPs and social protection, the survey analysis revealed 
greater evidence of impact in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment of type B 
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targeting measures, rather than reliance on the work conditionality and limited wage, which 
failed to target resources to the poorest. 
12.3 Why Do PWPs Remain So Popular?  
Given the mismatch between PWP expectations and programme outcome outlined above, 
the question emerges as to why such programmes are repeatedly implemented. The review 
of the PWP canon carried out in this thesis indicates that it is not possible to explain the 
ongoing popularity of PWPs on the basis of evidence of their social protection impact. The 
literature intimates that either conceptual confusion, resulting in unfounded expectations of 
PWP performance, or a set of ideological and political preferences, or a combination of the 
two, rather than empirical evidence, is leading to the repeated selection of PWPs in 
preference to alternative social protection interventions. These concerns are implicit in the 
conclusions of Murgai and Ravallion regarding the selection of an EGS (the NREGP) over 
alternative social protection options in India in 2005 (Murgai and Ravallion, 2005), and are 
explicitly outlined in Karuri et al. (2007) with reference to the political pressure exerted on 
the commission charged with the development of a comprehensive social protection strategy 
in South Africa to adopt a PWP-based response to the problem of the working age poor 
unemployed in preference to a cash transfer alternative.  
A degree of politicisation in the implementation of PWPs is also indicated if the timing of 
the launch or expansion of major PWPs is reviewed in relation to periods of political 
instability or potential regime change. Examples of the temporal coincidence of PWP 
initiation and a political imperative to gain support from segments of the unemployed are 
found in relation to many of the larger and higher profile PWPs internationally; the 
announcement of the expansion of the South African EPWP was made immediately prior to 
elections in 2004, while the AGETIP in Senegal was implemented during a period of urban 
unrest following regime change in an effort to quell urban protest against the government, 
and the NREGP was launched when the support of the rural poor electorate was critical for 
a new regime in India (McCord, 2007b). PWPs in such instances offer the opportunity for a 
government to be seen to be doing something highly visible about the issue of the working 
age poor, in the eyes of both the domestic constituency and the donor community. At the 
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associated with a cash transfer response to the same set of social protection concerns, as 
PWPs are more ideologically consistent with the dominant neo-liberal political orientation 
shared by donors and many sub-Saharan African governments.278 PWPs are also consistent 
with the ideologically, rather than the empirically, constituted concern to avoid ‘dependency’ 
which informs the current sub-Saharan African social protection debate (Meth, 2005c; Di 
Lollo, 2007279). The same ideological considerations render PWPs attractive since they 
represent the prospect of a market-based ‘treatment’ for the problem of the working age 
poor, through short-term PWP employment, despite the fact that both the theory and the 
limited but growing body of empirical evidence suggest that short-term PWP employment is 
unlikely to have a significant impact in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment. In 
this way the current PWP literature suggests fascinating insights into the political, rather than 
the empirical processes driving social protection policy selection. 
12.4 Conclusions 
The conceptual weaknesses and analytical omissions identified in this thesis have not 
impacted adversely on the popularity of PWPs, largely due to their profile in the popular 
discourse as a market-based ‘treatment’ for unemployment, which is perceived, without 
empirical justification, of being less ‘dependency-inducing’ than alternative options, and have 
the added benefit of being highly visible, and not unacceptably populist. 
It has been argued in this thesis that PWP selection is largely based on an empirical void, 
using assumptions and ideological preferences rather than evidence as a basis for policy 
making, and that the data required to build such an evidence base are systematically excluded 
                                                            
278 For example, in response to calls for the introduction of a cash transfer based social protection 
intervention for the working age poor in South Africa, in addition to a range of cash transfers for vulnerable 
groups outside the labour force, such as children and the aged, South African Finance Minister Trevor 
Manuel stated that such a grant would constitute ‘unaffordable economic populism’, Business Day, 20 
August 2002.  
279 Di Lollo argues that ‘Concern over “welfare dependency” has featured prominently in the public 
discourse around social assistance programmes in numerous countries for many years. The notion that 
social assistance payments tend to sap the recipient’s initiative, independence and propensity for securing 
paid employment is widespread and is often assumed to be an objective fact (rather than a concept) by 
public officials, social commentators and the media. Consequently, charges of “welfare dependency” have 
often been used as the basis for cutting social assistance expenditure, restricting eligibility or preventing 
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from PWP evaluations, with the policy discourse turning a blind eye to these catastrophic 
failures in policy analysis, rendering PWPs in many instances ‘black box’ interventions. 
This situation is exacerbated by the loose and inconsistent adoption of PWP terminology, 
with the single-term PWP representing, in the literature and policy discourse, a wide variety 
of programme types that are only loosely conceptually connected, with a diversity of 
objectives and widely divergent spheres of effectiveness. This lack of conceptual clarity 
contributes in turn to the repeated adoption of inappropriate forms of PWP in given 
contexts, with a mismatch between PWP form and function. The limited evidence base, 
together with basic labour market theory, can illustrate the inappropriateness of types A and 
C short-term PWPs in the context of many sub-Saharan African countries where the labour 
market crisis is chronic, and where programme design is unlikely to provide the desired 
social protection outcomes (current examples being Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa). 
12.5 Why Do the Findings Matter? 
These findings are significant as they illustrate that PWPs are repeatedly implemented with 
social protection objectives, yet without an adequate evidence base to attest to their ability to 
meet these objectives, a scenario which lead a senior South African government official to 
describe the national EPWP as ‘an accountability free zone’ (McCord, 2006a), an appellation 
which may well be appropriate to PWPs well beyond the South African sphere of operation.  
This matters as PWPs are regularly selected over alternative social protection instruments, 
and the argument presented in this thesis suggests that the result is the elevation of the cost 
of social protection provision for the working age poor. These costs are borne both by 
beneficiaries, due to the costs associated with accessing social protection through a PWP as a 
result of the work conditionality, and also the state, as PWPs entail a greater cost to the 
fiscus per unit transferred than alternatives such as cash transfers, while there is no empirical 
evidence that there is a commensurately greater benefit.  
In implementing a PWP, governments must allocate scarce administrative and financial 
resources to execute high cost social protection interventions, and while the administrative 
cost is borne at the expense of reduced administrative allocations to other government 
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significant opportunity costs in terms of alternative, potentially more pro-poor interventions, 
or through donor funds. Where donor funds take the form of loans, as in the case of 
Malawi’s MASAF PWP, passing the cost of programmes which creating assets of uncertain 
value for marginal current social protection gains, to future generations  provokes a serious 
ethical question. PWPs can also imply high opportunity costs for participants who, in pursuit 
of adequate income, are forced to compete for limited opportunities for labour in return for 
often uncertain wage rates, which are frequently below the statutory minimum wage, with 
unpredictable delays in remuneration, often in poor working conditions and carrying out 
hard physical labour (this represents a particularly high cost if one considers that many 
participants’ health may already be compromised by chronic poverty and malnutrition). The 
morality of making such demands on the poor, in return for what some argue is a state’s 
most basic responsibility to its citizens, the fulfilment of the right to basic social protection 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007:1), is questioned by the analysis set out in this thesis 
(see also Standing (2002 and 2008)). 
Hence, this thesis raises questions of empirical rigour, policy realism, and ultimately also 
morality. Instead of recognising the deficiencies in the PWP models selected in the region, 
policy makers have chosen to retain their ideologically driven preferences, retaining the 
language of graduation, exit strategies, self-targeting, and labour market solutions to poverty 
and social protection provision which together comprise an attractive rhetorical package, 
irrespective of the lack of robustness of these concepts and the failure of the empirical 
record to support these notions. This rhetoric also tends to pervade academic literature, 
irrespective of the reality of PWPs on the ground.  
This thesis is therefore an attempt to make the case for a reconsideration of the function of 
PWPs in the current social protection discourse, and to argue that the current PWP 
approach may not look so attractive from the beneficiary perspective. Only fleeting glimpses 
of their reality is revealed in the literature: the workers who have graduated from the short-
term PWP employment ‘treatment’ in South Africa and who argue that their only hope of 
future employment is the next government employment programme in their area (Ndoto 
and Macun, 2005); the women who frowned, perplexed at the question as to how they had 
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laughingly that ‘we have eaten our capital!’ (McCord, 2004a); women PWP workers enduring 
increased malnutrition as a result of hard physical labour in Bangladesh so that their families 
can benefit from the PWP wage (Helen Keller International, 2007); the workers unable to 
meet basic ILO labouring norms due to poor physical health and malnutrition in Ethiopia 
(Osei Bonsu, op cit); or the women forced to trade sexual favours in order to access PWP 
employment in South Africa (Preston, op cit). These glimpses, however, are enough to raise 
questions about the prevailing assumptions underlying ongoing PWP choice, and to provoke 
the search for more rigorous analysis of programme impact, programme design, and the 
reasons for the selection of PWPs over alternative social protection interventions, to ensure 
that future PWP implementation does not short-change the poor.  
This thesis is an attempt to address the lack of rigour in the current discourse, and to 
stimulate a more critical and robust analysis of this form of social protection. PWPs remain 
omnipresent in the social protection discourse, but in many instances they are extremely 
flawed and poorly designed programmes, whose form is inconsistent with their function and 
objectives. This thesis aims to open them up to critical scrutiny, and to improve future policy 
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Appendix 1: The Role of Political and Ideological Factors in PWP Implementation 
The conclusion of this thesis is that PWPs appear to be protected from the scrutiny and 
criticism to which other social protection instruments are subject, and to dominate 
alternative options for reasons which may not easily be linked to the empirical evidence 
available.  In this appendix the ideological aspects of this argument are developed, and it is 
suggested that the prevalence of PWP responses to social protection and labour market 
challenges may best be viewed In relation to a set of ideological preferences and assumptions 
rather than on the basis of an empirical evidence base.   This analysis was not included in the 
body of the thesis, as it represents a separate, and more reflective commentary, from the 
more empirically based analysis in the body of the document. 
The adoption of short term PWPs, offering a one-off social protection intervention, may 
function well in terms of consumption smoothing in the context of temporary labour market 
disruptions, but, as has been argued above, is unlikely to succeed in terms of meeting social 
protection objectives in the context of chronic poverty.  Such a response tends to offer only 
palliative inputs of limited significance, rather than facilitating the accumulation of resources 
(financial, material or human) required for participants to move out of chronic poverty.  If 
the objective of PWP is social protection in situations of chronic poverty, PWP, as 
frequently implemented, may not be the most appropriate policy choice, and may not offer 
the apparent ‘win-win’ outcome, widely anticipated by politicians and policy-makers. 
Notwithstanding these insights, out of a wide range of possible social  protection options, 
PWP are experiencing continued popularity and policy prominence, being widely 
implemented throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America, often with funding from 
international donor agencies, including the World Bank, DFID and the ILO, on the basis of 
the perception that they offer a ‘win-win’ social protection option, providing employment 
while also creating assets,  and offering a welfare transfer which is also a tangible economic 
investment.  As has been argued above, the efficacy of PWP in situations of chronic poverty 
is challenged by a range of critical commentators, including those within the Bank and the 
ILO.  Even so, such programmes continue to be implemented, and this chapter examines 
the assumptions underlying their continued implementation, and some of the challenges to 
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The a priori assumption that PWP have a positive impact on the accumulation of the 
resources required to move out of chronic poverty, which operates through three vectors; 
the wage transfer, improved labour market performance, and benefits accruing from the 
assets created, was questioned in the main body of the thesis.   This appendix focuses on the 
key factors which lead to the dominance of PWP over alternative interventions. 
Setting aside the question of the social protection impact of PWPs, it is proposed that such 
programmes remain attractive to donors and governments alike, for a number of reasons 
which are rooted in the contemporary preference for market rather than state oriented social 
protection approaches.  When considered in this respect, PWPs may be located in the 
current debate regarding social protection and ideology more broadly (see Surender, 2007).  
In principle, PWP offer the prospect of a market based solution to the problem of social 
protection delivery, with both the ‘market-based’ and the ‘solution’ concepts being critical in 
considering the popularity of short term PWPs (type A) in the context of chronic poverty, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.  When viewed in line with this perspective, short term 
PWP employment offers an employment based response to social protection, which is, to a 
greater or lesser degree, rooted in the functioning of the market (albeit contingent on 
significant state funding and management), and offers the illusion of providing a ‘treatment‘ 
which will provide a ‘solution’, with PWP employment being an event which leads to 
‘graduation’ and results in either enhanced employment or self-employment outcomes.  The 
inclusion of ‘exit strategies’ within the PWP discourse further reinforces this perception of 
type A PWPs as ‘treatments’, which result in the replacement of a concept of social 
protection provision which is fundamentally a flow concept, requiring ongoing support over 
time, and representing an ongoing demand on the fiscus, with a stock concept, whereby a 
single episode of PWP intervention is sufficient for the market to function correctly, and for 
further social protection inputs to be redundant.    As has been argued above, this analysis 
does not conform closely to reality or PWP performance in the context of chronic poverty 
and elevated unemployment, but it is the appeal to the concept of the market which is so 
beguiling in PWPs, and which informs policy debate and programme selection throughout 
Africa.   
The ‘market’ nature of PWPs may be analysed in terms of four main issues;  i) PWPs are 
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perceived ‘welfarism’ of direct transfers, ii) they involve the production of assets, thereby 
avoiding the perceived trade-off between productive investment, and expenditure on 
welfare, iii) in the popular political discourse they are perceived as creating ‘jobs’ rather than 
offering welfare, and iv) they are perceived as leading to self-targeting by the poor, by means 
of a low wage rate, rendering alternative state targeting mechanisms unnecessary. It is argued 
that it is for these reasons that PWPs are currently a popular social protection instrument in 
situations of chronic, as well as acute poverty, seeming to offer a ‘win-win’ policy option; 
providing employment, while also creating assets, offering a welfare transfer which is also a 
tangible economic investment.  This renders them an attractive option for policy makers and 
donors.   
However, it is suggested that the assumptions underlying the reasons for selecting PWP over 
alternative interventions may prove illusory, being based on false expectations.  In the light 
of this a fundamental question emerges; are PWP the win-win instrument policy makers 
often assume? Are they an appropriate policy instrument in the context of chronic poverty?  
This appendix explores these questions drawing on case studies from South Africa and 
Malawi.  In both countries PWP-based responses to poverty and unemployment play a 
central role in both national social protection policy, and equally, if not more importantly, 
the popular political discourse. 
Ideological concerns: the Work Ethic, Dependency and Welfarism 
One reason for the popularity of PWPs is their consistency with the dominant development 
ideology in relation to the work ethic, dependency and welfarism.  The PWP work 
requirement is consistent with an assumption that the work ethic may be absent among 
those in poverty, and a belief in the intrinsic benefit of having the poor work in return for 
social protection to prevent ‘laziness’ or a diminution of the work ethic arising as a result of 
unconditional social assistance, a sentiment which is widely cited during social protection 
policy dialogues.  This assertion is problematic in the context of the extremely low value 
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are unlikely to rely exclusively on social assistance income for their livelihoods,280 to the 
detriment of other income or subsistence generating activities.   
Likewise PWP are consistent with the dominant development ideology which eschews the 
perceived ‘dependency’ effect of direct transfers. Within this discourse it has been asserted 
that public works represent a significantly different intervention from direct transfers in 
terms of their dependency effect.  Both the concept of dependency itself, and the differential 
dependency impact of public works compared to other interventions has been challenged.281   
However, if the terminology of ‘dependency’ is accepted, it is not clear that any significant 
distinction can be drawn between PWP and other forms of social assistance rendering one 
less ‘dependency-inducing’ than the other – in situations of mass unemployment/ 
underemployment and chronic poverty, PWP employees come to depend on PWP 
employment, representing a form of ‘dependence’ arising from absolute reliance on the state 
to provide employment, which is as strong as the dependence on the state for direct grant 
transfers.  Where the programmes may differ significantly is in terms of the dignity often 
conferred on PWP participants by virtue of employment, and also, in some instances, the 
possibility of acquiring skills which may lead to improved employment opportunities, neither 
of which are liable to accrue to those simply receiving transfers.282  It is interesting to note 
that while some PWP confer related psychosocial benefits, namely the ‘self respect and 
independence’ ascribed to employment by Sen (1993) (see for example the psychosocial 
benefits reported in chapter eight), PWP are not necessarily empowering, and that the ILO 
                                                            
280 It is interesting to note that the concept of ‘benefit scroungers’ implied by this concern has spread along 
with the ideology of dependency from developed to developing economies, despite the fact that the value of 
many PWP transfers still leave participating households well below the poverty line, rendering the concept 
of such a transfer engendering laziness if not accompanied by a work requirement somewhat puzzling.  For 
example gross public works wage in South Africa vary between R350 and R600 per month (approximately 
₤30-₤55), leaving over 90% of participating households below the poverty line (McCord 2004a) and in 
Malawi the World Bank and DFID funded Social Action Fund public works programme offers 
remuneration of MK792 per month (approximately ₤4), again leaving participating households well below 
the poverty line (McCord 2004b). 
281 See Meth (2004c) for an overview of this debate, with particular reference to PWP. 
282 It should be noted however that impact of skills acquisition through PWP may be limited by both the 
short duration of employment, and hence the short period available for skills transfer, and also by 
constrained demand for semi-skilled workers in the construction sector, particularly in situations of slow 
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argues that contrary to the popular belief, the norm is for PWP employment to be 
stigmatizing (ILO, 2004: 372). 
Hence the work requirement is considered positive from an ideological perspective in terms 
of promoting the work ethic, and reducing ‘dependency’.  However, as discussed above, the 
work requirement can also have negative impacts in terms of the opportunity cost it implies.  
For households without access to sufficient resources for current consumption, the 
requirement may lead to the choice to divert labour into PWP in order to gain immediate 
cash income, and away from own production, often agricultural activities, with potentially 
negative medium to long term livelihoods consequences, which would not arise in the case 
of a simple transfer.  This is particularly problematic in situations where participants are 
engaged in small scale agriculture, and programme implementation coincides with periods of 
high agricultural activity.  Equally, the work requirement may lead to the foregoing of 
alternative income generating or subsistence activities, see for example Datt and Ravallion 
1994b, or McCord 2004a.  This consideration is recognized by the World Bank; 
‘Since poor people can rarely afford to be totally idle, they often give up some form 
of income to join a workfare scheme’ (World Bank, 2001:156) 
Hence, it is not clear that the work requirement has the function of either preventing 
‘dependency’ or supporting the ‘work ethic’, nor is the introduction of an opportunity cost a 
uniquely positive innovation, particularly in labour constrained poor households engaged in 
small scale domestic production.  However, the language of PWP is consistent with an 
ideology which is preoccupied with such concerns, even where they may be fallaciously 
constructed, and in the light of this public works programmes may be perceived as a more 
ideologically acceptable form of social assistance within the dominant discourse than cash 
transfers (Meth 2004c), despite the potentially negative impact of the work requirement. 
Job Creation 
PWP are popular with politicians as they offer the opportunity for a government to claim to 
be ‘creating jobs’ in a far more immediate, direct and observable way than through the 
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employment.  This renders PWPs attractive in terms of political visibility, and it is no 
coincidence that Subbarao et al (1997) and McCord (2007b) note the frequency of the 
initiation of public works programmes in the run up to elections, in order to win popular 
political support, recent examples being AGETIP in Senegal (Wade,  2004), the EPWP in 
South Africa and the NREGP in India, all of which were initiated at a time of political 
instability when governments needed to shore up their support base in the group prioritised 
for PWP employment (McCord, 2007b).283  Since they are presented as offering ‘jobs not 
grants’, PWPs reinforce the impression of selecting a policy option which will avoiding 
dependence on social assistance.  However, as has been argued above, the reality of PWP 
employment frequently belies this anticipated outcome, with the majority of PWP 
employment in Africa being short term and temporary in nature (Subbarao et al, 1997), 
conforming to type A PWPs.  In South Africa and Malawi, government PWPs tend to offer 
employment for between two and four months, and while such programmes may be 
presented as ‘employment creation’ programmes, in reality they provide only short term 
employment episodes,284 such as would be appropriate in the context of acute crises, rather 
than an appropriate response to a situation of chronic poverty.  The nature of most PWP 
‘employment’ is particularly problematic when considered in relation to the ILO concept of 
‘decent work’, with which it is in serious conflict, further challenging the frequently implicit 
assumption that PWPs, particularly type A, are ‘creating work’ (for a more detailed 
discussion see McCord, 2007c).  As argued in the thesis, offering a temporary consumption 
smoothing intervention is not synonymous with ‘creating employment’, and in the context of 
chronic mass unemployment and poverty represents a serious mismatch between problem 
and policy response. 
                                                            
283 An example of this is the fact that one of the criteria used to evaluate the success of AGETIP in Senegal 
is ‘visibility per unit of spending’ (Wade, 2004). 
284 It is interesting to note that in South Africa the government has adopted new terminology in response to 
the criticism that the national Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) implemented in 
South Africa during the 1990s, and the current EPWP do not create actual jobs or ongoing employment.  
The current discourse now uses the phrase ‘employment opportunities’, in order to give the impression of 
job creation in policy discussions, while at the same time technically avoiding the claim that the 
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While participants work in return for payment, thereby qualifying technically as employees, 
the value of the work they are carrying out is in many instances open to question, with the 
quality and economic or developmental relevance of the asset being created frequently 
omitted from project monitoring and evaluation criteria.285  A consequence is that much 
work carried out under the aegis of PWP may in fact be ‘make-work’ rather than genuinely 
contributing to the livelihoods either of those employed on the programme, or the wider 
community (see for example Subbarao et al, 1997), illustrating the somewhat illusory and 
imperfect nature of the ‘market’ aspect of PWP implementation. 
If the scale of employment in PWP were sufficiently large relative to the scale of 
unemployment, and the duration of employment sufficiently extended286 then it would be 
appropriate to speak of ‘employment creation’ and attendant social protection benefits, 
however, the effectiveness of small scale temporary PWP in the context of chronic poverty 
and mass under or unemployment remains open to question, as argued above.  Hence while 
governments can claim to be ‘creating employment’, the short term nature of the 
employment created under many PWP, and the limited likelihood of such employment in 
terms of social protection (either directly or indirectly) undermine the assumed positive 
social protection outcomes in the context of chronic poverty.   
Asset Creation 
The creation of assets is generally included as a key rationale for the selection of PWP 
interventions over alternative social assistance measures, as PWPs avoid the perceived trade-
off between ‘productive’ investment in infrastructure, and ‘consumption’ expenditure on 
                                                            
285 In neither the South African government funded CBPWP or EPWP, nor the Malawi Social Action Fund 
PWP, funded by the World Bank and DFID, were the quality or economic value of the assets created 
included in the programme monitored or evaluated. 
286 Subbarao et al argue that in the context of chronic poverty, public works employment must be offered 
year-round (Subbarao et al,1997:84), as do Datt and Ravallion who state that failure to obtain this work 
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welfare.  In this way PWP offer the potential to kill two birds with one stone, combining 
social assistance and asset creation, as Smith observes with reference to Malawi;  
‘as far as possible safety nets in Malawi need to be productivity-enhancing (for 
example in the form of public works […]), rather than pure transfers – […] to 
maximize long-tem income growth among the poor’ (Smith, 2001:13). 
This is also the basis of the ILO’s promotion of PWPs, as a means to promote the 
infrastructural investment necessary for growth, as well as providing ‘employment’.  
However, the beneficial economic and developmental value of the assets created through 
PWP is frequently assumed rather than empirically established, as discussed in chapter six.  
In some instances such as the flood and drought-related assets created in Bangladesh and 
India which have a direct impact on mitigating future risk and promoting land productivity, 
the economic benefit of the infrastructure created is readily apparent, in terms of a reduction 
in flooding and improved water harvesting.  Where the assets created are intended to 
promote economic growth rather than mitigate known environmental threats, the value of 
those assets is less apparent, and there is little empirical evidence.  Under these conditions 
evaluation is critical, yet frequently not carried out.  An example of the conflation of 
expenditure on asset construction with poverty alleviation which underlies this problem is to 
be found in the South African Ten Year Review, which justifies the claim of poverty alleviation 
by stating the amount spent and the number of assets constructed under PWP, rather than 
offering any analysis of the impact of these assets on poverty; 
‘these [public works] programmes have been successful in alleviating the asset 
poverty of communities.  Over R6.5 billion of expenditure on infrastructure has 
provided 2 182 community assets.  (South Africa, Policy Co-ordination and Advisory 
Services (PCAS), 2003:19). 
In South Africa and Malawi, there is little evidence of a positive economic or livelihoods 
impact arising as the result of infrastructure created through PWPs, (or for that matter 
evidence to the contrary), since data is not gathered on this aspect of public works 
programmes, despite this being an intrinsic component of programme objectives.  The 
objective of one DFID-funded PWP in Malawi was ‘to contribute to a sustained 
improvement in the livelihoods of the poor and to longer-term economic growth in Malawi’ 
(UK DFID, 2004b) and the World Bank and DFID funded PWP component of the Malawi 
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Malawi, 2003).  Since both programmes offered only short term employment, the wage 
transfer is unlikely to function as a safety net or instrument for sustained livelihoods 
improvement, and hence the potential of the programmes to achieve their anticipated 
outcomes is dependent on the ability of the assets created to deliver significant benefits to 
participants, which has not been evaluated.  The frequent failure to evaluate the benefit of 
assets created is partly due to methodological constraints relating to assessing the impact of 
infrastructural assets, a fact acknowledged in the 2004 World Development Report (Chapter 
eleven),287 and partly relates to the fact that programme evaluation tends to be limited to the 
period of programme execution, ie funding disbursement, rather than extended to 
incorporate medium term post programme asset performance, in terms of quality, durability 
and sustainability or utilisation (chapter six).  However, it is also informed by an implicit and 
frequently unsubstantiated assumption within the PWP discourse that the creation of assets 
such as roads or community structures, is, de facto, of economic or livelihoods benefit, either 
to participants, or the broader community.  
In some instances the construction of a road may have positive direct and indirect effects for 
a community, but this cannot be assumed a priori, and it is critical that this assumption is 
evaluated.  A recent study in South Africa highlighted the potential for discrepancies 
between the aspirational objectives and actual outcomes in a rural road construction 
programme, attributing this to the inability of asset creation alone to promote livelihoods in 
the absence of coordinated rural development initiatives (Mashiri and Mahapa, 2002).  This 
challenges the assumption underlying the creation of assets through PWPs, and places PWP 
asset performance within its institutional setting, which is noticeably absent from the PWP 
debate.  Subbarao and Smith noted a similar problem with PWP in Ethiopia, observing that; 
‘Workfare programs are not integrated with activities at various levels of government 
[…] because there has been no integration of aid-funded projects with the broader 
developmental activity […] the program suffered from […] low productivity (did not 
lead to assets of the type found in India’s Maharashtra employment Guarantee 
Scheme).  The program is driven by the consideration of labor use […] rather than 
the creation of assets consistent with regional (community) needs and priorities […].  
                                                            
287 Despite their positive conclusions regarding the impact of rural road construction in China even Gannon 
and Liu concede “knowledge of the transport conditions of the poor, and especially how these interact with 










The Anatomy of Public Works  Appendices 
  333
As a result [the] aim to use food aid as a “dual purpose instrument of relief and 
development’’ did not materialize’.  (Subbarao and Smith, 2003:21-22). 
In many instances assets created under PWP may be white elephants, unstrategically selected 
and uncoordinated with broader development initiatives.  Also, serious questions arise in 
terms of which segments of the population benefit from the creation of various assets and 
over what time horizon. There is a tension between the creation of assets which may 
promote national growth, but not have a significant impact on the livelihoods of the poor in 
the short to medium term, such as road infrastructure on the one hand, and those which 
may promote development and sustainable livelihoods for the poor in the short term, such 
as improved irrigation, but may not contribute significantly to national growth.  These are 
some of the key questions which frequently remain both unasked and unanswered in the 
PWP discourse. 
The work requirement of PWPs does have the potential to make a significant contribution to 
development, at either local or national levels, and in some instances both.  However, in 
many cases the contribution of public works assets to development passes unmonitored, 
despite the critical importance of the asset creation function of public works programmes in 
the decision whether to adopt public works programmes or alternative social assistance 
instruments.  This situation is frequently further exacerbated by lack of planning or budget 
allocations for asset maintenance, which further undermines the potential benefit of the asset 
component of public works.   
This question is particularly interesting if policy makers anticipate that long term benefits will 
accrue from assets created through PWP interventions.  The transfer benefits of PWP 
participation will be limited to the duration of the programme, and are unlikely to confer 
long term benefits themselves, hence the ability of a PWP to deliver a sustained reduction in 
poverty is contingent on whether the assets created confer long-term benefits on the poor.  
This is of critical importance given the high non wage component in PWP budgets, with 
wages typically comprising between 30 and 60% of the total programme cost (Subbarao et al 
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of unit transferred through public works significantly higher than alternative measures,288 an 
insight accepted by the World Bank, who concede that;  
‘Workfare programs are not necessarily an inexpensive way of delivering benefits to 
poor people’ (World Bank, 2001:155). 
Unless the assets are of economic value in terms of promoting either livelihood or growth 
improvements (direct or indirect), then any PWP premium is hard to justify.  The paucity of 
interest in monitoring and evaluating this aspect of PWP is problematic.  Evaluation of the 
economic value of the assets created has not been part of either the World Bank and DFID 
supported Social Action Fund PWP in Malawi, or the South African government’s EPWP or 
its predecessor, the CBPWP, both of which are based on the assumption that PWP 
produced assets will promote local and national growth through the provision of public 
services (see Government of Malawi, 2003, and Phillips, 2004 respectively).  This is evidence 
of a lack of donor and implementer interest in ascertaining the economic value of PWP 
created assets over time. 
Self Targeting  
The fourth assumed benefit of PWP is that they are perceived to offer benefits in terms of 
their simplicity of targeting, using self-targeting through a low wage rate to reach the poor, 
rather than targeting criteria which are complex and costly to administer.  This self-targeting 
aspect of PWP is based on the premise that the work requirement and low wages, 
conventionally set at or below the prevailing wage, lead to an outcome in which the poor self 
select themselves into the programme, leading the World Bank to assert confidently that; 
‘They [public works programmes] can easily be self-targeting by paying wages below 
market rates.’  (World Bank, 2001:155). 
This assumption is prevalent in the PWP literature, see for example Subbarao et al;  
‘The best way to ensure that the program reaches the poor is to maintain the 
program wage at a level no higher than the ruling markets wage for unskilled labor’ 
(Subbarao et al, 1997:77). 
and  
                                                            
288 Smith calculated a per unit cost of 13.9 to transfer a unit to the poorest in Malawi through public works, 
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‘maintaining a low program wage ensures that participation rates are low, attracting 
only the poorest to work sites’ (ibid:78).   
The argument continues that if the wage is increased, inclusion errors of non-poor also 
increase, citing evidence from Kenya (Teklu, 1994).  In this way it is assumed that the poor 
will select themselves into programmes, while the less poor will find them unattractive and 
not seek to participate.289  This then obviates the need for the administration of more 
complex forms of poverty targeting, based on various forms of means testing.  This principle 
is fully discussed in Subbarao et al, 1997.  This assumption is supported in part by evidence 
from the MEG, whose remuneration was set at the minimum wage.  Ravallion et al have 
illustrated how leakage to the non-poor increased significantly after the minimum wage was 
increased above the ‘prevailing wage’ in the 1980s (Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri, 1991).  
This supposed ease of targeting is therefore a major factor in the selection of PWP as a 
social protection instrument, particularly when the programme is to be implemented by the 
private sector.  The implementation of explicit targeting criteria is costly in terms of both 
budget, and skills and is problematic if the programme is to be implemented by the private 
sector (the social development skills required to ensure effective targeting within a 
community may be scarce if the programme is to be implemented by construction sector 
contractors), rendering the ‘self targeting’ nature of PWPs a great benefit.  It is assumed that 
spontaneous poverty-related self-targeting will take place through the market, on the basis of 
the wage rate. 
A wide range of literature suggests a degree of leakage to the non poor in PWPs which 
challenges this assumption.  Analysis examining incidence is rare in PWPs offering short 
term employment (Type A), as typically data is not gathered on the socio-economic 
characteristics of participants in these programmes, rendering incidence analysis 
problematic290.  However, where incidence analysis has been possible, largely in the context 
                                                            
289 The terms ‘poor’ and ‘less poor’ will not be further defined in this paper.  The purpose of this paper is to 
explore participation in PWP using a relational concept of poverty, the poor and less poor, given the 
majority of the population in many developing countries may be defined as poor, and hence it may be most 
useful to differentiate within the category of the poor rather than seek to define those who fall within or 
outside this category. 
290 For example, neither the EPWP in South Africa nor the MASAF PWP in Malawi gathered data on the 
socio-economic characteristics of participants, despite the anticipated social protection function of these 
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of Indian PWPs, evaluations repeatedly indicate participation by those who may not be 
classed as among the poorest, (those for whom the intervention was intended), not only in 
terms of inclusion in the payment roster, but also in terms of physical participation.  In 
theory self-targeting should preclude this, providing the wage is sufficiently low, but Barrett 
and Clay (2003) argue that even with wage levels at or below the prevailing wage, the 
marginal value of labour varies considerably within and between households, contingent on 
the amount of labour available in the household and access to productive assets such as land.  
This variation in the marginal value of labour renders PWP employment attractive to surplus 
labour in less poor households in some cases, as a form of supplementary income, yet 
unattractive to poorer households with limited access to labour.291  When the imperfection 
of labour markets is taken into consideration, Barrett and Clay argue that economic theory 
confirms the empirical finding, that self-targeting through a low wage may not be adequate 
to achieve incidence in line with that intended.  They argue moreover that a wage set at an 
extremely low level may be contrary to the social protection objectives which form the 
fundamental rationale for programme implementation.  This analysis is particularly relevant 
where labour markets are highly segmented and the prevailing market wage in the lowest 
segment is extremely low, as in the ganyu (informal contract labour) system in Malawi, where 
the daily ganyu wage is approximately MK33/day (US$0.16) (Chirwa et al, 2004a).  
Replicating this wage level in a PWP is unlikely to have any significant impact on poverty 
(McCord, 2004b), and creates a serious tension with a programme nominally intended to 
provide social assistance.   
In this context Subbarao’s assertion that a wage rate no higher than the prevailing market 
wage is an ideal PWP design feature (Subbarao, 2003:14), is problematic as is his response to 
the hypothetical question ‘how low should the program wage be?’.  Subbarao argues that the 
wage ‘should not be set not be set at such a low level that it stigmatizes the work, thus 
leading the ‘poor but proud’ to go hungry’ (ibid:10), irrespective of the fact that the social 
protection impact of PWP is a function of the value of the wage, or that a low wage may 
                                                            
291 This theoretical analysis confirms empirical programme evaluation findings, such as the review of the 
DFID funded Sustainable Livelihoods Through Inputs for Assets (SPLIFA) public works programme in 
Malawi, which found non-poor participants from labour rich households self selecting into the programme 
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serve as a barrier to participation by the labour constrained poor.292  Barrett and Clay present 
a fundamental challenge to this accepted, but problematic argument, and conclude that 
higher wages, together with alternative targeting mechanisms would be the appropriate 
response if social protection outcomes are the goal, since low wages in PWP are not 
sufficient to ensure adequate poverty targeting, and low level transfers may be inconsistent 
with programme objectives.  This represents a significant challenge to the fourth assumption 
informing the selection of PWP over alternative interventions.   
In situations of chronic poverty and mass unemployment/underemployment where the scale 
of PWP employment offered is trivial in relation to the scale of the unemployment and 
poverty problem, it is likely that competition for PWP employment will further erode any 
putative poverty based self-targeting, in the absence of explicit poverty targeting activities.  
In South Africa for example, where the national PWP aims to offer 200,000 employment 
opportunities per annum in the context of unemployment of more than 4 million, such 
targeting problems are likely to occur. 
Overview of Assumptions Informing Policy Choice 
It is not evident that PWP constitute a social protection instrument which can 
simultaneously i) create work and avoid dependency, ii) create assets which will promote 
livelihoods and or growth, and iii) through self targeting spontaneously deliver resources to 
the poor, in the context of chronic poverty.  This insight offers a serious challenge to the 
assumptions and prejudices which continue to inform policy choice, in the absence of 
adequate supporting evidence. 
Conclusion  
On the basis of cross country experience Subbarao et al are confident to assert that;  
 ‘public works are essentially a temporary safety net and should never be used as a 
permanent escape route from poverty’ (Subbarao et al, 1997:168). 
                                                            
292 Subbarao recognises that ‘a low wage rate will also result in low transfer earnings to each (poor) 
participant’, (Subbarao 2003:4), but does not explore the consequences of this statement in terms of the 
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The ILO is also forthright in its criticism of the reality, as opposed to the ‘presentation 
package’ offered by PWP, confirming the critique set out in this appendix; 
‘In sum, public works have long appealed to those concerned with poverty and 
unemployment.  They are frequently used in developing countries, and are often 
presented as the means of creating public infrastructure, generating jobs and 
‘targeting’ the poor.  Unfortunately there are reasons for skepticism about the wilder 
positive claims made for public works.  One is that that they use up a lot of scarce 
resources, and result in low productivity work being done.  Another is that they are 
not very good at ‘targeting’.  The poorest and most insecure are likely to be at the 
end of the queue for these casual jobs. [...] And perhaps above all, they have to be 
massive schemes if they are to have much effect on the incidence of poverty and 
economic insecurity.’ (ILO, 2004:372). 
Yet at the same time short term (Types A and C) PWP continue to be implemented with 
social protection and long term developmental objectives, with donor funding and support, 
highlighting a programme choice ambiguity.  The limitations of such interventions are 
documented, yet donors are still willing to endorse them in preference to the alternatives.  It 
is not possible to explain this policy dominance in situations of chronic poverty in terms of 
either empirical evidence or theory.  It is only possible to explain it in terms of the 
ideological attractiveness of PWP, which includes their apparent ease of self targeting, and 
the fact that they involve the creation of assets.  Ideological interests appear in some 
contexts to dominate theoretical and empirical programme choice arguments, and may 
represent a victory of political over ‘technical’ considerations in the sphere of social 
protection.293    
As argued above, the assumptions underlying the choice of PWP are problematic, and it is 
clear that programmes offering short term PWP employment are unlikely to deliver the goals 
of social protection and development frequently ascribed to them in both the national and 
international policy discourse.  Notwithstanding these criticisms, such programmes continue 
to be popular with governments and donors alike.  This enthusiasm is not necessarily shared 
by participants who recognize the limited social protection impact of such programmes; only 
one third of participants in a DFID and ILO supported programme in South Africa 
considered that the programme would have any sustained impact on their livelihood, 
                                                            
293 For a discussion of the inherent tension between political and ‘technical’ considerations in the South 
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(McCord, 2004a). However the issues of lack of voice among participants, and imperfect 
feedback loops, discussed in the 2004 World Development Report, (World Bank, 2004), 
apply egregiously in the case of many PWP, such that the failure of PWPs to function as 
anticipated in the ideologically driven policy discourse does not serve as a mechanism to 
challenge ongoing programme design norms. 
As this appendix has argued, PWP appear to dominate alternative options as the result of a 
number of ideological preferences and assumptions.  The problem is that while short term 
type A and C PWPs, providing a one-off social assistance intervention, may function well in 
terms of consumption smoothing in the context of one-off labour market problems of 
varying degrees of severity, they are unlikely to succeed in achieving social protection 
objectives in the context of chronic poverty.  Such a response tends to offer only palliative 
inputs of limited significance, rather than facilitating the accumulation of productive assets 
required for participants to move out of chronic poverty.  If a fundamental programme 
objective is social protection in situations of chronic poverty, type A and C PWPs, as 
frequently implemented particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, may not be the most appropriate 
policy choice, and may not offer the apparent ‘win-win’ outcome, widely anticipated by 
politicians and policy-makers, on the basis of their market oriented analysis of both the 
problem and the appropriate policy response.  Type A PWPs are designed within a particular 
ideological paradigm, which reflects the assumption that market interventions will enable the 
labour market to work more smoothly to resolve significant social protection problems, and 
is at same time responsive to related ideological concerns regarding dependency and 
welfarism.  However, the assumptions underlying this position are not borne out by closer 
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Appendix 3: PWP Participant Maximum Education Attainment (%) 
 Gundo Lashu
Percentage of participants 
Zibambele 
Percentage of participants 
No education 6.2 (n=21) 31.1 (n=128) 
Grades 1-4 5.1 (n=17) 27.9 (n=115) 
Grade 5-7 19.9 (n=67) 22.6 (n=93) 
Grade 8-10 35.6 (n=120) 15.3 (n=63) 
Grade 11-12/Diploma without 
matric 
31.8 (n=107) 3.2 (n=13) 
Higher than 12 NTC 
I/Diploma with matric 
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Appendix 4: Modal PWP Participant Education Levels by Gender and Age 
Age Gundo Lashu Zibambele Gundo Lashu Zibambele 
 Male Male Female Female 
 Grade Grade Grade Grade 
Under 20 8 - - - 
20-29 12 - 12 8 
30-39 11 7 12 0 
40–49 8 0 8 0 
50-59 1 and 2 0 0 0 
60-69 - - 0 0 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003. 
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Appendix 5: Literacy Among PWP Participants by Gender and Age (%) 
Age Gundo Lashu Zibambele Gundo Lashu Zibambele 
 Male (n=164) Male (n=29) Female (n=173) Female (n=389)
Under 20 100 (n=8) 100 (n=1) 100 (n=1) - (n=0) 
20-29 100 (n=70) 100 (n=4) 100 (n=47) 91 (n=22) 
30-39 96 (n=45) 67 (n=4) 98 (n=63) 85 (n=71) 
40–49 83 (n=25) 56 (n=5) 83 (n=34) 66 (n=97) 
50-59 63 (n=5) 14 (n=10) 56 (n=10) 47 (n=55) 
60-69 100 (n=1) 0 (n=0) 0 (n=0) 42 (n=8) 
Source: Own calculations using PWP Survey 2003. 
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Appendix 6: PWP Household Asset Ownership 
Asset Gundo Lashu Zibambele
 % households reporting ownership
Vehicle 9 1
Motorcycle 2 0 
Tractor 2 0
Plough 16 2 
Television 40  14 
Radio 80  57  
Bed 83 77
Watch/clock 74 60 
Books 73 66 
Sewing machine 21 7 
Sofa 41 22 
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Appendix 7: Chi-squared Test Results of Significance of Differing Household Asset 
Ownership between Gundo Lashu and Zibambele Households 
 
Asset Chi-Squared Test Results at 0.05 
Significance Level 
Vehicle 
χ=27.0052   p=0.000 
Motorcycle 
χ=7.9293   p=0.005 
Tractor 
χ=6.5397   p=0.011 
Plough 
χ=39.9434   p=0.000 
Television 
χ=58.6831   p=0.000 
Radio 
χ=38.9514   p=0.000 
Bed* 
χ=2.9038   p=0.088 
Watch/clock 
χ=14.8851   p=0.000 
Books* 
χ=3.7289   p=0.053 
Sewing machine 
χ=28.6235   p=0.000 
Sofa 
χ=29.0610   p=0.000 
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Appendix 8: Whole Population Dependency Ratios under Different Assumptions 
Groups included Limpopo KwaZulu-Natal
No exclusions 0.88 0.64 
Exclude households not living in housing units 0.89 0.65 
Exclude non Black African households 0.89 0.69 
Exclude urban households 0.93 0.82 
Exclude households in Sekhukhune District in Limpopo 0.84 0.64 
Excluding all subgroups 0.95 0.85 
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Appendix 9: Comparison of Characteristics of Matched Sample with and without 
Household Weights – Capricorn  





Mean age of head of household (years) 54.21 56.30 56.24 
Mean household size (persons) 6.99 7.06 7.02 
Dependency ratio294 0.67 0.72 0.72 
Traditional dwellings 12.61% 11.34% 11.22% 
Owning a TV 36.97% 40.76% 40.72% 
Owning a radio 79.83% 86.13% 85.71% 
Female-headed household 40.76% 42.86% 43.20% 
Household heads with no schooling 33.61% 35.71% 35.79% 
Household heads with some primary 
schooling 
24.37% 26.89% 26.75% 
Household heads with complete 
primary schooling 
7.98% 5.04% 5.02% 
Household heads with some secondary 
schooling 
29.83% 28.15% 28.22% 
Household heads with grade 12 / 
standard 10 
3.78% 3.78% 3.77% 
Household heads with higher education 0.42% 0.42% 0.44% 
Source:  McCord and Wilkinson (2009) 
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Appendix 10: Comparison of Characteristics of Matched Sample with and without 






Mean age of head of household (years) 48.53 48.69 48.59 
Mean household size (persons) 7.11 7.24 7.13 
Dependency ratio295 0.84 0.95 0.93 
Traditional dwellings 87.50% 87.50% 87.35% 
Owning a TV 14.25% 13.50% 13.29% 
Owning a radio 56.75% 57.25% 57.08% 
Female-headed household 70.25% 74.00% 73.38% 
Household heads with no schooling 35.75% 35.25% 34.72% 
Household heads with some primary 
schooling 
39.75% 43.75% 44.44% 
Household heads with complete 
primary schooling 
8.00% 5.25% 5.35% 
Household heads with some secondary 
schooling 
15.50% 13.75% 13.57% 
Household heads with grade 12 / 
standard 10 
1.00% 2.00% 1.92% 
Household heads with higher education 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Source:  McCord and Wilkinson (2009) 
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Appendix 11: Recipients of Community Contributions from PWP Households 
















6 (n=7) 5 (n=8) 3 (n=14) 
 
Relatives not in 
household 
 




12 (n=14) 11 (n=16) 22 (n=88) 
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Appendix 12: Impact of PWP Income on Nutrition: Frequency of adults not eating 
for a day 
% of households reporting this behaviour Before After 
 
Current Gundo Lashu 
(n=114) 
Most of the time 11 (n=12) 8 (n=9) 
Never 57 (n=66) 79 (n=90) 
Former Gundo Lashu 
(n=148) 
Most of the time 15 (n=22) 9 (n=14) 
Never 70 (n=103) 76 (n=113) 
Zibambele  
(n=413) 
Most of the time 40 (n=164) 0.24 (n=1) 
Never 15 (n=61) 85 (n=353) 
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Appendix 13: Impact of PWP Income on Nutrition: Frequency of reducing size of 
children’s meals  
% of households reporting this behaviour Before After 
 
Current Gundo Lashu 
(n=111) 
Most of the time 11 (n=12) 6 (n=7) 
Never 64 (n=71) 80 (n=89) 
Former Gundo Lashu 
(n=149) 
Most of the time 16 (n=24) 9 (n=13) 
Never 70 (n=104) 79 (n=117) 
Zibambele 
(n=411) 
Most of the time 52 (n=214) 1 (n=3) 
Never 13 (n=52) 80 (n=328) 
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